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Making Sense of the Politics of Caveats

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Coping with Caveats in Coalition Warfare

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Abstract

Why do states make substantial military contributions to coalition operations, while at the same time apply national reservations, caveats, to how the coalition can use the military contributions? Caveats signal reluctant participation and are a continuous challenge to the effective use of coalition forces. The application on national reservations on the use of force in the context of UN, NATO, and coalition-of-the-willing operations after the Cold War have stimulated research on the politics of caveats. However, much remains to do. The present study adds to the political study of caveats by reasoning the conceptual, analytical, theoretical, and methodological tenets of an empirical research program founded on the process-tracing and multi-level approach of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). An empirical research program engages in the formulation of substantive research problems, grounded in analytical frameworks of interpretation and explanation, and gives direction on methods to gather data and analyze empirical relationships.

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  1. Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

    Gunnar Fermann

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Fermann, G. (2019). Making Sense of the Politics of Caveats. In: Coping with Caveats in Coalition Warfare. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92519-6_1

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