Abstract
This introductory essay offers some thoughts on the meanings and politics of encounter both in a broader sense and with regard to the (inter)specifics of animal encounter. Drawing on the work of feminist and postcolonial theorist Sara Ahmed and others, it grapples with the ambivalent role of encounters as potentially transformative events or time-spaces that nonetheless remain bound to the largely anthropocentric systems of human-animal relations in and from which they emerge. In the second part, the chapter then reflects on the possibility and contours of a distinctly postanthropocentric ethos of encounter that might inform our own, mundane encounters and interactions with nonhuman creatures. In conversation with works from the fields of animal studies, posthumanism, ecofeminism, and philosophical ethology, it identifies three possible guiding principles of an ethos of encounter that are centered on the key aspects of body, world, and knowledge: embodied relationality, convivial worldhood, and creaturely knowledge.
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Notes
- 1.
“Encounter,” Merriam-Webster.Com (Merriam-Webster), accessed July 31, 2017, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/encounter.
- 2.
Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 139, original emphasis.
- 3.
Drawing on Foucault, in his introduction to Animal Encounters Tom Tyler suggests a useful distinction between “antagonistic” and “agonistic” forms of encounter. While the former consists in an adversarial standoff that does not leave much space for reciprocity and transformation, the latter provokes more diverse and productive forms of “struggle” and reciprocal engagement. Tom Tyler, “Introduction: The Case of the Camel,” in Animal Encounters, ed. Tom Tyler and Manuela Rossini (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 1–9, here 1–2.
- 4.
The concept of the anthropological machine is developed in Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004). For critical discussions of this concept, see, for example, Matthew Calarco, Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Kelly Oliver, Animal Lessons: How They Teach Us to Be Human (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
- 5.
For Calarco, thinking in terms of indistinction “offers us a glimpse of how thought and practice might proceed if we affirm the task of thinking through animals without the guidance of the anthropological difference.” Matthew Calarco, Thinking Through Animals: Identity, Difference, Indistinction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 47.
- 6.
Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet, trans. David Wills (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 5. The term “anthropological différance” is also used (in a different sense) by Tom Ryan in his essay “Anthropological Différance: From Derrida to Levi-Strauss,” in Derrida Downunder, ed. Laurence Simmons and Heather Worth (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 2001), 181–197, which discusses the possibility of a “deconstructive anthropology.”
- 7.
I take the term “situated anthropocenes” from Cleo Woelfle-Erskine and July Cole, “Transfiguring the Anthropocene: Stochastic Reimaginings of Human-Beaver Worlds,” TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly 2, no. 2 (2015): 297–316, here 300.
- 8.
Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 50. For a similar argument regarding the idea of earth as our “uncanny home,” see Kelly Oliver, “Earth Ethics and Creaturely Cohabitation,” in Beyond the Human-Animal Divide: Creaturely Lives in Literature and Culture, ed. Dominik Ohrem and Roman Bartosch (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 21–41.
- 9.
Morton, The Ecological Thought, 41.
- 10.
Morton, 17.
- 11.
Morton, 17.
- 12.
Morton, 42.
- 13.
Morton, 19.
- 14.
Val Plumwood, Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason (London: Routledge, 2002), 141, 168.
- 15.
Plumwood, 36, 175. Plumwood already uses the term “earth others” in her earlier Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London: Routledge, 1993).
- 16.
Plumwood, Environmental Culture, 190.
- 17.
Plumwood, 192.
- 18.
Sara Ahmed, Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality (London: Routledge, 2000), 8.
- 19.
Ahmed, 6–7.
- 20.
Ahmed, 5, 3, emphases in original.
- 21.
Ahmed, 16.
- 22.
Ahmed, 1, 3, emphasis in original.
- 23.
Ahmed, 1, 3.
- 24.
Ahmed, 3.
- 25.
Sylvia Wynter, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument,” CR: The New Centennial Review 3, no. 3 (2003): 257–337, here 313.
- 26.
Wynter, 318, 313. Indeed , Wynter herself critiques such undifferentiated evo- and invocations of “the human,” arguing that the grave ecological crises and the problem of climate change “we” are faced with in the Anthropocene—our “drift as a species toward an unparalleled catastrophe”—are inseparable from the long, ruinous hegemony of Man and are thus in fact “genre-specifically caused.” Sylvia Wynter and Katherine McKittrick, “Unparalleled Catastrophe for Our Species? Or, to Give Humanness a Different Future: Conversations,” in Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis, ed. Katherine McKittrick (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 9–89, here 18, 21, original emphasis. While Wynter is not directly concerned with human-animal relations, I would argue that her oeuvre offers important implications with regard to the conceptual and ethico-political intersections between postanthropocentric and decolonial, anti-racist, or other more traditionally “human-oriented” projects.
- 27.
For Derrida , Western modernity is characterized by a “veritable war of the species,” a “war without mercy against the animal … which should in effect end in a world without animals, without any animal worthy of the name and living for something other than to become a means for man.” Derrida , The Animal That Therefore I Am, 31, 102. Also see Dinesh Joseph Wadiwel, The War Against Animals (Boston: Brill, 2015).
- 28.
Ahmed, Strange Encounters, 8.
- 29.
See Ernst Bloch’s notion of an “ontology of the Not-Yet” associated with his concept of concrete utopia in The Principle of Hope, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight, vol. 1 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 13.
- 30.
Depending on how we characterize the relations between humans and companion animals, the latter are of course somewhat of an exception here—unless one regards them, as for example Deleuze tends to do, as diminished pseudo-animals. See Donna J. Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 27–30. A conviction of the irredeemably deficient, degenerate, or unnatural nature of companion and other domesticated animals is not uncommon and at times appears troubling in its barely disguised or even explicitly stated (and often implicitly gendered) contempt for such creatures. For Paul Shepard, for example, whose work has also influenced the philosophical ethology of Marchesini , domestic animals are “perverse and dysfunctional” (his characterization of dogs), “freaks and travesties” of their original, wild versions. Paul Shepard, The Others: How Animals Made Us Human (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1996), 267, 250; also see Anna L. Peterson, Being Animal: Beasts and Boundaries in Nature Ethics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 97–101.
- 31.
Alphonso Lingis, The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 13.
- 32.
Lingis, 87.
- 33.
Lingis, 84.
- 34.
Calarco, Zoographies, 6; Richard Iveson, Zoogenesis: Thinking Encounter with Animals (London: Pavement Books, 2014 [Kindle version]), “Itinerary,” par. 4.
- 35.
Iveson, Zoogenesis, esp. part 3 on “Ethics and Power.” The term “unloved others” is taken from the eponymous special issue of the Australian Humanities Review. See Deborah Bird Rose and Thom Van Dooren, “Introduction,” Australian Humanities Review, no. 50 (2011): 1–4.
- 36.
Iveson, Zoogenesis, part 3, “Butler’s Human and Burroughs’ Centipede,” par. 2.
- 37.
Iveson, part 3, “Introduction: The Fatal Risk of the Untimely,” pars. 4, 8.
- 38.
Iveson, part 2, “Invention of Monstrosity, Monstrosity of Invention,” final par.
- 39.
For a few examples of works in which (human) animal corporeality plays a significant role for thinking about human-animal relations and ethics, see Ralph R. Acampora, Corporal Compassion: Animal Ethics and Philosophy of Body (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006); Cary Wolfe, What Is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010); Anat Pick, Creaturely Poetics: Animality and Vulnerability in Literature and Film (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Elisa Aaltola, Animal Suffering: Philosophy and Culture (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
- 40.
Stacy Alaimo, “Trans-Corporeal Feminisms and the Ethical Space of Nature,” in Material Feminisms, ed. Stacy Alaimo and Susan J. Hekman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 237–264; Stacy Alaimo, Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); also see her recent Exposed: Environmental Politics and Pleasures in Posthuman Times (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016).
- 41.
Such a perspective on bodily ontology and/as relational ontology also shapes the work of Jean-Luc Nancy. See Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O’Byrne (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000); Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard A. Rand (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008); Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus II: Writings on Sexuality, trans. Anne E. O’Byrne (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013). Already in his earlier Being Singular Plural, Nancy engages with the possibility of a postanthropocentric, corporeal, and relational “ontology of being-with-one-another” that seeks to take into account the significance of “every body, whether they be inanimate, animate, sentient, speaking, thinking, having weight, and so on” (53, 84).
- 42.
Kelly Oliver, “Animal Ethics: Toward an Ethics of Responsiveness,” Research in Phenomenology 40, no. 2 (2010): 267–280, here 270.
- 43.
Acampora, Corporal Compassion, 5.
- 44.
Roberto Marchesini, “The Therioanthropic Being as Our Neighbour,” Angelaki 21, no. 1 (2016): 201–214, here 211.
- 45.
Dominik Ohrem, “An Address from Elsewhere: Vulnerability, Relationality, and Conceptions of Creaturely Embodiment,” in Beyond the Human-Animal Divide: Creaturely Lives in Literature and Culture, ed. Dominik Ohrem and Roman Bartosch (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 43–75.
- 46.
We might think, for example, of the discursive and material interconnections between human social class and (non-)pedigree animals, the association of working-class people with animal abuse, or the ways in which the nexus of racialization-animalization has often relied on the presence or absence of livestock or other “civilized” creatures in non-white (Indigenous) societies.
- 47.
Ahmed, Strange Encounters, 49.
- 48.
Iveson, Zoogenesis, part 3, “The Poor Rejected Pede,” par. 2. Also see Jonathan L. Clark, “Uncharismatic Invasives,” Environmental Humanities 6 (2015): 29–52; Jamie Lorimer, “Nonhuman Charisma,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 25, no. 5 (2007): 911–932.
- 49.
On a more general level, Judith Butler reminds us that “[t]he ‘being’ of life is itself constituted through selective means; as a result, we cannot refer to this ‘being’ outside of the operations of power, and we must make more precise the specific mechanisms of power through which life is produced.” Judith Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? (London: Verso, 2009), 2.
- 50.
Acampora, Corporal Compassion, 120.
- 51.
Helmuth Plessner, “Die Frage nach der Conditio humana,” in Conditio Humana, ed. Günter Dux, Odo Marquard, and Elisabeth Ströker. Gesammelte Schriften 8 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983), 136–217, here 189. This and the following Plessner quotes are my own translation.
- 52.
Helmuth Plessner, Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch: Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1928), 303. Plessner’s notion of positionality refers less to a fixed position inhabited by different animate forms but more dynamically to the types of relation that living things (lebende Dinge) have with both their body and their environment ; or, more precisely, with the boundary which, by way of its permanent negotiation between inside and outside, both separates living things from their environment and establishes a relation to this environment , thus acknowledging the vital dependency of all organisms on what is beyond and outside yet also constitutive of their own physical organization. For Plessner, the “eccentric” positionality of humans allows them to stand outside of themselves, comport themselves towards their bodies as objects, while the “centric” positionality of animals means that the latter remain fully absorbed the “Here-Now” (Hier-Jetzt) (288).
- 53.
Plessner, 307.
- 54.
Tim Ingold, “Rethinking the Animate, Re-animating Thought,” Ethnos 71, no. 1 (2006): 9–20, here 14.
- 55.
Helmuth Plessner, “Mensch und Tier,” in Conditio Humana, ed. Günter Dux, Odo Marquard, and Elisabeth Ströker. Gesammelte Schriften 8 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983), 52–65, here 58–59.
- 56.
Vinciane Despret, What Would Animals Say If We Asked the Right Questions? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 165.
- 57.
Acampora, Corporal Compassion, 12.
- 58.
Alaimo, Exposed, 39.
- 59.
Roberto Marchesini, “Dialogo Ergo Sum: From a Reflexive Ontology to a Relational Ontology,” Relations 4, no. 2 (2016): 145–158, here 149.
- 60.
Ernest Sosa , “Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue,” The Monist 68, no. 2 (1985): 226–245, here 242. As Sosa explains, animal knowledge is “knowledge about one’s environment , one’s past, and one’s own experience if one’s judgments and beliefs about these are direct responses to their impact … with little or no benefit of reflection or understanding.” Reflective knowledge, in contrast, means that “one’s judgment or belief manifests … also understanding of its place in a wider whole that includes one’s belief and knowledge of it and how these come about” (241–242).
- 61.
Ernest Sosa, “Human Knowledge, Animal and Reflective: Reply to Robert Audi, John Greco, and Hilary Kornblith,” in Ernest Sosa and His Critics, ed. John Greco (Malden: Blackwell, 2004), 290–292, here 291.
- 62.
Frans de Waal, Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are? (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2016).
- 63.
Sosa, “Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue,” 241.
- 64.
Hilary Kornblith, Knowledge and Its Place in Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 29–30. Also see Hilary Kornblith, “Sosa on Human and Animal Knowledge,” in Ernest Sosa and His Critics, ed. John Greco (Malden: Blackwell, 2004), 126–134.
- 65.
Kornblith, Knowledge and Its Place in Nature, 31–32.
- 66.
Kornblith, 33–34.
- 67.
Kornblith, 51–52. As Dominique Lestel argues with regard to the frequent dismissal of “anthropomorphic anecdotes”—especially those coming from non-academic sources—used to provide or support explanations of animal behavior, such anecdotes often constitute “weapons of war more than methodological or epistemological difficulties requiring careful negotiation.” This is not only because the legitimation of anecdotes as evidence “would destroy the hierarchic structure of knowledge,” according to which the authority of scientific knowledge surpasses and effectively negates all other domains of knowledge production, but also because they are incompatible with the lingering notion of animals as machines, since, unlike living creatures, the latter “do not give rise to anecdotes.” Dominique Lestel, “Epistemological Interlude,” Angelaki 19, no. 3 (2014): 151–160, here 153, 155.
- 68.
Donna J. Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,” Feminist Studies 14, no. 3 (1988): 575–599, here 594.
- 69.
Roberto Marchesini, “The Theriosphere,” Angelaki 21, no. 1 (2016): 113–135, here 114.
- 70.
Marchesini, 118, 115.
- 71.
Roberto Marchesini, “Nonhuman Alterities,” Angelaki 21, no. 1 (2016): 161–172, here 165.
- 72.
Marchesini, 164.
- 73.
A first version of Plumwood’s essay was published as “Being Prey,” Terra Nova 1, no. 3 (1996): 32–44. The quotations are taken from the version published as “Meeting the Predator,” in The Eye of the Crocodile, by Val Plumwood, ed. Lorraine Shannon (Canberra: Australian National University e-Press, 2012), 9–21, here 10–11. The book can be downloaded for free from the ANU Press website (http://press.anu.edu.au/publications/eye-crocodile).
- 74.
See, for example, Lynn Margulis and Dorion Sagan, Acquiring Genomes: A Theory of the Origins of Species (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Haraway, When Species Meet; Gísli Pálsson, “Ensembles of Biosocial Relations,” in Biosocial Becomings: Integrating Social and Biological Anthropology, ed. Tim Ingold and Gísli Pálsson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 22–41.
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Ohrem, D. (2018). Some Thoughts on (Animal) Encounter. In: Ohrem, D., Calarco, M. (eds) Exploring Animal Encounters. Palgrave Studies in Animals and Literature. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92504-2_1
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