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Compromising Electromagnetic Emanations of Wired USB Keyboards

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Abstract

The TEMPEST methods and procedures focus on classified information carriers generated by any electronic devices through electromagnetic radiation. Any electromagnetic radiation-carrying information is called compromising emanation. In this paper we will exemplify the keystroke information recovery by receiving compromising emanations emitted by the USB keyboards and the possibility of automatic detection of compromising emanation by using the autocorrelation function as well as the risk assessment of information vulnerability.

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References

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Correspondence to Alexandru Boitan .

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© 2018 ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Boitan, A., Bărtușică, R., Halunga, S., Popescu, M., Ionuță, I. (2018). Compromising Electromagnetic Emanations of Wired USB Keyboards. In: Fratu, O., Militaru, N., Halunga, S. (eds) Future Access Enablers for Ubiquitous and Intelligent Infrastructures. FABULOUS 2017. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 241. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92213-3_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92213-3_6

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-92212-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-92213-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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