Abstract
Having delineated genuine science from pseudo-science in the previous chapters, this concluding chapter turns to a delineation between genuine social science and pseudo-social science. Co-opting Sartre, I have suggested social science is the study of “man in situation”. The issue to be addressed now is that multiple cognitive styles do this which begs the question of why they struggle to cohere with one another? I propose this stems from a failure to consider the philosophical anthropological question “What is man?” Each has a different understanding of man which do not cohere. This brings us to the problem of intersubjectivity and how I recognise my fellow man as “man”. In further exposing the human prejudice, I will show how social science has been guided by a nonuniversal European supposition and fails to be genuine. In order to escape this outcome I will look at Jean-Paul Sartre’s understanding of intersubjectivity as it responds to Scheler. Out of Sartre’s theory of intersubjectivity we will get a radical reconception of “subject” and “object”. This constitutes an entirely new approach to the definition of man, one which has radical consequences for our understanding of social science. By pursuing this Sartrean approach we will be in a position to escape the crisis of social science.
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- 1.
Contained within this point is a further criticism of Merton ’s norms of science, particularly the norm of universalism that science does not adjudicate on the basis of gender, race, etc. As discussed by Barnes, Bloor and Henry, in its earliest days the Royal Society was more inclined to trust the word of a “gentleman” than a “commoner”. Thus, for example, although Robert Hooke’s (1635–1703) discoveries have withstood the test of time in comparison to Robert Boyle (1627–1691), among their contemporaries it is the latter who is credited with being a better scientist as he was a gentleman and Hooke his paid servant (Barnes et al. 1996, 146). Since then the authority of the gentlemen has transferred from virtuoso, to philosopher, to scientist (1996, 149). These transitions represent within science alterations in the rational standard by which work is verified and who is involved in such verification. Such a point is not problematic to my phenomenological understanding of social science because it only refers to who is involved. The later example of Robert Chambers shows how specialisation became a mark of authority and that scholars were even denounced for commenting on other specialisations (1996, 156–162). This emphasis on specialisation parallels my comments on disciplinarity in the Introduction.
- 2.
A similar point can be found in Kerry and Armour ’s evaluation of Sport Studies in Chap. 2.
- 3.
For example, Wechselverständnis, Einverständnis, Wechselverständigung.
- 4.
“Mutual understanding” is also found in Findlay’s translation of LI (Husserl 1970a, 278).
- 5.
The reader may object that the following treatment of PSW as well as my assessment of “The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl” is dogged by translation issues similar to those faced by Husserl , Scheler and Heidegger . However, the significant difference in the case of Schutz is that his later writings were in English. As George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert note of their translation of PSW they have followed the terminology established by these later English writings (in Schutz 1967, ix).
- 6.
The translation used here is of the fifth edition (1948[1973a]) which contains corrections by Maria Scheler of mistakes by the printer found in the second through fourth editions.
- 7.
I differ slightly from Scheler on this point who claimed that Crusoe would never think “I am alone in the world” (1954, 234). Loneliness as it is used here means the feeling of need for the presence of another. In the state of loneliness I believe there is someone “out there” but cannot find them. The feeling of loneliness I am suggesting of Crusoe is quite a broad one, one in which he thinks of a community rather than a particular Other. More often, the experience of loneliness is felt as the need for the presence of another who is not among those who are present. Much more space needs to be given over to the study of loneliness than can be given here. What I will emphasise is that though I have disagreed with Scheler on the feeling of loneliness I nevertheless affirm the conclusion he draws about knowledge about other subjects in general .
- 8.
Developed from van der Leeuw ’s (1963, 674–675) typological phenomenology .
- 9.
- 10.
A significant point to be drawn from this is that Scheler ’s argument to a large extent entails that subjectivity is intersubjectively constituted. Subjectivity, that is, in the sense of being an “individual self” different from others. Schutz , despite his disparagement of Scheler in “Scheler’s Theory of Intersubjectivity”, nonetheless agrees with this position.
- 11.
My interpolation—Schutz uses no particular term or phrase.
- 12.
If there is a connection to Scheler ’s concept of Person in this use I have not yet identified it.
- 13.
A critic may at this point wish to leap upon Schutz ’s use of “true”. As I take him to mean “true” in this context, it refers to whether the likes of Hallowell and Levi-Strauss have accurately represented the people they are talking about thus meeting the postulate of adequacy . The alternative reading of “true” is to suggest that in recognising subjectivity in the non-human these groups are being untrue somehow. But to make this claim violates the principle of principles . That is, groups that recognise subjectivity in the non-human or not all humans would be accused of being deviant. Such analysis ceases to be social scientific because it carries with it statements regarding how these groups “ought” to understand the world—i.e. it becomes colonial.
- 14.
Within this book a number of scholars utilised have perpetrated the human prejudice (e.g. Albrecht 1968; Byrne 1999; Delanty and Strydom 2003; Steel and Guala 2011). This even extends to those who have responded to or interpreted the very phenomenologists I have suggested were trying to avoid it (e.g. Spiegelberg 1971; Dunlop 1991; Glendinning 1998; Gorner 2007; Kelly 2011).
- 15.
Part of the problem with their account, however, is the continued use of the word “human”.
- 16.
I have favoured Pyysiäinen ’s account over Boyer’s because he rejects the latter’s “cognitive optimum” whereby the human mind can only handle so many counter-intuitive breaks by a single entity. Pyysiäinen (2003, 161–162) clearly demonstrates that insofar as we grant these ideas as counter-intuitive it is possible to have radically counter-intuitive ideas through the introduction of writing which allows them to be remembered.
- 17.
The reader may object that it is out of this European ferhđ that the idea of social science emerged. And while this might be true, such an objection hides a cultural parochialism—à la Slingerland in Chap. 6—in which it is assumed only Europe can be genuinely scientific.
- 18.
Hegel’s position is not examined here even though his inclusion by Sartre prompted French phenomenologists to regard Hegel as part of the Phenomenological Movement. A claim largely contended by other members (see Spiegelberg 1982, 440–442).
- 19.
Staehler (2008b, 18) offers a different view that ‘an alien tool is still recognised by us as a kind of tool that supposedly fulfils a certain function’. The major issue is how we conceive “alien”.
- 20.
In the translation of BN by Hazel Barnes “regard” is translated as “look”. I have maintained the original French for clarity.
- 21.
More formally we may, following Heidegger , say that a particular entity is either giefan as instrument when it is ready-to-hand or as object when it is present-at-hand.
- 22.
It is important that Sartre has italicised “man” is this regard to emphasis the shift to “mankind” rather than an individual male.
- 23.
Thus, Spiegelberg ’s (1982, 523–524) interpretation of the regard as “gaze” is in fact too restrictive particularly as he associates it with the “human gaze”.
- 24.
Sartre (2003, 347–355) never explicitly refers to Scheler in this regard but there are uses of “resistance ” that clearly echo Scheler ’s and a near identical criticism of Husserl and Heidegger .
- 25.
The real advantage of this use of “ge-”, however, is in relation to “ gehīersumian ”. While for our current discussions and the argument I wish to make here, it is fine to continue speaking of “domination,” the change from the strong “ gehīersumian ” to the weak “hīersumian” is significant. This latter weak verb means “to serve” or “obey”. As such, the “gehīersumian”/“hīersumian” distinction corresponds to Heidegger ’s distinctions between authenticity/inauthenticity and Sartre ’s own distinction of “good faith”/“bad faith ”. As a strong verb “gehīersumian” implies acting in “good faith” or “authentically” whereas “hīersumian” designates acting that is in “bad faith” or “inauthentic”—i.e. a subject which ‘constitutes itself in its own flesh as the nihilation of a possibility which another [réalité-humaine] projects as its possibility’ (Sartre 2003, 70). That is, hīersumian is a form of domination, but this exact form has in fact been determined by the Other’s domination ( gehīersumian ). For this term there is no easy English equivalent here, though we may speak of “subdomination” or “subordination”.
- 26.
Used in this context we can draw a parallel between beings differentiated by “knowledge how” and Sartre ’s notion of the négatités.
- 27.
It must be remembered that the regard is not about the actual constituents of Paul. If the regard is brought about by his looking at me this is bracketed in the actual experience of being regarded. It may be countered that in reflection I can bring to mind the fact that Paul looked at me and recognise this as the source of his regard. And I do not deny this, but his subjectivity, once established, is not then bound to his eyes. To say so would be to argue that to strike out his eyes would be to destroy his subjectivity.
- 28.
Many criticisms of Sartre ’s theory of intersubjectivity stem from the result that this constant interplay of domination means that subjects are never equal. As Fretz (1992, 88) summarises it, there is ‘no room for social intercourse in which equal subjects respect the ambiguity of human existence (facticity and freedom), with regard to themselves as well as to one another’. However, I regard this criticism on the basis of equality as somewhat vapid. Such arguments presume the equality of subjects but rarely consider what is meant by “equality”. Natanson (1981, 332–333), for instance, suggests that most of these criticisms charge that BN is not true to experience. Ironically, Schutz is among those who appeal to this sort of argument and yet also argued at the same time that equality is a relative notion.
- 29.
This then separates to become the concern of “knowledge of the Other’s thoughts ”.
- 30.
Here I differ from Sartre (2003, 292) slightly who took it that I cannot know—conceptual knowledge in the form of propositions—that a particular entity is an Other without this subjective experience.
- 31.
This lack was later recognised in his post-phenomenological period.
- 32.
From the Old English meaning “foreigner” or “demon”.
- 33.
Both can in fact be translated as “foreigner”. They are also potentially linguistically related if not cognate. Padgen (1982, 202) mentions the work of Ker (1958) in which the Normans were referred to as “barbarians”. However, it is not clear who called them this and I have been unable to find an edition of The Dark Ages (1904, 1953) that matches this pagination and thus failed to find the reference Padgen has alluded to.
- 34.
Scheler (1973b, 312) also produces a similar case to this.
- 35.
A similar example can be found in Glendinning (1998, 141–143).
- 36.
Contrary to Glendinning (1998, 65–70) it is possible to maintain Heidegger ’s “sharp” distinction between Dasein ( wer ) and animals (not-wer) because, as social, this divide is subjective not ontological. However, this requires a more detailed analysis of being not-wer of which orc is only one type.
- 37.
A similar line of thought can be found in Foucault’s The Order of Things (2002). More accurately Foucault argues that “man” did not exist until the end of the eighteenth century (2002: 336). As I understand it, Foucault’s discussion rather than covering wer without end really highlights the emergence of a particular négatités wer. Further study is required to explore the similarities and differences in Foucault’s projects and what is proposed here. An initial question would be the relation of this négatités wer to Husserl ’s discussion of the European ferhđ .
- 38.
Such a connection is emphasised by McCutcheon (2001, 114) himself who notes that ‘postmodern theorists tip their hats to Kant: there are intellectual and social conditions for and limits to your knowledge’.
- 39.
We should also not think that wer is the only being these entities can possess.
- 40.
This becomes doubly obstinate in the way that humans then become privileged in terms of “knowledge of”. For example, there are claims like that of Gerardus van der Leeuw above—prototypical of “the phenomenologies of religion ”—that wer is everywhere and everytime the same. Luther Martin (2012, 63) has contented similarly on the basis that evolutionary psychologists have found that the morphology of the human brain has remained relatively consistent for the past 100,000 years. The danger here is the slip into the “horse fallacy” identified by Evans-Pritchard (1977, 108) whereby we assume that the humans of some past epoch think exactly like we do but we then only construct a “world” that we (with all our prejudices) would conceive. I regard knowledge of humans from a past epoch as no more or less difficult than our knowledge of ducks. That we may happen to be human also offers no special privilege, or advantage I should say, in garnering this “knowledge of ”.
- 41.
They perpetrate the human prejudice in a number of places from an over-emphasis on language, to citing humans’ geographical spread and reproductive tendencies (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 65–70).
- 42.
- 43.
I am sceptical of how much of Berger and Luckmann ’s (1966, 29) work is still consistent with Schutz ’s phenomenology beyond this point. They make hefty use of Marx, Helmuth Plessner, Arnold Gehlen, Durkheim , and George Herbert Mead. It is not overtly clear, however, how reconcilable these thinkers are with Schutz ’s phenomenology.
- 44.
While it is possible to call any group of concurring weras a collective person, as in Chap. 5, it would potentially be more accurate to say that concurring weras actually involve a community of collective persons.
- 45.
A key passage for the development of the idea of “alien-worlds” comes from “Crisis of European Man”. Speaking of European and Indian civilisations Husserl (1954, 320) writes: ‘Dies tritt sofort hervor, sowie wir uns z.B. in die indische Geschichtlichkeit mit ihren vielen Völkern und Kulturgebilden einfühlen. In diesem Kreis besteht wieder Einheit einer familienhaften Verwandtschaft, aber einer uns fremden’. The key word “fremden” is translated by Lauer as “strange” (Husserl 1965b, 157) and by Carr as “alien” (Husserl 1970b, 275). Although Carr’s seems to be the predominant translation, Lauer’s could be used to create a connection with Schutz ’s work, particularly his essay “The Stranger” (1964a). A third possible translation of “fremden” is “foreign”. While I have reservations about Carr’s translation I have maintained it for ease of exposition.
- 46.
Redfield makes some rather hefty, and difficult to substantiate, claims about what these “human universals” are.
- 47.
It is also possible to find in Ideas II’s discussion of “näturlicher Weltbegriff” which translates as “natural world-concept”. According to Carr (2004, 372) the phrase seems to have come from Richard Avenarius. The phrase can also be found in Heidegger ’s BT. I suggest that both likely developed the notion from Scheler .
- 48.
Indeed, we should not. Not only do the terms “group-soul” and “group-mind” confuse with my accepted terminology of “ gāst ” and “ ferhđ ”, but there is, I suspect, a lack of dialectic between the two in Scheler ’s analysis. As Husserl ’s analysis of Galileo ’s mathematisation of nature shows, the European life-world came into being by creating new conditions as to what sort of negations can take place. But in this respect what was at the time of Galileo part of the “group-mind” has since become part of the “group-soul” of Europe. We may usefully apply Thomas Kuhn’s (2012) notion of “paradigm shift” in this case with certain qualifications.
- 49.
It is therefore the task of natural science to study these organisations, though whether the word “natural” of the title can still be maintained on the basis of this discussion is a point I will not explore.
- 50.
Up until this sentence the phrase “fremden Ich” (Scheler 1973a, 253) is consistently translated as “other selves” and no explanation is provided for the sudden switch to “mind” which I have replaced.
- 51.
Husserl (1988, 108) may have been rendering a similar point when he spoke of the “harmony” of monads.
- 52.
This does not exclude “world view” completely. As suggested above worldviews apply to variations within the home-world brought about by different locations and epochs. Within the European life-world , for example, there have been ‘changes from the early Western organismic world-view, which extended to the thirteenth century, to the mechanistic world-view’ (Scheler 1980, 43).
- 53.
Carr also speaks of a third “perceived world”. However, the notion is deeply problematic because alongside the “cultural world” it is “pre-given”. But if both are “pre-given” it is question begging as to how the to two can be distinguished from one another.
- 54.
A similar argument can be found in Glendinning (1998, 123–125).
- 55.
I hope to address many of these topics in my next project, currently under the working title of Forms of Knowing.
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Tuckett, J. (2018). The Crisis of Social Science. In: The Idea of Social Science and Proper Phenomenology. Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures, vol 28. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92120-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92120-4_7
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