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McCulley’s Warning

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Social Finance

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Abstract

Recent financial crises spurred interest in the work of Post-Keynesian economists such as Hyman Minsky and Charles Kindleberger. Their theories—while useful—rest on several concepts that themselves need to be explained. Social Finance presents a new framework of understanding financial stability centered on Keynesian notions of economic conventions. Conventions studied include ergodicity (or the belief that the future will resemble the past), deferring to expert opinion, and conventional expectations (known as the “Keynesian beauty contest”). This book demonstrates the utility of this new model via a case study of shadow banking during the global financial crisis. Audiences interested in learning more about Post-Keynesianism, shadow banking, market participants’ views of the global financial crisis, and a heuristic model of forecasting future instability will benefit from reading Social Finance.

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  1. Mexico City, Mexico

    Neil Shenai

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Shenai, N. (2018). McCulley’s Warning. In: Social Finance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91346-9_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91346-9_1

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-91345-2

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