Abstract
In this chapter, we will continue to discuss Arab revolutions in a wide historical and theoretical context. However, this chapter discusses the Arab revolutions in some other aspects as the previous one, especially as regards issues of democratic transitions and value orientations. In this chapter, we do not preserve a chronological sequence and focus on some other aspects. In particular, we define common and distinctive features in the course of revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt and pay considerable attention to the turning points of the Arab revolutions, especially the July 2013 coup in Egypt. This chapter attempts to analyze different versions of the transition to democracy, to show the costs and perils of the striving to establish democracy quickly and by radical means (from time to time using the example of the recent events in Egypt). Our goal in this chapter is to analyze the issue of democratization of Egypt and some MENA countries within the contexts of globalization and regional history. In the final part of the chapter, we present a sketch of the revolutionary and post-revolutionary events in Yemen, Libya, and Syria. We have also added to this chapter a very representative Appendix titled “Letters from Tahrir.”
The corresponding authors for this chapter are Leonid Grinin (leonid.grinin@gmail.com) and Andrey Korotayev (akorotayev@gmail.com).
This chapter is an output of a research project implemented as part of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2018 with support by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (Project No. 17-06-00464).
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Notes
- 1.
Its leader Rached Ghannouchi, a prominent ideologist of political Islam, is famous both in Tunisia and beyond. During the Bin Ali’s rule, the party An-Nahda was accused of the coup d’etat attempt, its activity was forbidden, and Rached Ghannouchi had to migrate and lived in the United Kingdom for twenty years. He returned to Tunisia on January 30, 2011, after the fall of the Ben Ali regime. Ghannouchi claimed he “was not going to become Tunisian Khomeini” and after An-Nahda’s success at parliamentary elections confirmed its adherence to democratic principles (Dolgov 2012).
- 2.
Still, in Tunisia the state of emergency that was imposed in late 2015 after a terrorist attack in the capital Tunis left dozens dead, including security personnel, since that time has been extended many times (last time—in February 2018).
- 3.
- 4.
On the other hand, the weakening of the economic engine in traditional democratic countries of Europe also leads to certain distrust to democratic institutions (see Lowi 1999). And what can be the result of the process which has already been considered, in particular by Robert Dahl who argues that extending the sphere of supranational activity reduces the citizens’ opportunities to control their vital problems through the national means of rule (Dahl 1989).
- 5.
Emergent cracks in the ruling coalition are rather connected with the participation in this coalition of some leftist secularists [first of all, Hamdeen Sabahi and his Egyptian Popular Current (al-Tayyar al-Sha`biyy al-Misriyy)], whereas the continuation of the cooperation of this part of the ruling alliance with both military and (especially) economic elites can in no way be guaranteed—one would rather expect to see eventually the final split between the left-wing and right-wing secularists in Egypt.
- 6.
Let us cite Samiha Razeq again (see Letter 2 in the Appendix to this chapter). “I’m just infuriated! I really wanna blow up all Western media that makes the success of Egyptian revolution after three years of struggle [that is, the overthrow of Morsi’s government] seem as if it’s a crisis and failure to so-called democracy, that’s in fact only a theocratic religious regim by a group that hijacked the beginning of the revolution with the help of SCAF, and serves the interests of US, Israel, and the West in the region, to deserve being labeled a democracy by their catastrophic media”.
- 7.
However, after the French revolution there emerged the term Thermidor, which later was used to denote the phase in some revolutions when the political pendulum swings back, the revolutionary radicalism steps back and a less radical revolutionary regime is established which gradually reduces the revolutionary excesses. Revolution tries to eliminate its own unnecessaries (Ustryalov 1921) and passes to a reasonable account of the situation. The term Thermidor was widely debated after the Russian Revolution of 1917 (see e.g., Ustryalov 1921; Trotsky 1935). Thermidor may be also replaced by dictatorship regime which Marx called Bonapartism (Marx 1957). About the phases of revolution see Grinin (2017).
- 8.
In addition, scholars also tend to characterize as such some other revolutions/revolutionary reforms in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the 1986 Revolution in the Philippines, as well as the revolutionary reforms in South Africa in the early 1990s: ‘Until very recently, revolutions have invariably failed to produce democracy. The need to consolidate a new regime in the face of struggles with domestic and foreign foes has instead produced authoritarian regimes, often in the guise of populist dictatorships such as those of Napoleon, Castro, and Mao, or of one party states such as the PRI state in Mexico or the Communist Party-led states of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Indeed, the struggle required to take and hold power in revolutions generally leaves its mark in the militarized and coercive character of new revolutionary regimes (Gurr 1988). It is therefore striking that in several recent revolutions—in the Philippines in 1986, in South Africa in 1990, in Eastern European nations in 1989–1991—the sudden collapse of the old regime has led directly to new democracies, often against strong expectations of reversion to dictatorship’ (Goldstone 2001: 168; see also Foran and Goodwin 1993; Weitman 1992; Pastor 2001).
- 9.
The structural-demographic factors regularly generating social explosions in the modernization process are thoroughly investigated in our earlier publications (see, e.g., Korotayev et al. 2006, 2011a, b, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015a, c; Korotayev and Khaltourina 2006; Turchin and Korotayev 2006; Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b, c, 2014; Grinin 2011, 2012a, b; Grinin and Korotayev 2012a; Zinkina and Korotayev 2014a, b); hence, we will not describe them here.
- 10.
Both in a particular country and in the world in general. It may seem paradoxical but in 1990, democratic regimes were established in approximately 45.4% of independent countries of the world, that is almost the same rate as it was seventy years earlier in 1922 (Huntington 1993). On some factors affecting the genesis of democratic institutions see also, e.g., Korotayev (1996), Korotayev and Bondarenko (2000), Bondarenko and Korotayev (2000), Korotayev (2003a, b), Korotayev and Cardinale (2003).
- 11.
This means that one should first achieve the cultural-humanitarian level allowing a true democratic transformation, namely, there should be present an intellectual stratum, a certain level of borrowings from the world culture, and certain political forms. But to establish democracy an even higher cultural-humanitarian level is needed as well as a dramatic change in social and economic situation (see, e.g., Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Besides, democracy is not just an idea but a mode of life; and to take the root it should become a really important part of everyday life. But since in newly democratic states the idea of democracy is quickly discredited, thus it fails to become a really important constituent of everyday life. Here we observe a vicious circle which can be broken only after several attempts and under certain social and economic conditions.
- 12.
In December, 1848 Louis Bonaparte, the nephew of Napoleon I, was elected the President of the French Republic, which was formed as a result of the February revolution of 1848. He was elected by the French peasants, while the Parisians who made the revolution were against him. His further career is extremely interesting in terms of the relationship between revolution and democracy. On the one hand, he betrayed the Republic, having made a military coup on December 2, 1851. A year later he became the Emperor Napoleon III, which, as one can see, was quite logical and typical for the life cycle of revolution. But on the other hand, he also applied democratic methods. Thus, the extension of his mandate for ten years was approved by the referendum on December 21, 1851 (it took place three weeks after the coup). Later, the transformation of the presidency into monarchy was approved by the referendum on November 21, 1852. On both referenda Louis Bonaparte’s actions were approved by an overwhelming majority of votes. Thus, one can see a contradiction between the liberal French capital, aspiring to a liberal and democratic republic and a conservative French village that yearned for a strong imperial hand. If the revolution had introduced limited suffrage, the urban residents could have won; meanwhile, the universal suffrage gave the advantage to the conservatives. The same dilemma between universal democracy and the strife for a higher-level democracy exists in Muslim countries, where secular forces are consistently a minority. The same refers to a number of countries with an authoritarian regime outside the Islamic world.
- 13.
One can also recall that during the elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly the principal Russian liberal party (the Constitutional Democrats) whose main objective was just to establish a system of universal, direct, equal, and secret polls, during the first Russian truly universal, direct, equal, and secret poll only got a tiny minority of votes, whereas the majority of votes were got by the peasant-oriented party of “Socialist Revolutionaries” (however, as is well known, this did not prevent the political power in Russia from being grabbed by a third political party that also got a minority of votes—the Bolsheviks).
- 14.
They think that three factors, namely, social-economic development, self-expression values, and democratic institutions, make a unity having human development as an underlying theme (ibidem). But this does not seem an ultimate truth to us. The human development proceeds in any society in the course of getting an education, especially at college level, an occupation, choice of the way of life, gaining certain spiritual values, etc. The human development proceeds rather successfully even under totalitarian regimes.
- 15.
The voting abstention in Russia even when the mass voter turnout could be decisive is quite a typical example. Moreover, a large number of voters (especially among the young) almost simultaneously with the right of voting get a steady ideological skepticism. Why voting? What is the use of it? Nothing will ever change. My vote means nothing. However, it seems easy to go and vote. But probably it is difficult as one should make a choice. On the other hand, there is some truth in this skepticism. The other part of the Russian population is accustomed to voting ‘they say we should, then we will vote’ but also not for the sake of a reasonable voting. In any case, it is out of question that the skepticism of one part of population and the promptness of the other part have been to the advantage of the party in power and of different kind of political chancers. This example explains how a political apathy may in a democratic way support certain forces in power. Karl Kautski called such masses involved in voting ‘the political flock of sheep’.
- 16.
Revolution (as any kind of politics) is hardly a fair contest, in this or that way one uses provocations, disinformation, deceit, and backstage dealings. The provocations often imply stirring up enmity towards government and opponents through direct or indirect murders [shooting from within crowd or something of this kind; with respect to the Revolutions of 1848 and some other revolutionary events see Nefedov (2008); recent examples can be found in Brazil or Ukraine] which evoke the escalation of violence, formation of military guards etc. Thus, violence and other rather precarious means become normal. Consequently, the violation of democracy is not considered as something terrible.
- 17.
The elections in such Caucasian territories as Karachay Cherkessia and South Ossetia, when the opponents renounce the win of the other party and thus trigger the political crisis, is a very illustrative example.
- 18.
The trial of the former rulers is one of the common revolutionary rituals. In Egypt before Morsi’s disposition the trial of the President Hosni Mubarak and his sons Ala’a and Gamal and a number of former top police officials was held. Even after the turnover the trial would continue and only in March 2017 the former President returned home. After the take-over the former President Morsi became the accused and after numerous sentences, appellations and retrials he was given a long prison term. It is interesting he was even accused of the escape from prison during the mass turmoil in 2011, that is during revolutionary events. It is worth noting that the military regime surpassed all the previous regimes in Egypt in the number of death sentences. See for example, Letter 7 in the Appendix where Samiha describes the restrictions of freedom, especially in universities, as unprecedented, And a year later she write that under Mubarak there used to be much more freedom and that she would even like him to return (see Letter 14 in the Appendix to this chapter).
- 19.
The ‘reaction’/‘counterrevolution’ is usually considered to be a definitely negative phenomenon (while revolution is associated, though not so unambiguously, with something positive—among other things just because it is supposed to lead to democracy). But such an interpretation is not always reasonable. The reaction often plays a rather positive role preventing the aggravation of revolutionary upheavals and thus establishing more balanced and viable political institutions. Sometimes positive aspects of political reaction’s processes are more pronounced, than the negative ones. For example, the Thermidorian reaction of 1794 can be considered just as an attempt of the French political leaders to mitigate rampage of the Jacobin Terror which caused the fierce civil war in many provinces and to form a new more viable social and political system. One can also point to a positive component in the Bonapartist reaction to the French revolution in 1848. History gives numerous examples. See above about Thermidorian phase of revolution.
- 20.
For the preparation of the Yemeni section of this chapter we have relied on the following main sources: Day (2012), Issaev (2012), Issaev and Shishkina (2012), Bonnefoy (2014), Brehony (2015), Issaev and Korotayev (2015), Fraihat (2016), Juneau (2016), Hill (2017), Ragab (2017), Sharp (2017), Blumi (2018), Palik (2018).
- 21.
It is remarkable that in the period before the Arab Spring the Yemeni moderate Islamists from the Islah Party demonstrated their high political pragmatism. For example, in 2003 it joined the left-wing Yemeni Socialist Party to form the Joint Meeting alliance (together with three other smaller leftist parties) to establish a joint opposition to that time ruling General People’s Congress.
- 22.
The Houthis emerged in the 2000s as radical Islamists-Zaydis but became more moderate after 2011 when they came from underground and started legal political activities (but mostly after their actual coming to power in Sanaa in September 2014) (see, e.g., Issaev and Korotayev 2015). Thus, they demonstrate that work within legal political framework and the strife to come to power by legal means can impact the Islamists making them more moderate. However, as we have already pointed in Chap. 3, this is an unstable situation. With exacerbation of political environment for Islamists they may become more radical and return to former methods of struggle.
- 23.
In 1994, an armed conflict took place between the Yemeni government in Sana’a and the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) in Aden headed by Ali Salem al-Bid, which ended with the defeat of the Southerners. During the Civil War, the religious leaders of al-Islah Shaykhs al-Zindani and al-Daylani issued fatwas against the residents of the South that justified massive violations of political and economic rights on the part of the northerners as well as the removal of the YSP from government (see Day 2012).
- 24.
For the preparation of the Libyan section of this chapter we have relied on the following main sources: al-Qadhdhafi (1998), David and Mzioudet (2014), Barfi (2014), Baum and Zhukov (2015), Eriksson (2015), Fraihat (2016), Willcoxon (2015, 2017), Bandeira (2017: 203–207, 220–224), Anderson (2017). Additionally, one of the sources for this section is represented by personal experiences of one of the authors who spent two years in Libya during the Qaddafi era.
- 25.
Earlier the U.S. Ambassador John Christopher Stevens was killed when the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi, Libya, was attacked by militants on September 11–12, 2012.
- 26.
Note, however, that relationships between Haftar and Tobruq government have always been far from ideal. A very high degree of internal rivalry have been observed within both Tripoli and Tobruq alliances from the very beginning.
- 27.
LIFG = “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group” (Al-Jama`ah al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libiya) was an armed Islamist group that was formed in 1995 from those Libyan jihadists who fought in Afghanistan. It had links with al-Qaeda and shortly after the September, 11 attacks it was banned by the UN Security Council.
- 28.
The point that this name is rather similar to the names of the party of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers in Egypt (“Freedom and Justice Party”), but especially to the name of the main moderate Islamist parties of Morocco and Turkey (“Justice and Development Party”, ideologically rather closely related to the Muslim Brothers) is not coincidental at all. And it is not coincidental either that Turkey (led by its Justice and Development Party) supports the Islamist-Misurata coalition in Libya.
- 29.
For example, in 2016 these militias played the most important role during the storm of the actual Libyan capital of the Islamic State, Sirte.
- 30.
BRSC = radical Islamist “Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council”.
- 31.
Note that among other things a close cooperation between the USA and the left-wing Kurdish fighters resulted in bizarre images of American commandos in Syria wearing patches with Communist red stars (Bertrand 2016).
- 32.
= Mohamed Morsi.
- 33.
This meeting took place in mid-November 2013.
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Grinin, L., Korotayev, A. (2019). Arab Spring, Revolutions, and the Democratic Values . In: Islamism, Arab Spring, and the Future of Democracy. Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91077-2_5
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