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The Falcon, the Helios, Two Scenarios, and Framework

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The Social Construction of Knowledge in Mission-Critical Environments

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Abstract

Aviation is the safest form of transportation. Expert performers – narrators, Ifaistos Limnios, as the pilot, and Megas Alexandros, as the investigator – explain the two paradigmatic flights and two scenarios to formulate the reference framework of the book, for effective problem-solving and handling rules and exceptions. The “shaking Falcon VIP flight” connects the concept of silence with accountability; a major incident of rapid descent without controls occurred, but the pilot was able to hold the shaking aircraft and to prevent it from crashing. Another paradigmatic flight Helios 522, silent ghost plane, signaled the rethinking of the silence concept inside and outside the plane, as the “no reply” activated the Renegade alert in the Greek FIR Space. It was a challenge for the sterile cockpit rule. In the scenario of silence, several accidents have shown that crew members’ failure to speak up can have devastating consequences with a risk to flight safety. A second major scenario was about the experience of hesitation in interaction that may leave incomplete information and truncated messages, generate uncertainty, and result to insufficient knowledge in the cockpit-controller interaction. The chapter explains flights and scenarios as the instrument for grounded theory to be applied and lessons from protocol analysis to develop. Cockpit acts of conversation are consistent with individual members’ tacit knowledge. Thus, human operators in flights must build mutual trust with all the other participants. The framework concludes with human factors explanation of the interactions among humans and other elements of a system and applies design principles to optimize human well-being and overall system performance.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This Falcon flight was labeled as “shaking” by the media or as “afraid horse” or “coffee shaker” in the minds of the survivals because of the feeling they got in the rapid descend (with ups and downs) and the effort to stabilize altitude with pilot’s manual virtuosic efforts.

  2. 2.

    The Aviation Safety Network is a private, independent initiative founded in 1996. Online since January 1996, the Aviation Safety Network covers accidents and safety issues with regard to airliners, military transport planes, and corporate jets. The ASN Safety Database contains detailed descriptions of over 10,700 incidents, hijackings and accidents (as described at http://aviation-safety.net/about/).

  3. 3.

    It is a French manufactured plane by Dassault Aviation, the company founded by the pioneer industrialist Marcel Dassault immediately after WWII. It holds a wide market share for executive business jet or jet-taxi for VIP passengers (or those who want to project the idea of a very important person). Several models are now in the market and are considered to be in the elite of private jets, as explained at http://www.dassaultfalcon.com/en/Pages/Home.aspx

  4. 4.

    In the Falcon 900B SX-ECH accident investigation (RCAI 2000) and series of judicial proceedings (Tsolakis 2013, pp. 328–337) several determinants of the situation remain unresolved as the protagonists reveal. But, the “pitch feel” warning signal and its impact in controlling the aircraft and choosing the maximum speed (with the autopilot disengagement after certain speed levels) was a repeated entry in the flight logbook remarks from the pilot-in-command, with no provision from the manufacturing company till this tragic event. The accident investigation team members for this crash were important informants in this study, with long discussion days regarding my topic.

  5. 5.

    Aircrafts are in constant monitoring for their operating and maintenance record with a service history log which ensures a memory function in their operating history. Eurocontrol’s skybrary electronic depository explains “The safety enhancement SE170: Monitoring of Service History ensures that maintenance task difficulty data is collected and reported to the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and proper maintenance is being performed to ensure aircraft systems continue to function as designed. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA ) was tasked in Output 1 of SE-170 with publishing a ‘best practices’ guide to standardize how these processes should be implemented by operators and OEMs.” (data from http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/SE170:_Monitoring_of_Service_History)

  6. 6.

    Ifaistos Limnios and other pilots proposed for investigation of the potential of an electronic warfare magnetic field that was activated in the area due to military missions that were conducted in that airspace. In this view the sudden loss of control during decent would be the result of electronic interference; this is a scenario that was difficult to verify, despite some available indications from other flights that landed in Bucharest airport, on that day.

  7. 7.

    It was June 17, 2011 when EASA issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD), prohibiting flight operations of Dassault Falcon 7X jets, due to an incident involved a Falcon 7X which experienced an uncontrolled pitch trim runway during descent. The crew succeeded in recovering a stable situation and performed an uneventful landing (data from Aviation Safety Net at http://news.aviation-safety.net/2011/05/26/easa-grounds-all-dassault-falcon-7x-aircraft-pending-incident-investigation/).

  8. 8.

    It is a unique accident in world aviation history. Only two other accidents with similar conditions, in small scale flights, have been reported: Beech Super King Air 200 VH-SKC, September 2000 in Australia (see https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24344/aair200003771_001.pdf) and Sunjet Aviation, Learjet Model 35, October 25, 1999 (http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/fulltext/aab0001.html ).

  9. 9.

    On December 7, 1944, the International Civil Aviation Convention was signed in Chicago, providing for the establishment of an International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) . The ICAO was to delimit the areas of responsibility for air space control for its member-states (Flight Information Region-FIR). The Athens FIR was delimited within the framework of the European Regional Aviation Conferences in 1950, 1952, and 1958. The Athens FIR covers Greek national air space plus some areas of international air space. Turkey was present in the abovementioned regional conferences and accepted delimitation of the air space for which Greece was granted responsibility. In accordance with ICAO rules and international practice, Greece requests that all civil and military aircraft should submit flight plans prior to their entry into the Athens FIR for reasons of safety for civilian flights. The Greek (Athens FIR) was delimited within the framework of the European Regional Aviation Conferences in 1950, 1952, and 1958. The Athens FIR covers Greek national air space plus some areas of international air space.

  10. 10.

    Following the events of 9/11 aircraft hijacking and attacks, the air transport industry and airlines in particular have instituted a range of physical and procedural defenses to deter and prevent such acts. For larger airplanes, regulatory changes followed. With effect from November 1, 2003, ICAO Annex 6 was amended so that under Chap. 13.2.2 “all passenger-carrying aeroplanes of a maximum certificated takeoff mass in excess of 45,500 kg or with a passenger seating capacity greater than 60 shall be equipped with an approved flight crew compartment door that is designed to resist penetration by small arms fire and grenade shrapnel, and to resist forcible intrusions by unauthorised persons. This door shall be capable of being locked and unlocked from either pilot’s station” (from http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Flight_Deck_Security). Of course locking the cockpit reduces cockpit-cabin communication and affects in-flight situational awareness of both ends.

  11. 11.

    A situation where a civil aircraft is used as weapon to perpetrate a terrorist attack is usually referred to as a Renegade (when substantial deviation from the flight plan is identified, or the plane is not following the Area Control Tower instructions, or does not reply in calls and remains silent). The Renegade protocol requires fighter jet scramble for identification and interception. In many cases bi-lateral agreements have been set up to better coordinate cross-border incidents . In most European countries the number of interceptions due to communication loss at least doubled after “9/11”. An atypical of those cases, with loss of communication for about 2 h, is the tragic crush of the “Helios Airways Flight HCY522” as investigated by the Greek AAIASB (at http://www.aaiasb.gr/imagies/stories/documents/11_2006_EN.pdf) and is in the mind of all the air traffic controllers that were interviewed for this study.

  12. 12.

    Five minutes before the crash another dyad of fighter planes from the quick reaction alert squadrons, two Mirage 2000–5s, were ordered for a 5 min readiness to scramble to replace the two F-16s that were running out of fuel due to the maneuver and holding patterns around the Helios jet. The Renegade case of the “ghost plane” was already in the briefings of two major HAF bases, 111 CW for the F-16’s and 114CW for the Mirages. The incident became a hot communication topic in the informal mouth-to-mouth network that is resilient in HAF’s micro culture, as in most active Air Forces.

  13. 13.

    The Discovery Channel, National Geographic, and Near-Miss Productions among others produced documentaries. Also, in the Guardian newspaper in the UK (December 18, 2006), Andrew Weir’s position article approached the Helios 522 flight from several interesting dimensions; he pointed out a safety and security problematic that represents a vivid discussion in aviation and society at large regarding cabin-cockpit contact (at http://www.theguardian.com/business/2006/dec/19/theairlineindustry.travel).

  14. 14.

    A detailed analysis of these recommendations and their impact is featured in the article “The Tragedy of Helios 522 at Grammatiko,” January–February 2007 issue of the Remove Before Flight specialized magazine published by 11Aviation Publications, Athens, Greece (at http://www.11aviation.com/).

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Katerinakis, T. (2019). The Falcon, the Helios, Two Scenarios, and Framework. In: The Social Construction of Knowledge in Mission-Critical Environments. Innovation, Technology, and Knowledge Management. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91014-7_3

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