Keywords

1 Introduction

The relationship between violent conflict and environmental degradation is a matter of some polemic. Events in recent history have demonstrated a relationship between environmental stress and conflict because in combination they intensify economic, ethnic, societal, and political fissures, thus undermining security. Evidence suggests that this trend will persist because climate change and the adverse effects of the environment will continue to stress marginal environments in places with inherently weak governance (IPCC 2014). This has inspired an acceptance of the relationship between regional instability and environmental factors, and has led to a greater acceptance of the environment as an emerging factor on the national security landscape––the so–called environmental security paradigm (Butts 1994; Homer-Dixon and Levy 1995).

The Cold War security landscape usually meant that adequate control was exerted over proxy regimes to preclude regional hot spots from escalating into violent confrontations. The recent proliferation of ungoverned space, however, combined with diluted superpower control over former surrogate regimes has enabled festering ethnic and political enmities to erupt into violent conflicts often triggered by environmental stress (Renner 2002). This problem is aggravated by unsustainable environmental practices, population pressures, migration, and resource shortages (Gleditsch et al. 2007). With conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor, Haiti, and now Syria as the precedent, the use of Western military forces to address humanitarian dimensions of regional conflict has been now well established (Dulian 2004; Femina and Werrell 2012). Nevertheless, conflicts with an environmental component coupled with divisive ethnic dimensions, such as those observed in 1994 Rwanda, have increased pressure on the West to commit military forces and other resources to stability efforts (Drapeau and Mignone 2007). In fact, strategic policy documents produced by the U.S. National Security Council (NSC 1991) and U.S. Department of Defense (DoD 2005) have delineated a long–standing U.S. strategic interests in environmentally enabled instability. The environment became a clear element in U.S. strategy in 1991, when the NSC pointed out that, “stress from environmental challenges is already contributing to political conflict” (NSC 1991, 2). By 2005, the DoD identified environmentally related instability as a fundamental strategic concern because of evidence that environmental stress is an important contributor to contemporary conflicts. Furthermore, environmental conflict typically manifests itself along ethnic lines, thus making its international management difficult (DoD 2005).

The interplay among factors of climate change, environmental degradation, resources shortages, and politico–military dynamics are highly problematic in much of the world, but especially in failed and failing states. Thus, it is plausible that we will witness a surge in three modes of conflict: internecine conflict driven by resources shortages, environmental stress, and demographic trends; civil war prompted by governmental collapse and economic factors; and limited–scale interstate conflicts. This chapter presents a case study that examines the initiation of a violent internecine conflict between tribal groups, and ultimately a genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Rwanda was once thought to be the architype of the new African state. It was thought to have a steady and prosperous economy and a stable society. However, all of that changed in 1994 when the country devolved into violent civil warfare and a genocide that ultimately witnessed the death of some one million people. Although the conflict was triggered by long–standing latent ethnic hatreds and economic collapse, environmental factors clearly exacerbated the situation and contributed to instability and violent civil conflict (Homer-Dixon 1999).

2 The Environment and Conflict

The incidence of environmentally triggered conflict is not new. Researchers have offered compelling evidence that identifies the role of environmental stress in precipitating warfare in ancient China as well as the collapse of the Mayan, Anasazi, and Akkadian civilizations (Gibbons 1993; Abate 1994; Diamond 2005; Mays 2007; Zhang et al. 2007). Recent examples in Darfur and Syria indicate the nexus of environmental stress and violent conflict is a reality and that the specter of contemporary environmental change and resource scarcity may prompt an increase in violent conflict (Femina and Werrell 2012). However, environmental stress alone does not trigger violent conflict, nor is an exclusively causative factor. Evidence suggests that it exacerbates conditions when it is combined with weak governance and social fragmentation, to affect an escalation of violence, typically along latent ethnic divisions. Furthermore, the spatial distribution of contemporary environmental stress is pervasive, but not uniform. Contemporary trends indicate that environmentally driven violence is concentrated in the developing world or regions with extreme social fragmentation (Homer-Dixon 1999; Gleditsch et al. 2007). Developing states are more susceptible to environmentally triggered violent conflict because they are, characteristically, more dependent on the environment for their economic productivity have manifested persistently weak governance (Homer-Dixon 1999; Galgano 2007).

Weak governance is a seminal problem in the developing world, and since 1990, the number of failing states has increased. The World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2003) examined effective sovereignty and governance by monitoring six key metrics as a means of quantifying the level of effective state control. Their findings suggest that of 187 states examined, 92 exhibited considerable levels of political instability and can be categorized as failing states. In the category of government effectiveness, 75 states exhibit significant levels of failure, and 20 of those showed an alarming drop in government control (Kaufmann et al. 2003). This trend has continued during the past decade and evidence now suggests that nearly 60% of the states in the developing world experience critical governance issues and are unable to adapt to climate change or other environmental shocks (FSI 2017). Ungoverned space is problematical because these places have large areas that are outside of effective government control and thus, can be affected severely by humanitarian disasters, environmental stress, and ethnic conflict. This is because they typically lack effective institutions and the financial and material resources to safeguard the population from the effects of environmental stress (Galgano 2007). This raises the complexity of the problem for government leaders as well as directors of non-governmental organizations and intergovernmental bodies as they attempt to develop relief strategies, especially without an effective framework for understanding the nature of the conflict and its environmental underpinnings (deMenocal 2001).

Environmental stress will play a pervasive role in future conflicts because the economic well-being of about one–half of the world’s population is tied directly to the land, thus making agricultural space, water, fuel, and forested space critical environmental indicators, especially considering anticipated population growth and projected climate change (IPCC 2014). This is important because nearly two billion people do not have access to clean drinking water (Gleick 2008), and nearly 75% of the world’s most impoverished inhabitants are subsistence farmers. Drought, desertification, deforestation, soil erosion, and exhaustion are major problems in these regions. These are compounded by the fact that although agricultural space, biomass fuels, and water are renewable resources, in many places non–sustainable practices are depleting them far beyond their renewal capacity (Homer-Dixon 1999). This scenario is made more problematical because anticipated population growth, especially in the developing world, will result in higher per capita consumption rates, exacerbating extant non-sustainable practices.

3 Framework for Analysis

Since 1990, violent conflicts have occurred in Bosnia, Kosovo, Croatia, Rwanda, Ivory Coast, Burundi, Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kashmir, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Palestinian Territories, Darfur, Libya, and Syria (Kaufman 1996; Renner 2002; Femina and Werrell 2012). It would be mistaken to assert that environmental stress instigated these conflicts, and too difficult to disaggregate their human and environmental components because they are interrelated and complex. Consequently, if we attempt a proactive approach to mitigate environmentally enabled conflict, it is useful to employ an analytical framework from which we can make informed assessments (Butts 1994). This framework must account for anthropogenic and natural environmental processes and recognize fundamental ethnic, economic, cultural, and political issues behind regional instability, understanding that each place is different (Homer-Dixon 1999).

Detractors of this perspective of conflict analysis argue that they result solely from politico-military factors, which are minimally influenced by environmental stress, and allude to environmental determinism––this too is an unsophisticated approach. Environmental stress and scarcity result from the combined influence of anthropogenic effects on the environment in conjunction with the vulnerability of the ecosystem. Scarcity and stress contribute to conflict only under certain circumstances, but there is no deterministic link (Percival and Homer-Dixon 1995). Not all violent conflicts are alike and the influence of environmental stress on warfare will vary in magnitude from example to example. Nonetheless, there is compelling evidence that indicates that environmental stress does enable violent conflicts (Gibbons 1993; Abate 1994; Homer-Dixon 1999; Renner 2002; Diamond 2005; Gleditsch et al. 2007; Mays 2007; Zhang et al. 2007; IPCC 2014).

The relationships between food, population growth, migration, climate, environmental resources, and environmental stress are evident in many developing states (Homer-Dixon 1999). This Malthusian paradigm generates much disagreement among scholars. Nevertheless, both sides have to agree on an irrefutable outcome that was evident in Rwanda in 1994––population growth and environmental stress, superimposed over latent ethic and political divisions will, in the end, be solved one-way or another. Thus, we use a framework for conflict analysis that identifies sources of environmental stress and linkages to political, cultural, economic, and ethnic dimensions. The framework is developed after the work of Butts (1994), Percival and Homer-Dixon (1995), Homer-Dixon (1999)), and Diamond (2005). The framework is not intended to be predictive or proscriptive, only an analytical tool to account for dynamic and complex factors that contribute to environmentally enabled conflict.

The framework (Fig. 1) is not a checklist because such inventories tend to disconnect intrinsically linked factors into artificially discrete variables. Instead, it forms the basis for a narrative explaining links between environmental stress and conflict. The framework suggests that environmentally triggered conflict evolves from four fundamental processes: (1) unsustainable practices; (2) natural environmental change; (3) governance; and (4) human activity. These processes form the basis of the framework and are not mutually exclusive: they take place concurrently, and occur at the intersection of the natural landscape and human activity. So too are the outcomes: (1) resource shortages; (2) ecosystem degradation; (3) loss of agricultural productivity; (4) disease; (5) economic decline; (6) population change; (7) decline of effective governance; and (8) violent conflict.

Fig. 1
figure 1

The environmental security framework for conflict analysis

Full size image

4 The Rwandan Genocide of 1994

The 1994 Rwandan conflict resulted in the genocide of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Tutsi and Hutu sympathizers and was the largest atrocity during 35–years of conflict in Rwanda (Department of State 2002). Although the 1994 outbreak was the most vivid, violence between ethnic Hutu and Tutsi was not unique; it was only the most disastrous. Between 1959–1994, thousands of Hutu and Tutsi were slaughtered as part of the political struggle to gain control of Rwanda following Belgian colonial rule. However, the salient variables that differentiates this event are that unsustainable environmental practices, drought, decreased agricultural output, rapid population growth, and economic collapse had destabilized Rwandan society, exacerbating ethic divisions, and eroded the government’s ability to sustain a secure living environment (Percival and Homer-Dixon 1995; Dulian 2004).

The 1994 genocide was carried out by two extremist Hutu militia groups, the Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi, between April and July. Some estimates put the death toll between 800,000 and 1,000,000, which represents about 75% of the Tutsi population and about 11% of Rwanda’s total population (Newbury 1995). This scale of killing is particularly gruesome because the weapon of choice was the machete, and the U.N. estimates that 1000 Rwandans were hacked to death every 20 min during the height of the genocide (Melvern 1999). So then, how did the nexus of ethnic friction, ineffective governance, and environmental stress come together to enable mass-murder?

4.1 Society and Governance

The distinction between Hutu and Tutsi is not expressly ethnic or racial, but rather economic. The Hutu are farmers and the Tutsi pastoralists who were more economically prosperous. Tutsi dominated the region politically and simply labeled the indigenous people “Hutu.” Hence, Hutu came to be a trans-ethnic identity associated with subjugation (Mitchell 1997). The Belgians, seeking an explanation for the complex society they found in the colony, framed the Hutu–Tutsi distinction as one of race. They issued racial identification cards, giving preferential treatment to Tutsis for administrative and economic positions, further deepening this latent ethnic division (Newbury 1995). When independence came in 1961, this pseudo–racial divide propelled Rwanda into a 35–year period of civil unrest, conflict, and forced migration, punctuated by periods of relative calm (Diamond 2005).

The downing of the Rwandan President’s plane on 6 April 1994 served as the political catalyst for the start of the genocide, and the killing was well organized with government support. By the time it started, Hutu militia was 30,000 strong and organized nationwide. Furthermore, there were widespread examples of government soldiers participating in the violence as well (Department of State 2002). The orgy of violence was to continue—as the West stood by—until the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) seized control of the country and effectively ended the violence in mid-July 1994 (Mitchell 1997).

4.2 Population Growth

Perhaps the seminal environmental stressor in Rwanda was its population density and the spiral of ecosystem degradation it engendered. Rwanda is situated in East Africa (Fig. 2), which has the highest regional population growth in the world, averaging about 4.1%, with a doubling time of 17 years. Rwanda is one of the world’s most densely populated states, and the most densely populated in Africa: its 1995 population was about 7.5 million with a growth rate of 4.7%. To make matters worse, large internal refugee displacements pushed increasing numbers of people into environmentally sensitive areas (Percival and Homer-Dixon 1995).

Fig. 2
figure 2

Map of Rwanda and East Africa

Full size image

Explosive population growth was enabled by a number of interrelated human factors to include adoption of non–native crops, improved sanitation and health care, and relative political stability, which opened up once contested areas for farming. Characteristics of Rwanda’s natural landscape facilitated population growth as well. Rwanda has comparatively higher relief and moderate temperatures. This is important because lower temperatures curtail vector populations, thus limiting the spread of disease (Diamond 2005). Rwanda also experiences moderate amounts of rainfall in two seasonal peaks (Fig. 2), which permits year-round farming, and limits nutrient leaching. Furthermore, its volcanic soils are fertile, and the geologic structure establishes conditions for a sustainable groundwater supply. Therefore, sustainable farming practices should enable Rwandans to produce crops to support a growing population (Mitchell 1997; Diamond 2005).

By 1994, however, population growth, migration, and unsustainable farming practices dangerously degraded the environment and diminished food output. Rwanda’s population growth meant that there was little useful arable land left for cultivation. Furthermore, about half of all farming in Rwanda is conducted on hill slopes greater than 10–degrees. Over–cultivation and cultivation on marginal land led to increased erosion and decreased soil fertility (Clay et al. 1998). Thus, Rwanda was transformed from one of the region’s leading producers in per capita food production in 1980, to one of its worst by 1990. Although total food output increased by 10% between 1980 and 1990, per capita production declined nearly 20% (Percival and Homer-Dixon 1995). The basic problem was that population growth was nearly exponential, but its food production increased at something approximating a linear rate that had begun to decline. Environmental stress damaged the agricultural system and food production decreased. Consequently, as food became scarce and internal migration became commonplace, a dangerous strain was placed on latent ethic divisions (Diamond 2005).

4.3 Ecocide

The foundations of Rwanda’s environmental degradation are associated with rapid population growth and a series of unsustainable land use practices, which were underscored by a decade–long drought. By 1990, Rwanda had experienced 15 years of relative calm and prosperity. It established a trade surplus built on coffee and tea exports, and attracted substantial development investment by the World Bank. By every measure, it appeared that Rwanda was a model African state. Events conspired, however, to destroy this illusion and trigger the genocide. The first was a steep decline in world coffee and tea prices, which the Rwandan economy could not absorb, and subsequently collapsed, which was followed by withdrawal of external monetary support. The second factor was environmental, which quickly exposed extant unsustainable land use practices that over–stressed the environment. During the early 1990s, a major drought affected East Africa and Rwanda in particular. Rainfall totals declined by as much as 30%, but more importantly, the drought revealed a set of fundamental land use problems, namely deforestation, soil erosion, and soil exhaustion (Newbury 1995; Diamond 2005).

Rwanda’s large population depended on subsistence farming, which was pushed into marginal land. Remarkably, even though Rwanda was a relatively prosperous state; population growth was not offset by new farming technology and more efficient practices. Instead, more land was placed under the plow; and thus, by 1985, all arable land in Rwanda, discounting that devoted to parks and other government land use, was under cultivation (Percival and Homer-Dixon 1995). To make this happen, forests were clear–cut and marshes were drained, exposing slopes to runoff and erosion, thus limiting the percolation of precipitation into the ground water table. Fallow periods were shortened resulting in soil exhaustion. Deforestation led to severe soil erosion and a lowering of the water table to the extent that streams began to run dry. Hence, when the climate began to shift into a decadal drought cycle, the ability to irrigate was lost. Clear–cutting was also the result of Rwanda’s high fuel–wood consumption, which was using 2.3 million cubic meters more than it was producing (Mitchell 1997).

The final variable in this ecocide was land tenure practices. The normal farm plot in 1980 was about 2.5 acres per family. As the population grew, additional arable land was tilled, yet food production could not accommodate the number of people to feed. Furthermore, the average farm plot was reduced to less than one acre per family as custom normally dictated that the oldest son would inherent the family farm. Once all of the arable land was taken, younger siblings had to remain at home; hence, family farms were split almost infinitesimally, and larger families had to be fed by increasingly small and unproductive farm plots (Clay et al. 1998).

The basic components of Rwanda’s environmental security framework are summarized in Fig. 3. The seminal problem was that Rwanda had a large, densely concentrated population that depended on the land for resources that were rapidly diminishing resulting from non-sustainable practices and environmental change. About 90% of Rwandans were engaged in subsistence agriculture on increasingly smaller plots of land with declining productivity and by 1994, population had clearly outpaced food production. These environmental factors, combined with the collapse of the global coffee market, as well as latent ethic problems and political competition perhaps pushed this society over the edge.

Fig. 3
figure 3

Framework summary for Rwanda

Full size image

5 Summary and Conclusions

Environmental security is, for the purpose of this analysis, defined as a process involving, environmental risk analysis based on an understanding of the complex interactions between anthropogenic and natural processes that destabilize the environment and contribute to instability or conflict. To operationalize this definition we use an analytical framework that is not proscriptive or predictive, rather it is a method for organizing the varied, dynamic, and complex environmental factors that produce regional instability and enable violent intrastate conflict. The framework for environmental security analysis is intended to form the foundation for a narrative explaining links between environmental stress and conflict to include: non–sustainable practices that degrade ecosystems; natural environmental change or events; governmental practices; and human activity.

No two conflicts are the same, thus accentuating the need for careful assessments of regional and local conditions to understand how ethnic, economic, and political tensions are affected by environmental stress. The Rwanda example demonstrates the fundamental problem with this type of analysis: factors of the human landscape and environmental stress are not mutually exclusive. They are complicated and inextricably linked making it difficult to quantify how much the environment has enabled a violent conflict. Nonetheless, the Rwanda example also demonstrates that population growth and severe environmental stress caused by non-sustainable practices, superimposed over latent ethic and political divisions will, in the end, be solved sometimes very violently.

Complex, interacting factors enabled Rwanda’s genocide, and military geography offers compelling insight and an especially valuable vantage point from which to conduct an analysis of conflict and environmental security. Rwanda’s genocide, like other violent conflicts, had profound roots in long-standing ethnic distrust, politically charged manipulation, and weak governance; but, economic disparity and environmental stress were certainly contributing factors. In Rwanda’s case, a principally rural society that depended heavily on subsistence agriculture and resource extraction from the environment proved particularly vulnerable to the effects of environmental stress, which threatened its stability even before the 1994 genocide. Evidence suggests, however, that by 1994, these stresses, combined with economic collapse and weak governance, precipitated a three-month-long episode of violence the likes of which the world has seldom witnessed.