Skip to main content

The Iranian Reform Movement and the Iranian Student Movement

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
The Iranian Reform Movement
  • 228 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter forms a trilogy on the Iranian student movement. The first episode of this trilogy traces the development of the Iranian university student movement in post-charisma Iran. It explore the changes this movement has experienced and the mechanisms it has been subject to, which have transformed it from a justice-oriented movement to a democracy-oriented one. The main forces influencing this movement are intellectuals and women. These were crucial elements of a movement that was mostly characterized as dedicated to reform in contemporary Iran.

Three hypotheses are formulated with respect to the determinants of student support for the reform movement in Iranian universities in the 1990s: student reformism appears to flourish particularly among students who (1) receive government assistance; (2) attend larger universities; and (3) do not belong to the traditionally religious groups based in mosques. Based upon this analysis, some generalizations are formulated concerning (1) the psychology and behavior patterns peculiar to students due to their status in society; and (2) some social conditions favorable to student movements. Conversely, two hypotheses are formulated with regard to the determinants of the student withdrawal of support for the reform movement after 2000: (1) the failure of elected bodies to fulfill the goals of the reform movement; and (2) the insistence of Islamist reformers on ideological and behavioral principles that have been the core of the Islamist ideology in Iran.

The second episode relates to the transition process from party politics and civil society activism to passivism and civil disobedience as the main strategies of the Iranian student movement in its struggle against despotism and authoritarianism in contemporary Iran. After a short review of the history of this movement, I will explain its foundations, contexts and implications.

Based on discourse analysis of statements by university student organizations between 1996 and 2006, the third episode will address the pros and cons of five approaches to politics in the reform movement era based on five discourses among university students in the past two decades of Iranian politics and their consequences for reshaping the Iranian polity. This section first discusses five socio-political processes: Islamicization; social differentiation; limited political competition; transformation of Shi’i authority; and personalization of power. These processes would subsequently lead to three social and political schisms in Iranian society: inequality, political, social and cultural discrimination, and secular–Islamist tension. These developments are crucial for shaping not only schisms and gaps among different political factions and student groups, but also at some stages, links and bridges among them.

Referring to these schisms, political discourses shape the ideologies and actions of Iranian student movements. These discourses are social justice, tradition, totalitarianism, pluralism and Islamic democracy. Even if these discourses were no more than intellectual pronouncements by university students, they were powerful enough to extend to Iranian political society. Studying these discourses may help us to better analyze and understand the interactions among different Iranian student groups and clarify how they reacted to political events external to the student movements. My approach to understanding the social-political processes, social schisms and discourses is analytical and interpretive.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 49.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 64.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/390790.stm.

  2. 2.

    news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1021392.stm.

  3. 3.

    isna.ir/Main/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-661921.

  4. 4.

    abc.net.au/pm/stories/s727133.htm.

  5. 5.

    payvand.com/news/03/jun/1068.html.

  6. 6.

    In late June 2003, a letter signed by 166 MPs decried “the brutal behavior towards the students” by the Basij and Ansār-e Hezbollah, but nonetheless warned students to be wary of suspicious elements infiltrating their ranks. The letter also stated that the demonstrations were the result of the absence of channels for criticism of the political system and of the regime’s failure to pay attention to the people’s democratic demands.

  7. 7.

    After demolishing the office of Muslim Student Association by the President of Amir Kabir University, the students did not let the Minister of Higher Education to enter the classroom to teach on December 2, 2006 (iranews.org/Default_view.asp?@=47502&T=%25).

  8. 8.

    Donya-ye Eqtesad, March 16, 2017.

  9. 9.

    Hamid Showkat, interviewed by Roozonline, November 7, 2005, roozonline.com/08interview/012319.shtml; Mohammad Ghā’ed, interviewed by Roozonline, November 7, 2005, roozonline.com/08interview/012318.shtml (both accessed January 17, 2007).

  10. 10.

    UCBAS’s statement on the beginning of the academic year 2005–2006, jomhouri.com/a/06ann/004442.php; UCBAS’s statement on the arrest of hundreds of public bus drivers in Tehran, sufnews.blogfa.com/8411.aspx; The Committee for Following the Starred Students’ Cases (students who were deprived of registration because of their political opinions and political affiliations) asked all Iranian students to sign a petition: h-advar.com/advar/1385/09/post_2.php (all accessed January 17, 2007).

  11. 11.

    According to government statistics, which are always manipulated, only 46% of the population participated in the ninth parliamentary election in 2008: balatarin.com/permlink/2008/4/13/1272887.

  12. 12.

    In the second municipality council elections in 2002, 49.96% of the whole population of the country and 23.87% of Tehranians participated in the election: moi.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=Event&CategoryID=832a711b-95fe-4505-8aa3-38f5e17309c9&LayoutID=1dc2d9d3-a0bc-4104-a90a-e8cf4a94441a&ID=4a7f7d56-d21b-4ecd-8111-93abec839020. The turnover for the seventh parliament and ninth presidential elections were 51.21 and 59.76% for the whole country, respectively. moi.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=Event&CategoryID=832a711b-95fe-4505-8aa3-38f5e17309c9&LayoutID=1dc2d9d3-a0bc-4104-a90a-e8cf4a94441a&ID=0ad76c80-7a53-4c36-beef-426ab4f4f6c0 (both accessed January 18, 2007).

  13. 13.

    According to Articles 5 of the Constitution, “during the occultation of the Vali-e Asr [leader of the age] the leadership of the ummah [nation of Islam] devolve upon the just and pious person, who is fully aware of the circumstances of his age, courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability, will assume the responsibilities of this office in accordance with Article 107.” Article 107 makes the mechanism for the selection of the leader clear: “The experts [all of them clerics] will review and consult among themselves concerning all the religious men possessing the qualifications specified in Articles 5 and 109. In the event they find one of them better versed in Islamic regulations or in political and social issues, or possessing general popularity or special prominence for any of the qualifications mentioned in Article 109, they shall elect him as the Leader. Otherwise, in the absence of such a superiority, they shall elect and declare one of them as the Leader.” Article 109 describes the essential qualifications and conditions for the leader: “a. Scholarship, as required for performing the functions of religious leader in different fields, b. Justice and piety, as required for the leadership of the Islamic ummah, c. Right political and social perspicacity, prudence, courage, administrative facilities, and adequate capability for leadership.”

  14. 14.

    The Iranian national censuses of 1956, 1966, 1976, 1986, 1991 and 1996, Sālnāmeh-ye Āmāri-ye Keshvar (National Statistical Yearbook), 1976 and Sālnāmeh-ye Āmāri-ye Keshvar (National Statistical Yearbook), 1996.

  15. 15.

    The Iranian national censuses of 1956, 1966, 1976, 1986, 1991, and 1996, Sālnāmeh-ye Āmāri-ye Keshvar (National Statistical Yearbook), 1976 and Sālnāmeh-ye Āmāri-ye Keshvar (National Statistical Yearbook), 1996.

  16. 16.

    Donya-ye Eghtesad, March 16, 2017.

  17. 17.

    Almost all religious institutions have a line in the governmental budget: mporg.ir/ghanon-85/jadavel%20kalan/A02.html (accessed January 17, 2007).

  18. 18.

    Nāder Shari’atmadār, a Tehran council member who is in the same political camp as Ahmadinejad, Roozonline, November 3, 2005, roozonline.com/08interview/016375.shtml (accessed January 17, 2007).

  19. 19.

    According to reliable sources in the government, each section of the ruling clerics benefits from lucrative importing businesses relating to basic goods: sugar, rice, tire, electronics, tea, cigarette and cooking oil. The foreign trade is monopolized in the hands of the government by the constitution and the government delegates this task to high-ranking clerics and their loyalists through a licensing procedure that is not transparent and open to the public.

  20. 20.

    Some recent evidence for this claim are the statements of Students’ Unity Consolidation Bureau on the detention of tens of bus drivers in Tehran including Mansour Osānlu, the secretary of the Tehran’s Bus Drivers Syndicate news.gooya.com/politics/archives/043339.php and the oppression of a women’s demonstration on June 12, 2006 news.gooya.com/politics/archives/049486.php (both accessed January 17, 2007).

  21. 21.

    On December 12, 2006, Iranian students staged a rare demonstration against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, burning pictures of him as he delivered a speech at Amir Kabir University. It was the first time after the end of the reform movement that a group of dissidents standing in front of a president backed by the military and intelligence expressed their protest against the trends in the country. The protesting students interrupted Ahmadinejad’s speech with slogans, including “Death to the Dictator,” “Get lost Basij”—a reference to the horde of right-wing students who support the government and had been bussed in from Pasdārān Guards centers—“Get lost liars”—referring to the state-run press and TV channel reporters—“Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, agent of corruption and discrimination,” and “Political prisoners must be freed.” The students slogans of “Down with the Dictator” were not referring to Ahmadinejad as a dictator but intended to refer to the leader of the country 1384.gooya.com/politics/archives/2006/12/055657.php (accessed January 17, 2007). On December 13, 2006, Shiraz University students protested against the Minister of Interior, Mostafā Poor-Mohammadi, during his address, which was supposed to be for like-minded students and university officials roozna.com (accessed January 17, 2007). The Islamic Republic of Iran says that these protests demonstrate freedom of expression in Iran, but this is not true. All dissidents who have spoken out have later paid a price by being prosecuted, jailed and tortured by the militia or the intelligence ministry agents.

  22. 22.

    Afshin Matin-Asgari, Confederation of Iranian Students, National Union iranica.com/newsite/articles/v6f2/v6f2a003.html (accessed January 17, 2007).

  23. 23.

    The Nationalist Democratic faction of Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat, ‘Allāmeh Spectrum, strongly criticized Ali Afshāri and Akbar ‘Atri’s participation in a panel discussion of the US Senate on Iran in March 2006 (mellimazhabi.org/news/032006news/0603tahkim.htm). The statement proclaims that despite the challenges the students face, the participants should have exercised discretion and not joined “two of the most right-wing politicians in the US” with a certain agenda. The statement contends that the Iranian student movement in its 50-year history has always relied on the internal dynamics of the democratic process, and has never appealed to foreign interests to interfere in its political developments. This criticism is totally understandable in view of the Iranian students’ long anti-West tradition. The nationalist Democratic and Enlightenment factions believe in Islam as their guide and see religious intellectualism as a way to address different readings of Islam in the student movement, while the modern faction has no ideological limitation on its membership (isna.ir/Main/NewsXML.aspx?ID=661921, accessed January 17, 2007). The modern faction was open to secularists as well as students who believed in religious intellectualism.

  24. 24.

    Ahmadinejad accused the students who interrupted his lecture at Amir Kabir University of being on the payroll of the USA (advarnews.us/university/3448.aspx); Mohammad Taqi Mesbāh Yazdi has repeatedly talked about a suitcase full of dollar bills, once 20 million and at another time 500 million, for Iranian journalists and dissidents from CIA, sharghnewspaper.com/sal2/html/view.htm; irankhabar.com/headlines/Detailed/13675.html; jomhouri.com/a/03art/004061.php (accessed January 17, 2007).

  25. 25.

    Basij-e Dāneshjoo’e has welcomed any opportunity to ask for cutting diplomatic relationship between Iran and Great Britain, sharghnewspaper.com/830909/html/law.htm (accessed January 18, 2007). The Iran–USA diplomatic relationship is a taboo for this organization.

  26. 26.

    ‘Abdollāh Mo’meni: “Religious Identity Should not be Used as a Labeling Gun” advarnews.org/idea/664.aspx (accessed January 17, 2007); Maryam ‘Abbāsi, Right to Identity, Sharq, June 26, 2006; Mehdi Shirzād, Ignorance upon Ignorance, Sharq, May 31, 2006; Hamid Jalāeepour, It’s a Mistake to Ignore Religious Identity, Sharq, May 17, 2006.

  27. 27.

    The secretary of UCBAS, Gooya, quoting ISNA news.gooya.eu/politics/archives/2006/11/055221.php (accessed January 17, 2007).

  28. 28.

    Mesbāh believes that even the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is credible because the ruling jurist has confirmed it: namir.info/pdf/akbar_rooz5/mesbah.htm, accessed January 17, 2007.

  29. 29.

    This policy could be seen in a letter from this organization to the head of the judiciary, Mahmud Shāhrudi regarding its delay in prosecuting corrupted individuals and making decisions about those cases ilna.ir/shownews.asp?code=321736&code1=1 (accessed January 17, 2007).

  30. 30.

    This group has a long history of attacking gatherings and demonstrations by reformist student groups. In any event that is not sponsored by the authoritarian camp, this group is present to prevent or interfere.

  31. 31.

    The Reserve Officers’ Training Corps is an elective part of the college curriculum and interested students can enroll for the same. They are later absorbed into the United States Army.

  32. 32.

    Teun A. van Dijk, Politics, Ideology and Discourse discourse-in-society.org/Politics,%20ideology%20and%20discourse%20(ELL).htm (accessed January 17, 2007).

  33. 33.

    Kayhān , August 13, 2006; Kayhān, February 28, 2006.

  34. 34.

    Iranian journalists, bloggers, political activists and writers who have been arrested have been under pressure to confess in front of state-run TV cameras, hrw.org/persian/docs/2006/12/12/iran14825.htm; bbc.co.uk/go/wsy/pub/rss/1.0/-/persian/pressreview/story/2005/01/050106_la-press.shtml (both accessed January 17, 2007). There are some books that depict this procedure in detail: Behbahāni and Dāvaran (2003). Ghaffāri (1998) and Kāzemiān (2004) give an extensive report of the authors’ experiences in prison.

  35. 35.

    For some examples of these stories, see the following websites: baran.st/contents/en-uk/Chand%20nokte%20Massood%20Mafan%20Baran%208&9%20Filtrerad.htm; khateratezendan.blogspot.com; zarezadeh.blogfa.com/cat-4.aspx; news.gooya.eu/politics/archives/2007/01/056572.php#more (all accessed January 14, 2007).

  36. 36.

    Independent survey research institutions are banned to work in Iran; only those institutions that are loyal to the authoritarian camp are licensed to carry out surveys and they are no way to evaluate the results of these.

  37. 37.

    There are four reasons for unreliability of the ninth presidential election results: about 300,000 monitors, most of them from Basij, in polling stations all recruited by the Guardian Council, which takes sides in any election; the high percentage of turnover in some provinces, up to 95%, which had no precedent in Iran; turnovers higher than the population in some provinces; and irregularities in counting procedures, news.gooya.com/president84/archives/032027.php; news.gooya.com/president84/archives/032181.php; news.gooya.com/president84/archives/031899.php (all accessed January 15, 2007). Mehdi Karroubi and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as the most prominent candidates of this election questioned the results by referring to the irregularities. In a letter to Khamenei , Karroubi protests against the change of the results in the last hours of counting in the Interior Ministry: mag.gooya.com/president84/archives/031422.php; in a report on Islamic Republic Guards Corp members’ interference in the election, Hātef News posted dozens of cases where the military personnel took a position against Rafsanjani and launched negative advertising against him: mag.gooya.com/president84/archives/031871.php (both accessed January 19, 2007).

  38. 38.

    In about a year since the beginning of the Ahmadinejad administration, 57 university students’ magazines and 35 student organizations were banned, closed or disrupted; about 300 verdicts were issued for university students who have been critical of the administration; and 53 faculty members from one university alone, ‘Elm va San’at (Science and Technology) University, were pushed to retire: news.gooya.eu/politics/archives/2007/01/056521.php; 1384.gooya.com/politics/archives/2006/11/055304.php (both accessed January 15, 2007).

  39. 39.

    Husayn Shari’atmadāri, Kayhān editor and the most vocal representative of Khamenei’s opinions in the press, used this parable to explain the strategy of totalitarian camp against the reformists in his column in Kayhān in the 1990s.

  40. 40.

    The Ministry of Higher Education officials reported 28 suicides by university students in four months in 2006, news.gooya.eu/politics/archives/2007/01/056521.php (accessed January 14, 2007).

  41. 41.

    The news on scientific progress of Iran posted by the authoritarian media is focused on cloning and proliferation; no independent media has ever confirmed such news, qudsdaily.com/archive/1385/html/1/1385-01-24/page9.html; kayhannews.ir/850529/12.htm (both accessed January 13, 2007).

  42. 42.

    khabarnameh.gooya.com/ (12, 05. 2006); as an example, Matin Meshkin, a PhD student expelled from Amir Kabir University, iran-emrooz.net/index.php?/news2/11623/ (accessed January 14, 2007).

Bibliography

  • Bāghi, Emaduddin. 2000. Jonbesh-e Dāneshjoo’i Iran az Aghaz tā Eqelāb-e Eslāmi (Iranian Student Movement: From the Beginning to the Islamic Revolution). Tehran: Jāme`eh-ye Irāniān.

    Google Scholar 

  • Behbahāni, Farhād, and Habibollāh Dāvaran. 2003. Dar Mehmāni-ye Hāj Āqā va Dāstān-e Yek `Eterāf (In Hāj Āqā’s Party and a Confession Story). Tehran: Bahār-e Fardā.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ghaffāri, R. 1998. An Eye Witness Report of Islamic Republic Prisons. Koln: Mehr.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hajjāriān, Sa`id. 1999. The Only Beating Heart during Political Impasse. In Dirooz, Emrooz va Fardā-ye Jonbesh-e Dāneshjou’i-e Iran (Past, Present, and Future of the Iranian Student Movement), ed. Mas`oud Safiri. Tehran: Nai.

    Google Scholar 

  • Karimian, Alireza. 2002. Jonbesh-e Dāneshjoo’i Iran, az Ta’sis-e Dāneshgāh tā Piroozi-ye Eqelāb-e Eslāmi (Iranian Student Movement, from the Establishment of Universities to the Victory of the Islamic Revolution). Tehran: Entāshārāt-e Markaz-e Asnād-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmi.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kāzemiān, Mortezā. 2004. Asrār-e Tārikhkānehā (The Secrets of Dark Houses). Tehran: Qasideh Sarā.

    Google Scholar 

  • Matin-Asgari, Afshin. 2002. Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mohammadi, Majid. 1999. Darāmadi bar Raftār-e Siāsi-ye Dāneshjooyān-e Irani (An Introduction to Political Behavior of Iranian Students: 1979–99). Tehran: Kavir.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Mohammadi, M. (2019). The Iranian Reform Movement and the Iranian Student Movement. In: The Iranian Reform Movement. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90969-1_7

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics