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Abstract

In the Canadian Constitution, the Constitution Act 1867 [For the Constitution Act, 1867, see http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const//index.html#docCont (accessed on 4 January 2018).], the principal enumeration of competences for the two law-making spheres is established in Section 91 on the powers of the Parliament and Section 92 on the exclusive powers of the provincial legislatures. Similarly, Sections 18 and 27 of the Self-Government Act of the Åland Islands provide for two sets of enumerations [for the Self-Government Act, see http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1991/en19911144.pfd (accessed on 4 January 2018)], and in principle, so does the Danish law that establishes a short list of enumerated powers for the Parliament of Denmark, while making possible transfer of legislative powers from the national law-maker to the Faroe Islands by way of enactments of the Faroese Legislative Assembly [for the Takeover Act, see http://stm.dk/_p_13089.html (accessed on 4 January 2018)].

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For the Constitution Act, 1867, see http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const//index.html#docCont (accessed on 4 January 2018).

  2. 2.

    For a translation into English of the 1991 Self-Government Act, see http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1991/en19911144.pdf (accessed on 4 January 2018).

  3. 3.

    At the material time, the understanding seemed to be that the self-government of the Faroe Islands was of a delegated nature, to some extent comparable to municipalities, but over the decades, the arrangement is increasingly understood as one where the different parts of Denmark constitute a Commonwealth under the Constitution of Denmark where the Legislative Assembly of the Faroe Islands exercises legislative powers proper. See Sølvará 2003, pp. 168–175.

  4. 4.

    Lov nr. 137 af 23. Marts 1948 om Færøernes Hjemmestyre, or the so-called 1948 Home Rule Act, available in translation into English at http://stm.dk/_p_13089.html (accessed on 4 January 2018).

  5. 5.

    Lov nr. 578 af 24. Juni 2005 om de færøske myndigheders overtagelse af sager og sagsområder, or the so-called 2005 Takeover Act, available in translation into English at http://stm.dk/_p_13089.html (accessed on 4 January 2018).

  6. 6.

    More specifically on the various reasons for the evolution of the pre-Confederation Canada, see Inwood 2013, pp. 24–45.

  7. 7.

    See Hogg 2014, who emphasizes the French language and the Catholic religion in the context [NB! References to Hogg 2014 are to sections in the supplemented loose-leaf volume, not to pages]. See also Inwood 2013, pp. 45–55, and Smith 2010, pp. 40–61. In the scheme of distribution of legislative competence in Canada, language is ancillary to a main legislative competence. The order of government that that has law-making power over courts has the power to decide the language of courts (Jones v. A.G. of New Brunswick, [1975] 2 SCR 182, 1974 CanLII 164 (SCC); provincial and also some federal power) and the one that has law-making power over commerce also has jurisdiction over language of commerce or various materials produced by business operations (Devine v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 SCR 790, 1988 CanLII 20 (SCC); provincial power), but when passing such laws, the linguistic rights of the Constitution must be respected and taken into account.

  8. 8.

    See, e.g., Légaré 2008.

  9. 9.

    The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was enacted in 1982 as a part of the Constitution.

  10. 10.

    Such laws are the Election Act, An Act respecting the National Assembly, the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Charter of the French Language, the Charter on the Exercise of the Fundamental Rights and Prerogatives of the People of Quebec, and the Executive Power Act. See also Brun et al. 2008, pp. 18–19.

  11. 11.

    See, e.g., Funston and Meehan 2003, p. 35, who summarize some of the main conventions involved in responsible government as follows: “1. the Governor General only acts on the advice of the Privy Council; 2. this Privy Council is not the full Council described in s. 13 of the Constitution Act, 1867, but rather is a much smaller subset, the Cabinet; 3. the Cabinet is chosen by the Prime Minister, and the number of ministers in it is up to him/her; 4. the Prime Minister, although mentioned nowhere in the Constitution Act, 1867, is the head of government; 5. the Prime Minister and his/her Cabinet must have the support of a majority of members in the House of Commons; 6. the Prime Minister and his/her Cabinet must have seats in the House of Commons or Senate; 7. House of Commons support for Prime Ministers and Cabinets is rallied by means of political parties; and 8. a failure to command the support of a majority of members in the House of Commons results in the government stepping down and, usually, the calling of a general election.” See also Hogg 2014, s. 9.1. Other conventions mentioned by Funston and Meehan 2003, p. 35f., in a non-exclusive list of examples relate to “1. the exercise of prerogative powers of the Crown; 2. the operation of Parliament and the legislatures generally, including political parties and, at the national level, the relationship between the elected House of Commons and the appointed Senate; 3. the operation of the federal and provincial cabinets, ministers and civil services and the relationships among them; 4. federalism generally, aside from the formal division of powers, including reservation and disallowance of federal and provincial Acts, and the role of the federally appointed Lieutenant Governors in provincial matters; 5. the role of judges and courts in the governmental process and the independence of judges and courts from interference by the executive and legislative branches; […]”.

  12. 12.

    Hogg 2014, s. 5.3(e).

  13. 13.

    See the decision of the Council of the League of Nations of 24 June 1921, as supplemented on 27 June 1921 by the more concrete guarantees for the Åland Islands. This Åland Islands Settlement of June 1921 should not be confused with the Åland Islands Convention, that is, the Convention on the Non-Fortification and Neutralization of the Åland Islands, done in October 1921. See Suksi 2011, pp. 149–152.

  14. 14.

    Suksi 2005, p. 173 f.

  15. 15.

    There is, however, no evidence in the travaux preparatoires concerning the 1951 Self-Government Act that the Canadian model would have been considered in the context of the Åland Islands, when the system of double enumeration was created. See Regeringens proposition RP 100/1946 rd till Riksdagen angående självstyrelselag för Åland and Regeringens proposition RP 38/1948 rd till Riksdagen angående självstyrelselag för Åland. As concerns distribution of competence, the government proposal aimed at eliminating the many problems of interpretation caused by the formulations in the single enumeration of the powers of the Parliament of Finland.

  16. 16.

    See Ålands självstyrelse i utveckling 2017.

  17. 17.

    However, the case has also been made that the Faroe Islands was a country within the Danish realm just as Norway had been until 1814 and Iceland until 1944. See speech by Eidesgaard 2006.

  18. 18.

    See Sølvará 2003, p. 164.

  19. 19.

    Lov nr. 137 af 23. Marts 1948 om Færøernes Hjemmestyre. However, in the beginning, the general understanding was that the self-government of the Faroe Islands was to some extent comparable to municipal self-government. See Sølvará 2003, p. 168.

  20. 20.

    For a description of the steps in the negotiations between the Danish and Faroese governments leading up to the adoption of the 2005 Takeover Act, see travaux preparatoires, Forslag til Lov om de færøske myndigheders overtagelse af sager og sagsområder, fremsat den 11. maj 2005 af statsministeren (Anders Fogh Rasmussen), section 1 of general aim and background.

  21. 21.

    Lov nr. 579 af 24. Juni 2005 om Færøernes landsstyres indgåelse af folkeretlige aftaler. See Circular Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Department of International Law (JTF. File No. 8.U.107), issued in Copenhagen on 7 November 2005 to all heads of diplomatic missions accredited to the Kingdom of Denmark, where treaty powers of the Faroe Islands and Greenland, established in two acts, one for each of the entities, are brought to the attention on the basis of the constitutional position of the two entities within the Danish Realm. At the same time as reference is made to the fact that the two acts are “in conformity with the right of self-determination of the People of the Faroes and the People of Greenland under international law”. In the note, the Government of Denmark actually recognizes that the population of the Faroe Islands is a people entitled to self-determination, although that entitlement is not spelled out in positive Danish law in the same way it is spelled out for Greenland.

  22. 22.

    For a consideration of the relationship between the 1948 Home Rule Act and the 2005 Takeover Act, see Forslag til Lov om de færøske myndigheders overtagelse af sager og sagsområder, fremsat den 11. maj 2005 af statsministeren (Anders Fogh Rasmussen), section 5. For a consideration of the relationship between the mechanism of taking over Danish legislative to the Faroe Islands, on the one hand, and the Danish Constitution, on the other, see appendix 1 to the proposal (Bilag 1: Notat om grænserne for overladelse af sager og sagsområder til de færøske myndigheder af hensyn til rigsenheden og særlige bestemmelser i grundloven), where section 3.2. concludes that the Constitution of Denmark applies in all parts of the Danish Realm and where section 3.5. concludes that it is a firm presumption that the legislative power can transfer (delegate) its competence, albeit under restrictions that follow from Section 3(1) of the Danish Constitution.

  23. 23.

    See Craig and Walters 2000, pp. 229–233, where the authors distinguish between statutory interpretation and constitutional interpretation and indicate that they are essentially different in nature. While this may be so in the Commonwealth context and against the background of the praxis of the Privy Council, the relevance of the distinction for other, very different jurisdictions is likely to be very limited.

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Suksi, M. (2018). Construction of Two Enumerations. In: Double Enumeration of Legislative Powers in a Sub-State Context. SpringerBriefs in Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90921-9_2

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