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Like Fish in a Stream? Considering the Agency of the UN Peacekeepers of the Global South: Rwanda and India as Case Studies

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Ethiopian Yearbook of International Law 2017

Part of the book series: Ethiopian Yearbook of International Law ((EtYIL,volume 2017))

Abstract

‘Blue Helmet’ peacekeeping operations have come to characterise the UN’s response to armed conflict. These operations have evolved from the ‘simple’ monitoring of ceasefires into complex ‘peacebuilding’ projects and interventionist ‘peace enforcement’ actions and employ considerable forces of peacekeepers, contributed by member states. The composition of these forces has also transformed over the period as the previously predominant troops from the developed Northern states have given way to the peacekeepers of the Global South. Peacekeeping scholarship is sharply divided between those who regard this sea change as indicative of a rising Global South and those who perceive its soldiers as exploited substitutes for the developed world, finessed into the role via a West-oriented UN. This paper asks if the current composition of troop-contributing countries to UN Blue Helmet peacekeeping operations reflects the changing identities, interests and ambitions of the Global South or just the continuing hegemony of the developed world. Do the Southern states have agency in respect of their participation, or are they merely ‘fish in a stream’, obliged by persistent hegemonic currents to conform to the agendas of the North? Using a case study of India and Rwanda, the article argues that Northern hegemony does still find expression in UN peacekeeping operations but is straining to contain the more assertive Southern states, which participate, largely, for their own carefully considered, often very disparate, reasons.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    There is debate as to whether ‘the appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment’ of Article 36, Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter provide a basis for peacekeeping missions, alone or in conjunction with Article 42, Chapter VII. The latter allows for ‘such action by air, sea, or land forces’ necessary to maintaining or restoring international peace and security and, combined, Chapters VI and VII of the Charter seem to provide a foundation for both consensual and non-consensual peacekeeping. Howe et al. (2015), pp. 8, 9.

  2. 2.

    Levin et al. (2016), p. 107; Gray (2016), p. 195.

  3. 3.

    Global South’ will be used here, following Dirlik (2007), p. 12, to refer to those societies, ‘largely but by no means exclusively located in the geographical south, that …face difficulties in achieving the economic and political goals of capitalist modernity’. The term is generally accepted to include emerging Southern countries, such as Brazil and India, but to exclude Australia, New Zealand and Japan.

  4. 4.

    The average strength of each mission is 4200, but only eight missions have more than 1000 personnel, and several of them have a post-conflict ‘peacebuilding’, rather than ‘peacekeeping’ role. Six African missions account for over 73,000 of the total. Providing for Peacekeeping (2017).

  5. 5.

    Providing for Peacekeeping (2017); UN Financing (2017); Levin et al. (2016), p. 108.

  6. 6.

    For an example of the positive view, see Amar (2012), pp. 1–13. For sceptics, see, Cunliffe (2013).

  7. 7.

    Cunliffe (2013), p. 30.

  8. 8.

    The ‘Global North’ includes Australia, New Zealand and Japan, alongside the developed countries of the northern hemisphere. The latter includes, and is often most characterised by, the liberal North American and European democracies, usually collectivised as ‘the West’. Dirlik (2007), pp. 12–14; Pugh (2004), p. 41.

  9. 9.

    ‘Agency’ is construed in the sense that an ‘agent performs activity that is directed at a goal…adopted on the basis of an overall practical assessment of his options and opportunities’. It assumes autonomy, as opposed to the control of others. Wilson and Shpall (2016).

  10. 10.

    The term will be applied to the ‘full spectrum of UN peace and security missions’, variously denoted as ‘peacekeeping’, ‘robust peacekeeping’, ‘peace enforcement’ or ‘peacebuilding’. More will be said about these expressions during the discussion, but the Capstone Doctrine describes them as operations deployed to prevent, manage, and/or resolve violent conflicts or reduce the risk of their recurrence’. Some regional organisations conduct peacekeeping operations, but this article is only concerned with UN missions. See UNDPKO (2008), p. 97; Gray (2016), p. 194.

  11. 11.

    For explanations of the ‘Most Different’ model, the usage of case studies and interpretive analysis, see Peters (1998), pp. 36–41; Gerring (2004), pp. 342, 343; Lamont (2015), pp. 77, 78.

  12. 12.

    Bellamy and Williams (2013).

  13. 13.

    Bellamy and Williams (2013), pp. 17–21; Nieto (2012), pp. 166, 167; Capie (2016), pp. 1–27; Hansel and Moeller (2014), pp. 141–157.

  14. 14.

    ‘Imperialism’ here refers to any system of domination and subordination organised with an imperial centre and a periphery. It thus extends beyond actual military occupation or colonialism. See Said (1994), p. 9; Cunliffe (2013), pp. 20–26.

  15. 15.

    The ‘actors’ can include NATO, the Council of Europe, the UN Commission on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights and the World Bank. Richmond (2004), pp. 83–92 and (2009).

  16. 16.

    UN Charter (1945), Article 2(1)(4).

  17. 17.

    Chandler discerns in this a switch to a people-centred, rather than a state-centred approach. See Chandler (2001), pp. 1, 2; Richmond (2004), pp. 83–101.

  18. 18.

    UNPO (2000), paras. 48–50.

  19. 19.

    UNPO (2000), paras. 35–47.

  20. 20.

    Note, however, that R2P restricts coercive, external, interventions to a last resort, and emphasis the central responsibility of the affected state itself. WSO (2005), paras. 138, 139; Howe et al. (2015), p. 9.

  21. 21.

    Cunliffe (2013), pp. 121–123.

  22. 22.

    Tanner (2010), p. 211.

  23. 23.

    Amar (2012), pp. 2, 3; Nieto (2012), pp. 162, 163; de Coning et al. (2013), pp. 135–152.

  24. 24.

    Amar (2012), p. 3.

  25. 25.

    See summary of democratic peace theory and liberal institutionalism, for instance, in Bellamy and Williams (2013), pp. 4–17.

  26. 26.

    Clark (2011), pp. 6–8; Cox (1987, 1996).

  27. 27.

    See Ruggie (1998), p. 856; Wendt (1992), pp. 392–394, both prominent proponents of social constructivism.

  28. 28.

    International Monetary Fund (2017).

  29. 29.

    Namely Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

  30. 30.

    2011 speech by Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai quoted in Hansel and Moeller (2014), p. 146.

  31. 31.

    Acharya (2011), pp. 851–869; Hansel and Moeller (2014), p. 146.

  32. 32.

    Hansel and Moeller (2014), p. 148.

  33. 33.

    India concentrates most of its peacekeeping efforts in Asia and Africa and regards itself as an advocate of developing nations. Banerjee (2013a); Hansel and Moeller (2014), p. 148; Singh (2007), pp. 72–78.

  34. 34.

    See Acharya (2011), p. 62, which also notes the support since afforded to the country’s global ambitions by Presidents G.W. Bush and Obama.

  35. 35.

    Mukherjee and Malone (2011), pp. 311–329.

  36. 36.

    India has never acceded to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. Tannenwald (2013), pp. 299–317; Singh (2007), p. 80.

  37. 37.

    Beswick (2014), p. 218.

  38. 38.

    UN Outreach Programme (2017).

  39. 39.

    UN Past Missions (2017).

  40. 40.

    See Roth (2009); Wedgwood (2010); ‘Game Over for Democracy in Rwanda’ Freedom House (2015).

  41. 41.

    Economist Intelligence Unit (2016).

  42. 42.

    Beswick (2014), pp. 221–223.

  43. 43.

    Beswick (2014), pp. 221–225.

  44. 44.

    Jowell (2014), p. 284.

  45. 45.

    Jowell (2014), p. 279.

  46. 46.

    Jowell (2014), pp. 278, 279.

  47. 47.

    Banerjee (2013a).

  48. 48.

    UN Peacekeeping Resources (2017).

  49. 49.

    Hansel and Moeller (2014), p. 141.

  50. 50.

    ‘Beswick and Jowell (2014); ‘UN Secretary-General praises India’s peacekeeping contributions in remarks at New Delhi training centre’ UN (2001); Banerjee (2013b), pp. 225–236; Banerjee (2013a); ‘Ban Thanks India for Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Efforts’ The Daily Pioneer (2014).

  51. 51.

    Banerjee (2013a); Beswick and Jowell (2014).

  52. 52.

    Banerjee (2013a).

  53. 53.

    The Constitution of India 1949, Article 51.

  54. 54.

    Nambiar (2014).

  55. 55.

    ‘Inaugural Address by Preeti Saran’ Ministry of External Affairs (2017).

  56. 56.

    Hansel and Moeller (2014), p. 148.

  57. 57.

    Wendt (1992), p. 398.

  58. 58.

    Lebow (2003), p. 126; Gill (1993), pp. 42, 43.

  59. 59.

    Banerjee (2013a).

  60. 60.

    Fennimore (1996), p. 2.

  61. 61.

    Bjorkdahl (2006), p. 215.

  62. 62.

    ‘UN owes India $55 Million for Peacekeeping Operations’ The Hindu (2017); Hansel and Moeller (2014), p. 54; Banerjee (2013a).

  63. 63.

    Banerjee (2013a).

  64. 64.

    Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, quoted in Hansel and Moeller (2014), p. 155.

  65. 65.

    ‘Speech by External Affairs Minister Shri S.M. Krishna’ Ministry of External Affairs (2010). In similar vein, see ‘India’s Global Role, Speech by Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon’ Ministry of External Affairs (2010).

  66. 66.

    ‘Africa vows to support India’s permanent seat quest at UN Security Council’ Asian Age (2011); ‘US congressional resolution introduced backing India’s UN Security Council Bid’ Press Trust of India (2016).

  67. 67.

    See for example Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj’s speech of October 2015. ‘Sushma Swaraj Calls for Security Council Seat for India, Africa’ Mint (2017).

  68. 68.

    Then vice-president Kagame in a 1996 interview, in Gourevitch and Kagame (1996), pp. 174, 175; On a similar theme see ‘Speech by H.E. Ambassador Valentine Rugwabiza, Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Member of Cabinet of the Government of Rwanda, at the 23rd Commemoration of the Genocide against the Tutsi’ Permanent Mission of Rwanda to the United Nations (2017).

  69. 69.

    Beswick (2014), pp. 222, 223.

  70. 70.

    Statement by Minister of State Eugene-Richard Gasana’ Permanent Mission of Rwanda to the United Nations (2016).

  71. 71.

    Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians (2015).

  72. 72.

    Paul Kagame and RPF cadre member Protais Musoni quoted in a report of the celebrations for the 22nd anniversary of Rwanda’s liberation. See ‘Rwanda celebrates 22 years of Liberation’ The East African (2016).

  73. 73.

    The UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peace Building Support, quoted in Beswick (2014), p. 220.

  74. 74.

    Allegedly in relation to reports of RPA/RDF genocide against Hutus in the DRC, it being claimed that Kagame had threatened to withdraw his forces from UN peace operations if unfavourable reports were not amended. See Beswick (2014), pp. 220, 221; Beswick and Jowell (2014).

  75. 75.

    Wilen (2012), pp. 1332, 1333.

  76. 76.

    Wilen (2012), p. 1331; Beswick (2014), p. 216; Jowell (2014), p. 288; US Department of State (2012).

  77. 77.

    Waugh (2004), p. 98; Beswick and Jowell (2014).

  78. 78.

    Beswick and Jowell (2014).

  79. 79.

    As in the DRC in 2008 when Indian peacekeepers were accused of sexual abuse. See Hansel and Moeller (2014), p. 154.

  80. 80.

    ‘What’s the Point of Peacekeepers When They Don’t Keep the Peace?’ The Guardian (2015).

  81. 81.

    Jaganathan and Kurtz (2014), p. 464.

  82. 82.

    Unnamed Western diplomat quoted in Jaganathan and Kurtz (2014), p. 469.

  83. 83.

    Jaganathan and Kurtz (2014), pp. 464–469.

  84. 84.

    McGreal (2015).

  85. 85.

    ‘Inaugural Address by Preeti Saran’ Ministry of External Affairs (2017).

  86. 86.

    For example, the amended MONUSCO mandate of March 2014, which authorised ‘targeted operations’ to ‘neutralise’ armed groups threating civilians and state security in the DRC. See UNSCR (2014), p. 7; Hansel and Moeller (2014), pp. 146, 147.

  87. 87.

    From a newspaper report of comments by India’s Deputy Permanent Representative Tanmaya Lal, speaking at a General Assembly debate on peacekeeping operations. See ‘India Slams UN for Unwieldy Peacekeeping Mandates’ The Daily Pioneer (2016).

  88. 88.

    ‘India Has Right to Attend UNSC Decisions on Peacekeeping Ops’ The Daily Pioneer (2015).

  89. 89.

    ‘Statement by Prime Minister at the Summit on Peacekeeping in New York’ Ministry of External Affairs (2015).

  90. 90.

    Gray (2016), p. 210.

  91. 91.

    Thakur (2011), p. 900.

  92. 92.

    Singh (2007), p. 82.

  93. 93.

    ‘Statement by Rwandan UN Charge d’Affaires, a.i, Jeanne d’Arc Byaje’ Permanent Mission of Rwanda to the United Nations (2016).

  94. 94.

    Beswick and Jowell (2014).

  95. 95.

    The EASF was established to provide a regional capability for rapid deployment of forces to carry out preventive deployment, rapid intervention, peace support/stability operations and peace enforcement. It, like the AU, is very much oriented towards the R2P doctrine); ‘Remarks by President Paul Kagame’ Government, Republic of Rwanda (2014).

  96. 96.

    Wilen (2012), pp. 1332, 1333; Renwick (2015).

  97. 97.

    ‘UN Owes $80 million to India for Peacekeeping Operations’ The Daily Pioneer (2013).

  98. 98.

    Beswick and Jowell (2014).

  99. 99.

    An example of robust ‘peace enforcement’ on the part of the UN. See Gray (2016), p. 205; Smith (2013b); ‘USA Says Rwanda Army the Most Capable of World’s Peacekeepers’ News of Rwanda (2014); Beswick (2014), pp. 229, 230; Greening (2013).

  100. 100.

    That is, the ‘dependency model’. Weisskopf (1981), pp. 327–336.

  101. 101.

    Galeano (1973); Pugh (2004), p. 39.

  102. 102.

    To neo-Gramscians like Cox, ‘historical structure is ‘a picture of a particular configuration of forces which imposes pressures and constraints’. Cox (1981), pp. 126–155.

  103. 103.

    Cunliffe (2013), p. 123.

  104. 104.

    Kennedy (2006).

  105. 105.

    UNPO (2000), p. ix; Richmond (2004), p. 86; Gray (2016), pp. 195, 196.

  106. 106.

    Pugh (2004), pp. 39–44, 54.

  107. 107.

    Williams (2013), p. 109.

  108. 108.

    See Williams (2013), pp. 108–112; Smith (2013a), pp. 71–92.

  109. 109.

    Coleman (2013), pp. 58, 59; US Department of State (2012).

  110. 110.

    The UK, as an example, claimed a ‘leading role’ in UN peacekeeping in September 2016, when it had 343 troops committed to UN missions. See ‘UK Bolsters Support to Peacekeeping in South Sudan’ UK Ministry of Defence (2016).

  111. 111.

    Wilen (2012), pp. 1330, 1331.

  112. 112.

    Even though these militarised approaches have impacted extremely detrimentally on host countries like Colombia and Mexico. Youngers and Rosin (2005), pp. 1–11, 45–47.

  113. 113.

    Wilen (2012), p. 1326.

  114. 114.

    Cunliffe (2013), p. 192; Hansel and Moeller (2014), p. 151.

  115. 115.

    India quickly climbed down and began supplying helicopters again, in return for only one machine from the international community. Hansel and Moeller (2014), p. 151.

  116. 116.

    Thakur (2011), p. 900.

  117. 117.

    Acharya (2011), p. 363; Mukherjee and Malone (2011), pp. 327–329.

  118. 118.

    Jaganathan and Kurtz (2014), p. 461.

  119. 119.

    Wendt (1992), p. 398.

  120. 120.

    Capie (2016), pp. 5–7; Agensky and Barker (2012), p. 114. Indonesia has been contributing significant numbers of peacekeepers since 2004. In May 2017, it had 2719 UN peacekeepers deployed across nine missions, the biggest contingents being in Lebanon and Darfur. See UN Peacekeeping Resources (2017).

  121. 121.

    Capie (2016), p. 7; Poole (2014), p. 47.

  122. 122.

    See Capie (2016), pp. 8, 9 for Indonesian reservations regarding the use of force in the DRC and its encouragement for a forceful intervention in Syria.

  123. 123.

    Principally, when Italy invaded the then Abyssinia in 1935–1936. Yihdego et al. (2016), pp. 3, 4.

  124. 124.

    UN Peacekeeping Resources (2017). Ethiopia has been a regular troop contributor since the late 1990s and in May 2017 had a total of 8229 peacekeepers deployed across five UN missions. All but nine of this number were in South Sudan, Darfur or Abyei.

  125. 125.

    E.g. Al Shabab incursions into Somalia. Firsing (2014), pp. 54–56; Dersso (2013); ‘UK Supports Ethiopian Peacekeeping’ Mareeg (2017).

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Roberts, P. (2018). Like Fish in a Stream? Considering the Agency of the UN Peacekeepers of the Global South: Rwanda and India as Case Studies. In: Yihdego, Z., Desta, M., Hailu, M., Merso, F. (eds) Ethiopian Yearbook of International Law 2017. Ethiopian Yearbook of International Law, vol 2017. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90887-8_6

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