Abstract
In this chapter, the method developed above is applied in a case study of an interdisciplinary approach. The case in question is a study which is part of an ongoing research project, EASE, in which philosophical phenomenology is integrated with more traditional approaches to schizophrenia research. A number of problems with this specific act of integration are pointed out. Indeed, there are a lot of good things to say about the EASE-project. The basic idea is certainly a good one, and it has the potential to significantly improve how we understand and handle schizophrenia. Nevertheless, approach-based analysis reveals considerable epistemic problems related to the specific approach in focus.
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Notes
- 1.
We need to distinguish clearly between the EASE project and the distinct constitutive approaches as presented in individual publications. To repeat myself: An approach-based analysis of interdisciplinary activities requires focus on one interdisciplinary approach (at a time). As discussed in several places above, in approach-based analysis specific research projects (or programmes, perhaps) are considered to be bundles of closely related approaches. A discipline, on the other hand, is considered to be a bundle (of bundles) of approaches. For convenience and clarity, I will use ‘NP2014’ to refer to the approach in focus in this case study and ‘EASE’ to refer the bundle, of which NP2014 is a constitutive element.
- 2.
With the important caveat that I am not a trained psychiatrist. Consequently, I do not possess the competences to carry out any kind of psychiatric diagnostics with or without the EASE-methods involved.
- 3.
Short for ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders’ (published the American Psychiatric Association) and ‘The International Classification of Diseases’ (published by WHO).
- 4.
In Hvidtfeldt (2011), I analysed differences between how anxiety patients and psychiatrists described what it is to suffer from anxiety. Interestingly, in the patients’ descriptions expressions such ‘being afraid’, ‘feeling scared’, ‘to panic, or ‘feeling terrified’ were absolutely central, but these played only a very minor role in descriptions of anxiety by the psychiatrists.
- 5.
Another interesting finding of (Hvidtfeldt 2011) was that anxiety patients in some cases seemed to develop the official symptoms of anxiety only after being presented with the suspicion that anxiety might be the explanation for some indeterminable somatic complaint (such as more or less chronic bellyache) for which they had consulted their GP. Importantly, the symptoms of anxiety are perfectly healthy reactions in threatening situations. Indeed, it does not seem completely irrational to be more than a little alarmed by being diagnosed with a mental disorder.
- 6.
- 7.
It would not be unreasonable to describe EASE as mainly proceeding in the polymath mode with all the associated risks discussed in Chap. 3. Even though it is an interesting topic, I shall refrain from providing anecdotal evidence for this claim, since it is not central to the goal of this case study.
- 8.
All items are discussed in some detail and exemplified in (Parnas et al. 2005, pp. 240–256), to which I refer the interested reader.
- 9.
Recall Hacking’s notion of “interactive kinds” briefly mentioned above.
- 10.
Apart from his opinion about the utility of phenomenology in studies of genesis, it is interesting that Jaspers appear to express a strong disdain for interdisciplinarity in this quote. The danger of “cerebral mythologies” can best be understood along the lines of “the seductive allure of neuroscience” discussed in Chap. 3 (Weisberg et al. 2008). Certainly, Jaspers did not endorse a strong medical model.
- 11.
This is likely to be the case even if we ignore the significant problems of false positives and false negatives which plague psychiatric diagnostics (Cohen 1994, p. 998 f.).
- 12.
Josef Parnas has published extensively on various problems of contemporary psychiatry, for instance those related to operationalisation (Parnas and Bovet 2014).
- 13.
In the technical sense of a dynamical system which is highly sensitive to initial conditions. See Kellert 2009 for an interesting discussion of chaos theory and interdisciplinarity.
- 14.
In a less friendly tone, Kieran Healy criticises reliance on the sophisticated judgment of people in possession of esoteric expertise. He claims that a “weak methodological core invites connoisseurs”, and that “[…] connoisseurship thrives best in settings where judgment is needed but measurement is hard” (Healy 2017).
- 15.
This is most apparent in live interview sessions and video recordings. For examples in print, see Parnas et al. (2005).
- 16.
That is, “Ideas Implying Nonphysical Causality” (Parnas et al. 2005, p. 255). Examples could be the belief that hoping for something to happen will affect whether it happens or not, or that the weather is somehow affected by one’s mood.
- 17.
Certainly, it would not take a talented evolutionary psychologist very long to come up with a list of advantages related to an optimum level of self-disturbance. For instance, it might be easier to maintain a high spirit if one’s somewhat disturbed view of the world would facilitate the “re-interpretation” of facts to fit one’s preferences better.
- 18.
Which the authors of NP2014 are well aware of, of course, and make use of in other contexts (Parnas et al. 2011, p. 201).
- 19.
The importance of this point is not diminished by (EASE) studies suggesting high interrater reliability such as presented in (Møller et al. 2011; Nordgaard and Parnas 2012). High interrater reliability may suggest, but does not demonstrate neutrality (i.e. immunity towards bias). Further, unfortunately, the mentioned interrater reliability studies are not terribly convincing. Though the raters compared were blinded to diagnostic and clinical information in the studies, they did not rate on the basis of independent interviews. Actually, they were either both present during the interview or re-rated on the basis of videotaped interviews. Since a central reason for doing semi-structured interviews is the possibility of addressing interesting issues in detail, it is hardly surprising if a second rater notices the same interesting topics that the interviewer finds worth pursuing in more detail.
- 20.
In spite of these hypothesised smaller effect sizes, one might still get significant results, of course, but that might require substantially larger samples.
- 21.
“Prodromal” is used to capture a phase in which symptoms of an illness are experienced before the full-blown syndrome has developed. The concept implies that the development of the full-blown illness is inevitable (Phillips et al. 2005). In the case of schizophrenia, it is often negative symptoms that appear in the prodromal phase. This is in part a consequence of the requirement of at least one positive symptom for being diagnosed with schizophrenia.
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Hvidtfeldt, R. (2018). Phenomenology Imported with EASE. In: The Structure of Interdisciplinary Science. New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90872-4_8
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