Part of the New Directions in the Philosophy of Science book series (NDPS)


In this chapter, the general enterprise of the book is introduced along with the general reasons why the topics discussed are worth considering at all. I present the positions and theoretical elements on which the discussions of the following chapters are based. The most central concepts of the framework to be developed, as well as some terminology that is crucial for the subsequent analyses, are outlined. All in all, this chapter serves to prepare the reader for the more detailed discussions in the rest of the book.


Algorithm Proposition Representational Activity Repraesentat Epistemic Vices Individual Elderly Person 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


  1. Cartwright, Nancy. 1983. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. ———. 1999. The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Collins, Harry M. 1981. The Place of the Core-Set in Modern Science: Social Contingency with Methodological Propriety in Science. History of Science 19 (1): 6–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. ———. 1985. Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice. London: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  5. Collins, Harry M., and Robert Evans. 2002. The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience. Social Studies of Science 32 (2): 235–296.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Giere, Ronald N. 1988. Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach, Science and Its Conceptual Foundations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. ———. 1999. Science without Laws, Science and Its Conceptual Foundations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  8. ———. 2006. Scientific Perspectivism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Godfrey-Smith, Peter. 2006. The Strategy of Model-Based Science. Biology and Philosophy 21: 725–740.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. ———. 2009. Models and Fictions in Science. Philosophical Studies 143: 101–116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Hempel, Carl G., and Paul Oppenheim. 1948. Studies in the Logic of Explanation. Philosophy of Science 15 (2): 135–175.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Hvidtfeldt, Rolf. 2017. Interdisciplinarity as Hybrid Modelling. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 48 (1): 33–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Klein, Julie Thompson. 1990. Interdisciplinarity: History, Theory, and Practice. Detroit: Wayne State University.Google Scholar
  14. Suarez, Mauricio. 2004. An Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation. Philosophy of Science 71 (5): 767–779. Scholar
  15. Thomson-Jones, Martin. 2012. Modeling without Mathematics. Philosophy of Science 79: 761–772.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. van Fraassen, Bas C. 1980. The Scientific Image, Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  17. ———. 2008. Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Weingart, Peter. 2010. A Short History of Knowledge Formations. In The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity, ed. Robert Frodeman, Julie Thompson Klein, and Carl Mitcham. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  19. Weisberg, Michael. 2007. Who is a Modeler? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58: 207–233.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. ———. 2013. Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the World. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Aalborg UniversityCopenhagenDenmark

Personalised recommendations