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Normative Reasons and Theism pp 181–192Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Conclusion

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Part of the book series: Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion ((PFPR))

Abstract

I summarize the main argument developed in this work and the fifteen arguments I gave in support of its premises. I go on to describe how the contemporary debate can be said to be characterized by some classic symptoms of normative autism or mind-blindness, ranging from a failure to register the mental import of the terms it deploys to literalism where rational intuitions are concerned. Finally, I describe my own journey from mind-blindness to mind-sight where Reason is concerned.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Massey University, Palmerston North, Manawatu-Wanganui, New Zealand

    Gerald K. Harrison

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  1. Gerald K. Harrison
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Harrison, G.K. (2018). Conclusion. In: Normative Reasons and Theism. Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90796-3_10

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