Abstract
The article by Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal in this issue, however provocative some of its observations, has the merit of raising an important question: How should we think about the relationship between deductive theories of deterrence on the one hand and, on the other, research on deterrence that is at the same time empirical and oriented toward theory? While forcefully defending the deductive form of theory, Achen and Snidal also clearly dissociate themselves from the extreme position that it is a self-contained enterprise that need not take empirical research seriously. Rather, they recognize that empirical case studies are capable of contributing, and, indeed, have to some extent already contributed, to the development of theory, perhaps even to the kind of deductive theory they favor.
This text was first published as: “Deterrence and Foreign Policy.” With Richard Smoke. World Politics, vol. 41, no. 2 (January 1989). The permission to republish this text was granted on 16 March 2017 by Ms. Georgina Stratton on behalf of Cambridge University Press. For helpful comments on an earlier draft the authors express appreciation to Kenneth A. Oye, Jack S. Levy, and Robert Jervis who, however, bear no responsibility for the thoughts expressed in this comment.
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- 1.
Thus: “in the hands of George and Smoke, the case study approach helps generate theory in a very direct way” (p. 156); “we emphatically believe that they [case studies] are essential to the development and testing of social science theory” (p. 167); “indeed, analytic theory cannot do without case studies” (p. 169; see also p. 159). Achen and Snidal, “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,” World Politics 41 (January 1989), 143–69.
- 2.
Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). Since publishing this book, we have worked steadily to raise standards and explicate procedures for improving the quality of case studies and their contribution to theory development. We have given serious attention to most of the concerns about them raised by Achen and Snidal. See A. L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979); A. L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development,” paper presented to the Second Annual Symposium on Information Processing in Organizations, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, October 15–16, 1982; A. L. George and T. J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” in Robert Coulam and Richard Smith, eds., Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, Vol. 2 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1985), 21–58. Case-study methodology is discussed also in Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), chap. 3 and app. B. George continues efforts to improve case-study methodology and plans additional publications.
A discussion of the uses and limitations of the controlled comparison method of studying a small number of cases for theory development should not overlook the importance of single case studies. Lack of space prevents us from summarizing the arguments on behalf of the contributions a single case study can make to theory development that have been advanced by such writers as Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7 (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79–138, and Lawrence B. Mohr, “The Reliability of the Case Study As a Source of Information,” in Coulam and Smith, op. cit., 65–97.
- 3.
The description of this method in George and Smoke (footnote 2), 95–103, has since been elaborated, and related methodological and theoretical issues more fully discussed, in the two articles by George (footnote 2) and in the George-McKeown article (footnote 2).
- 4.
The formulation of contingent generalizations is necessary in order to capture the fact that deterrence is characterized by the phenomenon of what General Systems Theory refers to as ‘equifinality’ (and what John Stuart Mill referred to as “plurality of causes” when he warned that his “method of agreement” and “method of difference” could not be easily employed for inferring causal relationships). Equifinality refers to the fact that similar outcomes on a dependent variable (e.g., deterrence failures) occur as a result of different causal processes, thus making the search for robust universal causal generalizations infeasible. Abstract deductive deterrence theory has thus far ignored the phenomenon of equifinality.
- 5.
See George (footnote 2, 1979), 59–60.
- 6.
This kind of disaggregated theory is an example of what Paul Diesing, drawing upon Abraham Kaplan, has referred to as “concatenated theory” in his Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), 22–24.
- 7.
Particular attention must be given not only to the strength of the Initiator’s motivation to challenge the status quo but also to the time he has in which to do so. Moreover, asymmetry of motivation favoring the Initiator can sometimes compensate for asymmetry of power favoring the Defender. On this point see, for example, A. L. George et al., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Zeev Maoz, “Resolve, Capabilities, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes, 1816–1976,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 27 (June 1983), 195–229; Jack S. Levy, “When Do Deterrent Threats Work?” British Journal of Political Science 18 (October 1988), 433–60.
- 8.
Robert Wilson notes the difficulty that game-theoretic models encounter with contextual variables, which render most situations indeterminate; “Deterrence in Oligopolistic Competition,” in Paul C. Stern et al., eds., Perspectives on Deterrence (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
- 9.
Examples of difficulties encountered in attempts to apply deterrence strategy at substrategic levels of conflict are provided in the analysis of the Eisenhower administration’s Middle East policies in George and Smoke (footnote 2), chap. 11. For a discussion of thirteen ways in which the characteristics of deterrence at the strategic level differ from those at lower levels of conflict, see chap. 2.
- 10.
Ibid., 520–22.
- 11.
Ibid., chap. 18.
- 12.
See particularly footnote 24 in Achen and Snidal (footnote 1): “Analysts continue to struggle painfully for a fully satisfactory version of this game; as Harrison Wagner has remarked to us, ‘the rational theory of deterrence’ doesn’t exist.” However, they go on to offer the confident assurance that “the principal conclusions of a legitimate theory of deterrence are foreseeable even if the supporting arguments are at present incomplete; it is the former that we call ‘rational deterrence theory.’”
- 13.
Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases From 1900–1980,” World Politics 36 (July 1984), 496–526.
- 14.
George and Smoke (footnote 2), chap. 17.
- 15.
Schelling, Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 4. For a fuller statement of our concern over the limitations of the rationality assumption in deterrence theory see George and Smoke (footnote 2), 73–77.
- 16.
See, for example, the discussion of different ways in which individuals attempt to cope with the cognitive limits on rationality (i.e., inadequate information, inadequate knowledge, and value complexity) in A. L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), chap. 2.
- 17.
Simon, “Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science,” American Political Science Review 79 (June 1985), 293–304. See especially pp. 295 and 300.
- 18.
See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).
- 19.
George and Smoke (footnote 2), chap. 18.
- 20.
See, e.g., ibid. chap. 3.
- 21.
On situational analysis and the diagnostic function of theory, see George and Smoke (footnote 2), chap. 16; also George (footnote 16), chap. 14. For a more detailed discussion of policy-relevant theory see George and Smoke (footnote 2), app. A longer version of this appendix was published by Smoke and George, “Theory for Policy in International Relations,” Policy Sciences 4 (December 1973), 387–413.
- 22.
See George and Smoke (footnote 2), 77–78.
- 23.
Ibid., chap. 21.
- 24.
For additional discussion see George and Smoke (footnote 2), 5–6; also George (footnote 16), 252–54. The importance of ‘promises’ (as against ‘threats’) was briefly noted by Schelling (footnote 15), 43–46, 131–37, 175–77. Important leads for the development of a broader influence theory were given by David A. Baldwin, “The Power of Positive Sanctions,” World Politics 24 (October 1971), 19–38, and “Inter-Nation Influence Revisited,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 15 (December 1971), 471–86. The importance of conceptualizing the strategy of coercive diplomacy to include possible use of ‘carrots’ as well as ‘sticks’ was emphasized and illustrated in George et al. (footnote 7). The concept of “crisis bargaining” developed by Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing includes accommodative as well as coercive actions; Conflict Among Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). Other writers, too numerous to mention here, have also emphasized the need for a broader, multifaceted theory of inducement or influence. More recently, Janice Gross Stein and Richard Ned Lebow have emphasized the need for more attention to various forms of ‘reassurance’ to supplement or replace deterrence in conflict situations.
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George, A.L., Smoke, R. (2019). Deterrence and Foreign Policy. In: Caldwell, D. (eds) Alexander L. George: A Pioneer in Political and Social Sciences. Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice, vol 15. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90772-7_11
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