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Biobank Expertise and the Research Unit-Biobank Relationship

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Public Regulation of Tumor Banks

Abstract

The present paper models the relationship between a research unit wishing to launch a new project and a biobank capable of supplying the necessary biological resources (biological samples and associated data). Although the project’s aim may be to produce an innovative product or process, such as a new drug or treatment protocol, whether it will be a success is uncertain. Neither the biobank nor the research unit can know a project’s commercial value in advance, but this value is endogenous, that is, it depends on the actions and decisions of the actors involved. Our objective was to ascertain how these actions and decisions affect the project’s value.

Analysis based on a theoretical model developed by Bobtcheff and Haritchabalet (2017).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Whether a biobank focuses on a small number of collections or offers a wide range of samples impacts its expertise: specialized biobanks have greater expertise than generalist biobanks.

  2. 2.

    Moral hazard arises when one party is free to change its behavior to the detriment of another party after a transaction has taken place.

  3. 3.

     The project’s social value includes all the returns (financial, academic, knowledge creation, etc.) it generates.

  4. 4.

    The revenue of innovation, R, is positive if an innovation succeeds. R is zero if an innovation fails.

  5. 5.

    We assume that all project’s returns can be expressed in monetary terms.

  6. 6.

    These intervals are included in [0,1].

  7. 7.

    See Bobtcheff and Haritchabalet (2017).

  8. 8.

    As shown in Figs. 14.1 and 14.2.

References

  • Bobtcheff, C., & Haritchabalet, C. (2017). Experience and screening in the management of innovation. Working Paper, 2017.

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  • Casamatta, C., & Haritchabalet, C. (2007). Experience, screening and syndication in venture capital investments. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 16(3), 368–398.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tykvová, T. (2007). Who chooses whom? Syndication, skills and reputation. Review of Financial Economics, 16(1), 5–28.

    Article  Google Scholar 

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Correspondence to Catherine Bobtcheff .

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Bobtcheff, C., Haritchabalet, C. (2018). Biobank Expertise and the Research Unit-Biobank Relationship. In: Bioy, X. (eds) Public Regulation of Tumor Banks. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90563-1_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90563-1_14

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-90562-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-90563-1

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