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Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment? pp 21–44Cite as

The Historical Development of Benefit Sanctions in the UK

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Abstract

This chapter provides a historical account of the development of eligibility and entitlement conditions and benefit sanctions in the UK. It focuses on the last 20 years and shows how benefit sanctions have increased in scope and severity since then. The chapter draws attention to the fact that the introduction of Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) in 1996 and the New Deal in 1998 represented something of a watershed and that the sanctions regime that was introduced in 2012 was far more stringent than the one that preceded it. It also draws attention to the striking continuity of approach between governments of different political colours, all of whom seem to have bought into the dominant ideology of conditionality.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Fulbrook (1978: 22).

  2. 2.

    Figures based on Employment Service Labour Market Statistics, Analysis of Adjudication Officers’ Decisions for year ending 31 March 1999.

  3. 3.

    Published in 1998 principle was vigorously promoted by the Prime Minister (Tony Blair) and enacted in the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999.

  4. 4.

    Now known as ‘Work Coaches’.

  5. 5.

    Margaret Hodge (2016), formerly Chair of the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, provides a revealing account of the Work Programme, which draws attention to the failure of private contractors to achieve their targets despite receiving lucrative contracts from the government.

  6. 6.

    National Audit Office (2016: para 12).

  7. 7.

    The unwillingness of the Home Office to countenance research on immigration and asylum is, however, comparable to the unwillingness of the DWP to countenance research on social security and suggests that access is particularly difficult where it would focus on activities for which the government department is directly responsible.

  8. 8.

    Disqualifications are applied to claimants who do not qualify for benefit, e.g. because they have left work voluntarily, for misconduct or because they are not considered to be unemployed or disabled. Sanctions, which are the main concern of this book, are applied when claimants are considered to have failed to meet the conditions of entitlement to benefit, e.g. for not attending interviews or training schemes, for not putting enough effort into job search or refusing to apply for or accept a job.

  9. 9.

    Gulland (2017).

  10. 10.

    Discussed below.

  11. 11.

    The others were Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness.

  12. 12.

    See, for example, Sinfield (2001).

  13. 13.

    Beveridge (1942: para 20).

  14. 14.

    See King (1987) and Deacon (2000).

  15. 15.

    These are all means-tested benefits for low income households. Family Credit, which was replaced by Working Families Tax Credit in 1999, was paid to working families who were responsible for at least one child under 16 (or under 19 if in full-time education) where the applicant or the applicant’s partner (if they had one) worked for 16 hours or more per week. Housing Benefit is for low income households, who may either be on benefit or in work and who need financial help to pay all or part of their rent. Council Tax Benefit is likewise for low income households, who may be on benefit or in work and need financial help to pay all or part of their council tax, which is a local tax on domestic property that is paid by everyone who owns or rents their accommodation.

  16. 16.

    The unemployment trap refers to the lack of financial incentives for unemployed people to return to work. It is caused by high replacement rates, i.e. by incomes for the unemployed that approach (and, in a few cases, exceed) the incomes they did or could obtain from work.

  17. 17.

    Wright (2009: 200).

  18. 18.

    Giddens (1998).

  19. 19.

    For an excellent review of the measures introduced by successive governments since 1997, see Wright (2009).

  20. 20.

    See Adler (2004) and Millar (2003).

  21. 21.

    The distinctive feature of activation programmes is that participation is obligatory for relevant target groups. Key examples of activation programmes are requirements on unemployed people to attend intensive interviews with employment counsellors, apply for job vacancies as directed by employment counsellors, independently search for job vacancies and apply for jobs, accept offers of suitable work, participate in the formulation of an individual action plan and participate in training or job-creation programmes.

  22. 22.

    See Lipsky (1980) and Wright (2003).

  23. 23.

    Sainsbury (2003).

  24. 24.

    See Chapter 1 above.

  25. 25.

    Members of the public are encouraged to report cases of benefit fraud to the National Benefit Fraud Hotline and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) employs over 3000 fraud investigators to investigate allegations of fraud and apprehend those who are involved. See Grover (2005).

  26. 26.

    For an account of these developments, and of the shift from a ‘passive’ to an ‘active’ approach in the provision of social security for sickness and disability, see Sainsbury (2009).

  27. 27.

    The health care professional may be a doctor, a nurse, an occupational therapist or a physiotherapist. From its inception, medical assessments for ESA were outsourced to private companies, first to Atos in 2008, and more recently to Maximus in March 2015.

  28. 28.

    Gregg (2008).

  29. 29.

    Gregg (2008: 12).

  30. 30.

    There was likewise no discussion in the Report of whether the ECHR and other international conventions impose any constraints on what the New Deal authorities can require from claimants in return for the help that they are given.

  31. 31.

    See Gulland (2011).

  32. 32.

    This issue is discussed in Chapter 6.

  33. 33.

    Harris (2010).

  34. 34.

    The requirement was phased in between 2001 and 2004. From April 2014, single parents whose youngest child is less the one year old have been exempted.

  35. 35.

    The original aim was to simplify an overcomplicated benefit system and ease the transition in and out of work and back again while ensuring, transparently, that it always paid to be in a job.

  36. 36.

    Timmins (2016).

  37. 37.

    For example, those with literacy problems or learning difficulties and those who don’t, for whatever reason, have access to the internet. See Dwyer and Wright (2014).

  38. 38.

    Langenbucher (2015).

  39. 39.

    For details, see the Job Seeker’s Allowance (Sanctions) (Amendment) Regulations 2012.

  40. 40.

    Dwyer and Wright (2014).

  41. 41.

    Between August 2015 and June 2017, the rate of sanctioning as a percentage of Universal Credit (UC) claimants subject to conditionality averaged 7.0% per month before challenges and was 5.2% in the three months from April–June 2017. It is not known how the sanctioning rate varies between the different groups who were on UC, although unemployed people accounted for 80.7% of UC claimants subject to conditionality at June 2017. Meanwhile, the JSA sanctioning rate stabilised at around 1.7 per month before challenges with the rates for ESA and for lone parents on Income Support much lower, averaging 0.3% per month. See Webster (2017). The contrasts in sanctioning rates are striking although why the sanctioning rate for UC claimants is so much higher than the sanctioning rate for JSA claimants is unclear.

  42. 42.

    According to the National Audit Office, these changes moved the UK from eighth to third in the OECD rankings of unemployment sanction strictness. However, this is clearly incorrect.

  43. 43.

    Comptroller and Auditor General (2016: para 1.13).

  44. 44.

    Langenbucher (2015: paras 44 and 51).

  45. 45.

    Adler and Terum (2018: 167–168).

  46. 46.

    Department for Work and Pensions (2018: Sect. 5).

  47. 47.

    Given that repayments are made at the rate of 40% of benefit—the same as the amount by which a hardship payment is lower than the benefit—this means that, for claimants receiving hardship payments , UC sanctions in effect last 3.5 times as long as their nominal length.

  48. 48.

    For details, see Webster (2015c). Hardship payments are discussed in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6 below.

  49. 49.

    See Abercrombie and Turner (1978).

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  1. School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK

    Michael Adler

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Adler, M. (2018). The Historical Development of Benefit Sanctions in the UK. In: Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment?. Palgrave Socio-Legal Studies. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90356-9_3

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