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Toward a European Regulatory Investor Protection Law

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Regulating Investor Protection under EU Law

Abstract

The book opens by drawing up the boundaries of its normative scope. This chapter starts by briefly explaining the key differences of the two traditional patterns of financial systems and the gradual shift—from bank based toward market based—which has been occurring in Europe over the last decades. It, then, gives an account of the European Regulatory Private Law (ERPL) theory and embeds the EU law of investor protection into the margins of such theory. The overall message is the claim that the EU law of investor protection is actually a “European Regulatory Investor Protection Law”.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine, “Bank-Based and Market-Based Financial Systems: Cross-Country Comparisons,” The World Bank - Policy Research Working Paper no. WPS 2143 (1999). At 1.

  2. 2.

    Ibid. At 2. Professors Moloney, Ferran, and Payne state that: “Bank-based intermediation manages this process by means of maturity transformation: the provision by banks of long-term loan assets to capital seekers, based on the short-term bank deposit liabilities which provide returns for capital suppliers. Market-based intermediation is based on the raising of funds by capital seekers through marketable instruments (such as shares and bonds) which provide capital suppliers with a return.” Niamh Moloney, Eilís Ferran, and Jennifer Payne, “Introduction,” in The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation, ed. Niamh Moloney, Eilís Ferran, and Jennifer Payne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). At 4. As regards studies concerning the different kinds of financial systems, see: Raymond W. Goldsmith, Financial Structure and Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969); Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale, “A Welfare Comparison of Intermediaries and Financial Markets in Germany and the U.S.,” American Economic Review 39 (1995); Comparing Financial Systems (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, eds., Financial Structure and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Comparison of Banks, Markets, and Development (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), in particular: Sergio Schmukler and Esteban Vesperoni, “Firms’ Financing Choices in Bank-Based and Market-Based Economies,” in Financial Structure and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Comparison of Banks, Markets, and Development, ed. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001); Sigurt Vitols, “The Origins of Bank-Based and Market-Based Financial Systems: Germany, Japan, and the United States,” ed. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung - Discussion Paper FS I 01 - 302 (Berlin, 2001); Ross Levine, “Bank-Based or Market-Based Financial Systems: Which Is Better?,” ed. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series - WP No. 9138 (Cambridge, MA, 2002); Iain Hardie and David Howarth, “Market-Based Banking and the Financial Crisis,” ed. University of Edinburg Working Paper (Edinburgh, 2011 ).

  3. 3.

    In the words of R. Barry Johnston, Liliana Schumacher, Jingqing Chai: “public disclosure [… is] a key concern under market-based financial systems”. R. Barry Johnston, Liliana Schumacher, and Jingqing Chai, “Assessing Financial System Vulnerabilities,” International Monetary Fund - Working Paper No. 00/76 (2006). At 10.

  4. 4.

    Casu, Girardone, and Molyneux give a clear account of the difference between commercial banking and investment banking: Barbara Casu, Claudia Girardone, and Philip Molyneux, Introduction to Banking, vol. 10 (Pearson Education, 2006). At 69–71.

  5. 5.

    Sergio Schmukler and Esteban Vesperoni, “Firms’ Financing Choices in Bank-Based and Market-Based Economies,” in Financial Structure and Economic Growth, ed. Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine (MIT Press, 2001). At 349.

  6. 6.

    Casu, Girardone, and Molyneux, 10. At 70–71. On the role of banks, Bart DeMeester, Liberalisation of Trade in Banking Services: An International and European Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). At 13.

  7. 7.

    Schmukler and Vesperoni, “Firms’ Financing Choices in Bank-Based and Market-Based Economies.” At 349–350. In particular, the authors highlight how: “Bank-based systems may encourage long-term relationships between borrowers and lenders. During a crisis, banks’ inside information allows them to continue lending to sound firms”. At 350.

  8. 8.

    The World Bank, “Financial Structures – Bank-Based Vs. Market-Based Financial System,” http://go.worldbank.org/R6XUIEOF40.

  9. 9.

    Ibid. Furthermore, in the words of Kern Alexander, Rahul Dhumale, John Eatwell: “The United States was classified as a financial system that relies to a large extent on capital-market finance, whereas Germany was classified as a financial system that relies, by and large, on bank-led finance.” Kern Alexander, Rahul Dhumale, and John Eatwell, Global Governance of Financial Systems: The International Regulation of Systemic Risk (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). At 19.

  10. 10.

    Ginevra Cerrina Feroni and Ettore Andreani, “Il Sistema Delle Sparkassen in Germania Tra Frammentazione Del Mercato, Processi Di Privatizzazione E Fondazioni Di Emanazione Bancaria,” in Fondazione E Banche. Modelli Ed Esperienze in Europa E Negli Stati Uniti, ed. Ginevra Cerrina Feroni (Torino: Giappichelli, 2011). At 75.

  11. 11.

    On the traditional Spanish credit system: Gianluca Mancuso, “Le Cajas De Ahorro Quali Enti Fondazionali Del Sistema Creditizio Spagnolo,” ibid., ed. Ginevra Cerrina-Feroni. At 107.

  12. 12.

    Christophe Blot et al., “Structural Evolutions and Reforms of the French Banking and Financial System since the 1980s: Relationship with the Legal Process of European Integration,” in FESSUD Working Paper Series No. 66, ed. FESSUD Project (2014). At 7.

  13. 13.

    Loi N°84-46 Du 24 Janvier 1984.

  14. 14.

    Legge N. 218 Del 30 Luglio 1990. The Act was officially named disposizioni in materia di ristrutturazione e integrazione patrimoniale degli Istituti di credito di diritto pubblico (provisions on the capital restructuring and consolidation of credit institutions of public law), and informally named “Amato Act”, after the then Minister of the Treasury, Professor Giuliano Amato.

  15. 15.

    See Filippo Zatti, “La Dimensione Costituzionale Della Tutela Del Risparmio. Dalla Tutela Del Risparmio Alla Protezione Dei Risparmiatori/Investitori E Ritorno?,” in Studi in Onore Di Vincenzo Atripaldi, ed. Marco Benvenuti et al. (Naples: Jovene, 2010).

  16. 16.

    A bank-run “occurs when depositors suspect that a bank may go bankrupt and, therefore, “run” to the bank to withdraw their deposits”. N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Macroeconomics (Mason: Cengage Learning, 2008). At 353.

  17. 17.

    The term “prudent saver” is used by the 2008 Optem Report in opposition to “gamblers”: both invest their funds in securities markets but the latter are “more likely to take and accept risks” than the former [European Commission, “Optem Report - Study on Pre-Contractual Information for Financial Services” (2008), at 8]. In this book the term “prudent banking saver” is, however, mostly referred to the traditional banking-deposit savers, namely, someone who deposits their money in low-return saving accounts and invest in “zero-risk” instruments. This meaning is used by Professor Zatti in his article “La dimensione costituzione della tutela del risparmio”. Zatti. At 1472. Professor Zatti mentions the seminal work of Professor Costi: tutela dei depositanti e tutela del risparmio tendenzialmente coincidono, nel senso che entrambi si riconducono alla solvibilità dell’impresa bancaria e (…) quest’ultima deve essere perseguita nell’interesse dello sviluppo dell’economia reale [Author’s translation: “depositor protection and savings protection tend to coincide, since both refer to the solvency of the banking entity and (…) solvency shall be pursued in the interests of the development of the real economy”] Renzo Costi, L’ordinamento Bancario (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007). At 39.

  18. 18.

    Commission Recommendation 77/534/Eec of 25 July 1977 Concerning a European Code of Conduct Relating to Transactions in Transferable Securities. Commission Recommendation 1977/534/EEC, OJ L 212/37, 20.08.1977.

  19. 19.

    In her seminal work, Eilís Ferran carries out an analysis on the law’s role in building an integrated securities market. In particular, Professor Ferran points out: “The recent shift in Continental Europe towards securities market-based financing can be attributed to a range of factors, some of which affected securities markets around the world, some of which were exclusively, or particularly, EU-orientated. […] The evolving EU processes of political and economic integration also played a significant part in fostering the development of securities market-based financing.” Eilís Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). At 22–23.

  20. 20.

    Demirguc-Kunt and Levine. At 4.

  21. 21.

    Ibid. At 37. A similar conclusion was achieved by Hardie and Howarth in 2011: “It is now clear that banking in developed world economies, to varying but significant degrees, underwent profound changes in the early years of this century. Amongst the casualties of this change is the distinction, central to the varieties of financial capitalism literature, between ‘bank-based’ and ‘capital market-based’ capitalism. Banking, this special edition argues, has, increasingly but to varying degrees across the countries studied, become ‘market-based banking’.” Hardie and Howarth. At 2.

  22. 22.

    Moloney, Ferran, and Payne. At 6.

  23. 23.

    As it is evident from the parallels drawn in the Lamfalussy Committee’s Final Report. The Committee of Wise Men - Lamfalussy Committee, “Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets” (2001).

  24. 24.

    Some parts of this section have been previously published in Antonio Marcacci, “European Regulatory Private Law Going Global? The Case of Product Governance,” European Business Organization Law Review 18, no. 2 (2017).

  25. 25.

    Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, “The Transformation of Enforcement in European Private Law: Preliminary Considerations,” European Review of Private Law 4 (2015). At 496.

  26. 26.

    In the words of Professor Moloney: “investor protection regime is ultimately a creature of political compromise and is closely tied to market integration priorities.” Niamh Moloney, How to Protect Investors: Lessons from the EC and the UK (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). At 45.

  27. 27.

    Julia Black, “Involving Consumers in Securities Regulation: Research Study for the Taskforce to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada,” ed. Task force to Modernize Securities Regulation in Canada (2006). At 28.

  28. 28.

    Eric Pan, “Organizing Regional Systems: The Us Example,” in The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation, ed. Niamh Moloney, Eilís Ferran, and Jennifer Payne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). At 192.

  29. 29.

    Moloney. At 32.

  30. 30.

    Grounding publications of the School of Freiburg are: Franz Böhm, “Die Idee Des Ordo Im Denken Walter Euckens. Dem Freund Und Mitherausgeber Zum Gedächtnis,” in Ordo - Jahrbuch Fuer Die Ordnung Von Wirtschaft Und Gesellschaft (1959); Walter Eucken, Grundsätze Der Wirtschaftspolitik (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004); Die Grundlagen Der Nationalökonomie (Berlin: Springer, 2013); Leonhard Miksch, Wettbewerb Als Aufgabe (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1937). For more recent analyses: Manfred E. Streit, “Economic Order, Private Law and Public Policy the Freiburg School of Law and Economics in Perspective,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 148, no. 4 (1992); Viktor Vanberg, “Freiburg School of Law and Economics,” in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, ed. Peter Newman (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998).

  31. 31.

    The author would like to thank Professor Hans Micklitz for his advice on Ordoliberalism.

  32. 32.

    As mentioned in: Oliver Budzinski, “Monoculture Versus Diversity in Competition Economics,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 32, no. 2 (2007). At 305.

  33. 33.

    Christian Joerges, “The European Economic Constitution and Its Transformation through the financial Crisis,” in A Companion to European Union Law and International Law, ed. Dennis Patterson and Anna Södersten (New York: Wiley, 2016). At 245.

  34. 34.

    Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, “The Internal Vs. The External Dimension of European Private Law—a Conceptual Design and a Research Agenda,” in EUI Working Paper Law 2015/35, ed. European University Institute (Florence, 2015). At 2 mentioning Duncan Kennedy, “Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000,” in The New Law and Economic Development - a Critical Appraisal, ed. David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

  35. 35.

    Micklitz, “The Internal Vs. The External Dimension of European Private Law—a Conceptual Design and a Research Agenda.” At 2.

  36. 36.

    Ibid. At 2.

  37. 37.

    Ibid. At 2.

  38. 38.

    Ibid. At 2.

  39. 39.

    Ibid. At 2. Mentioning: “Social Justice and Access Justice in Private Law,” in EUI Working Paper Law 2011/2, ed. European University Institute (Florence, 2011). At 3.

  40. 40.

    “The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law—the Transfor-mation of European Private Law from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation,” Yearbook of European Law 28, no. 1 (2009). At 7.

  41. 41.

    Ibid. At 8–10.

  42. 42.

    Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, Yane Svetiev, and Guido Comparato, “European Regulatory Private Law—the Paradigms Tested,” in EUI Working Paper Law 2014/04, ed. European University Institute (Florence, 2014). At 5, as also mentioned by Vanessa Mak, “The Consumer in European Regulatory Private Law,” in Tilburg Private Law Working Paper Series No. 05/2015, ed. Tilburg University (Tilburg, 2015).

  43. 43.

    Olha O. Cherednychenko, “Financial Consumer Protection in the Eu: Towards a Self-Sufficient European Contract Law for Consumer Financial Services?,” European Review of Contract Law 10, no. 4 (2014). At 478.

  44. 44.

    On this point: Mak.

  45. 45.

    Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, “The Public and the Private – European Regulatory Private Law and Financial Services,” European Review of Contract Law 10, no. 4 (2014).

  46. 46.

    For the telecommunication sector, see the exhaustive analysis of Marta Cantero-Gamito, “Towards the Self-Sufficiency in European Regulatory Private Law (I) the Case of European Telecommunications Services Law,” in A Self-Sufficient European Private Law – a Viable Concept?, ed. Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz and Yane Svetiev (EUI Working Papers, LAW 2012/31: European University Institute, 2012). For the energy sector, see the comprehensive analysis of Lucila DeAlmeida, “Integration through Self-Standing European Private Law: Insights from the Internal Point of View to Harmonization in the Energy Market” (PhD Thesis, European University Institute, 2017).

  47. 47.

    Micklitz, “The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law—the Transformation of European Private Law from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation.”

  48. 48.

    Giudo Comparato, “Private Autonomy and Regulation in the Eu Case-Law,” in European Regulatory Private Law-the Paradigms Tested, ed. Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, Yane Svetiev, and Guido Comparato (EUI Working Paper Law 2014/04: European University Institute, 2014).

  49. 49.

    As Professor Mak says: “inroads into party autonomy in private law can be explained, or even justified, in the light of the EU’s internal market policy,” Mak. At 4.

  50. 50.

    Ibid.

  51. 51.

    Micklitz, “The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law—the Transformation of European Private Law from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation.” At 33.

  52. 52.

    “Most, not all, continental private legal orders enshrine the idea of social justice, understood as distributive justice, which has to be preserved in private law matters, both in contract and in tort law,” ibid. At 9. In addition: “Social Justice and Access Justice in Private Law.”

  53. 53.

    Cherednychenko. At 477. In the words of Professor Cherednychenko: “Traditionally, private law has been concerned with doing justice between the two private parties in an individual case and not with the attainment of external political, social, or economic goals.” “Public Supervision over Private Relationships: Towards European Supervision Private Law?,” European Review of Private Law 22, no. 1 (2014). At 51.

  54. 54.

    In the words of Professor Cherednychenko: “national private laws have been primarily concerned with justice between market participants rather than the pursuance of specific public goals, the EU has viewed private law, in particular contract law, as an instrument for achieving the collective objectives of European integration” “Public Supervision over Private Relationships: Towards European Supervision Private Law?.” At 38.

  55. 55.

    Ibid. At 38. See also: “Financial Consumer Protection in the EU: Towards a Self-Sufficient European Contract Law for Consumer Financial Services?.” At 478.

  56. 56.

    Micklitz, “Social Justice and Access Justice in Private Law.” At 6.

  57. 57.

    Ibid. At 6.

  58. 58.

    Professor Micklitz compares the English pragmatism with the German Idealism and the French Rationalism. Ibid.

  59. 59.

    Ibid.

  60. 60.

    Ibid. At 2.

  61. 61.

    Ibid. At 2.

  62. 62.

    Micklitz, “The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law—the Transformation of European Private Law from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation.” At 34.

  63. 63.

    Iris H-Y Chiu, “Securities Intermediaries in the Internet Age and the Traditional Principal-Agent Model of Regulation: Some Observations from European Union Securities Regulation,” Virginia Law & Business Review 2, no. 2 (2007). At 309–310.

  64. 64.

    Keeping investors’ confidence in financial markets has been also highlighted by the ECJ: Alpine Investments Bv V Minister Van Financiën (1995).

  65. 65.

    Professor Haar highlights “a close interdependence between market efficiency and investor confidence”. Brigitte Haar, “Organizing Regional Systems: The Eu Example,” in The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation, ed. Niamh Moloney, Eilís Ferran, and Jennifer Payne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). At 168.

  66. 66.

    “Retail market regulation has, from the outset, been concerned with addressing market failures arising from the gaping information asymmetry between retail investors and professional market actors”. Niamh Moloney, “Regulating the Retail Markets,” ibid. At 739.

  67. 67.

    In the words of Professors Enriques and Gilotta: “The core function of MD [mandatory disclosure] in financial market regulation is to provide economic agents with information to help them make better decisions. Its rationale, in turn, is grounded on the belief that in the absence of MD there would be less information available for such choices than it would be optimal or (which is largely the same) that higher production and dissemination costs would lead to its undersupply.” Alongside investor protection and market functioning concerns, Enriques and Gilotta rightly claim that mandatory disclosure also “addresses the agency problems affecting large corporations, thus supporting their ability to serve as a means of organizing, financing and operating today’s large entrepreneurial ventures; and […] ensures that prices fully reflect all value-relevant information, so as to help financial markets in their fundamental function of efficiently allocating scarce financial resources across the economy”. Luca Enriques and Sergio Gilotta, “Disclosure and Financial Market Regulation,” ibid. At 513–514.

  68. 68.

    In the words of Professor Micklitz: “The concept of the confident consumer now becomes a legal normative prerogative which changes the outlook of consumer law”. Micklitz, “The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law—the Transformation of European Private Law from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation.” At 10.

  69. 69.

    Enriques and Gilotta. At 513.

  70. 70.

    On the weaker consumer: Mak.

  71. 71.

    Professor Lynn A. Stout explains that the rational expectations investor model is strongly interconnected with the law and economics school: “legal scholars who specialize in securities regulation have been strongly influenced over the past two decades by the “law and economics” school of analysis. The law and economics school, in turn, relies on a model of investor behavior that I will call the “rational expectations” investor model.” Lynn A. Stout, “The Investor Confidence Game,” Brooklyn Law Review 68, no. 2 (2002). At 6–7.

  72. 72.

    Ibid. At 7.

  73. 73.

    “Conduct of Business Rules as Supervision Standards” Olha O. Cherednychenko, “The Regulation of Retail Investment Services in the Eu: Towards the Improvement of Investor Rights?,” Journal of Consumer Policy 33, no. 4 (2010). At 410.

  74. 74.

    In the words of Professor Micklitz: “Regulatory agencies, designed for securing the functioning of the respective market, are confronted with the need to either instrumentalise private law rules for public enforcement and/or to delegate the enforcement of private law rules in regulated markets to the parties concerned, and thus to the judiciary as the traditional form of conflict resolution.” Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, “Administrative Enforcement of European Private Law,” in The Foundations of European Private Law, ed. Roger Brownsword et al. (Oxford-Portland: Hart Publishing, 2011). At 564.

  75. 75.

    “The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law—the Transfor-mation of European Private Law from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation.” At 12.

  76. 76.

    Ibid. At 13.

  77. 77.

    Ibid. At 13.

  78. 78.

    Although in a different specific context, this is also claimed by Professor Enriques: “Investor Protection is just an instrumental end, something to the pursued in order to attain market integration.” Luca Enriques, “Conflicts of Interest in Investment Services: The Price and Uncertain Impact of Mifid’s Regulatory Framework,” in Investor Protection in Europe, ed. Guido Ferrarini and Eddy Wymeersch (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). At 338.

  79. 79.

    I am referring here to the Lamfalussy procedure.

  80. 80.

    I am referring here to the ESMA .

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Marcacci, A. (2018). Toward a European Regulatory Investor Protection Law. In: Regulating Investor Protection under EU Law. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90297-5_2

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