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Cognitive Science of Religion and the Cognitive Consequences of Sin

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New Developments in the Cognitive Science of Religion

Abstract

This paper explores the relation between evolutionary explanations of religious belief and a core idea in both classical Christian theology and (among other philosophical streams of thought) Reformed Epistemology, namely that humans have fallen into sin. In particular, it challenges the claim made by De Cruz and De Smedt (2012) that ‘(..) in the light of current evolutionary and cognitive theories, the Reformed epistemological view of NES [the noetic effects of sin] is in need of revision.’ Three possible solutions to this conundrum are examined, two of which are shown to be plausible.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See for example (Clark and Barrett 20102011; Wilkins and Griffiths 2013). Justin McBrayer (Chap. 9), Matthew Braddock (Chap. 10) and Robert Nola (Chap. 5) also address this topic in this volume.

  2. 2.

    We do not need to take a stance on the so-called Euthyphro-dilemma here, which asks whether a sinful act is morally wrong because it goes against God’s will or whether it goes against God’s will because it is morally wrong.

  3. 3.

    For an overview of CSR, see e.g. Claire White’s paper in this volume.

  4. 4.

    Following an older line of theological research, De Cruz and De Smedt view Irenaeus of Lyon as the main exemplar of this alternative view (cf. Hick 1966, part III).

  5. 5.

    De Cruz and De Smedt use the concept of warrant (in ‘unwarranted’) because they consider their argument as a challenge to (part of) Plantinga’s warrant epistemology.

  6. 6.

    In fact, there are two theories that explain religious beliefs by pointing to their effects on cooperation. One finds their adaptive use in biological evolution and argues that belief in most or all supernatural beings fosters cooperation. Another, called the Big Gods Theory, places their use in cultural evolution. Here, not all supernatural beings foster cooperation but only a subclass does, viz. ‘big gods’ which transcend the scope of particular tribes. During the neolithical revolution societies with such big gods outcompeted societies with smaller gods because believing in big gods allowed for living in larger communities.

  7. 7.

    De Cruz and De Smedt cite (Sosis and Alcorta 2003) and (Bering 2012) as the main defenders of this theory.

  8. 8.

    De Cruz and De Smedt cite (Guthrie 1993) and Barrett (2009) as defenders of this theory.

  9. 9.

    For a more complete overview, see (White, Chap. 3, this volume).

  10. 10.

    They note that Guthrie’s theory rarely incorporates good empirical evidence and claim that Barrett’s theory lacks a detailed story about how agency detection experiences are connected to supernatural beliefs (Van Leeuwen and Van Elk, forthcoming).

  11. 11.

    Brunner 1952, 131.

  12. 12.

    Brunner 1952, 131.

  13. 13.

    Bavinck 2006, 181, 182. So according to Bavinck, natural evil (or what we, not he, would call the evolutionary process) was allowed or ordained by God because of his foreknowledge of the Fall, whereas the situation became worse after the Fall.

  14. 14.

    As a matter of fact, De Cruz and De Smedt come close to this second solution, but they deny that the sensus divinitatis is corrupted from the outset as a result of sin; instead, they argue that the sensus divinitatis is underspecified, potentially leading to both false and correct religious beliefs depending on the input (De Cruz and De Smedt 2012, 62). Thus, they seem to reject CCS.

  15. 15.

    See from the Protestant and the Catholic side respectively: Smith 2017 and Van den Brink forthcoming; Levering 2017.

  16. 16.

    For their helpful comments on earlier versions of the paper, we would like to thank Helen de Cruz, Justin McBrayer, Nikolaj Nottelmann, Tyler Taber, and René van Woudenberg. This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from the Templeton World Charity Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Templeton World Charity Foundation.

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Peels, R., van Eyghen, H., van den Brink, G. (2018). Cognitive Science of Religion and the Cognitive Consequences of Sin. In: van Eyghen, H., Peels, R., van den Brink, G. (eds) New Developments in the Cognitive Science of Religion. New Approaches to the Scientific Study of Religion , vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90239-5_11

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