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Global Justice, Human Rights and the Modernization of International Law pp 163–184Cite as

What Was Not Meant to Be: General Principles of Law as a Source of International Law

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Abstract

This paper reflects on the modest role fulfilled by general principles of law in contemporary international legal thought and practice. It submits that the tepidity with which international lawyers have resorted to general principles of law in practice and legal thought—and especially in their expansionist enterprises—is the result of the inability of general principle of law to operate as a source of international law. In particular, it is argued here that the miserable fate of general principles of law can be traced back to a choice by early twentieth century international lawyers to locate and organize the prevention of non liquet as well as analogical reasoning within the sources of international law. The following will show that the doctrine of sources of international law may not have proved the most adequate framework for the prevention of non liquet and gap-filling function that was bestowed upon general principles of law. It is only once general principles of law come to be construed and deployed in international legal thought and practice as an argumentative technique of content-determination (i.e., a mode of interpretation) and thus not as a source of international law that they have a chance to play a meaningful role in international legal argumentation.

Professor of Public International Law, University of Manchester; Professor of International Law, Sciences Po Law School, Paris, France. The author thanks G.C. McBain for his assistance.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See, generally, d’Aspremont (2016).

  2. 2.

    See, generally, d’Aspremont (2015), pp. 111–129.

  3. 3.

    It focuses on general principles of law only and leaves aside the debate of expansionism in relation to general principle of international law. There are occasional conflations of general principles of law and general principles of international law in the literature, see, e.g., Bassiouni (1990); it is well-known that Brownlie included both general principles of law derived from domestic law as and general principles of international law, see Crawford (2012), pp. 36–37; it is noteworthy that Art. 21(1)(b)–(c) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court now clearly distinguishes between general principles of international law and general principles of law.

  4. 4.

    Raimondo (2008), Chap. 2; Danilenko (1993), pp. 173–177; Degan (1997), pp. 46–53; Gaja (2013), paras. 1–3; Pellet (2012), pp. 685–688.

  5. 5.

    PCIJ, Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee, 16 June-24 July 1920, pp. 322–325; on this debate see Bos (1984), pp. 68–75; Pellet (2012), pp. 685–689; see also the separate opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade in ICJ, Pulp Mills over the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, pp. 3–6; Kammerhofer (1920).

  6. 6.

    On the idea that they constitute a material source of law, see Virally (1983), p. 171; Fitzmaurice (1958), p. 174; Weil (1992), pp. 148–149; Tunkin (1975), pp. 1–218; on the idea that they constitute a formal source of law, see Cheng (1953), p. 390; See also De Visscher (1925), p. 339; Heiborn (1926), p. 20.

  7. 7.

    On the discussion about the possible amendments of Art. 38 by the Washington Committee of Jurists, see Pellet (2002), pp. 689–691.

  8. 8.

    This originates in an amendment proposed by Chile. UNCIO, Vol. XIII, Doc. 240 (1945), 164.

  9. 9.

    In the same vein, Degan (1997), p. 52.

  10. 10.

    See Verhoeven (2002), p. 9; Pellet (2002), p. 1073.

  11. 11.

    For an overview see Gaja (2013), pp. 25–30.

  12. 12.

    See, e.g., IACtHR, Aloeboetoe et al v Suriname, Judgment of 10 September 1993, Series C No. 15, paras. 61–62.

  13. 13.

    See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Judgment of 22 February 2001, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para.439; for an analysis of the use of general principles of law in international criminal law, see Raimondo (2010), pp. 45–59; Ellis (2011), pp. 967–970.

  14. 14.

    See e.g. Arbitral practice ICSID, Amco Acia Co v Republic of Indonesia, Award of 20 November 1984, para. 267; Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) v Libyan Arab Republic, Award, 12 April 1971, 62 ILR (1982) 145, p. 175; on general principles and investment law, see Gazzini (2009), pp. 103–119; Stone Sweet and della Cananea (2014); Hirsch (2011), p. 16—arguing that it played a prominent role in the formative period of international investment law; on the recent move away from general principles of law in arbitral practice, see, however, Fauchald (2008), p. 304.

  15. 15.

    On these two dimensions of the notion of source, see d’Aspremont and Besson (2017).

  16. 16.

    See Besson (2017), p. 26; Gaja (2013), para. 31; Kleinlein (2016), sect. 2.2; this distinction draws on legal theory and jurisprudence. See, e.g., Dworkin (1978), p. 24—arguing that principles differ in the direction they given, general principles suggest a given direction without necessitating a particular decision; without referring to general principles of law as is understood in Art. 38, the ICJ has played down this distinction between rules and principles, see ICJ, Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v United States of America), Judgment of 12 October 1984, ICJ Reports 1984, para.79—“the use of the term ‘principles’ may be justified because of their more general and more fundamental character”. On this point see the remarks of Yee (2016), pp. 488–489.

  17. 17.

    See e.g. the contention of Kolb according to whom general principles are neither rules nor simple vague ideas but “norm-sources” as a type of source—Kolb (2006), p. 1.

  18. 18.

    Besson (2017), p. 24; see also Quadri (1964), p. 350.

  19. 19.

    Rousseau (1944), p. 890.

  20. 20.

    Cheng (1953), p. 390; Gazzini (2009), p. 106.

  21. 21.

    Voigt (2008), p. 8.

  22. 22.

    Knop (2003), p. 437.

  23. 23.

    Waldock (1962), p. 39.

  24. 24.

    Cassese (2005), p. 188.

  25. 25.

    Lauterpacht (1958), p. 172; on the natural law dimension of general principles, see also Fitzmaurice (1958), p. 174; ICJ, South West Africa Case (Ethiopia v South Africa), Judgment of 18 July 1966, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, ICJ Reports 1966, p. 299.

  26. 26.

    Kolb (2006) p. 7.

  27. 27.

    Klabbers (2013), p. 35: they are “rules which are perhaps a bit more ‘necessary’… than other rules, and for which therefore there would apply less strict demands on State practice and opinio juris”; on the difficulty to distinguish general principles from customary law, see Degan (1997), p. 8.

  28. 28.

    Guggenheim (1953), p. 152.

  29. 29.

    Lauterpacht (1958), p. 205.

  30. 30.

    On this debate, see generally, d’Aspremont (2011).

  31. 31.

    Gaja (2013), para. 1; Verdross (1935), p. 207; Pellet (2012), p. 763; Brierly (1949), p. 64; Gazzini (2009).

  32. 32.

    See, e.g., Lorimer (1885), pp. 19–64; Woolsey (1877); Lawrence (1923), pp. 95–114.

  33. 33.

    For an overview of the nineteenth century arbitral practice, see Raimondo (2010), Chap. 2; Degan (1997), pp. 34–41; Lauterpacht (1927), pp. 203–296; Verdross (1935), pp. 207–219.

  34. 34.

    See, e.g., Affaire des réclamations des sujets italiens résidant au Pérou (Italie, Pérou), Award of 30 September 1901, RIAA 15, pp. 389–453 (where general principles were applied to interpret a conventional rule of international law).

  35. 35.

    Degan (1997), p. 40.

  36. 36.

    Lauterpacht (1927), pp. 67–68.

  37. 37.

    See, e.g., Sénat de la Ville libre de Hambourg, Différend opposant la Grande-Bretagne et le Portugal dans l’affaire Yuille, Shortridge & Cie, Sentence du 21 octobre 1861, RIAA 29, pp. 57–71; See also PCA, Russian Indemnity Case (Russia v Turkey), Award of 11 November 1912, RIAA 6, pp. 421–447 as cited in Lauterpacht (1927), p. 257; in the same vein, Strupp (1934), pp. 335–336; Lauterpacht (1927), p. 257; Degan (1997), p. 40.

  38. 38.

    Bassiouni (1990), pp. 787–801; Blondel (1968), pp. 201–236.

  39. 39.

    Pellet (2012), p. 767; Hernandez (2014), p. 261; Besson (2017), pp. 36 and 39; Degan (1997), p. 58; Ellis (2011), p. 950; Raimondo (2010), Chap. 2; Gaja (2013), paras. 9–16; Verhoeven (2000), p. 348: this author asserts that “la CIJ n’a jamais fait explicitement application d’un principe général de droit ainsi compris [that is, as a result of a survey of municipal law], même dans les matières principalement procédurales où leur utilité est réputée la plus manifeste. Elle s’est contentée, le cas échéant, de les écarter expressément”; with respect to the absence of general principles of law in the case law of the PCIJ, see Rousseau (1944), p. 898; Koskenniemi (2005), p. 49.

  40. 40.

    ICJ, South West Africa Case (Ethiopia v South Africa), Judgment of 18 July 196, ICJ Reports 1966, para. 88.

  41. 41.

    ICJ, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, p. 23: “the principles underlying the Convention which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any convention obligation”.

  42. 42.

    ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands), Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 17.

  43. 43.

    In Barcelona Traction, the Court referred to “rules generally accepted by municipal legal system”—ICJ, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v Spain), Judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports 1970, para. 50.

  44. 44.

    ICJ, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Admissibility, Judgment of 31 March 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, para. 127.

  45. 45.

    For instance, see PCIJ, Lighthouses in Crete and Samos (France v Greece), Judgment of 8 October 1937, Series A/B, No. 71, Separate Opinion of Judge Séfériadès, pp. 137–138; ICJ, International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion of 11 July 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, Separate Opinion by Sir Arnold McNair, p. 148; ICJ, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (United Kingdom v Iran), Preliminary Objection, Judgment of 22 July 1952, ICJ Reports 1952, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Levi Carneiro, p. 161; ICJ, Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants (Netherlands v Sweden), Judgment of 28 November 1958, ICJ Reports 1958, Separate Opinion of Judge Moreno Quintana, p. 107; ICJ, Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India), Merits, Judgment of 12 April 1960, ICJ Reports 1960, Separate Opinion of Judge Wellington Koo, pp. 66–67; ICJ, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand), Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, ICJ Reports 1962, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Alfaro, pp. 42–43; ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, Declaration of Judge Fleischhauer, pp. 308–309; ICJ, Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment of 6 November 2003, Merits, ICJ Reports 2003, Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, paras. 66–74; ICJ, Questions relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v. Australia), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 March 2014, ICJ Reports 2014, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Greenwood, para. 12.

  46. 46.

    Ibid, majority opinion, p. 152, para. 24; on this point, see the remarks of Yee (2016), pp. 487–488; more impressive is the pleadings of Portugal in The Right of Passage over Indian Territory where Portugal produced a comparative law study covering 64 different national laws with a view to establishing the existence of a general principle concerning the right of access to enclaved pieces of land—ICJ, Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India), Pleadings, vol. I, ICJ Reports 1960, pp. 714 and 858; see also the remarks by Pellet (2012), p. 770.

  47. 47.

    See e.g. “traditional principle”—PCIJ, Question of Jaworzina (Polish-Czechoslovakian Frontier), Advisory Opinion of 6 December 1923, Series B, No. 8, p. 37; “principle[s] generally accepted”—PCIJ, Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow, Jurisdiction, Judgment of 26 July 1927, Series A, No. 9, para. 87; “well-known rule [in reference to a general principle]”—PCIJ, Interpretation of Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Lausanne, Advisory Opinion of 21 November 1925, Series B, No. 12, para. 95; “well-established and general recognized principle of law”—ICJ, Effect of awards of compensation made by the U.N. Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion of 13 July 1954, ICJ Reports 1954, p. 53.

  48. 48.

    In many decisions, they can hardly be distinguished from customary international law, see PCIJ, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment of 26 March 1925, Series A, No. 5, p. 30; PCIJ, Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow, Merits, Judgment of 13 September 1928, Series A No. 17, p. 29; ICJ, Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment of 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 22; ICJ, Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the UN Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion of 12 July 1973, ICJ Reports 1973, p. 177; ICJ, La Grand (Germany v. United States), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 2001, ICJ Reports 2001, p. 503; for some comments, see Danilenko (1993), p. 182.

  49. 49.

    See The International Court of Justice, Handbook, 6th ed., 2013.

  50. 50.

    See ICTY, Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Judgment of 22 February 2011, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 39; for an analysis of the regular use of general principles of law in international criminal law, see Raimondo (2010), pp. 45–59.

  51. 51.

    In international investment law, see Hirsch (2011), p. 16—arguing that general principles of law played a prominent role in the formative period of international investment law; on the recent move away from general principles of law in arbitral practice, see, however, Fauchald (2008), p. 304.

  52. 52.

    Mechanisms to prevent non liquet are known in other legal systems. See the famous Art. 4 of the French Civil Code on the prohibition of non liquet.

  53. 53.

    On the various mechanisms which can prevent non liquet, see Pellet (2012), p. 705—referring to adjudication ex aequo et bono, progressive interpretation and customary law.

  54. 54.

    See Lauterpacht (1958), p. 205.

  55. 55.

    Ibid.

  56. 56.

    Cheng (1953), p. 390.

  57. 57.

    General principles of law did not prevent the ICJ from making a finding of non liquet in advisory proceedings—see ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, para. 97; see also the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins, ICJ Reports (1996) 583, paras. 36–38; see also ICJ, Reparations for Injuries in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, pp. 174 and 185: “in such case, there is no rule of law which assigns priority to one or to the other, or which compels either the state or the Organization from bringing an international claim”.

  58. 58.

    Kolb (2006), p. 9.

  59. 59.

    Bassiouni (1990), pp. 769 and 777.

  60. 60.

    Jenks (1958) p. 106: “Where neither international convention nor accepted custom nor international judicial precedent furnishes a satisfactory rule of law, the law must be deduced from the general principles of law recognised by Civilised nations”; de Visscher (1955), p. 234; Bassiouni (1990), pp. 769 and 775: “a means for developing new norms of conventional and customary international law”; Brierly (1963), p. 63; Verzijl (1968), p. 57; Gross (1984), p. 145; Degan (1997), p. 108; Kolb (2006), p. 9.

  61. 61.

    Wolfgang Friedmann, writing in 1963, also stated his belief that general principles would grow in importance, see Friedmann (1963), pp. 279–280. He predicted that general principles formed through comparative law studies would be particularly influential in emerging areas of international law having to do with welfare, such as health, food, transportation, and management of resources as well as economic development: Friedmann (1963), pp. 282–283; see also Bassiouni (1990), p. 769: “As the world’s interdependence increases, there will doubtless be greater reliance on international law as a means to resolve a variety of issues which neither conventional nor customary international law is ready to meet… it is quite likely that “General Principles” will become the most important and influential source of international law in this decade”.

  62. 62.

    For some criticisms of the use of general principles to develop IHRL, see Pellet (2000), p. 7.

  63. 63.

    See, e.g., Simma and Alston (1988–1989), p. 82; Meron (1989), p. 88; Hannum (1995–1996), pp. 351–352; Wouters and Ryngaert (2009), pp. 120–122; Felice (2009), pp. 21–31, esp. p. 25; Kaufman Hevener and Mosher (1978), p. 596; O’Boyle and Lafferty (2013), p. 194.

  64. 64.

    See Wouters and Ryngaert (2009), pp. 120–122; Jain (2016), p. 111; Bantekas (2006), p. 136.

  65. 65.

    Fan (2012), p. 1078.

  66. 66.

    Such achievements include the criminalization of rape and sexual assault as war crimes, ICTR, Prosecutor v Akayesu, Judgment of 2 September 1998 ICTR-96-4, pp. 596–598; ICTY, Prosecutor v Furundzija, Judgment of 10 December 1998, IT-95-17, p. 78; see Hayes (2010) pp. 129–157; on duress as a mitigating factor in sentencing but not a complete defence against a charge involving the killing of innocent human beings as well as a number of procedural principles, see ICTY, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Appeal Judgment of 7 October 1997, IT-96-22-A, paras. 1–10; for a general overview, see Raimondo (2008); as well as Raimondo (2010), pp. 45–61; see also Jain (2016), pp. 121–129; Swart (2010), pp. 468–471.

  67. 67.

    Bassiouni (1990), p. 775; Cheng (1953), p. 390; see Verdross (1935), p. 227; Gazzini (2009)—with an emphasis on the interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment; Freeman Jalet (1963), p. 1063; Blondel (1968), p. 234.

  68. 68.

    Bassiouni (1990), pp. 769 and 776.

  69. 69.

    McNair (1957), p. 15.

  70. 70.

    Blondel (1968), pp. 202 and 234; Guggenheim (1953), p. 150.

  71. 71.

    Besson (2017), p. 30; see also Cheng (1953), p. 390.

  72. 72.

    Jouannet (2006); see also Stone Sweet and della Cananea (2014).

  73. 73.

    Besson (2017), p. 30.

  74. 74.

    Blondel (1968), p. 202.

  75. 75.

    Ibid., p. 234.

  76. 76.

    Besson (2017), p. 30.

  77. 77.

    Brownlie (1998), p. 16.

  78. 78.

    Kolb (2006), p. 7.

  79. 79.

    Guggenheim (1953), p. 150; Besson (2017), p. 30.

  80. 80.

    Besson (2017), p. 38.

  81. 81.

    Blondel (1968), p. 236.

  82. 82.

    In the same vein, see Jennings and Spencer (1981), p. 41.

  83. 83.

    Raimondo (2008), Chap. 2; Degan (1997), p. 67; Yee (2016), p. 489.

  84. 84.

    Raimondo (2008), Chap. 2; the question of whether general principles of law emanate from consent has been the object of diverging views in the literature. For some authors, they constitute an expression of consent—see Bassiouni (1990), p. 786; Rousseau (1944), p. 890; for others, general principles of law as introduced in Article 38 constitute an innovative departure from State consent, see e.g. ICJ, South West Africa Case (Ethiopia v South Africa), Judgment of 18 July 1966, ICJ Reports 1966, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, p. 298; general principles are a source that is alien to consent, see Brierly (1963), p. 63; Lauterpacht (1927), pp. 298–299.

  85. 85.

    Danilenko (1993), p. 184.

  86. 86.

    Degan (1997), p. 67.

  87. 87.

    Ellis (2011), p. 950; See also Jennings and Spencer (1981), pp. 39–40.

  88. 88.

    Gaja (2013), para. 2; Yee (2016), p. 489.

  89. 89.

    Gaja (2013), para. 16.

  90. 90.

    Ibid.

  91. 91.

    Yee (2016), p. 489.

  92. 92.

    Koskenniemi (2009), p. 3.

  93. 93.

    For an acknowledgement that there exists no consensus on their mode of ascertainment, see Danilenko (1993), p. 173; Degan (1997), p. 14; Pellet (2012) p. 765; Kleinlein (2016); for a detailed overview of the great variety of doctrinal positions on general principles, see Virally (1982) pp. 48–116.

  94. 94.

    See, e.g., Jennings and Watts (1996), p. 37; Lauterpacht (1927), pp. 67–69; Gazzini (2009), p. 107.

  95. 95.

    For Thirlway, the comparative law methodology is not a law-ascertainment method but a guide—see Thirlway (2014), p. 99; in contrast, for Pellet, the resort to comparative law is not necessary: “it is enough to ascertain that such principles are present in any (or some) of the laws belonging to these various systems”—see Pellet (2012), p. 770; on the idea that there is no agreement on the comparative law methodology required by general principles of law, see Bassiouni (1990), p. 773.

  96. 96.

    It is noteworthy that Kelsen rejected the comparative law method because general principles are only those that are already part of international law either as treaties or custom—see Kelsen (1952), pp. 393–394.

  97. 97.

    Ibid.; see, also, Tunkin (1975); for a rejection of this argument see Gaja (2013), para. 6.

  98. 98.

    See ICJ, South West Africa Case (Ethiopia v South Africa), Judgment of 18 July 1966, ICJ Reports 1966, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, p. 300; Zemanek (1965), pp. 208–211; see also ICJ, South West Africa Case (Ethiopia v South Africa), Pleadings vol IX, Statement of E. Gross, Agent for the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia, ICJ Reports 1966; Verdross (1968), p. 525; Verdross and Simma (1984), p. 639; on this aspect of the theory of Verdross, see Simma (1995), pp. 49–50.

  99. 99.

    In this respect, it seems no coincidence that the ascertainment of general principles of law has been included as a topic of future work by the International Law Commission (see ILC, Report on the work of its sixtyeighth session (2016), GAOR Supp. No. 10, A/71/10, p. 378, para. 313).

  100. 100.

    See Ellis (2011), pp. 949–971; see also Koskenniemi (1990), pp. 1948 and 1950; See also the remarks of Blondel (1968), p. 203.

  101. 101.

    Koskenniemi (2009), p. 15: “The question remains how to identify and compare autochtonous forms of thinking about inter-community relations that would not necessarily be subsumable under European legal categories but would stand on their own and thus also provide a wider comparative perspective under which European categories could be examined as equally ‘provincial’ as others”.

  102. 102.

    See discussion in Degan (1997), pp. 68–72; see also Ellis (2011), pp. 955–958, for Ellis, it is futile to seek universality (p. 971); for the claim that we should only look at democratic States if one wants to preserve human rights and self-determination, see Besson (2017), p. 38.

  103. 103.

    For an overview of the comparative law methods that could be deployed by international lawyers, see Ellis (2011), pp. 959–967; see also the methods suggested by Knop (2003), pp. 455–469.

  104. 104.

    Weil (1992-VI), pp. 146–147.

  105. 105.

    See ICJ, International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion of 11 July 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, Separate Opinion by Sir Arnold McNair, p. 148; Pellet (2012), p. 840; Degan (1997), pp. 103–104; Sourgens and Noland (2009), p. 513; Ellis (2011), pp. 958–959; see the critical remarks of Freeman Jalet (1963), pp. 1076–1077 (citing Gutteridge 1946, p. 66).

  106. 106.

    Koskenniemi (2009), p. 6.

  107. 107.

    For Bassouini, it is the same empirical methodology as in custom, Bassiouni (1990), p. 811.

  108. 108.

    For one of the very few attempts to unpack the comparative law methodology of the identification of general principles, see Sourgens and Noland (2009), pp. 505–533.

  109. 109.

    The expression is from Ellis (2011), p. 950.

  110. 110.

    Jenks (1958), p. 109.

  111. 111.

    Pellet (2012), p. 770.

  112. 112.

    Ellis (2011), p. 950.

  113. 113.

    Rousseau (1944), p. 891.

  114. 114.

    On the idea that the ascertainment of general principles of law is a matter of analogy, see Anzilotti (1929), p. 117; Degan (1997), p. 99; ICJ, South West Africa Case (Ethiopia v South Africa), Judgment of 18 July 1966, ICJ Reports 1966, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, p. 295; Lauterpacht (1958), p. 205; Ghil (1957), pp. 51 and 87–91; Nollkaemper (2006), p. 308; see also Blondel (1968), p. 234, where he argues that the ascertainment of general principles of law comes down to a question of fundamental analogy (“analogie fondamentale et rationelle”) rather than formal analogy (“analogie formelle”).

  115. 115.

    On the question whether the current law-ascertainment criteria of the sources of international law constitute are formal or not, see d’Aspremont (2011).

  116. 116.

    Rousseau (1944), p. 891.

  117. 117.

    It is noteworthy that Lauterpacht, one of the champions of general principles of law, has himself defended a very ambiguous position regarding their role as a source of international law; see, generally, Lauterpacht (1927).

  118. 118.

    On the idea, that general principles do not necessarily need to operate as a source, see Besson (2017), p. 19; for Hart, general principles are an aspect of legal reasoning and judicial decision-making as they refer to some “purpose, goal, entitlement, or value”—Hart (1997), p. 263.

  119. 119.

    This is part of the argument I have tried to make elsewhere, see d’Aspremont (2017).

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  1. University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

    Jean d’Aspremont

  2. University of Sciences Po, Paris, France

    Jean d’Aspremont

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    Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi

  2. Faculty of Law, Catholic University of Milan, Milan, Italy

    Pasquale De Sena

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d’Aspremont, J. (2018). What Was Not Meant to Be: General Principles of Law as a Source of International Law. In: Pisillo Mazzeschi, R., De Sena, P. (eds) Global Justice, Human Rights and the Modernization of International Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90227-2_7

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