Abstract
This introductory chapter explains why it is important to rethink gubernatorial effects on a national political arena. The 2001 political-economic crisis in Argentina and President Lula’s difficulty in reforming the Brazilian tax system indicate that governors may exercise considerable influence over national politics, but we still do not know why. Kikuchi argues that we should study senatorial behavior in committees and on the floor together, considering senators from the same district may face pressures from different actors of subnational politics. He also introduces the case of Argentina for this study.
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- 1.
La Nación, “Los gobernadores del PJ analizan la situación del país (The PJ governors analyze the situation of the country),” December 20, 2001.
- 2.
There was no vice-president at that time, since Vice-President Carlos “Chacho” Álvarez also resigned in 2000 due to a vote-buying scandal at the Senate. See Chapter 3. Under such situation, the provisional president of the Senate (the president of the Chamber of Deputies if there is no provisional president of the Senate, or the president of the Supreme Court if there is no provisional president of the Senate and the president of the Chamber of Deputies) assumes the presidency for 48 hours, and he or she is in charge of calling a meeting of the legislative assembly (asamblea legislativa), which consists of all senators and deputies , to elect the interim president from senators, deputies, and provincial governors.
- 3.
In contrast with the US, Article 77 of the Argentine constitution allows the executive branch to initiate its bills in the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies .
- 4.
La Nación, “Sin respaldo, renunció Rodríguez Saá (Without support, Rodríguez Saá resigned),” December 31, 2001.
- 5.
The CPMF was a federal tax on all financial operations, which was in effect between 1997 and 2007. It intended to finance public health, social insurance, and the Fund to Eradicate Poverty (Fundo de Combate e Erradicação da Pobreza), but its revenue was not shared with the states (González 2016).
- 6.
In 2007, another extension was rejected by the Senate.
- 7.
Andrea Welsh, “Buoyed by Victory, Brazil’s Lula Seeks Allies,” Reuters.com, November 23, 2006, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2006/11/23/us-brazil-politics-idUKN2328442620061123.
- 8.
Provincial party bosses are a small group of politicians or a single individual who dominates parties at the provincial level (Jones and Hwang 2005b). Governors are provincial party bosses of their parties, but there are also “non-governor” provincial party bosses, as is the case when a party does not have a gubernatorial position. The loyalty of legislators to the governors of their provinces depends on the homogeneity of their parties at the provincial level. See Chapter 2 for more discussion.
- 9.
Even though Argentina started to use “Open, Simultaneous, and Mandatory Primaries ” (Primarias Abiertas Simultáneas y Obligatorias, PASOs) in 2011, they still play a crucial role in the candidate selection process. See Chapter 2.
- 10.
In Mexico, current incumbent deputies are prohibited to run for immediate reelection , while no incumbent governor may run for the governorship for life. However, the 2014 constitutional reform allowed deputies to serve for up to four consecutive terms beginning 2018. See Chapter 6 for more information.
- 11.
Recently, Kikuchi and Lodola (2014) found that the ideal points of senators from a governor’s party tend to be far from those of their national parties. In addition, Gervasoni and Nazareno (2017) argued that legislators from a party of longstanding governors are more likely to feel the governors’ control over their votes. However, again, it is still not clear how governors may influence the sequential flow of the legislative process.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
Regardless of the differences between unitary and federal states, legislators’ bills are far less likely to be approved than presidential bills. During the Aylwin administration (1990–1993) in Chile, presidential legislative success rate was 63.4%, which exceeded approval rate of legislators’ bills (6.8%) (Siavelis 2002). Alemán and Calvo (2008) also show that presidential legislative success rate in Argentina between 1983 and 2001 was 51.3%, and that only 5% of legislators’ bills were approved by Congress.
- 15.
When Argentina was democratized in 1983, it consisted of 22 provinces and Federal Capital (Capital Federal). Tierra del Fuego was declared to be the 23rd province in 1990, whereas the 1994 constitutional reform transformed Federal Capital with an appointed mayor into the City of Buenos Aires with a directly elected chief of the government.
- 16.
The president used to be elected by an electoral college for a six-year term under the previous constitution until 1994.
- 17.
This description is based on the information as of January, 2018.
- 18.
- 19.
Examples of the studies on the upper chambers in Latin America include Alemán (2008), Crisp and Desposato (2004), Crisp and Ingall (2002), Ingall and Crisp (2001), Kikuchi and Lodola (2014), Micozzi (2012), Neiva (2011), Langston (2006), Llanos and Nolte (2003), Llanos and Sánchez (2006), and Londregan (2000).
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Kikuchi, H. (2018). Introduction. In: Presidents versus Federalism in the National Legislative Process. IDE-JETRO Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8_1
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