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Downfall: Iran’s Non-State Foreign Policy in 1973–77

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The Shah of Iran, the Iraqi Kurds, and the Lebanese Shia

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Abstract

In this period, Iran entirely transformed its non-state foreign policy in both Iraqi Kurdistan and Lebanon. As the war changed at the expense of the Iraqi Kurds and the possibility of direct war with Baghdad increased, the Shah bypassed his American and Israeli allies and terminated his support for Barzani. In the Algiers Agreement of 1975, Iraq accepted territorial concession to Iran in Arvand Rud, while Iran cut off backing to the Iraqi Kurds. The resistance of the Kurdish Peshmerga, who had increasingly depended on the Iranian Army, soon collapsed.

In the meantime, Ambassador Qadar and SAVAK finally convinced the Shah to shift Iran’s policy toward the Lebanese Shia. The Lebanese Civil War of 1975 weakened Sadr’s position and widened a gap between the Shia community and other Lebanese parties, the PLO, and Arab regimes. Despite rising tensions between Sadr and pro-Ayatollah Khomeini elements, the increasing presence of the Iranian revolutionaries in the south of Lebanon tarnished Sadr’s image in Tehran. The Pahlavi regime ultimately broke its relations with Sadr and stripped him of his Iranian passport.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Memorandum of Conversation, Ford, the Shah, Kissinger , and Scowcroft, May 15, 1975. Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 11.

  2. 2.

    An interview with Dr. Ahmad Chalabi: How is it possible that Saddam Hussein is still in power in Baghdad? See http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saddam/interviews/chalabi.html.

  3. 3.

    Memcon, March 9, 1975, NSA, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China and Middle East Discussions, Box 3, GRFL.

  4. 4.

    On 7 October 1973, Iraq opened its embassy in Tehran. In addition to signaling a turn in their regional policy, Iraqi leaders’ main intention in reviving the relations with Tehran, and later London, was to take retaliatory measures against Anwar Sadat, Hafez Assad, and the Russians, since the Iraqis felt humiliated by not having been informed by their Arab friends of a coordinated attack in the Yom-Kippur War .

  5. 5.

    United States Mission to the United Nations 472 to the U.S. Department of State, “Iraqi Request for SC Meeting,” February 12, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), pp. 12; and Tehran 1159 to the U.S Department of State, “Iraqi-Iranian Border Clashes,” February 11, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), pp. 1–2.

  6. 6.

    Al-Samarrai, Wafiq, Hottam al-Bawabat al-Sharqi [The Destruction of the Eastern Gate], translated in Farsi (Tehran, Markaz Asnad va Tahghighat-e Defa-e Moghaddas) p. 56.

  7. 7.

    Amid his Arab-Israeli peace-building efforts in the post-October War of 1973, Kissinger was faced with a critical problem of managing the Israeli Army withdrawal from the Syrian Golan Heights. Though securing a disengagement agreement in January 1974 and Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, he saw an Iraqi armored brigade, about one-third of Iraq’s Army, in Syria as a threat to his peace initiative. Right after reopening diplomatic relations with Iran and neutralizing the eastern border, Iraq had dispatched an armored brigade to Syria to fight the Israelis. See Kissinger , Henry. Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999). p. 586. Baghdad soon withdrew from the Syrian front in the middle of the war, due to Iraqi leaders’ anger at Egyptian-Syrian covert cooperation. However, with Libyan and Algerian interferences, Baghdad resent the Army in November 1973. See Baghdad 600 to U.S. Department of State, “Iraq Rejoins Battle,” November 7, 1973 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1973), pp. 1–2.

  8. 8.

    White House, Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger and Meir , May 7, 1974 (DNSA/KT01143), p. 12.

  9. 9.

    U.S. Mission to the United Nations 531 to U.S. Department of State, “Baghdad: SC Meeting on Iraqi Complaint,” February 15, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), p. 1; and U.S . Mission to the United Nations 575 to State, “Iraqi Complaint in SC,” February 20, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), pp. 1–2. In its file submitted to the Security Council, Baghdad stated that “[t]he situation on the frontier is deteriorating rapidly as the Iranian aggression continues and heavy massing of Iranian troops on the borders is still in progress … Iranian forces at different levels are concentrated in the border area and continue their military actions, openly violating Iraqi territory in a planned manner while Iranian air force fighters violate Iraqi airspace threatening Iraq’s national security and sovereignty.” See SCOR Supp. S/11216 (12 Feb. 1974). Iran, in turn, accused Iraq of cross-border attacks and demanded compensation for losses incurred. See SCOR Supp. S/11218 (12 Feb. 1974). Yemen, the UAE , and Libya joined the Council debate and contended that “Iran’s aggression against Iraqi border posts could be regarded as an escalation of tension and an invitation to large-scale hostilities.” See Sturchler, Nikolas, The Threat of Force in International Law, 2009, p. 231.

  10. 10.

    To avoid using a veto to block the likely Security Council resolution against Tehran, Kissinger asked the Shah to accept a watered-down consensus statement, earlier passed on February 28, and let the Security General investigate the event. See U.S. Mission to the United Nations 634 to U.S. Department of State, “Developments in Iraqi SC Complaint,” February 26, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), pp. 1–2; U.S. Mission to the United Nations 674 to U.S. Department of State, “Iraqi Complaint in SC,” February 27, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), p. 1; U.S. Mission to the United Nations 697 to U.S. Department of State, “SC Adopts Consensus in Iran-Iraq Dispute,” February 28, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), pp. 1–2; and United Nations Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council,” February 28, 1974, S/11229, pp. 1–2. But the Shah ignored it. See Tehran 1735 to U.S. Department of State, “Iran-Iraq Border Clash,” March 4, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), p. 1; and Tehran 1779 to State, “Latest Iran-Iraq Border Clash,” March 5, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), p. 1.

  11. 11.

    “Meeting Held at the Iraqi Foreign Ministry in Baghdad on Monday, 8 April 1974, at 5.30 pm,” S-0904-0022-08, UNARMS.

  12. 12.

    The U.S. Department of State 37806 to Tehran, “Soviet-Iraq Threat to Iran in Middle East,” March 14, 1970 (FRUS/1964-68/XXI/doc.268), pp. 1–3.

  13. 13.

    Postponed twice, the census for disputed areas had been unable to remove the long-term obstacle of his proposed capital of the Kurdish state: Kirkuk. Earlier before, in 1972, Barzani rejected Baghdad’s proposal to apply the 1957 census figures to Kirkuk that would demonstrate the majority of Iraqi Turkmen in the city who were likely to prefer the Baath rule due to the bloody days of July 1959.

  14. 14.

    The Baath-imposed autonomy law established under the auspices of more than six anti-Barzani and socialists Kurds. See McDowall, David, A Modern History of the Kurds (London, New York 2004) pp. 332–335.

  15. 15.

    Baghdad 136 to U.S. Department of State, “Nominal Autonomy for Kurdistan,” March 10, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), pp. 1–2.

  16. 16.

    Helms to Scowcroft, March 18, 1974, CIA-Helms; Helms to Scowcroft, March 18, 1974, (FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol XXVII).

  17. 17.

    United States Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA: The Pike Report (Nottingham, England: Spokesman Books, 1977). p. 197.

  18. 18.

    Helms to Scowcroft, March 20, 1974 (CIA/FOIA/Helms), pp. 1–2.

  19. 19.

    CIA, Memorandum for Kissinger, “Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s Request,” March 21, 1974 (NPL/HAK/Box138/Kurdishs Problem-Vol. I/June 1972–Oct 1973), p. 1.

  20. 20.

    United States Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA: The Pike Report (Nottingham, England: Spokesman Books, 1977). p. 214.

  21. 21.

    The National Security Council and Scowcroft suggested financially supporting the Kurds with a “token amount” of $500,000–750,000 in refugee aid. They were also worried about exposing the operation that could provoke Turkey, the USSR , and Arab states. They contended that Barzani’s announcement of a “kind of rump government” that “would be … a dangerous point and gratuitously provoke Iraq (with strong Soviet and possibly even Turkish support) [into war]” and “would give Iraq no choice but to launch a major attack against Kurdistan if it [was] to protect its national integrity” without any guarantee of the Shah’s support. Also, it “would project [the U.S .] beyond the boundaries of a covert and would operation, making secrecy impossible thus jeopardize other policy equities.” The NSC argued that any support for the Kurds should demonstrate the U.S. sympathy with the Kurdish uprising while dissuading Barzani from asking for so much that the U.S. could not keep the operation covert, since the U.S. was not able to “play a prime role in the new ballgame.” See White House, Memorandum, Scowcroft to Helms , no date, (NPL/HAK/Box138/Kurdish Problem–Vol. II/doc.7), pp. 1–4.

  22. 22.

    Kissinger , Henry. Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999). pp. 588–589.

  23. 23.

    Kissinger to Nixon , April 11, 1974, NSA, KSWWOF, Box 19, GRFL. The support included additional amounts up to $1 million to continuing the subsidy for “refugee relief” as well as increasing financial contribution to $8 million and providing a 900,000-pound stockpile of non-attributable small arms and ammunition. Kissinger to Nixon , April 11, 1974, NSA, KSWWOF, Box 19, GRFL; and U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, “The Secretary’s Principals and Regionals Staff Meeting, Monday, April 22, 1974—3:00 p.m.,” April 23, 1974 (DNSA/KT01111), p. 41; Kissinger to Nixon , June 24, 1974, NSA, KSWOF, Box 19, GRFL.

  24. 24.

    The U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, “The Secretary’s Principals and Regionals Staff Meeting, Monday, April 22, 1974—3:00 p.m.,” April 23, 1974 (DNSA/KT01111), p. 41.

  25. 25.

    Kissinger to Helms, undated, NSA, KSWWOF, Box 19, GRFL; Memorandum, Kissinger to Helms, no date (NPL/HAK/Box138/Kurdish Problem–Vol. II/doc.20), pp. 1–2.

  26. 26.

    [Excised] to [Excised], June 27, 1974 (CIA/FOIA/Helms), pp. 1–2.

  27. 27.

    Helms to Kissinger , May 21, 1974, CIA-Helms.

  28. 28.

    The U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, “The Secretary’s Principals and Regionals Staff Meeting, Monday, April 22, 1974—3:00 p.m.,” April 23, 1974 (DNSA/KT01111), p. 41.

  29. 29.

    McDowall, David, A Modern History of the Kurds, London, New York 2004, p. 337.

  30. 30.

    Tabriz 7 to the U.S. Department of State, “Kurdish War in Iraq: Iranian Inputs,” June 9, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), p. 1.

  31. 31.

    Tabriz 7 to the U.S. Department of State, “Kurdish War in Iraq: Iranian Inputs,” June 9, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), p. 1; and CIA, Memorandum, Colby to Kissinger , “Transmittal of Kurdish Democratic Party Autonomy Plan for the Kurdish Area of Iraq,” April 16, 1974 (NPL/HAK/Box138/Kurdish Problem–Vol.II/doc.21), p. 3. The Iraqi Army included two divisions of special mountain troops, one regular infantry division, and two armored brigades, supported by four air squadrons. Baghdad 221 to State, April 11, 1974, (FRUS 1969–1976, XXVII, 245).

  32. 32.

    Helms to Scowcroft, March 18, 1974, (FRUS 1969–1976, XXVII, 242).

  33. 33.

    Memcon, March 21, 1974, 01078, DNSA.

  34. 34.

    Baghdad 280 to the U.S. Department of State, May 1, 1974, (FRUS 1969–1976, XXVII, 249).

  35. 35.

    Weckmann-Munoz to Waldheim , April 30, 1974, S-0303-0003-01, UNARMS.

  36. 36.

    Ibid.

  37. 37.

    Ibid.

  38. 38.

    Tehran 3088 to U.S. Department of State, April 20, 1974, NPM, NSCF, CFME, Box 603.

  39. 39.

    Other anti-Barzani’s main figures were Omar Dababeh, Isa Zabihi, and Yadolah Fili. See Qaneifard, Erfan, Tondbad-e Havades: Goftogooi ba Isa Pejman [Hurricane of Events: A Dialogue with Isa Pejman] (Elm Publication, Tehran, 2011) p. 173.

  40. 40.

    Helms to Scowcroft, July 8, 1974, CIA-Helms.

  41. 41.

    Helms to Scowcroft, March 20, 1974 (CIA/FOIA/Helms), pp. 1–2.

  42. 42.

    Tabriz 12 to the U.S. Department of State, “Kurdish Refugees in Iran,” June 31, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), p. 1.

  43. 43.

    Helms to Kissinger via Scowcroft, July 8, 1974 (CIA/FOIA/Helms), pp. 1–4.

  44. 44.

    Kissinger , Henry. Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999). p. 590.

  45. 45.

    Tabriz 20 to the U.S. Department of State, “The Kurdish War in Iraq,” September 4, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), pp. 1–10. See also O’Ballance, Edgar. The Kurdish Revolt, 19611970 (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1973). p. 96.

  46. 46.

    Tehran 6788 to the U.S. Department of State, “Iran-Iraq Border Incidents Mar Talks in Istanbul,” August 14, 1974, (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), pp. 1–2.

  47. 47.

    Tehran 7134 to the U.S . Department of State, “Iran Details Additional Border Violations by Iraq,” August 25, 1974 (NARA/ AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), p. 1.

  48. 48.

    Baghdad 564 to the U.S. Department of State, August 29, 1974, FRUS 1969–1976, XXVII, 260.

  49. 49.

    Barzani’s request “to meet the threat of highflying bomber aircraft” was ignored, since it was “just too big (would require prime movers to transport), too complicated and too expensive to pursue.” Scowcroft to Helms, August 22, 1974 (CIA/FOIA/Helms), p. 1. Instead, the Americans arranged the delivery of AK-47s as well as making $1 million available for SAVAK and the CIA help to purchase anti-tank weapons for the Kurds. Scowcroft to Helms, August 22, 1974 (CIA/FOIA/Helms), p. 1.

  50. 50.

    Paper Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/NIO 1039–75, Washington, May 1, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976, Iran-Iraq, 1973–1976 Volume XXVII. Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01142A, Box 5, Folder 5. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A note on the first page reads: “This paper was produced under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East. It was drafted by CIA (OCI) and coordinated with State/INR and DIA.”

  51. 51.

    Intelligence Note prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, November 18, 1974, (FRUS 1969–1974, XXVII, 267, Tab B).

  52. 52.

    Barzani to Kissinger , October 22, 1974, NSA, KSWWWOF, Box 19, GRFL.

  53. 53.

    Parsons (Tehran) to Wright (London), October 24, 1974, Foreign Common Office 8/2309.

  54. 54.

    CIA Memorandum, “Defense and Humanitarian Support for General Barzani,” October 31, 1974, NSA, KSWWOF, Box 19, GRFL.

  55. 55.

    Qaneifard, Erfan, Tondbad-e Havades: Goftogooi ba Isa Pejman [Hurricane of Events: A Dialogue with Isa Pejman] (Elm Publication, Tehran, 2011) p. 196.

  56. 56.

    “Cable from Jerusalem Translated by Shalev and Dictated to General Scowcroft,” August 24, 1975, NSA, KSWWOF, Box 19, GRFL. Note prepared by the Government of Israel, August 24, 1974, NSA, KSWWOF, Box 19, GRFL.

  57. 57.

    Scowcroft to Helms, August 24, 1974 (CIA/FOIA/Helms), p. 1; Helms to Scowcroft, August 25, 1974 (CIA/FOIA/Helms), p. 1; Memcon, September 17, 1974, NSA, KSWWOF, Box 19, GRFL; Kissinger , Henry. Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999). p. 591.

  58. 58.

    211- White House, Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger and Dinitz, October 19, 1974 (DNSA/KT01377), p. 9.

  59. 59.

    Including Sagger (AT-3) and Strela missiles (SA-7). White House, Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger and Rabin , November 7, 1974 (DNSA/KT01405), pp. 10–11.

  60. 60.

    Alam, Assadollah. The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran’s Royal Court,19681977 (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1991), p. 403.

  61. 61.

    Similarly, the State Department considered Baghdad’s détente efforts as its larger move to distance the country from the Soviet . Baghdad 1109 to the U.S Department of State, August 2, 1974, NPM, NSCF, CFME, Box 603; and U.S. Department of State 170249 to Tehran, August 5, 1974, (FRUS 1969–1976, XXVII, 256).

  62. 62.

    Amman 7404 to U.S. Department of State, December 11, 1974, NSA, PCFMESA, Box 22, GRFL.

  63. 63.

    Tehran 10954 to the U.S. Department of State, December 30, 1974, NSA, PCFMESA, Box 14, GRFL.

  64. 64.

    Tehran 6206 to U.S. Department of State, July 28, 1974, NPM, NSCF, CFME, Box 603.

  65. 65.

    Baghdad 564 to the U.S. State Department, August 29, 1974 (FRUS 1969–1976, XXVII, 710).

  66. 66.

    Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no Number, no Date.

  67. 67.

    Ibid.

  68. 68.

    Tehran 6788 to the U.S. Department of State, August 14, 1974; and Baghdad 583 to U.S. Department of State, September 7, 1974, RG59, CFPF 1973–76, AAD.

  69. 69.

    Baghdad 583 to the U.S. Department of State, “Iraqi-Iranian Conflict,” September 7, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), pp. 1–2.

  70. 70.

    Tehran 8821 to the U.S. Department of State, “Iran and Iraq Resume Talks; Khalatbary at UNGA,” October 21, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), p. 1.

  71. 71.

    Ibid.

  72. 72.

    Tehran 10592 to the U.S. Department of State, December 16, 1974, NSA, PCFMESA, Box 14, GRFL.

  73. 73.

    Kisinger to Scowcroft, Isfahan, November 3, 1974, 0115Z, FRUS, 1969–1976, Iran-Iraq, 1973–1976, Vol XXVII; Scowcroft to Ford, November 3, 1974, NSA, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for HAK, Box 3, GRFL.

  74. 74.

    Tabriz 32 to the U.S. Department of State, “Iraqi Kurdish War: Failure of Iraqi Summer Offensive,” December 2, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), pp. 1–3.

  75. 75.

    White House, Memorandum, “Defense and Humanitarian Support for General Barzani,” October 31, 1974 (GFL/KSF/Box20//Kurds-10/15/73–12/5/74), p. 1.

  76. 76.

    Helms to Kissinger via Scowcroft, November 13, 1974 (CIA/FOIA/Helms), pp. 1–7.

  77. 77.

    Helms to Kissinger via Scowcroft, November 13, 1974 (CIA/FOIA/Helms), pp. 1–7.

  78. 78.

    Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. III: 1352/1973 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1995). p. 211.

  79. 79.

    Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. IV: 1353/1974 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 2000). p. 267.

  80. 80.

    Tehran 10429 to U.S. Department of State, “King Hussein’s Intermediary Role,” December 10, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), pp. 1–2.

  81. 81.

    Tehran 10429 to U.S. Department of State, “King Hussein’s Intermediary Role,” December 10, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), pp. 1–2.

  82. 82.

    In an interview with al-Bayraq, President Sadat contended that “the Shah of Iran is a wise, prudent leader with a power in the analysis of the regional and international politics.” He also added that Cairo would try to meddle between Iran and Iraq. Beirut 3464 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 January 1975.

  83. 83.

    Baghdad 47 to the U.S. Department of State, “King Hussein’s Invitation to Iraqi Leaders,” January 17, 1975 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1975), p. 1.

  84. 84.

    Ankara 904 to the U.S. Department of State, “Iran-Iraq Talks,” January 31, 1975 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1975), p. 1.

  85. 85.

    Baghdad 59 to the U.S. Department of State, “Iranian-Iraq Negotiations,” January 22, 1975 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1975), p. 1.

  86. 86.

    On 16 January 1975, Yigal Allon, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, repeated Tel Aviv’s request of the need to speed up support for the Kurdish Peshmerga to hold off the Iraqi offensive. Informing Kissinger that the Iraqis had managed to hold their positions in the mountains for the first time ever, Allon pointed him out that the Shah appeared to be playing “his own game” and warned Kissinger that “to abandon the Kurds is a crime.” See Memcon, January 16, 1975, 01477, NSA; and White House, Memorandum of Conversation, January 16, 1975 (DNSA/KT01477), pp. 10–11.

  87. 87.

    Baghdad 52 to U.S. Department of State, “Iraqi-Iranian Conflict,” January 18, 1975 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1975), pp. 1–2.

  88. 88.

    Tabriz 8 to U.S. Department of State, “Iraqi Kurdish War: Temporarily Quiet,” February 2, 1975 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1975), pp. 1–5.

  89. 89.

    White House, Memorandum, Scowcroft to President Ford, February 19, 1975 (GFL, NSC, Middle East and South Asian Affairs Staff Files, December 2008 Opening, Box 9), pp. 1–2.

  90. 90.

    Kissinger to Barzani, February 20, 1975, NSA, KSWWOF, Box 19, GRFL.

  91. 91.

    On February 20, Kissinger responded to Barzani’s January letter. He wrote: “I want you to know of our admiration for you and your people and for the valiant effort you are making. The difficulties you have faced are formidable. I very much appreciated reading your assessment of the military and political situation. You can be assured that your messages receive the most serious attention at the highest levels of the United States Government because of the importance we attach to them.” He also suggested that the Kurdish leader send an emissary in secret instead of making personal visit to the U.S., and added that “I am convinced that secrecy has been of paramount importance in maintaining our ability to do what we have done; it is only for this reason—plus our concern for your personal safety— that I hesitate to suggest a personal meeting here with you.” See White House, Kissinger to Barzani, February 20, 1975 (GFL/KSF/Box20/Kurds-2/20/75–2/12/76), p. 1.

  92. 92.

    Letter, Barzani to Kissinger , January 22, 1975 (GFL/KSF/Box20/Kurds-2/20/75–2/12/76), pp. 1–13.

  93. 93.

    Kissinger , Henry. Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999). p. 593.

  94. 94.

    In interview with Dr. Ahmad Chalabi: How is it possible that Saddam Hussein is still in power in Baghdad? See http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saddam/interviews/chalabi.html.

  95. 95.

    Tehran 2237 to the U.S. Department of State, “Iranian/Iraqi Agreement,” March 10, 1975 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1975), p. 1.

  96. 96.

    The terms of the Algiers Pact included: (1) Demarcation of the river frontier according to the Thalweg Line or median line; (2) demarcation of land frontiers on the basis of the 1913 Constantinople Protocol and minutes of 1914 Frontier Demarcation Commission; (3) strict and effective control along borders to end all subversive infiltration from either side, which meant the termination of Iran’s support for the Kurdish Peshmerga and the termination of stirring up anti-government sentiment among minority groups, particularly the Arab population of Khuzestan as well as of allowing Iranian dissidents to promote their activities from Iraqi territory; and (4) the above three arrangements are indivisible elements of a comprehensive settlement. In addition, both parties agreed to remain in constant contact with Algerian leader Houari Boumédiène while the accord was implemented and that the foreign ministers would meet to establish a commission to implement the agreement. See Defense Intelligence Agency Notice, March 7, 1975, FRUS 1969–1976, XXVII, 273; and Baghdad 248 to U.S. Department of State, “Iraqi-Iranian Agreement,” March 8, 1975. (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1975), p. 1.

  97. 97.

    Col. Isa Pejman in an interview with Habib Lajevardi, Paris, March 4, 1983, Tape 1, Harvard University Iranian Oral History.

  98. 98.

    Beirut 1004 to Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 June 1975.

  99. 99.

    Parsi, Trita, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (Yale University Press, 2007) p. 50.

  100. 100.

    David Korn, “The Last Years of Mullah Mustafa Barzani,” 1/2 (1994), Middle East Quarterly, pp. 12–27.

  101. 101.

    Kimche , David, The Last Option, (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991) p. 195.

  102. 102.

    Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. IV: 1353/1974 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 2000). p. 347.

  103. 103.

    Ibid. p. 340.

  104. 104.

    Ibid. p. 341.

  105. 105.

    Syrian Foreign Minister Abd al-Halim Khaddam told Kissinger that “solving that problem has left a lot of satisfaction with us.” Memcon, March 9, 1975, 01522, DNSA.

  106. 106.

    Parsi, Trita, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (Yale University Press, 2007) p. 29.

  107. 107.

    Helms to Scowcroft, March 8, 1975, (FRUS 1969–1976, XXVII, 275).

  108. 108.

    CIA weekly summary 0013/75, March 28, 1975, CREST.

  109. 109.

    Parsi, Trita, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (Yale University Press, 2007) p. 57.

  110. 110.

    Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. IV: 1353/1974 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 2000). p. 346.

  111. 111.

    Ibid. pp. 326–327.

  112. 112.

    Beirut 3252 to the U.S. Department of State, “Kurdish/Iranian Relations,” March 15, 1975 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1975), p. 1.

  113. 113.

    Kissinger , Henry. Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999). pp. 594–596.

  114. 114.

    Tehran 1188 to U.S. Department of State, March 10, 1975, NSA, KSWWOF, Box 19, GRFL; and Helms to Kissinger via Scowcroft, March 10, 1975 (CIA/FOIA/Helms), pp. 1–2.

  115. 115.

    Memcon, March 9, 1975, NSA, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China and Middle East Discussions, Box 3, GRFL.

  116. 116.

    Tehran 2237 to the U.S. Department of State, “Iranian/Iraqi Agreement,” March 10, 1975 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1975), p. 1.

  117. 117.

    Ibid.

  118. 118.

    Ibid.

  119. 119.

    Both thought the Algiers Agreement would bring a potential regional stability. Tehran 2254 to the U.S. Department of State, “Iraqi-Iranian Agreement,” March 10, 1975 (GFL, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 14, Iran-State Department Telegrams: SECSTATE—EXDIS [1]), p. 1.

  120. 120.

    Kissinger , Henry. Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999). p. 595.

  121. 121.

    Ibid, pp. 594–595.

  122. 122.

    Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. IV: 1353/1974 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 2000). p. 346.

  123. 123.

    Kissinger , Henry. Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999). p. 595.

  124. 124.

    David Korn, “The Last Years of Mullah Mustafa Barzani,” 1/2 (1994), Middle East Quarterly, pp. 12–27.

  125. 125.

    White House, Situation Room to Kissinger via Borg/Adams/Rodman, March 19, 1975 (GFL, Documents from the National Security Advisor: Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, December 2008 Opening, Box 6, 2/10-18/75 Middle East and Europe—2/5-22/75 London and Middle East), p. 1.

  126. 126.

    Kissinger to Helms via Scowcroft, March 15, 1975 (GFL, Documents from the National Security Advisor: Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, December 2008 Opening, Box 6, 2/10-18/75 Middle East and Europe—2/5-22/75 London and Middle East), pp. 1–2.

  127. 127.

    Helms to Kissinger via Scowcroft, March 10, 1975 (CIA/FOIA/Helms), pp. 1–2; Scowcroft to Kissinger, Washington, March 10, 1975, 1930Z, FRUS, 1969–1976-Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976, Vol XXVII.

  128. 128.

    CIA Memorandum for Scowcroft, March 13, 1975, NSA, KSWWOF, Box 19, GRFL; and Helms to Kissinger via Scowcroft, March 10, 1975 (CIA/FOIA/Helms), pp. 1–2.

  129. 129.

    Kissinger , Henry. Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999). p. 596.

  130. 130.

    TOHAK141 from Helms to Kissinger , March 19, 1975, DDRAC, Box 9, GRFL.

  131. 131.

    Korn, David. “The Last Years of Mullah Mustafa Barzani,” 1/2 (1994). Middle East Quarterly, p. 22.

  132. 132.

    Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. IV: 1353/1974 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 2000). p. 348.

  133. 133.

    Tehran 2351 to U.S. Department of State, “Iran/Iraq Relations,” March 13, 1975 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1975), p. 1.

  134. 134.

    The implication of the Iran-Iraq Agreement—DCI/NIO 1039–75, 1 May 1975.

  135. 135.

    Fardoust, Hossein and Abdollah Shahbazi, Khaterat-e Arteshbod-e Baznesheshteh Hossein Fardoust [The Memoirs of Retired General Hossein Fardoust] (Tehran, 1990).

  136. 136.

    Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. IV: 1353/1974 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 2000). p. 359.

  137. 137.

    The implication of the Iran-Iraq Agreement—DCI/NIO 1039-75, 1 May 1975.

  138. 138.

    McDowall, David. A Modern History of the Kurds (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007 ed) pp. 338–9.

  139. 139.

    The regime even offered financial payments to Arabs to marry Kurdish wives. McDowall, David. A Modern History of the Kurds (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007 ed) p. 340.

  140. 140.

    Qaneifard, Erfan, Tondbad-e Havades: Goftogooi ba Isa Pejman [Hurricane of Events: A Dialogue with Isa Pejman] (Elm Publication, Tehran, 2011) p. 197.

  141. 141.

    Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. IV: 1353/1974 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 2000). pp. 341–2.

  142. 142.

    Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. IV: 1353/1974 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 2000). pp. 343–4.

  143. 143.

    Ibid. pp. 344.

  144. 144.

    Memorandum of Conversation, Ford, the Shah, Kissinger , and Scowcroft, May 15, 1975. Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 11.

  145. 145.

    Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. IV: 1353/1974 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 2000). pp. 346–7.

  146. 146.

    Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. IV: 1353/1974 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 2000). pp. 348–9.

  147. 147.

    Parsi, Trita, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (Yale University Press, 2007) p. 55.

  148. 148.

    Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History.

  149. 149.

    Kimche , David, The Last Option, (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991) p. 195.

  150. 150.

    John A. Conway, “The Kurds and Israel,” Newsweek, April 7, 1975, 17.

  151. 151.

    Parsi, Trita, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (Yale University Press, 2007) p. 56; and Randal, Jonathan. After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness? My Encounters with Kurdistan (London: Westview Press, 1999). p. 199.

  152. 152.

    Kimche , David, The Last Option (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991) pp. 195–196.

  153. 153.

    Memcon, March 9, 1975, NSA, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China and Middle East Discussions, Box 3, GRFL.

  154. 154.

    Kimche , The Last Option (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991) p. 195.

  155. 155.

    Parsi, Trita, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (Yale University Press, 2007) p. 57.

  156. 156.

    Colby to Kissinger , June 4, 1975, (FRUS 1969–1976, XXVII, 289).

  157. 157.

    Kissinger , Henry. Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999). p. 591.

  158. 158.

    Memcon, February 7, 1975, NSA, Memcons, Box 9, GRFL.

  159. 159.

    Minutes of the Secretary’s Staff Meeting, July 30, 1976, 02000, DNSA.

  160. 160.

    Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. IV: 1353/1974 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 2000). pp. 326–327.

  161. 161.

    Joseph Kraft, “What Restrains the Shah?” Washington Post, April 27, 1975.

  162. 162.

    Beirut 213/191 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 18 April 1977.

  163. 163.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/94, 28 April 1975.

  164. 164.

    Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History.

  165. 165.

    Sadr pointed out that he had no personal problem with al-Asaad; rather, he disagreed on dealing with the central regime in Beirut. See SAVAK Documents, No. 213/635-52/12/9).

  166. 166.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/16054, 17 February 1975.

  167. 167.

    Ibid.

  168. 168.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/479, 14 February 1974.

  169. 169.

    Seyed Ali-Akbar Mohtashamipour was a revolutionary cleric who became Iran’s ambassador in Damascus and Interior Minister after the Revolution. He also played a major role in the establishment of Hezbollah in 1982. He is one of the main Iranian figures who strongly advocated Iran’s policy of “Export of the Revolution” in the 1980s.

  170. 170.

    Sheikh Abbas-Mohammad Montazeri was Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri’s elder son, who was killed amid the bloody Civil War in a 1981 Mojahedin bombing in Tehran. In the aftermath of the Revolution, Montazeri and Mehdi Hashemi, Montazeri’s brother-in-law, founded the Revolutionary Organization of the Masses of the Islamic Republic (SATJA), which played a major role in Iran’s policy of the Export of the Revolution. He was also a member of the first Majlis in March 1980.

  171. 171.

    Jalal ad-Din Farsi was an Afghan-origin Iranian Islamist revolutionary who was the candidate of the Islamic Republic Party (which included most important clerical figures like Ayatollah Khamenei, Beheshti , Hashemi Rafsanjani, Bahonar , and Mofatteh). His candidacy was, however, rejected when Sheikh Ali Tehrani, Ayatollah Khamenei’s brother-in-law, and Abolhassan Banisadr’s major ally, announced Farsi had an Afghan nationality. Farsi was the most important anti-Sadr, anti-Chamran politician among non-clerical, pro-Khomeini figures.

  172. 172.

    Gharazi was one of the key figures responsible for the establishment of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) who became Minister of Petroleum from 1981 to 1985 and Minister of Posts from 1985 to 1997. He was also a member of the Iranian Majlis from 1980 to 1984 and also governor of Khuzestan Province in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Iran and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq (1980–88) War. He was also an independent candidate in the 2013 presidential election.

  173. 173.

    Ahmad Nafari’s real name was Sefatollah Barzegar.

  174. 174.

    Other members of this group included: Ali Fallahian (Iran’s Minister of Intelligence from 1989 to 1997), Ali Jannati (Iran’s ambassador to Kuwait from 2006 to 2010 and Minister of Culture 2013 till present), Abbas Agha-Zamani or Abu Sharif (the second commander of the IRGC from 1979 to 1981), Mohammad Boroujerdi (one of the key founders of the IRGC), Alireza Aladpoush (one of the key founders of Iran’s Construction Jihad, Jahad-e Sazandegi), Ahmad Movahedi (Iran’s first representative in Lebanon after the Islamic Revolution), Ali Younesi (Iran’s Minister of Intelligence from 2000 to 2005), Mehdi Bakeri (Iran’s military hero and one of the most famous commanders of the IRGC), Said Taghadosian (deputy of judicial assistant of President Hasan Rouhani from 2014 till present), Marziyeh Hadidchi (Tahereh Dabbagh) (one of the key founders of the IRGC), Ahmad Fazaeli, Mohsen Shojaie, Sedaghatnejad, Hasan Motaghi, Mohammad Vaghefi, Seyyed Salman (Ghahreman) Safavi (one of the founders of IRGC branch in Isfahan), General Rahim Safavi (the commander of the IRGC from 1997 to 2007 and the present director of London Academy of Iranian Studies), Habibollahi, Ali Sepahsalari, Serajoddin Mousavi (commander of the Islamic Revolution Committees from 1985 to 1990 and Iran’s ambassador to Kuwait from 1997 to 2005), Mohammad-Ali Hadi Najafabadi (Iran’s ambassador to UAE and Saudi Arabia in the 1980s and 1990s), Hasan Ebrahimi, Mahmoud Sharifian, Mohammad-Hossein Taremi (head of intelligence of Iran’s national Radio and Television, Seda-va-Sima), Sharifkhani and his wife, Zahra Pishgamifard (one of the major members of President Rouhani’s main party, the Moderation and Development Party).

  175. 175.

    He was arrested with 67 young pro-Mojahedin activists, though he had weak connections with the Mojahedin . According to Taghi Shahram, Gharazi was the only prisoner who wrote a letter to the officials, expressing his repent and regret. In the aftermath of the Mojahedin’s ideological approach to Marxism, Gharazi cut off his connection with them.

  176. 176.

    Andarzgoo was a major member of the Jami’at-e Motalefeh-e Eslami (Islamic Coalition Population) who had a close connection to Ayatollah Khomeini . Mohammad Bokharaie and Andarzgoo killed former Prime Minister Ali Mansour. He has been known as “the lonely guerrilla of the Revolution.”

  177. 177.

    Interview with Ebrahim Yazdi, Tehran, April 4, 2016.

  178. 178.

    Ibid.

  179. 179.

    Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ali-Akbar, Doran-e Mobarezeh, Daftar-e Nashr-e Maaref, 1376, pp. 278–276.

  180. 180.

    Interview with Ebrahim Yazdi, Tehran, April 4, 2016.

  181. 181.

    Montazeri , Hossein-Ali. Khaterat [Memoirs]. Tehran. 1378. pp. 62–63.

  182. 182.

    Tabatabai, Mohammad Sadeq, Kahterat-e Siasi Ejtemai [Socio-political Diaries] (Moassese Tanzim Nashr Asar Emam Khomeini, 1388) vol. 1, p. 174.

  183. 183.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 212/1169, 21 July 1970.

  184. 184.

    Interview with Ali-Akbar Mohtashamipour , Tehran, February 2016.

  185. 185.

    Zabiha is the Islamic method of slaughter, derived from the Quran and Sunnah.

  186. 186.

    Interview with Ali-Akbar Mohtashamipour , Tehran, February 2016. Accompanied with his fellow, Seyyed Mohammad Mousavi Bojnordi, Mostafa Khomeini was warmly welcomed by Seyyed Musa Sadr in Beirut. SAVAK Documents, No. 234, 11 March 1978.

  187. 187.

    See http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/459203.

  188. 188.

    Interview with Ebrahim Yazdi, Tehran, April 4, 2016.

  189. 189.

    Mohtashamipour , Ali-Akbar, Khaterat-e Siasi [Political Diaries], pp. 143–150.

  190. 190.

    Interview with Ali-Akbar Mohtashamipour , Tehran, February 2016.

  191. 191.

    Mohtashamipour , Ali-Akbar, Khaterat-e Siasi [Political Diaries], pp. 143–150.

  192. 192.

    Interview with Ali-Akbar Mohtashamipour , Tehran, February 2016.

  193. 193.

    Mohtashamipour , Ali-Akbar, Khaterat-e Siasi [Political Diaries], pp. 143–150.

  194. 194.

    Tabatabai, Mohammad Sadeq, Kahterat-e Siasi Ejtemai, Moassese Tanzim Nashr Asar Emam Khomeini, 1388, vol. 1, p. 172.

  195. 195.

    Ibid. p. 192.

  196. 196.

    http://imamsadr-news.com/article/3025.

  197. 197.

    Farsi, Jalalodin, Zavayay-e Tarik [Dark Angles], Farsi, Jalalodin, Zavayay-e Tarik [Dark Angles], Hadis Publisher, Tehran, 1373. p. 53.

  198. 198.

    Yazdi , Ebrahim, Naqsh-e Imam Musa Sadr dar Lobnan [Imam Musa Sadr’s Role in Lebanon], p. 116. in Yad- Nameh Emam Musa Sadr [Imam Musa Sadr’s Memoirs], edited by Seyyed Hadi Khosrowshahi, Moaseseh Farhangi- Tahghoghati-e Emam Musa Sadr, Tehran, 1387. p. 416; SAVAK Documents, No. 4440, 14 May 1974; SAVAK Documents, No. 3108, 21 June 1972; SAVAK Documents, No. 1034, 22 June 1972. SAVAK Documents, No. 213/671, 17 March 1974; SAVAK Documents, No. 4047, 5 April 1974; SAVAK Documents, No. 440, 14 May 1974; SAVAK Documents, No. 1034, 22 June 1972.

  199. 199.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/831, 10 August 1975.

  200. 200.

    http://shakhsiatnegar.com/ﻓﺎرﺳﯽ-اﻟﺪﯾﻦ-ﺟﻼل.

  201. 201.

    The Tel al-Zaatar battle occurred during the Lebanese Civil War on August 12, 1976. Tel al-Zaatar was a Palestinian Refugee camp under United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) with approximately 50,000–60,000 refugees in northeast Beirut.

  202. 202.

    Goftogo ba Asghar Jamalifard , Abou Hanif [A Conversation with Asghar Jamalifard, Abou-Hanif]. http://www.teribon.ir/archives/135456.

  203. 203.

    Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History.

  204. 204.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/5701, 29 March 1973.

  205. 205.

    Tabatabai, Mohammad Sadegh, Kahterat-e Siasi Ejtemai [Socio-political Diaries], Moassese Tanzim Nashr Asar Emam Khomeini, 1388, vol. 1, p. 173.

  206. 206.

    Interview with Ali-Akbar Mohtashamipour , Tehran, February 2016.

  207. 207.

    Farsi still believes that the “myth of Chamran” has been constructed by the FMI. “When [in initial years of the Iran-Iraq War], the FMI had been constructing the myth of Chamran in a way that he had defended against Iraqi invasion with one Kalashnikov, killed them all and such nonsense, we did not react to avoid damaging our defense and national unity.” http://shakhsiatnegar.com/ﻓﺎرﺳﯽ-اﻟﺪﯾﻦ-ﺟﻼل.

  208. 208.

    Founder and former director of the Islamic Revolution Documents Center and present Director of the Historical Research Foundation and Encyclopedia of the Islamic Revolution.

  209. 209.

    Tabatabai, Mohammad Sadeq, Kahterat-e Siasi Ejtemai [Socio-Political Diaries] (Moassese Tanzim Nashr Asar Emam Khomeini, 1388) vol. 1, pp. 108–110.

  210. 210.

    Tabatabai, Mohammad Sadegh, Kahterat-e Siasi Ejtemai, Moassese Tanzim Nashr Asar Emam Khomeini, 1388, vol. 1, p. 177.

  211. 211.

    See also Az Nameh-Ha-ye Chamran [From Chamran’s letters], http://imamsadr-news.com/article/1311.

  212. 212.

    SAVAK Documents, No. h/10277, 27 October 1973.

  213. 213.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/5701, 29 March 1973.

  214. 214.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/531, 30 January 1974.

  215. 215.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/8048, 10 April 1975.

  216. 216.

    SAVAK Documents, No. pp. 380–1.

  217. 217.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/19088, 7 May 1975.

  218. 218.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/545, 2 February 1974; SAVAK Documents, No. (33-4).

  219. 219.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/549, 4 February 1974.

  220. 220.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/19, 3 April 1974.

  221. 221.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/420, 20 May 1974.

  222. 222.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/563, 10 February 1974.

  223. 223.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 22h20/116364.

  224. 224.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/2642, 11 February 1974.

  225. 225.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/2886, 12 March 1974.

  226. 226.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 1050-7051, 18 March 1974.

  227. 227.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 584/m/8, 1 April 1974.

  228. 228.

    His father was Kazim al-Khalil , former minister of national economy.

  229. 229.

    Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. IV: 1353/1974 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 2000). p. 47.

  230. 230.

    Ibid, p. 274.

  231. 231.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/79, 10 April 1974.

  232. 232.

    Qadar added that the assassin then became Director of the Islamic Propagation Organization after the Revolution Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History.

  233. 233.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/16, 4 April 1974.

  234. 234.

    Ayatollah-Zadeh Esfahani was an anti-Shah activist who held close ties with General Teymour Bakhtiar. He left Iran to Egypt to meet Nasser and then Iraq to wage struggle against the regime of Tehran. According to SAVAK, “Ayatollah-Zadeh Esfahani was in close contact with Khalil Ebrahim Abdel-Hamid, the head of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation). He also participated in secret weekly meetings in Najaf with Mostafa Khomeini, Sheikh Mousa Qomi, Mohammad Sadeghi, and Seyed Morteza Nakhjavani Mohammad-Ali Molawi Arabshahi, talking about Iran’s domestic affairs.” See SAVAK Documents, 16 July 1966. SAVAK also reported that Ayatollah-Zadeh Esfahani , Mostafa Khomeini, and Mohammad Sadeghi planned to publish a magazine, Jomhoriyyat, in Iraq. See SAVAK Documents, 9 February 1966. Despite these initial connections, Mostafa Khomeini soon cut off his relations with Ayatollah-Zadeh Esfahani due to Esfahani’s extensive networks with the Baath regime and Bakhtiar .

  235. 235.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 4290/m/8, 7 May 1974.

  236. 236.

    SAVAK Documents, No. reported from 312.

  237. 237.

    Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History.

  238. 238.

    SAVAK Documents, No. (p. 2111).

  239. 239.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/572, 10 February 1974.

  240. 240.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/2722, 5 March 1974.

  241. 241.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 221/33631, 9 May 1974.

  242. 242.

    Ibid.

  243. 243.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/2218, 18 December 1974.

  244. 244.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/2395, 26 January 1974.

  245. 245.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/500, 19 January 1974.

  246. 246.

    El-Husseini was then-speaker of the Lebanese Parliament and then-Amal’s Secretary-General in 1978. Husseini had a key role in brokering the Taif Agreement of 1990 that terminated the Lebanese Civil War (1975–90).

  247. 247.

    Interview with Ali-Akbar Mohtashamipour , Tehran, February 2016.

  248. 248.

    Interview with Ebrahim Yazdi, Tehran, April 4, 2016.

  249. 249.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 3260, 14 December 1973.

  250. 250.

    Halawi, Majed. A Lebanon Defied: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia Community (Oxford, 1992) p. 190.

  251. 251.

    Shanahan, Rodger, The Shi’a of Lebanon: Clans, Parties and Clerics (London and New York, Taurus Academic Studies, January 1, 2005).

  252. 252.

    Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History.

  253. 253.

    Beirut 213/243, from 213 to 713, SAVAK Documents, 8 July 1975.

  254. 254.

    Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History.

  255. 255.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 212/82, 11 April 1970; SAVAK Documents, No. 4796-4797, 25 November 1974.

  256. 256.

    SVAK Documents, No. 6552, 11 January 1974.

  257. 257.

    SAVAK Documents, No Number.

  258. 258.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 334/1988, 27 July 1973.

  259. 259.

    SAVAK Documents, No Number, No date.

  260. 260.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 5152, 4 September 1974; SAVAK Documents, No. 213602, 17 July 1975; SAVAK Documents, No. 213/1648, 19 February 1976; SAVAK Documents, No. 17/033-3/1068; 7 May 1977; SAVAK Documents, No. 4873-4872, 13 July 1974; SAVAK Documents, No. 334/1988, 27 July 1974; SAVAK Documents, No. 4990, 3 August 1974; SAVAK Documents, No. 5114, 3 September 1974.

  261. 261.

    Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History. Abbas Agha-Zamani or Abu Sharif was the second commander of the IRGC, preceded by Jawad Mansouri, from 1979 to 1981. Abu Sharif was one of the rare pro-Banisadr commanders in the IRGC. In the aftermath of Banisadr’s impeachment on 21 June 1981, he was appointed as Iran’s ambassador to Islamabad, Pakistan.

  262. 262.

    SAVAK Documents, No.213/54013, 6 April 1974.

  263. 263.

    Interview with Ali-Akbar Mohtashamipour , Tehran, February 2016.

  264. 264.

    Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History.

  265. 265.

    Beirut 213/243, from 213 to 713, SAVAK Documents, 8 July 1975.

  266. 266.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 334/936, 2 June 1973.

  267. 267.

    An ideologically eclectic front of both radical and reformist opposite parties against the Maronites.

  268. 268.

    Beirut 213/201, SAVAK Documents, 5 May 1975; Beirut 213/196, SAVAK Documents, 5 May 1975; SAVAK Documents, No.251514/245, 16 August 1975.

  269. 269.

    Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History.

  270. 270.

    Ibid.

  271. 271.

    Fatah-land refers to a part of southern Lebanon where Palestinian guerrillas set up their military bases in the aftermath of the Black September of 1970.

  272. 272.

    The Cairo agreement of 3 November 1969 gave the Palestinian guerrillas permission to launch anti-Israeli operations from the south of Lebanon. The agreement, in fact, provided the PLO a status autonomy in the South that allows them to operate outside of Lebanese sovereignty.

  273. 273.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/425, 10 August 1977.

  274. 274.

    Theroux, Peter. The Strange Disappearance of Imam Moussa Sadr (London, 1987). p. 41.

  275. 275.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/161, 14 June 1977.

  276. 276.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/445, 20 August 1977.

  277. 277.

    Abu Abbas split with Jibril’s group in the middle of the Lebanese Civil War.

  278. 278.

    The Fadaiyan had a tense relation with the Tudeh Party, Iran’s major Marxist party, denouncing the Party for its officer-agent relations with Moscow.

  279. 279.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/94, 28 April 1975.

  280. 280.

    Ibid.

  281. 281.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/60, 25 April 1976.

  282. 282.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 223/998, 12 October 1976.

  283. 283.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/595, 29 August 1976.

  284. 284.

    Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History.

  285. 285.

    Interview with Ali-Akbar Mohtashamipour , Tehran, February 2016.

  286. 286.

    Interview with Ebrahim Yazdi, Tehran, April 4, 2016.

  287. 287.

    SAVAK Documents, No number, no date.

  288. 288.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 212/17025, 5 April 1971; SAVAK Documents, No. 212/14278, 9 March 1971.

  289. 289.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/550, 6 February 1974.

  290. 290.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 222/1182, 19 October 1977.

  291. 291.

    Sayed Hassan Shirazi’s father was Ayatollah Seyed Mahdi Hussaini Shirazi, and his brothers were Ayatollah Seyed Muhamad Shirazi, Ayatollah Seyed Mojtaba Shirazi, and Ayatollah Seyed Sadegh Shirazi. Other members of the Shirazis were Grand Ayatollah Mirza Hassan Shirazi, leader of Iran’s Tobacco Movement; Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Shirazi, leader of the Iraqi Revolution of 1920; Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Modarresi; and Ayatollah Hadi Modarresi.

  292. 292.

    Tabatabaie, Fatemeh, Eqlim-e Khaterat [Region of Memories] (Emam Khomeini va Enghelab-e Eslami research Institute, Tanzim va Nashr-e Aasar-e Emam Khomeini Organization, 2001) Vol I. p. 298.

  293. 293.

    Shirazi founded a Hawza Ilmiyya--Hawza Ilmiyya as a seminary where Shia clerics are trained—and Madrasat [School] al-Imam al-Mahdi, in 1971. It was the first hawza in Lebanon founded by a non-Lebanese cleric. The Madrasat was closed after Shirazi’s assassination. Later, he established Dar al-Sadegh publication and Jama’at al-Ulama al- Lubnaniyya (Ulama Community of Lebanon) in 1977.

  294. 294.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 4875-4874, 17 August 1974.

  295. 295.

    The Zaynabeyyah Hawza was established in the vicinity of Sayyidah Zaynab Mosque. It was the first Shia seminary in Sunni-majority Syria.

  296. 296.

    The pamphlet Al-Alawiyyun, Shi’at ahl al-Bayt (Beirut: 17 December 1972), preface.

  297. 297.

    Tabatabaie, Fatemeh, Eqlim-e Khaterat [Region of Memories] Vol I. (Emam Khomeini va Enghelab-e Eslami research Institute, Tanzim va Nashr-e Aasar-e Emam Khomeini Organization, 2011) p. 315.

  298. 298.

    Shirazi was heavily supported by Maronite “Patriarch Khoraish ” (Anthony Peter Khoraish was the 75th Maronite Patriarch of Antioch and the Whole Levant between 1975 and 1986), Bachir Gemayel (Bachir Gemayel was one of the major Lebanese leaders in the Civil War. He was the supreme commander of the Lebanese Forces militia and president-elect who was assassinated on 14 September 1982), Amin Gemayel (Amin Gemayel was the leader of Kataeb Party and President of Lebanon, in place of his assassinated brother, Bachir, from 1982 to 1988), and Camille Chamoun,’ Shia “Kazim al-Khali, Kamel al-Asaad , Cheril al-Qeys and Mohsen Salim (a Shia politician and former Member of Parliament.),” and Sunni Sheikh Hassan Khaled. See Beirut 9830 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 July 1977; Beirut 213/30 to Tehran, from 213 to 231, 22 January 1978; Tabatabai, Mohammad Sadeq, Kahterat-e Siasi Ejtemai [Socio-political Diaries] (Moassese Tanzim Nashr Asar Emam Khomeini, 1388) vol. 1, p. 377.

  299. 299.

    Beirut to Tehran, SAVAK document, 14 April 1977.

  300. 300.

    Beirut to Tehran, No. 226, SAVAK document, 14 April 1977; Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to SAVAK, 213–334.

  301. 301.

    Beirut 213/147, SAVAK documents, 20 April 1977.

  302. 302.

    “Imam” was supposed to be entitled to the head of the SISC .

  303. 303.

    Tabatabai, Mohammad Sadeq, Kahterat-e Siasi Ejtemai, Moassese Tanzim Nashr Asar Emam Khomeini, 1388, vol. 1, p. 377.

  304. 304.

    Tabatabai, Mohammad Sadeq, Kahterat-e Siasi Ejtemai, Moassese Tanzim Nashr Asar Emam Khomeini, 1388, vol. 1, p. 378.

  305. 305.

    Beirut 146-145 to SAVAK, 17 April 1977.

  306. 306.

    Ayatollah Khomeini-Sayed Hassan Shirazi’s connection was so extensive [as] such that Ardeshir Zahedi, Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, once claimed, “[Ayatollah] Khomeini launched the Revolution in Qom, but it was Shirazi who delivered his message to the World in Karbala” (al-Osbou al-Arabi, 2 July 1979, no 1029, p. 28). Shirazi also tried to convince Ayatollah Khomeini to leave Iraq for Syria. Although Ayatollah considered seeking refuge in Damascus, he finally left Najaf for Paris by 6 October 1978.

  307. 307.

    Ayatollah Nasrollah Sedghi Hasani, known as Khalkhali , was Ayatollah Khomeini’s close aide who financially supported pro-Khomeini forces. He died months before the Islamic Revolution, on 4 March 1978.

  308. 308.

    According to hadiths, the share belonging to God, Prophet, and Dhi l-Qurba (close relatives of the prophet) belongs to the leader of the Islamic society (the Prophet (s) or Imam). This share is called the Sahm al-Imam (share of Imam). Shia Marja, instead of Imam, receives this share during Occultation of Imam al-Mahdi and spends it the same as Imams did in the past, as hadiths testify. See http://en.wikishia.net/view/Khums.

  309. 309.

    SAVAK 497, Syria to Tehran, 17 September 1977.

  310. 310.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/191, 9 January 1977.

  311. 311.

    Beirut 213/147, SAVAK documents, 20 April 1977.

  312. 312.

    Beirut 213/191 to Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 18 April 1977.

  313. 313.

    Ibid.

  314. 314.

    Ibid.

  315. 315.

    Ibid.

  316. 316.

    Beirut 213/191 to Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 18 April 1977.

  317. 317.

    Ibid.

  318. 318.

    Ibid.

  319. 319.

    Ibid.

  320. 320.

    Ibid.

  321. 321.

    Beirut 213/30, SAVAK Documents, 1 May 1977.

  322. 322.

    Beirut 213/33 to Tehran, SAVAK Documents, from 713 to 213, 31 January 1978.

  323. 323.

    Beirut 9830 to Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 July 1977.

  324. 324.

    Beirut 471 to Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 September 1977.

  325. 325.

    Beirut 213/33 to Tehran, SAVAK documents, from 713 to 213, 31 January 1978.

  326. 326.

    SAVAK documents, 223/1479, 10 December 1977.

  327. 327.

    Beirut 213/33 to Tehran, SAVAK documents, from 713 to 213, 31 January 1978.

  328. 328.

    Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 3334-8 to Setad Bozorg Arteshtaran, edare etelaat va zed-e etelaat, from 213 to 713.

  329. 329.

    25 February 1978. SAVAK Documents, No.213/869, 7 March 1978.

  330. 330.

    Beirut 213/30 to Tehran, SAVAK Documents, from 213 to 231, 22 January 1978.

  331. 331.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/869, 25 February 1978.

  332. 332.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/869, 7 March 1978.

  333. 333.

    Seyyed Ahmad Vahedi 213/7 to SAVAK, 16 September 1978.

  334. 334.

    It seems that Saddam Hussein ordered assassinating him. See Khalid Abdul-Ghaffar’s, Saddam’s personal aide, interview with Islamic Revolution Newspaper.

  335. 335.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 849, 25 August 1977.

  336. 336.

    Including Sheikh Mojtaba Araqi, Sheikh Reza Golsorkhi, and Seyed Younes Araghi.

  337. 337.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/19707, 2 March 1976.

  338. 338.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 99, 10 September 1976.

  339. 339.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 2288/m/8, 14 May 1975.

  340. 340.

    Samii, Abbas William, The Shah’s Lebanon Policy: The Role of SAVAK. (January 1997). Middle Eastern Studies, 33 (1): 83.

  341. 341.

    Fars News Agency, Interview with Ehsan Naraghi, http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8711240772.

  342. 342.

    Beirut 471 to Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 September 1977.

  343. 343.

    SAVAK Documents, 334/2205, 7 November 1977.

  344. 344.

    Ali Shariati was truly an Iranian Fanon who articulated a radical interpretation of Shiism.

  345. 345.

    Seyyed Musa Sadr, Ebrahim Yazdi, Mostafa Chamran, Seyed Mahmood Doaei, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, Sadeq Tabatabai, Mohammad Mofatteh (Fatah’s representative), and Ehsan Shariati (Ali Shariati’s son), participated in the ceremony. SAVAK Documents, No. 12h20/22817, 8 July 1977.

  346. 346.

    Interestingly, some pro-Khomeini revolutionaries, like Eshraqi were critical of his participation. See Tabatabai, Mohammad Sadeq, Kahterat-e Siasi Ejtemai, Moassese Tanzim Nashr Asar Emam Khomeini, 1388, vol. 1, p. 141.

  347. 347.

    SAVAK Documents, No Number.

  348. 348.

    Tabatabai, Mohammad Sadeq, Kahterat-e Siasi Ejtemai [Social Diaries] (Moassese Tanzim Nashr Asar Emam Khomeini, 1388) vol. 1, p. 112.

  349. 349.

    Beirut 213/447, SAVAK Documents, 20 August 1977.

  350. 350.

    Qadar did not have a good relationship with Poursartip. “While Iran’s ambassador was Poursartip, it was me who handled the security issues and personal relations with Assad with Damascus,” Qadar claimed. See Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History.

  351. 351.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/16427, 28 September 1977.

  352. 352.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 8/3610-320-2, 28 August 1977. The withdrawal from citizenship or suspension of passports was a common SAVAK method for dealing with expatriate Iranian opponents. For more discussion, see the interview with Hassan Alavikia by H. Ladjevardi for the Harvard Iranian Oral History Project (1 March 1983, Paris).

  353. 353.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/466, 10 September 1977.

  354. 354.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 5318, p. 6.

  355. 355.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 1168, 28 September 1977.

  356. 356.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 8/320-2/4750-8/320, 10 October 1977.

  357. 357.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 473, 1 September 1977.

  358. 358.

    SAVAK Documents, No. (p. 307), 5 November 1977.

  359. 359.

    SAVAK Documents, No. (46).

  360. 360.

    Including Ayatollah Mohammad-Bagher Ashtiani, Ayatollah Seyed Reza Shirazi, Ayatollah Abdol-Karim Mousavi Ardabili, Ayatollah Seyyed Morteza Asgari, Ayatollah Sheikh Yahya Nouri, Ayatollah Seyed Reza Sadr (Seyyed Musa’s older brother), Ayatollah Seyed Abdol-Qaffar Sajadi, and Ayatollah Seyed Morteza Mostajabi.

  361. 361.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 134/3283, 9 January 1977.

  362. 362.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 1182, 30 September 1977.

  363. 363.

    SAVAK Documents, No. m1-/600-1-20, 6 October 1977.

  364. 364.

    Major among them were Sheikh Salman Yahfoofi (Mufti of Baalbek), Ahmad Shoqi al-Din (the judge of Bent Jabil), Sheikh Yousef Asaad Abdel-Satter, and Mohammad-Ali Seyyed Abdel-Saheb. SAVAK Documents, No. 1274, 17 October 1977.

  365. 365.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 213/16592, 26 November 1977.

  366. 366.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 5250-3/5114, 12 December 1977.

  367. 367.

    He had connections with Sayed Hassan Shirazi , Ja’far Sharaf al-Din, and Kamel al-Asaad, and was supported by Iran’s embassy in Beirut SAVAK, 213/16665, 17 January 1978.

  368. 368.

    Beirut 213/605, SAVAK Documents 16 January 1978.

  369. 369.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 592, 5 December 1977.

  370. 370.

    The article was originally published in a French weekly magazine, Le Nouvel Observateur. See SAVAK Documents, No. 213/895, 11 March 1978.

  371. 371.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 8/270-2/316, 18 April 1978.

  372. 372.

    Interview with Ebrahim Yazdi, Tehran, April 4, 2016.

  373. 373.

    Ibid.

  374. 374.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs DB/5254 to SAVAK, 13 November 1977; SAVAK Documents, No. DB/5254, 13 December 1977.

  375. 375.

    Ibid.

  376. 376.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 8/270-2/316, 18 April 1978.

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    Reisinezhad, A. (2019). Downfall: Iran’s Non-State Foreign Policy in 1973–77. In: The Shah of Iran, the Iraqi Kurds, and the Lebanese Shia. Middle East Today. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89947-3_7

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