Protecting Triple-DES Against DPA

A Practical Application of Domain-Oriented Masking
  • Pascal Sasdrich
  • Michael HutterEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10815)


Although AES has become the predominant standard for symmetric block ciphers, T-DES is still widely used especially for electronic payment and financial solutions. In order to protect small and embedded devices against power analysis and side-channel attacks in general, appropriate countermeasures have to be considered. In this paper, we present the first practical application of the Domain-Oriented Masking (DOM) scheme for the T-DES cipher in hardware and provide practical evaluation results that confirm the security of DOM and our designs. In particular, using Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) as evaluation methodology confirms that our first- and second-order secure architectures do not exhibit detectable leakage using up to 2 billion traces. This is the first paper that presents a T-DES hardware implementation using a state of the art provable secure masking technique.

Supplementary material


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Cryptography ResearchSan FranciscoUSA
  2. 2.Horst Görtz Institute for IT-SecurityRuhr-Universität BochumBochumGermany

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