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International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design

COSADE 2018: Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design pp 207–226Cite as

Protecting Triple-DES Against DPA

A Practical Application of Domain-Oriented Masking

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10815))

Abstract

Although AES has become the predominant standard for symmetric block ciphers, T-DES is still widely used especially for electronic payment and financial solutions. In order to protect small and embedded devices against power analysis and side-channel attacks in general, appropriate countermeasures have to be considered. In this paper, we present the first practical application of the Domain-Oriented Masking (DOM) scheme for the T-DES cipher in hardware and provide practical evaluation results that confirm the security of DOM and our designs. In particular, using Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) as evaluation methodology confirms that our first- and second-order secure architectures do not exhibit detectable leakage using up to 2 billion traces. This is the first paper that presents a T-DES hardware implementation using a state of the art provable secure masking technique.

P. Sasdrich—This work was done while the author was at Cryptography Research.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Cryptography Research, 425 Market Street, 11th Floor, San Francisco, CA, 94105, USA

    Pascal Sasdrich & Michael Hutter

  2. Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, Germany

    Pascal Sasdrich

Authors
  1. Pascal Sasdrich
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  2. Michael Hutter
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Michael Hutter .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Open Security Research, Shenzhen, China

    Junfeng Fan

  2. KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

    Benedikt Gierlichs

A Representations of all S-boxes and \(4 \times 4\) Permutations

A Representations of all S-boxes and \(4 \times 4\) Permutations

1.1 A.1 Algebraic Normal Form for S-Box 1

figure a

1.2 A.2 Algebraic Normal Form for S-Box 2

figure b

1.3 A.3 Algebraic Normal Form for S-Box 3

figure c

1.4 A.4 Algebraic Normal Form for S-Box 4

figure d

1.5 A.5 Algebraic Normal Form for S-Box 5

figure e

1.6 A.6 Algebraic Normal Form for S-Box 6

figure f

1.7 A.7 Algebraic Normal Form for S-Box 7

figure g

1.8 A.8 Algebraic Normal Form for S-Box 8

figure h

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Sasdrich, P., Hutter, M. (2018). Protecting Triple-DES Against DPA. In: Fan, J., Gierlichs, B. (eds) Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design. COSADE 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10815. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89641-0_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89641-0_12

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-89640-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-89641-0

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