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Sorsogon: Field Research Findings

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Book cover Peace Infrastructures and State-Building at the Margins

Part of the book series: Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies ((RCS))

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Abstract

This chapter examines the local level implementation of PAMANA in villages affected by the Maoist insurgency. As it comes into contact with local realities, PAMANA produces expected and unexpected outcomes. Three distinct pathways have emerged in how local communities interacted with the programme. In some places, it produced what its designers wanted. In other villages, however, unexpected forms of engagement based on local interpretations and interests diverted the resources in ways not only unexpected but in some cases undesirable to the programme’s designers. Similarly, the interaction between the programme and the NPA is also complex, as the research shows.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See the header on the main page the PAMANA website: http://pamana.net/, accessed on 23 February 2016.

  2. 2.

    On 8 September 2013 a faction of the MNLF entered Zamboanga City in Western Mindanao, took hostages and entrenched itself, in the name of a Bangsamoro Republik they had proclaimed earlier. The siege, which lasted 19 days caused several civilian deaths and the displacement of approximately 100,000 people.

  3. 3.

    Interview 7.

  4. 4.

    The military claims the NPA is present in half as many provinces and have much fewer fighters (Inquirer.net, 2014).

  5. 5.

    Interviews 14 and 15.

  6. 6.

    Peace Forum on Recognizing Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding: The Sorsogon PAMANA Experience See also: The PAMANA aims to contribute to lasting peace by achieving the following objectives:

    • Reduce poverty and vulnerability in conflict-affected areas

    • Improve governance, and

    • Empower communities and strengthen their capacities to address issues of conflict and peace through activities that promote social cohesion (DILG/OPAPP, 2012, p. 6; NEDA, 2011, p. 296)

  7. 7.

    Interviews 10, 13, 14, 15.

  8. 8.

    Interview 58.

  9. 9.

    Update: PAMANA is being continued, even expanded, under the Duterte Administration.

  10. 10.

    Interview 3.

  11. 11.

    Interview 59.

  12. 12.

    Interview 7.

  13. 13.

    Interviews 16 and 19.

  14. 14.

    Interview 6.

  15. 15.

    Interview 3.

  16. 16.

    Regarding the central administration, see also Hodder (2010a, 2010b).

  17. 17.

    Interview 59, speaking of the then launched National Community-Driven Development Programme, the new round of Kalahi-CIDSS.

  18. 18.

    Interview 56.

  19. 19.

    My field research yielded other interesting bits of information, of course. Some of these are significant unexpected outcomes, which are not included in the main narrative because they are outside its scope and the purview of state-building. For example, a PAMANA area manager shared with me that, according to local sources, rido was reduced thanks to the road that PAMANA constructed in the area. Interview 7.

    Another was shared by the Third Party Monitor, a gender- and women’s rights NGO in Sorsogon. When they went to remote villages to check on the projects, they found out about many cases of incest through their interviews with the locals. They were able to help the victims of sexual abuse find professional assistance. They also commented that PAMANA helped in minimising child labour through improving access to schools and livelihood. Interview 24.

  20. 20.

    In Kalahi and PAMANA-related issues, 80% of household representation is required according to DSWD community facilitators. Interview 43.

  21. 21.

    A purok is a sub-division of a barangay. A sitio is a hamlet removed from the centre of the village.

  22. 22.

    Interview 58.

  23. 23.

    Interview 7.

  24. 24.

    Interview 39.

  25. 25.

    Interview 20.

  26. 26.

    Interview 13.

  27. 27.

    PAMANA Interactive Project Database: http://pamana.net/projects, accessed on 30 March 2016. At the time of access the database contained 15,230 projects. The quality of information is uneven, some project entries contain more information than others and it was last updated on 17 August 2015, thus many projects are not yet available. Nevertheless, the database as it is, with all its shortcomings, is an excellent tool to look up PAMANA projects and does increase transparency.

  28. 28.

    Interview 13.

  29. 29.

    Interview 59. This interviewee also explained that as much as OPAPP can, they try and streamline all procedures in order to make the procedures clear and as uniform as possible, partly in order to avoid ‘forum shopping’ by municipalities.

  30. 30.

    Interview 32.

  31. 31.

    Interviews 44 and 45.

  32. 32.

    Interview 47.

  33. 33.

    Interview 25.

  34. 34.

    Interview 31.

  35. 35.

    Interview 38.

  36. 36.

    An ADB assessment of Kalahi-CIDSS also found that 87% of the respondents perceived there was not corruption in Kalahi, 6% that there was less than in other development programmes and 4% thought there was as much corruption in it as in other programmes (ADB, 2012, p. 31).

  37. 37.

    Interview 43.

  38. 38.

    Interview 21.

  39. 39.

    Interview 10. He specifically mentioned Mulanay in Quezon, and Juban and Casiguran in Sorsogon.

  40. 40.

    Interview 56.

  41. 41.

    Interview 50.

  42. 42.

    Interview 43.

  43. 43.

    Clifford Burkley interview.

  44. 44.

    Interview 58.

  45. 45.

    Interview 11.

  46. 46.

    Interviews 13 and 23.

  47. 47.

    Interview 31.

  48. 48.

    Interviews 34, 35.

  49. 49.

    Interview 5.

  50. 50.

    Private communication with a former OPAPP employee.

  51. 51.

    Interview 58.

  52. 52.

    Interview 55.

  53. 53.

    Bantay Bayanihan: http://www.securityreforminitiative.org/bantay-bayanihan/, accessed on 03 February 2016.

  54. 54.

    Interview 22. In fairness to PAMANA, the interview subject did not make a distinction between PAMANA, Kalahi-CIDSS and the military’s development activities, he lumped them together here. He did, however, point out a weakness of development by the military, the unfulfilled promise, which a military officer also told me about in Interview 6.

  55. 55.

    Interview with NPA member.

  56. 56.

    Interview 57.

  57. 57.

    Interview 8.

  58. 58.

    Interview 59.

  59. 59.

    Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas—The League of Barangays of the Philippines.

  60. 60.

    Interview 49.

  61. 61.

    Interview 47.

  62. 62.

    Interview 43.

  63. 63.

    Interview 56.

  64. 64.

    Interview 55.

  65. 65.

    Interview 34.

  66. 66.

    Interview 23.

  67. 67.

    Interview 58.

  68. 68.

    Interview 52.

  69. 69.

    Interviews 44 and 45.

  70. 70.

    Interview 58.

  71. 71.

    Interview 55.

  72. 72.

    Interview 23.

  73. 73.

    Interviews 55, 53.

  74. 74.

    Interview 58.

  75. 75.

    Interview 48.

  76. 76.

    Interview 39.

  77. 77.

    Interview 54.

  78. 78.

    Interview 49.

  79. 79.

    Interview 51.

  80. 80.

    Interview 53.

  81. 81.

    Interview 58.

  82. 82.

    Here I do mean to say ‘seem’ as Pillar 3 was not the primary focus of my research as my observations are less supported by evidence than Pillar 2. Having said this, it is my informed opinion that anti-corruption has not been successful in Pillar 3.

  83. 83.

    In my research area people talked about the permits to campaign and win matter-of-factly, as a routine exercise and nobody reported actual physical violence in relation to these. Nevertheless, it can happen. For example, a vice mayor was killed for allegedly breaching the conditions of his permit to campaign in Isabela province (Visaya, 2016).

  84. 84.

    Interview 49.

  85. 85.

    Interview 41.

  86. 86.

    A police source mentioned 55% as the highest imposed S.O.P., depending on the fund. Interview 40.

  87. 87.

    Interview 42; concurring accounts from a DSWD community facilitator (Interview 52) and municipal employees (Interview 19).

  88. 88.

    Interview 21.

  89. 89.

    Interviews 23 and 47.

  90. 90.

    Interviews 27, 32, 38, 40, NPA member.

  91. 91.

    Interview 40.

  92. 92.

    Interview 19.

  93. 93.

    Interview 40.

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Kovács, B.Á. (2019). Sorsogon: Field Research Findings. In: Peace Infrastructures and State-Building at the Margins. Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89566-6_9

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