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Antecedents of Political Confidence

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Political Confidence and Democracy in Europe

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Abstract

What are the respective antecedents of individual citizens’ confidence in representative and regulative institutions and authorities? In the third chapter of his book, Schnaudt analyzes whether the sources of citizens’ confidence in representative and regulative institutions and authorities are the same or rather different ones. For this purpose, the author relies on the most widely used explanations of political confidence in the literature—namely social capital, institutional-performance evaluations, and political involvement—and examines their respective relevance and explanatory power with regard to a one-dimensional and a two-dimensional conception as well as a typology of political confidence. Using the same group of explanatory accounts for different conceptions and types of political confidence, Schnaudt is able to determine whether one and the same set of antecedents is related differently to citizens’ confidence in representative and regulative institutions and authorities. In his empirical analysis based on individual-level data from the European Social Survey (ESS), the author shows that different facets of social capital, institutional-performance evaluations, and political involvement exert a varying influence on citizens’ confidence in representative and regulative institutions and authorities, respectively. The chapter’s main conclusion is that citizens’ decision to place confidence in representative institutions and authorities depends on a different set of factors than their corresponding decision to place confidence in regulative institutions and authorities. According to the author, it is therefore clearly misleading to assume that political confidence is a coherent, one-dimensional syndrome that emanates from one identical pool of antecedents.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For an overview of the manifold criticisms of social capital, see, inter alia, Fine (2010, 2002), Foley and Edwards (1999), Jackman and Miller (1998, 1996), Schuller et al. (2000), Durlauf (2002), Bowles and Gintis (2002, p. F419) and Woolcock (2010, p. 482).

  2. 2.

    Its alleged status as a collective good is also what distinguishes social capital from other forms of capital: “the actor or actors who generate social capital ordinarily capture only a small part of its benefits, a fact that leads to underinvestment in social capital” (Coleman 1988, p. S119). However, social capital’s status as a collective good is far from undisputed. As some authors have argued, many types of social relations and networks do not grant equal access to all individuals and thus cannot be considered collective goods. These instances of ‘bonding’ or ‘exclusive’ (as opposed to ‘bridging’ or ‘inclusive’) social capital might actually imply detrimental effects for societies as a whole and are known as “the dark side of social capital” (cf. Putnam 2000, pp. 21–24, ch. 22; Halpern 2005, pp. 22–25; Zmerli 2003, 2008). Accordingly, social capital’s potential status as collective good will not be included in a minimal definition of the concept.

  3. 3.

    This is also the reason why the focus of social capital theory has been predominantly on formal rather than informal networks. Since the continued existence of mutual relations in informal networks is comparatively more insecure and investments in such relations are consequently less likely, formal networks are considered a more promising environment for bringing about the benevolent consequences for democracy mentioned above (cf. Gabriel et al. 2002, p. 39). For the same reasons, the following discussion will be mostly restricted to formal networks as well.

  4. 4.

    Two caveats have to be added. First, not all voluntary associations are (equally) likely to exert these overtly romantic effects on their members (cf. Stolle and Rochon 1998). For example, individuals who are involved in a sports club will probably develop less political skills than those who belong to some sort of advocacy group (cf. Warren 2001, pp. 72, 76). Second, repeated interactions and cooperation within voluntary associations of different kinds does not necessarily have to lead to the acquisition of democratic norms and habits. The Ku Klux Klan or the Hells Angels are clear examples in which associations cultivate non- and even anti-democratic norms as well as distrusting behaviors towards outgroups (cf. Putnam 2000, p. 340; Rothstein and Stolle 2008, p. 276).

  5. 5.

    Although this assumption might be challenged from several points of view (see Sect. 2.1.2), the obvious fact here is that the one-dimensional conception of political confidence does at least not imply any concrete effort to disentangle whether citizens’ confidence in different (types of) institutions and authorities emanates from diverging antecedents.

  6. 6.

    Considering that we are primarily interested in whether the antecedents for representative as opposed to regulative trusters differ, all hypotheses will be formulated in such a way that regulative trusters serve as reference category for the three remaining types of the typology.

  7. 7.

    It thus appears to be good news that empirical research reports generally high levels of support for norms of citizenship (for an overview see Gabriel et al. 2002, pp. 74–85; Roßteutscher 2004, pp. 183–187; Denters et al. 2007a, pp. 95–97; Dalton 2008, pp. 82–83; van Deth 2007, pp. 410–412; van Deth 2009, pp. 181–183; van Deth 2012, pp. 367–376).

  8. 8.

    At this point, it has to be noted that the presumed direction of the relationship between norms of citizenship and political confidence is far from undisputed (for a recent assessment see van Deth 2017). In this connection, Zmerli (2008) as well as van Deth (2012) treat norms of citizenship as a consequence rather than antecedent of political confidence in their analyses. Nevertheless, Zmerli (2008, p. 662) concedes that norms of citizenship and political confidence are ‘mutually interdependent’: While political confidence should enhance a citizen’s likelihood to disapprove of free-riding behavior, norms of citizenship “likewise increase a citizen’s willingness to put trust in political institutions and actors.” The mutual interdependence of norms of citizenship and political confidence as well as the causal directions of their relationship will be discussed in greater detail in Chap. 4 of this study. In this context, we will also provide an empirical re-assessment of the relationships to be presented in this section by conceptualizing political confidence as antecedent rather than consequence of norms of citizenship (see Sect. 4.1).

  9. 9.

    Another strand of research hints at the possibility that the sources of social trust might be of biological nature or even genetically determined (cf. Kosfeld et al. 2005; Sturgis et al. 2010).

  10. 10.

    It thus appears that Kaase’s earlier call for “[b]etter conceptualisations and more empirical research” has indeed helped to get a more advanced understanding of the relationship between social trust and political confidence (cf. Kaase 1999, p. 19). For a similar discussion, see also Gabriel et al. (2002, pp. 190–191).

  11. 11.

    In the meantime, empirical studies based on more recent waves of the WVS including more fine-grained measurements of social trust and political confidence likewise report a positive relationship between both concepts (cf. Newton and Zmerli 2011; Zmerli and Newton 2011).

  12. 12.

    Due to coding errors during fieldwork, information on citizens’ associational involvement is not available for the Czech Republic and Switzerland.

  13. 13.

    Given that the focus of social capital theory is on social rather than political participation, membership of political parties will be excluded from the following analysis. Citizens’ political participation will be part of the analysis in Chap. 4 of this study (see Sect. 4.2).

  14. 14.

    The respective proportions of citizens indicating to be a member of more than one or more than three voluntary association(s) amount to approximately 30 and 8%.

  15. 15.

    Only in Italy, Hungary, Luxembourg, Portugal and the UK this solution is less clearly visible mainly due to cross-loadings on the solidarity item.

  16. 16.

    This question has been the standard item for measuring citizens’ social trust in various surveys all around the globe for more than 50 years (cf. Zmerli et al. 2007, pp. 38–39; Nannestad 2008, p. 417; Bjornskov 2007, p. 2). Despite—or rather because of—its status as the most widely used survey item for measuring social trust, the question has been subject to various criticisms. These criticisms mostly pertain to the (alleged) underspecification of the question, in particular with regard to the object and domain of social trust (for an overview and details, see Miller and Mitamura 2003; Bjornskov 2007, p. 2; Nannestad 2008, p. 418; Oskarsson 2010). While the question wording has remained largely untouched during the years, earlier surveys have employed a dichotomous answer option (yes/no) instead of the 11-point scale described above (cf. Zmerli et al. 2007, pp. 46–50).

  17. 17.

    Rosenberg (1956, 1957) originally labeled this composite measure ‘faith-in-people scale’.

  18. 18.

    In addition, a negative effect can be observed in Greece and Luxembourg.

  19. 19.

    This observation per se is not at odds with the propositions of social capital theory. Considering arguments about voluntary associations as catalyzers of norms and trust, their observed lack of influence on political confidence could simply indicate the presence of some mediation effect: the influence of membership in voluntary associations on political confidence is mediated by norms and trust. However, if this were to be the case, we should have observed more substantial effects of participation in voluntary associations on political confidence in the preceding bivariate analysis (see Table 3.2).

  20. 20.

    A negative association can again be observed in Greece.

  21. 21.

    While the unstandardized coefficients are still not directly comparable because of the varying covariance in both models, this strategy at least minimizes possible confounding effects that may hamper the comparison across models. In order to get some information about the relative importance of the different aspects of social capital within each model as well, all independent variables in the regression model have been standardized to range from 0 to 1. Accordingly, the unstandardized coefficients presented in Table 3.5 indicate the respective change in citizens’ confidence when switching an independent variable from its minimum to its maximum while holding all other independent variables constant.

  22. 22.

    In addition, a negative effect can be observed in Luxembourg.

  23. 23.

    The substantive conclusions presented here also remain robust when using alternative measurements of associational involvement focusing on active participation in voluntary associations rather than membership (detailed results not shown).

  24. 24.

    For arguments specifying a reversed causal relationship between satisfaction and political confidence see Van de Walle and Bouckaert (2003, pp. 902–908), but see also footnote 3 on page 16.

  25. 25.

    Some studies reach the conclusion that citizens’ sociotropic considerations are even more relevant to account for differences in political confidence than pocketbook ones (cf. Kornberg and Clarke 1992, p. 125; Mishler and Rose 2002, p. 21).

  26. 26.

    What is more, survey questions about citizens’ income have the additional problem that they elicit high levels of missing answers on the side of respondents (cf. van der Meer 2010, p. 533; van der Meer and Dekker 2011, p. 103).

  27. 27.

    In France, the respective question contained an additional (neutral) answer category. The results for French respondents are thus not (directly) comparable to those for respondents from the remaining countries in the first wave of the ESS.

  28. 28.

    In Ireland, the respective question was about the national parliament. The results for Irish respondents are thus not (directly) comparable to those for respondents from the remaining countries in the first wave of the ESS.

  29. 29.

    For the origins of the concept political efficacy and its two variants internal and external efficacy, see Campbell et al. (1954, p. 187), Lane (1959, p. 149), and Balch (1974).

  30. 30.

    All country-specific values for Cronbach’s alpha reach acceptable levels of at least 0.6 while most of them are well above 0.7.

  31. 31.

    Only in Great Britain the results do not show any systematic relationship between citizens’ perceived difficulty in borrowing money and their confidence in representative institutions and authorities.

  32. 32.

    These countries are Finland, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.

  33. 33.

    These countries are Czech Republic, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain.

  34. 34.

    These countries are Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, and Poland.

  35. 35.

    See also footnote 21 on page 36.

  36. 36.

    It is already evident that two of the facets of political involvement mentioned above (the consumption of political news in the media as well as the discussion of politics with acquaintances) represent actual behaviors rather than mere attitudes. However, these behaviors can be considered as less or even non-instrumental insofar as they do not necessarily aim at influencing governmental processes or decisions, which would characterize them as forms of political participation (cf. Topf 1995, pp. 60–61; van Deth 1990, p. 285). Therefore, they better qualify as facets of political involvement indicating citizens’ general willingness to take note of politics and to devote themselves to political issues and the political sphere. For a more encompassing and concise depiction of the concept political participation, see Chap. 4 of this study.

  37. 37.

    It has to be noted, however, that the authors use a measure of citizens’ political interest which additionally includes media consumption and discussion of politics as well (cf. Espinal et al. 2006, p. 218).

  38. 38.

    Interestingly, in a follow-up study partly based on the same data from the first wave of the ESS, the same author reports a uniformly positive impact of interest on confidence across all countries under investigation (cf. Zmerli 2012, p. 165). These diverging results might be due to different operationalizations of political confidence and/or the usage of different sets of explanatory variables in the regression models across both studies.

  39. 39.

    Kotzian (2011, p. 38), for example, explicitly labels the police and the courts as ‘non-political’ or ‘order’ institutions.

  40. 40.

    See also footnote 21 on page 36.

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Schnaudt, C. (2019). Antecedents of Political Confidence. In: Political Confidence and Democracy in Europe. Contributions to Political Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89432-4_3

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