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Monarchical Government, Opposition and a Divided Political Nation

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The Intellectual Origins of the Belgian Revolution

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Abstract

In 1817 the government, still controlled by its more moderate members, recognised that there existed a problem concerning ministerial responsibility, and initiated a debate on how the situation could be improved through a constitutional revision. However, different views on the bases of the constitutional order would result in misunderstandings on all sides about the intentions of the other sides, and, as a consequence, the debate would be aborted before it had truly started. The failure to address the constitutional void would, as we will see, bring with it the triumph within the government of the political forces which advanced the view that the monarch held priority over the constitution.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Van Velzen refers to Discours sur l’histoire de la Patrie, in H. van Hogendorp, ed., Brieven en Gedenkschriften, part 3 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1876), 320–321.

  2. 2.

    The draft can be found in H. van Hogendorp, ed., Brieven en Gedenkschriften, part 6 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1902), 257–261.

  3. 3.

    Although Van Hogendorp’s original outline provided that the ‘executive actions [amptverrichtingen]’ of ministers could become the object of prosecution before a High Council ‘upon accusation by the States General’, the constitution of 1815 provided that ministers would be judged before the High Council for ‘offences committed whilst in function’, and only for ‘offences committed in the exercise of their function’ was permission required for prosecution by the States General (van Velzen 2005, 39; Colenbrander 1909, 651).

  4. 4.

    The discussion that followed resulted in a petition being sent to the Second Chamber in demand of ministerial responsibility, presumably by Pierre-François van Meenen (van Velzen 2005, 140–141): Mémoire à la Seconde Chambre des Etats-Généraux par les marchands de vin et de sel des provinces méridionales (Antwerp, 1817). The petition pointed out the need to ‘rehabilitate ministerial responsibility in accordance with our constitutional rights’.

  5. 5.

    ‘De l’abus des mots’, Les Ephémérides de l’opinion, February 1816, 155–167.

  6. 6.

    Les Ephémérides de l’opinion, May 1817, 197 (van Velzen 2005, 121): ‘Our legislation needs a law which declares the ministers responsible, specifies all the cases of responsibility according to their functions, and determines how and by whom they should be accused and prosecuted.’ The article also made it explicitly clear that the issue could not be settled with a simple law, as this would not settle speculations about the proper interpretation of the constitution on the matter.

  7. 7.

    Van Meenen , in a similar way to those who denied ministerial responsibility (or would come to deny it), argued that article 177 did not provide for ministerial responsibility in any sense, but only concerned the application of the normal penal law to ministers (van Meenen 1817a, 66). The reason was, obviously, that, if read in the sense that it provided for ministerial responsibility, the article only granted a very limited role to the parliament.

  8. 8.

    Van Meenen quoted a passage from Constant, in which the latter had explained the articles of the French Charter (which explicitly authorised the Chambre des Pairs to judge the ministers), in the sense that ‘the peers have to make a judgment as supreme judges, following their reason, their honour and their conscience’.

  9. 9.

    This summary of Van Maanen’s politics is based on: van Velzen (2005, 151–173).

  10. 10.

    The prince made it clear that he considered the negotiations for a constitution to be a charade. He insisted that the constitution could only be regarded as ‘a toy’, which, placed in the hands of the crowd, offered ‘an illusion of freedom’. He furthermore pointed out that it was up to him to ‘accommodate [the constitution] according to the circumstances’.

  11. 11.

    Like many other representatives of the former class of ‘regents’ from the province of Holland, Van Hogendorp found William I too supportive of the new industry in the Southern provinces and negligent of the commercial interests of the North.

  12. 12.

    In this sense the term is unrelated to its more common understanding in terms of the possibilities of recourse to secular authorities in ecclesiastical affairs (see Chapter 5).

  13. 13.

    For the following paragraph: Drion (1950, 92–99).

  14. 14.

    For the text of this royal decree: Drion (1950, 71–72).

  15. 15.

    Quoted in van Velzen (2005, 188–190).

  16. 16.

    He excluded, however, matters concerning civil rights, property rights and debt mediation, for which he did acknowledge the full competence of the courts.

  17. 17.

    Quoted in van Velzen (2005, 177–178).

  18. 18.

    This provided a clear break with the political culture of the Netherlands from before French rule, in which interference by the judicial power with political power had been most common. At the time of the Brabant Revolution in the Habsburg Netherlands, a Sovereign Council of Brabant had been attributed the role of arbiter between the States General and the monarch. The provincial courts in the Northern Netherlands had equally played a prominent role in controlling the decisions of the political authorities, and possible transgressions into (‘political’) legislative work were hardly considered an issue. In France itself, the so-called parlements , in origin a purely judicial institution, were renowned for their prominent role in the politics of the Ancien Régime. They often invoked their droit d’enrégistrement and the remontrances to obstruct economic and social reform policies. See: Van den Bossche (2001, 36–40, 188–196), Drion (1950, 37–38, 40–42).

  19. 19.

    Article 167 declared that no one could be denied the attribution of his case to the proper judicial authority. Furthermore, the constitution did not foresee an institution that would be competent to pass judgement in cases where the public authorities would invoke a conflict (Colenbrander 1909, 642).

  20. 20.

    As Jan Drion has pointed out, the new legislation led to confusion primarily in the Southern Netherlands, where judges had become more accustomed to the French system than in the Northern Netherlands (for the obvious reason that the Southern Netherlands had been an integral part of France for two decades). This explains why it were precisely Belgian members of the Constitutional Commission (Jean-François Gendebien and Olivier Leclerq) who had insisted on making it explicit in the constitution of 1815 that the conflictenstelsel became abolished (Drion 1950, 67–69, 81–82).

  21. 21.

    It declared that any public administration that believed that the judicial power interfered with its proper tasks should have the right to appeal to the king. At the same time the Council reserved the same right to the judicial power, when it believed public administration interfered with its tasks (Drion 1950, 125).

  22. 22.

    Article 1 of the new law did refer, however, to article 165 of the constitution, outlining that the new decree could provide no justification for the violation of property rights, or, for that matter, any other civil rights.

  23. 23.

    Less than six months later the States-Provincial, clearly on insistence by the government, revoked Nes’ mandate. In fact, preventing re-election of critical representatives became a common practice, designed to keep the Second Chamber compliant with the wishes of the government (van Zanten 2004, 137).

  24. 24.

    On Van Alphen and Warrin: van Zanten (2004, 147).

  25. 25.

    Quoted in van Velzen (2005, 209–210). Van Velzen has pointed out that Kemper was probably used by the government in a strategy aimed at delaying the establishment of a High Council .

  26. 26.

    The basis for the discussion was article 163 of the constitution, which foresaw ‘one general book of civil law, commercial law, criminal law […]’ for the entire kingdom (Colenbrander 1909, 642).

  27. 27.

    See for these different traditions also: De Cruz (1999).

  28. 28.

    On the codification-projects under the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands: Gilissen (1983, 1984, 430–432).

  29. 29.

    Extracts from the debates on the codification of civil law appeared in Van Meenen’s articles on the issue: van Meenen (1819a, b).

  30. 30.

    On Van der Straeten , see: Bergmans (1926–1929).

  31. 31.

    This was a reference to the royal decree of 8 June 1820, which stipulated that the Second Chamber needed the approval of the First Chamber for the transmission of any petition or request to the king (van Zanten 2004, 258).

  32. 32.

    In the spring of 1821, a commission was established to elaborate a new fiscal system, more advantageous to the commercial interests in the North. It encountered a lot of opposition from Southern representatives, who feared the consequences would be harmful to agriculture and industry. The ultimate proposal consisted of a compromise, as it compensated the predicted negative effects for the South with subsidies for Southern industry. The law was passed by 55 against 51 votes.

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Marteel, S. (2018). Monarchical Government, Opposition and a Divided Political Nation. In: The Intellectual Origins of the Belgian Revolution. Palgrave Studies in Political History. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89426-3_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89426-3_4

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