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Economic Constitutionalism and Inequality

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Inequality

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism ((PASTCL))

Abstract

A commitment to voluntary, mutually beneficial modes of human action implies certain forms of inequality are inadmissible. This includes inequality driven by political processes, entailing advantages to wealthy interests at the expense of others, including the poor. Even if policy-induced inequality cannot be eliminated, the entangled political economy approach indicates that the underlying actions can, and should, be influenced to help reduce the worst excesses of such inequality.

This chapter indicates that better institutional rules are necessary to help suppress inequalities arising from abuses of political power that inhibit equalising market processes. Both fiscal and regulatory policies are ripe for reform in this context. Pro-equality rules to restructure economic policies in an entangled political economy are most suitably inspired by the principles of non-discrimination and decentralisation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Political actors in most developed countries have prepared a written constitution, usually in collaboration with political and legal peers, and with some degree of consultation with the general public. However, there are some countries (e.g. Israel, New Zealand, United Kingdom) that uphold constitutional principles without reference to a written constitution.

  2. 2.

    The division of powers between levels of government within a given country may be in the form of a confederation (with a weak central governmental authority deriving most or all of its powers from lower-level governments), federation (with powers shared between central and lower governments), or a unitary state (with strong central authority, and limited powers for lower governments as prescribed by the central government).

  3. 3.

    As had been mentioned in a previous chapter, public debt is not the subject of an extensive analysis for this book. It is noted, however, that the appropriate management of borrowings by political enterprises has long been of concern to classical liberal thinkers, and such matters are legitimately incorporated into an expansive conception of the fiscal constitution. Borrowing activities by political agents essentially generate intertemporal non-generality norms in fiscal politics, raising fundamental questions about the appropriateness of extending debt burdens onto future generations that lack current-day political access.

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  1. RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

    Mikayla Novak

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Novak, M. (2018). Economic Constitutionalism and Inequality. In: Inequality. Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89417-1_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89417-1_7

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