The Ukraine Crisis and Its Implications for the Euro-Atlantic Security System

Zięba, Ryszard

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-79105-0_9

Ryszard Zięba¹¹

Part of the book series: Global Power Shift ((GLOBAL))

439 Accesses

Abstract

In the ninth chapter, the author demonstrates how the Euro-Atlantic security system’s shift from cooperation to rivalry for spheres of influence reached its apogee in the Ukraine crisis. In the spring of 2014, following the arrival in power in Kyiv of nationalist and pro-Western politicians the crisis turned into an international crisis and to Russian intervention. Like the leading neorealists, the author holds the view that Ukraine was the scene of a clash between the West and Russia. The West attempted to draw Ukraine into its sphere of interests, and Russia countered this by annexing Crimea and by supporting militarily the secession of Ukraine’s eastern provinces (the Donbas). This crisis had a very negative impact on the Euro-Atlantic security system. It led to geopolitical rivalry, to military confrontation and to the weakening of Ukraine. The author also analyzes the chances for overcoming the crisis, by pointing to the need for a compromise with the participation of the three interested parties—Ukraine, the West and Russia.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Chapter: USD 29.95; Price excludes VAT (USA)

eBook: USD 119.00; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Softcover Book: USD 159.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Hardcover Book: USD 159.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

1.
The two following works can be recognized as representative of the two approaches: Moravcsik (1997), Wendt (1992).
2.
Kissinger (2014).
3.
Verheugen ostrzega przed Kijowem … (2014).
4.
Father Isakowicz-Zaleski noted that one of those ministers, Andriy Mokhnik “is an excellent example of the aggression of Ukrainian nationalism, because four years ago, he broke up a conference devoted to the genocide in Volhynia”. In the priest’s opinion, the consolidation of the pro-Bandera party Svoboda is convenient for Russian president Vladimir Putin. The Polish government should support the pro-European aspirations of Ukraine and, at the same time, say clearly that it doesn’t wish “to pal around” with nationalists and banderists, because they are anti-Polish, and not entirely European. He also expressed the fear that Putin will take advantage of the fear of the banderist movement in order to split up Ukraine, and “the worst possible outcome is the disintegration of Ukraine, because then there will be no counter-balance for Ukrainian nationalism”. See Jesteśmy na progu podziału Ukrainy … (2014).
5.
Plenarprotokoll 18/20 … (2014).
6.
Były ambasador USA w ZSRR Jack Matlock … (2014).
7.
Morgenthau (1958), pp. 65–66, (1967), pp. 5, 519.
8.
Hartmann (1962), pp. 6, 14. The category of ‘vital interests’ is also in use among British scholars. For example, see Frankel (1970), pp. 73–76, Northedge (1976), pp. 194–197.
9.
Kaczmarski (2015).
10.
Mearsheimer (2001).
11.
Dugin (1997).
12.
This concerns efforts made by Russia and China to prevent the UN Security Council from authorizing an armed intervention in Syria for the purpose of toppling the regime of Al. Assad.
13.
The Russian government convinced the Iranian authorities to submit their nuclear program to international control—something the United States proved unable to do.
14.
Trenin (2014), p. 1. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ukraine_great_power_rivalry2014.pdf. Accessed January 27, 2018.
15.
Former Polish prime minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, until then known for his toned down pronouncements, stated in March 2014 on one of the Polish television stations, that “Russia had shown the face of a thug”, and that its leading politicians lie so, that they are all growing Pinocchio noses. See Rosja pokazała gębę bandziora … (2014).
16.
Janukowycz … (2013).
17.
Authors analyzing the issue from a constructivist standpoint claim that the EU imposed sanctions against Russia for having violated Ukraine’s sovereignty and the right of Ukrainians to self-determination. See Sjursen and Rosén (2017).
18.
ONZ … (2014).
19.
Joint Geneva Statement on Ukraine (2014).
20.
Borger and Luhn (2014).
21.
Sakwa (2015), p. 26.
22.
Smith (2016), p. 35.
23.
Cohen (2014b).
24.
Mearsheimer (2014), p. 1.
25.
For more, see Morelli (2017), pp. 36–41.
26.
According to Putin, the protesters in Kyiv were trained in bases near the border in Lithuania, Poland and in Ukraine itself. The spokesman of the Polish defense ministry denied this information on Twitter. See Świat … (2014).
27.
Stoner and McFaul (2015), pp. 181–184.
28.
Walt (2015).
29.
Zając (2016), pp. 48–52, Osińska (2009), pp. 133–136.
30.
Zięba (2013), pp. 200–202.
31.
Stolarczyk (2014), p. 62.
32.
Łagowski (2014).
33.
The Normandy Format is a group of four states: Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine to resolve a conflict in eastern Ukraine. The group was created on June 6, 2014, when France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine leaders met on the margins of the 70th anniversary of the D-Day allied landings in Normandy (in 1944).
34.
Busygina (2018), pp. 113-114. For more see Laruelle, M. (2015).
35.
In Minsk, during the August 26, 2014 summit of the EU and the Customs Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, with the president of Ukraine participating, Russia’s president said that Ukraine’s signing of an association agreement with the EU would cause Russia to lose over 100 billion rubles (about 2.1 billion euro). See Mińsk … (2014).
36.
Cohen wrote “It was to that that Putin reacted. It was to the fear that the new government in Kiev, which overthrew the elected government, had NATO backing and its next move would be toward Crimea and the Russian naval base there… But he was reacting, and as Kiev began an all-out war against the East, calling it the ‘anti-terrorist operation,’ with Washington’s blessing. …”. Kovalik (2015).
37.
Obrashcheniye Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 18 marta 2014 goda [Statement of the President of the Russian Federation, March 18, 2014] http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. Accessed January 27, 2018.
38.
Becker et al. (2016), pp. 123–126. Roy Allison proceeds to assess in detail three different explanations for Russia’s operations in Ukraine: geopolitical competition and structural power (including the strategic benefits of seizing Crimea); identity and ideational factors; and the search for domestic political consolidation in Russia. See Allison (2014).
39.
Kryzys na Ukrainie … (2014).
40.
Ibidem. See also Sibal (2014).
41.
Góralczyk (2014).
42.
Helmut Schmidt … (2014), Były ambasador USA w ZSRR Jack Matlock … (2014).
43.
Morgenthau (1967), p. 4.
44.
In the next two sections I use the theses contained in my article Zięba (2017b), p. 117 et seq.
45.
Ibidem, pp. 9–10. Morgenthau, H. (1967). Politics among Nations…, p. 9-10.
46.
See Karagiannis (2013).
47.
See Wolff (2014).
48.
Freedman (2014), pp. 8–12.
49.
Walt (2015). op. cit. See another critical view in Marten (2015), p. 200.
50.
Lee et al. (2017), USA dostarczą Ukrainie … (2017). Incidentally, western information agencies gained access to State Department documents showing that Ukraine had been buying small quantities of such weapons for several years, both before and after the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine and in succeeding years.
51.
See Chap. 6 in this volume.
52.
Belkin et al. (2014), p. 4.
53.
10 tysięcy ofiar śmiertelnych konfliktu na Ukrainie … (2017). The conflict in Ukraine continued unabated, and at the beginning of 2018, UN sources put the number of persons killed at 10,300. This figure includes the 298 passengers of the Malaysian Airlines plane shot down by separatists over eastern Ukraine on 17 July 2014.
54.
On 25 March 2014, Yevhen Perebyinis, the spokesman of the Ukrainian foreign ministry, declared that his country does not plan to revert to the status of nuclear power.
55.
See van Ham (1994), pp. 13–14.
56.
Nuland zatrzęsła Kijowem … (2015).
57.
Comment by the Information and Press Department … (2018).
58.
Ibidem.
59.
Ibidem.
60.
Kublik (2015).
61.
The American political elites are convinced that Ukraine faces two main threats: Russian aggression, and corruption. For this reason, they think that, on the one hand, Ukraine should be given lethal weapons and, on the other helped to combat corruption. See Carpenter (2018).
62.
Nowy ukraiński rząd zaprzysiężony … (2016).
63.
The Netherlands ratified the association agreement only in June 2017, after the European Council had, in December 2016, had adopted a compromise declaration stating that the agreement was not an introduction to Ukraine’s membership in the EU, it does not obligate the EU to defend that country, and does not open the EU labor market to Ukrainian workers. This made it possible for the association agreement between Ukraine and the EU to come into full force on September 1, 2017. See to Busygina (2018), p. 192.
64.
Zając (2016), p. 147.
65.
Lavrov: gotovy rabotat’s administratsiyey … (2017).
66.
For more, see Bieleń (2015).
67.
See Footnote 24.
68.
Arbatova and Dynkin (2016), p. 71.
69.
See Cohen (2014a).
70.
Mearsheimer (2014), p. 12.
71.
See Footnote 2.
72.
See Brzezinski (2014).
73.
See Footnote 6.
74.
Walt (2015).
75.
See Footnote 3.
76.
See Sekielski … (2014).
77.
Od Władywostoku do Lizbony … (2015).
78.
See Vystupleniye i otvety na voprosy … (2014).
79.
Wieder Krieg … (2014). See also Stolarczyk (2015), pp. 356–358.
80.
Stadler (2015).
81.
Kryzys w Rosji … (2015). https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/unia-europejska/wiadomosci/artykul/kryzys-w-rosji-paryz-obiecuje-moskwie-pomoc,145,0,1871761.html. Accessed January 22, 2018. Compare with David (2017).
82.
Rieker and Lundby Gjerde (2016), pp. 319–320.
83.
Pond (2017/18), p. 152. For a critical view of this proposal, see Rogin (2017).
84.
In December 2016, Russia, Turkey and Iran brought about a ceasefire between the governmental forces and the moderate opposition in Syria. It was an obvious success of Russian diplomacy, which showed that if collaboration with the West doesn’t work, it can find other partners.
85.
See Footnote 2.
86.
Ibidem.

References

10 tysięcy ofiar śmiertelnych konfliktu na Ukrainie, Polsat News, 21.02.2017. http://www.polsatnews.pl/wiadomosc/2017-02-21/10-tysiecy-ofiar-smiertelnych-konfliktu-na-ukrainie/. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Allison, R. (2014). Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: How and why Russia broke the rules. International Affairs, 90(6), 1255–1297.
Article Google Scholar
Arbatova, N. K., & Dynkin, A. A. (2016). World order after Ukraine. Survival, 58(1), 71–89.
Article Google Scholar
Becker, M. E., Cohen, M. S., Kushi, S., & McManus, I. P. (2016). Reviving the Russian empire: The crimean intervention through a neoclassical realist lens. European Security, 25(1), 112–133.
Article Google Scholar
Belkin, P., Mix, D. R., & Woehrel, S. (2014, July 31). NATO response to the crisis in Ukraine and security concerns in Central and Eastern Europe. Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service.
Google Scholar
Bieleń, S. (2015). Powrót do Realpolitik w stosunkach Rosji z Zachodem jako konsekwencja kryzysu na Ukrainie. In K. Czornik, M. Lakomy, & M. Stolarczyk (Eds.). Implikacje kryzysu ukraińskiego dla polityki bezpieczeństwa Polski. Aspekty polityczne, wojskowe, gospodarcze oraz społeczne (pp. 387–404). Katowice: Regionalny Ośrodek Debaty Międzynarodowej.
Google Scholar
Borger, J., & Luhn, A. (2014, April 17). Ukraine crisis: Geneva talks produce agreement on defusing conflict. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/17/ukraine-crisis-agreement-us-russia-eu. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Brzezinski, Z. (2014, May 2). What Obama should tell Americans about Ukraine: The crisis is getting worse. It’s time for the president to rally the nation. https://www.politico.com. Accessed November 24, 2017.
Busygina, I. (2018). Russia-EU relations and the common neighborhood. Abingdon: Routledge.
Google Scholar
Były ambasador USA w ZSRR Jack Matlock: Ukrainie lepiej będzie bez Krymu, An Interview of Jack Matlock to Polish Press Agency, PAP, March 21, 2014.
Google Scholar
Carpenter, M. (2018, January 4). Ukraine needs U.S. help to fight corruption: Domestic reforms are just as important as defending against Russian aggression. Foreign Policy.
Google Scholar
Cohen, S. F. (2014, September 15). Patriotic heresy vs. the new cold war: Fallacies of US policy may be leading to war with Russia. The Nation.
Google Scholar
Cohen, S.F. (2014, March 3). Distorting Russia: How the American media misrepresent Putin, Sochi and Ukraine. The Nation.
Google Scholar
Comment by the Information and Press Department in connection with Ukraine adopting the so-called Law on Re-integration and De-occupation of Donbass, January 18, 2018. http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/kommentarii_predstavitelya/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/3023218. Accessed January 27, 2018.
David, D. (2017). Vivre avec la Russie. Politique étrangère, 82(1), 61–70.
Article Google Scholar
Dugin, А. (1997). Osnovy geopolitiki [Fundamentals of geopolitics]. Моscow: Arctogeya.
Google Scholar
Frankel, J. (1970). National interest. London: Pall Mall.
Book Google Scholar
Freedman, L. (2014). Ukraine and the art of limited war. Survival, 56(6), 7–38.
Article Google Scholar
Góralczyk, B. (2014, March 31). Rok 2014 może być początkiem nowego ładu na świecie, Wirtualna Polska. wp.pl, March 31, 2014. https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/prof-bogdan-goralczyk-dla-wp-pl-rok-2014-moze-byc-poczatkiem-nowego-ladu-na-swiecie-6031298977018497a. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Hartmann, F. (1962). The relations of nations. New York: Macmillan.
Google Scholar
Helmut Schmidt: działania Putina na Krymie “całkowicie zrozumiałe”, sankcje to “głupota”, TVN24, March 26, 2014.
Google Scholar
Janukowycz: deklaracja UE była upokarzająca. Nie pozwolę, by Ukrainę ktoś poniżał, PAP, TVN24, November 26, 2013.
Google Scholar
Jesteśmy na progu podziału Ukrainy. Banderowcy w rządzie “to błąd”, TVN24, March 28, 2014.
Google Scholar
Joint Geneva Statement on Ukraine from April 17, 2014: The full text. Washington Post, April 17, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/joint-geneva-statement-on-ukraine-from-april-17-the-full-text/2014/04/17/89bd0ac2-c654-11e3-9f37-7ce307c56815_story.html?utm_term=.453b3a09631c. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Kaczmarski, M. (2015). Realizm neoklasyczny. In R. Zięba, S. Bieleń, & J. Zając (Eds.), Teorie i podejścia badawcze w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych (pp. 13–27). Warsaw: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych UW.
Google Scholar
Karagiannis, E. (2013). The 2008 Russian-Georgian war via the lens of offensive realism. European Security, 22(1), 74–93.
Article Google Scholar
Kissinger, H. (2014, March 5). To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html?utm_term=.4e54a4c1fdff. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Kovalik, D. (2015, July 7). Rethinking Russia: A conversation with Russia Scholar Stephen F. Cohen. The Blog. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dan-kovalik/rethinking-russia-a-conve_b_7744498.html. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Kryzys na Ukrainie. Indyjski polityk krytykuje USA i Unię Europejską, 25.03.2014. https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/kryzys-na-ukrainie-indyjski-polityk-krytykuje-usa-i-unie-europejska/5kee2. Accessed February 20, 2018.
Kryzys w Rosji. Paryż obiecuje Moskwie pomoc w odbudowie kontaktów z Unią Europejską, Money.pl, August 2, 2015.
Google Scholar
Kublik, A. (2015, January 8). Soros apeluje o 50 mld dol. pomocy dla Ukrainy. Wyborcza.biz. http://wyborcza.pl/1,155290,17227735,Soros_apeluje_o_50_mld_dol__pomocy_dla_Ukrainy.html?disableRedirects=true. Accessed January 29, 2018.
Łagowski, B. (2014, October 7). Rusofobia to jest obecnie ideologia państwowa. Onet.pl, 07.10.2014 http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/prof-bronislaw-lagowski-rusofobia-to-jest-obecnie-ideologia-panstwowa/51vhw. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Laruelle, M. (2015). The ‘Russian World’: Russia Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination, Washington, DC: Center on Global Interests.
Google Scholar
Lavrov: gotovy rabotat’s administratsiyey Trampa po vsey povestke [Lavrov: Ready to Work with the Trump Administration on the Entire Agenda], Izvestia, February 10, 2017.
Google Scholar
Lee, M., Berry, L., & Isachenkov, V. (2017, December 23). US agrees to send lethal weapons to Ukraine. Angering Russia. ABC News. http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/us-officials-lethal-weapons-headed-ukraine-51965891. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Marten, K. (2015). Putin’s choices: Explaining Russian foreign policy and intervention in Ukraine. The Washington Quarterly, 38(2), 189–204.
Article Google Scholar
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. New York: W.W. Norton.
Google Scholar
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Why the ukraine crisis is the west’s fault: The liberal delusions that provoked Putin. Foreign Affairs, 93(5), 1–12.
Google Scholar
Mińsk: Petro Poroszenko i Władimir Putin uścisnęli sobie dłonie. TVN24, PAP, August 26, 2014. https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/minsk-petro-poroszenko-i-wladimir-putin-uscisneli-sobie-dlonie-6025267898974849a. Accessed February 20, 2018.
Moravcsik, A. (1997). Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics. International Organization, 51(4), 513–553.
Article Google Scholar
Morelli, V. L. (2017, January 3). Ukraine: Current issues and U.S. policy. Congressional research service report, No. 7-5700.
Google Scholar
Morgenthau, H. J. (1958). Dilemmas of politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Google Scholar
Morgenthau, H. J. (1967). Politics among Nations: The struggle for power and peace (4th ed.). New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Google Scholar
Northedge, F. S. (1976). The international political system. London: Faber.
Google Scholar
Nowy ukraiński rząd zaprzysiężony. Wołodymyr Hrojsman premierem, IAR, PAP. April 14, 2016,
Google Scholar
Nuland zatrzęsła Kijowem. Plotki o tajnej umowie Obamy z Putinem, TVN24, July 31, 2015.
Google Scholar
Od Władywostoku do Lizbony. Merkel chce w przyszłości strefy wolnego handlu także z Rosją, April 17, 2015. https://wpolityce.pl/swiat/241314-od-wladywostoku-do-lizbony-merkel-chce-w-przyszlosci-strefy-wolnego-handlu-takze-z-rosja. Accessed January 27, 2018.
ONZ: ponad 700 tys. Ukraińców uciekło z powodu walk do Rosji, TVN24, August 5, 2014.
Google Scholar
Osińska, L. (2009). Miejsce Ukrainy w koncepcjach polityki wschodniej RP. Dialogi Polityczne III RP, II, 129–149.
Google Scholar
Plenarprotokoll 18/20. Deutscher Bundestag. Stenografischer Bericht. 20. Sitzung Berlin, Donnerstag, den 13. März 2014, p. 1524. http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/18/18020.pdf. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Pond, E. (2017–18). War in Ukraine: Is this the way it ends? Survival, 59(6), 143–156.
Article Google Scholar
Rieker, P., & Lundby Gjerde, K. (2016). The EU, Russia and the potential for dialogue—Different readings of the crisis in Ukraine. European Security, 25(3), 304–325.
Article Google Scholar
Rogin, J. (2017, November 26). Putin’s proposal for Ukraine is another trap for Trump. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/putins-proposal-for-ukraine-is-another-trap-for-trump/2017/11/26/2b238622-cfc3-11e7-9d3a-bcbe2af58c3a_story.html?utm_term=.051a9a754a25. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Rosja pokazała gębę bandziora, TVN24, March 5, 2014.
Google Scholar
Sakwa, R. (2015). Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. London: I.B. Tauris.
Google Scholar
Sekielski pyta Cioska: Czy należy negocjować z bandytą Putinem?, Radio Tokfm, March 12, 2014.
Google Scholar
Sibal, K. (2014). Kanwal Sibal on how the US bungled in Ukraine. India Today, March 11, 2014.
Google Scholar
Sjursen, H., & Rosén, G. (2017). Arguing sanctions. On the EU’s response to the crisis in Ukraine. Journal of Common Market Studies, 55(1), 20–36.
Article Google Scholar
Smith, N. R. (2016). The EU under a realist scope: Employing a neoclassical realist framework for the analysis of the EU’s deep and comprehensive free trade agreement offer to Ukraine. International Relations, 30(1), 29–48.
Article Google Scholar
Stadler, R. (2015, August 20). Genscher fordert Neuanfang mit Putin. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
Google Scholar
Stolarczyk, M. (2014). Dylematy bezpieczeństwa Polski w kontekście kryzysu i konfliktu ukraińskiego w latach 2013–2014. In K. Czornik & M. Lakomy (Eds.), Dylematy bezpieczeństwa Polski na początku drugiej dekady XXI wieku (pp. 13–40). Katowice: Wydawnictwo Regionalnego Ośrodka Debaty Międzynarodowej.
Google Scholar
Stolarczyk, M. (2015). Polska i Niemcy wobec kryzysu i konfliktu ukraińskiego. Zbieżność i różnice intersów. In K. Czornik, M. Lakomy, & M. Stolarczyk (Eds.). Implikacje kryzysu ukraińskiego dla polityki bezpieczeństwa Polski. Aspekty polityczne, wojskowe, gospodarcze oraz społeczne (pp. 349–386). Katowice: Regionalny Ośrodek Debaty Międzynarodowej.
Google Scholar
Stoner, K., & McFaul, M. (2015). Who lost Russia (This Time)? Vladimir Putin. The Washington Quarterly, 38(2), 167–187.
Google Scholar
Świat: Rosja oskarża Polskę o szkolenie euromajdanowców, IAR, March 4, 2014.
Google Scholar
Trenin, D. (2014). The Ukraine crisis and the resumption of great-power rivalry. Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center.
Google Scholar
USA dostarczą Ukrainie “śmiercionośną broń”. Jest odpowiedź Rosji. PAP, TVN24, 23.12.2017. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/swiat/artykuly/565286,usa-dostarcza-ukrainie-smiercionosna-bron-jest-odpowiedz-rosji.html. Accessed January 27, 2018.
van Ham, P. (1994). Ukraine, Russia and European security: Implications for western policy. Chaillot Papers, 13.
Google Scholar
Verheugen ostrzega przed Kijowem. Rząd, w którym zasiadają faszyści, TVN24, March 18, 2014.
Google Scholar
Vystupleniye i otvety na voprosy Ministra inostrannykh del S. V. Lavrova v khode vstrechi so studentami i professorsko-prepodavatel’skim sostavom MGIMO(U) [Speech and answers to questions of Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey V. Lavrov at a meeting with students and faculty of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University)], Моscow, September 1, 2014. https://spain.mid.ru/web/spain_ru/sovremennost-/-/asset_publisher/P2WtTlLbh04P/content/id/7192598. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Walt, S. M. (2015, February 9). Why arming Kiev Is a Really, really bad idea. Foreign Policy.
Google Scholar
Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. International Organization, 46(2), 391–425.
Article Google Scholar
Wieder Krieg in Europa? Nicht in unserem Namen! Die Zeit, December 5, 2014.
Google Scholar
Wolff, A. T. (2014). The future of NATO enlargement after the Ukraine crisis. International Affairs, 91(5), 1103–1121.
Article Google Scholar
Zając, J. (2016). Poland’s security policy: The West, Russia and the changing international order. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Book Google Scholar
Zięba, R. (2013). Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
Google Scholar
Zięba, R. (2017b). The Ukraine Crisis as a Rivalry for Spheres of Influence between the West and Russia. International and Security Studies, 1, 115–132.
Google Scholar

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
Ryszard Zięba

Authors

Ryszard Zięba
View author publications
You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ryszard Zięba .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Zięba, R. (2018). The Ukraine Crisis and Its Implications for the Euro-Atlantic Security System. In: The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the 21st Century. Global Power Shift. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79105-0_9

Download citation

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79105-0_9
Published: 26 April 2018
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-79104-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-79105-0
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics