Abstract
The author claims that the greatest problems in the Euro-Atlantic security system arose with the West’s continued policy of dominance and expansion eastwards. The first tensions and diverting interests in relations with Russia were due to the West’s promotion of democracy in the Western Balkans and in the post-Soviet space, including the so-called ‘color revolutions’. Russia viewed this policy as a cover for the strategic interests of the USA, NATO and the EU and as interference in East-European countries’ internal affairs. Russia had been opposed to NATO expansion to the east since the previous decade, but had no means to prevent it during the first two post-Cold War rounds of NATO enlargement in 1999 and 2004. When, in 2008, NATO announced plans to include Ukraine and Georgia in the alliance, however, Russia was strong enough to oppose it and demonstrated its military power during the Georgian-Russian War of 2008, and then by intervening in Ukraine in 2014. As NATO reacted to this by reinforcing its eastern flank, Europe became the scene of a dangerous confrontation reminiscent of Cold War days.
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Notes
- 1.
Fukuyama (1992).
- 2.
Dahrendorf (1990).
- 3.
The subject literature distinguishes four models of promoting democracy: (a) compulsion, (b) conditionality, (c) persuasion, and (d) socialization. For more, see Beichelt (2012).
- 4.
European Council in Copenhagen (1993), p. 13.
- 5.
Kotzian et al. (2011), p. 998.
- 6.
Börzel and Risse (2009), pp. 6–36.
- 7.
Bush (2010), pp. 323–324.
- 8.
Gene Sharp has been a professor of political science at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth since 1972. In 1983 he founded the Albert Einstein Institution, a non-profit organization devoted to studying and promoting the use of nonviolent action in conflicts worldwide. The AEI has received funding between others from the International Republican Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy. From 1970s Sharp has developed the theory of nonviolent resistance and conflicts. His main book is From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation. London: Serpent’s Tail (2012).
- 9.
Moniz Bandeira (2015), pp. 42, 46.
- 10.
Włodkowska-Bagan (2013), p. 148.
- 11.
- 12.
Moniz Bandeira (2015), pp. 24–25.
- 13.
From the outset, the EU treated the three Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, former Soviet republics, as being part of Central Europe. They were admitted into the EU on May 1, 2004.
- 14.
See Hillion (1998).
- 15.
- 16.
Common Strategy of the European Union … (1999), pp. 1–9.
- 17.
- 18.
Schmidt-Feltzmann (2016), pp. 99–103.
- 19.
Moniz Bandeira (2015), p. 47.
- 20.
More see Stent (2014), pp. 103–110.
- 21.
Moniz Bandeira (2015), p. 50.
- 22.
Ibidem, p. 52.
- 23.
- 24.
Surkov (2006).
- 25.
- 26.
Forsberg (2004).
- 27.
Sakwa (2015), p. 26.
- 28.
Riecker and Lundby Gjerde (2016), pp. 305–306.
- 29.
Zięba (2013), p. 242.
- 30.
Poland did not join in these measures, and the recalled Polish ambassador returned to Minsk as early as January 1999.
- 31.
The Belarus Democracy Act (2004).
- 32.
Press Availability at the NATO Ministerial … (2005).
- 33.
- 34.
Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act (2006).
- 35.
Czachor (2011), p. 245.
- 36.
Ambrosio (2009), pp. 105–109.
- 37.
Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act (2011).
- 38.
- 39.
Incidentally, Moscow forced the candidates for NATO membership which neighbored on it (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) to join the CFE Treaty, and these countries submitted the appropriate declarations.
- 40.
Ambrosio (2009), pp. 151–155.
- 41.
The Prague Summit and NATO’s Transformation … (2003), p. 20.
- 42.
- 43.
Comment by the Information and Press Department … (2017).
- 44.
Ibidem.
- 45.
Compare German (2017).
- 46.
- 47.
Lété and Basagni (2016).
- 48.
Kirk (2016, May 20). Sweden and Finland Upgrade NATO Relations. EU Observer.
- 49.
Pedrotty (2016).
- 50.
Eriksson (2016).
- 51.
O’Hanlon (2017), p. 12.
- 52.
Compare Eellend (2016).
- 53.
Domisse (2016), pp. 4–5.
- 54.
The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris 27 May 1997 says: “NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.”
- 55.
See Sojusz z przyszłością … (2010).
- 56.
Active Engagement, Modern Defense … (2010).
- 57.
Ibidem, pt. 27.
- 58.
More see Deni (2017), p. 7 et seq.
- 59.
In March 2010, a group of influential German politicians and generals spoke in favor of “NATO opening the door” for Russia. In their opinion, Russia’s admission to NATO, and even the prospect of such admission, would greatly reinforce the North Atlantic Alliance. The article carried the signatures of former defense minister (under Helmut Kohl) Volker Rühe, former German ambassador in Poland Frank Elbe, and also of two generals: the former chairman of the NATO Military Commission Klaus Nauman, and Rear-Admiral Ulrich Weisser, who had been the head of the Planning Committee at the German defense ministry. See Ex-Verteidigungsminister Volker Rühe fordert Aufnahme Russlands in die NATO, Der Spiegel, November 6, 2010.
- 60.
Polish foreign policy shows a lack of consistency with regard to Russia and NATO’s eastern policy. This can be seen, for example, in Polish foreign minister Radosław Sikorski’s statement that Russia could be admitted to NATO in the future if Moscow would wish it. The Polish politician made this statement on March 30, 2009 in Toruń at the 4th Copernican Debate organized by the Nicolas Copernicus University.
- 61.
Looking through the prism of offensive realism, the Georgian-Russian War was the manifestation of rivalry between Russia and the USA for domination in the Southern Caucasus, and Russia chose the path of war to restore its domination in that region. See Karagiannis (2013).
- 62.
Chicago Summit Declaration … (2012).
- 63.
- 64.
Mention was also made in this context of the failure to maintain confidentiality during the bilateral meeting of presidents Obama and Medvedev, held on March 26, 2012 in Seoul. Behind the scenes of the summit, devoted to nuclear security, the microphones of TV cameras picked up words whispered a bit loudly by Obama: “This is my last election. After my election I have more flexibility”. “I understand. I will transmit this information to Vladimir [Putin],” answered Medvedev, also nearing the end of his term in office. See Reset tarczy … (2013).
- 65.
The rotational stationing of members of the US Armed Forces in Poland for the purpose of training the Polish military was regulated on the basis of an agreement signed on December 11, 2009 about the status of US military personnel on Polish territory (SOFA).
- 66.
Zięba (2015), p. 14.
- 67.
Fryc (2014).
- 68.
For more, see Zając (2016), pp. 120–125.
- 69.
Wales Summit Declaration … (2014).
- 70.
Warsaw Summit … (2016).
- 71.
Ibidem.
- 72.
Operation Atlantic Resolve is a demonstration of continued U.S. commitment to defense security through a series of actions designed to reassure NATO allies and partners of America’s dedication to enduring peace and stability in the region in light of the Russian intervention in Ukraine. The Operation was established within the European Reassurance Initiative—a program initiated in June 2014.
- 73.
13 najważniejszych decyzji szczytu … (2016).
- 74.
Warsaw Summit Communiqué … (2016).
- 75.
Zima (2016).
- 76.
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Zięba, R. (2018). The West’s Dominance and Expansion and Russia’s Response. In: The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the 21st Century. Global Power Shift. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79105-0_6
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