The West’s Dominance and Expansion and Russia’s Response

  • Ryszard ZiębaEmail author
Part of the Global Power Shift book series (GLOBAL)


The author claims that the greatest problems in the Euro-Atlantic security system arose with the West’s continued policy of dominance and expansion eastwards. The first tensions and diverting interests in relations with Russia were due to the West’s promotion of democracy in the Western Balkans and in the post-Soviet space, including the so-called ‘color revolutions’. Russia viewed this policy as a cover for the strategic interests of the USA, NATO and the EU and as interference in East-European countries’ internal affairs. Russia had been opposed to NATO expansion to the east since the previous decade, but had no means to prevent it during the first two post-Cold War rounds of NATO enlargement in 1999 and 2004. When, in 2008, NATO announced plans to include Ukraine and Georgia in the alliance, however, Russia was strong enough to oppose it and demonstrated its military power during the Georgian-Russian War of 2008, and then by intervening in Ukraine in 2014. As NATO reacted to this by reinforcing its eastern flank, Europe became the scene of a dangerous confrontation reminiscent of Cold War days.


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© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Political Science and International StudiesUniversity of WarsawWarsawPoland

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