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Hardware Trojans in Analog and Mixed-Signal Integrated Circuits

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Trusted Digital Circuits

Abstract

Modern designs are a mix of digital and analog circuits, and they exist in many real-life applications such as smart phones, sensors, and wireless communications. While there has been a relatively high concentration on the security of digital circuits, the security of analog and mixed-signal (AMS) integrated circuits (ICs) has not gained enough attention. This chapter studies hardware Trojan design, prevention and detection in AMS ICs, and highlights some of major challenges that demand further research.

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References

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Salmani, H. (2018). Hardware Trojans in Analog and Mixed-Signal Integrated Circuits. In: Trusted Digital Circuits. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79081-7_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79081-7_9

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-79080-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-79081-7

  • eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)

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