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Design Techniques for Hardware Trojans Prevention and Detection at the Gate Level

  • Hassan Salmani
Chapter
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Abstract

A hardware Trojan can be inserted in a gate-level netlist by a rogue designer, or it already exists in a provided gate-level netlist (e.g., a firm intellectual property) by an untrusted third-party design developer. Various techniques have been proposed to prevent hardware Trojan insertion or to detect hardware Trojans at the gate level. This chapter studies some of the major existing techniques and discusses their effectiveness.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hassan Salmani
    • 1
  1. 1.EECS DepartmentHoward UniversityWashington, DCUSA

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