Circuit Vulnerabilities to Hardware Trojans at the Gate Level

  • Hassan Salmani


A gate-level netlist is a description of the connectivity of a circuit. To meet design constraints such as time to market and product cost, gate-level netlists as firm IPs are commonly used for complex circuits implementation. Meanwhile, not all entities providing gate-level netlists are trusted and they may modify expected circuit functionality or use unused portions of a circuit to realize a hardware Trojan. Therefore, there is a serious demand to gate-level vulnerability analyses and security metrics to determine hard-to-detect areas in a circuit that would most probably be used for hardware Trojan implementation to ensure the hardware Trojan goes undetected during production test and extensive functional test analyses.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hassan Salmani
    • 1
  1. 1.EECS DepartmentHoward UniversityWashington, DCUSA

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