Circuit Vulnerabilities to Hardware Trojans at the Register-Transfer Level

  • Hassan Salmani


Realized by modifying design implementation, hardware Trojans can interfere with any step of the design process. A hardware Trojan may undermine a system’s confidentiality by leaking secret information or can abrogate system availability by performing a malfunction. Soft third-party intellectual properties (IPs) are extensively used in high-level implementation, and they are highly vulnerable to hardware Trojan insertion. Therefore, there is a need for systematic approaches to assess vulnerabilities of a circuit to hardware Trojan insertion and to identify potential hardware Trojan locations at the register-transfer level.


Hardware Trojan Register Transfer Level Weight Values Range High Hardness Conditions Condition Stack 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hassan Salmani
    • 1
  1. 1.EECS DepartmentHoward UniversityWashington, DCUSA

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