Abstract
In this paper I seek to explore how the idea of modus vivendi might help us to understand political legitimacy. A suitable conception of modus vivendi, I suggest, can represent a way of underpinning a viable and attractive account of political legitimacy. On my account a modus vivendi is basically a set of arrangements that are accepted as basis for conducting affairs by those who are party to them. Political legitimacy, I argue, is ultimately rooted in the judgements of those subject to it, but is mediated through a language in which claims to it are argued and assessed. The thought is that the web of operative beliefs and values in any given society, which constitute the grounds of judgements about political legitimacy, are what sustains a modus vivendi around the basic political institutions and practices. On this view, legitimate political institutions and practices incline towards a modus vivendi in that they are the outcome of an historical and ongoing conglomeration of settlements reflecting shifting and conflicting values and interests, as well relative balances of power, both currently and in the past. The marriage of modus vivendi and political legitimacy, therefore, seeks to reflect the contingent and ‘negotiated’ character of basic political institutions and practices and an understanding of political legitimacy that sees it as mediated through an ongoing and emergent discourse of argument and judgement, which remains nonetheless always vulnerable to challenge and change.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
As Patrick Neal has rightly observed, initially, the ‘modus vivendi model of liberalism is the creation of its critics, and it was created for the purpose of allowing them to explain what they are not’ (Neal 1997: 191). It is also worth noting that some theorists who find a place for modus vivendi in their work think that there need be no tension with ideal theory because they play different roles, e.g. Wendt (2016) and Wall (2018).
- 3.
It should of course be acknowledged that there are a few theorists who have made serious attempts to develop a fuller account of modus vivendi, most importantly, perhaps, John Gray (2000) and David McCabe (2010). In a nutshell, I principally differ from both in not wanting to tie my account of modus vivendi to a theory of value pluralism and also from McCabe (and perhaps Gray) in not wanting to claim it to be liberal in any meaningful sense. I have, however, learnt a good deal, although probably not enough, from them both.
- 4.
To be clear, I conceive of modus vivendi and political legitimacy as distinct ideas. The project is to try to show how they can mutually inform each other.
- 5.
Much though I admire his work, I fear that Gray (2000) is partly responsible for some confusion on this. Although his book supposedly supports the claim that there are two faces of liberalism, one of which he believes defensible and the other not, he often writes as if he is criticising the claims of liberalism tout court, which is further exacerbated by his vagueness about the specifically liberal credentials of the form that he is supposedly defending.
- 6.
Bernard Williams (2005) at least hints at the idea that only a liberal regime could be legitimate under the conditions of modernity. If that is indeed his view then I am sceptical about such a claim (although much will depend upon exactly what is meant by conditions of modernity).
- 7.
Modus vivendi theorists, therefore, typically depart from agonistic theorists such as Chantal Mouffe (2005) in refusing to valorise political conflict. For modus vivendi theorists conflict is pretty much the order of the day in political life, but also always a potential source of threat to political order and security that therefore needs to be ameliorated.
- 8.
I use this Latin tag partly because it already has some currency in the literature, but also to avoid possible misunderstanding. I would be perfectly happy with the more mundane ‘compromise’, but for the fact that some political theorists have wanted to make a sharp distinction between a compromise and a bargain. However exactly that distinction is made, though, the conception of modus vivendi with which I am concerned incorporates both.
- 9.
The line between the two can be vague and imprecise. It is not always clear what will count as a basic institution or practice.
- 10.
This thought is perhaps well-captured by Thomas Fossen’s suggestion that a modus vivendi is ultimately rooted in the question of what can I live with (Fossen 2018).
- 11.
The use of the terms ‘peace and security’ is, it should be mentioned, far from unproblematic. First, their meaning is not precise, and they can to some extent be differently interpreted. Secondly, in respect of their being scalar, they are always a matter of a degree, and there will be room for differences between people about how much is ‘sufficient’ for political purposes. Thirdly, the focus on these values can lead one to think that these are the only values that matter; they are not. But they do have a kind of political primacy in that some measure of them is the precondition for the realisation of almost all other political values. It does not follow, though, that more peace and security is always preferable to the realisation of other values.
- 12.
For a different approach, which focuses on the boundaries of a morally legitimate modus vivendi, see Wendt (2016).
- 13.
Enzo Rossi (2010) has some interesting things to say about this, but he is specifically concerned with the relationship between modus vivendi and liberalism, and in particular the liberal principle of political justification, according to which the basic political structure should be reasonably acceptable (not accepted) to all those who are subject to it. As I am not concerned to relate modus vivendi with liberalism in this way, I need not be at all worried by his conclusion that ‘the idea of modus vivendi does not offer a viable internal corrective for consensus-based accounts of the foundations of liberalism’ (Rossi 2010: 22). However, while I can happily welcome the decoupling of modus vivendi from liberalism, and in this regard view Rossi as an ally, this does not mean that some of the points he raises are not pertinent to the enquiry I am engaged in, and to which I cannot claim to have done full justice here.
- 14.
This section is essentially a very slightly reformulated account of political legitimacy set out in Horton (2010b).
- 15.
While contestation about some of the criteria of legitimacy within a given political community is often ongoing, even such contestation takes place in a context of intelligible disputes about what is contested. That is, not just anything will count as a serious criterion for political legitimacy in any particular context.
- 16.
I have discussed Winch’s views on political authority more fully in Horton (2005). My account is much indebted to his.
- 17.
The Basic Legitimation demand arises when ‘A coerces B and claims that B would be wrong to fight back: resents it, forbids it, rallies others to oppose it as wrong’, because in so doing, ‘A claims that his actions transcend the conditions of warfare, and this gives rise to a demand of justification of what A does’ (Williams 2005: 6).
References
Beetham, D. (1991). The legitimation of power. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Erman, E., & Moller, N. (2015). Political legitimacy in the Real Normative World: The priority of morality and the autonomy of the political. British Journal of Political Science, 45, 215–233.
Fossen, T. (2018). Modus Vivendi beyond the social contract: Peace, justice, and survival in realist political theory. In J. Horton, M. Westphal, & U. Willems (Eds.), The political theory of Modus Vivendi. Cham: Springer.
Freeden, M. (2012). Editorial: Interpretative realism and prescriptive realism. Journal of Political Ideologies, 17, 1–11.
Galston, W. A. (2010). Realism in political theory. European Journal of Political Theory, 9, 385–411.
Gaus, G. F. (2003). Contemporary theories of liberalism. London: Sage.
Geuss, R. (2008). Philosophy and real politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gray, J. (2000). Two faces of liberalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hall, E. (2015). Bernard Williams and the basic legitimation demand: A defence. Political Studies, 63, 266–480.
Horton, J. (2005). Peter Winch and political authority. Philosophical Investigations, 28, 235–252.
Horton, J. (2006). John Gray and the political theory of Modus Vivendi. Critical review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 9, 155–169.
Horton, J. (2010a). Modus Vivendi and religious conflict. In M. Mookherjee (Ed.), Democracy, religious pluralism and the liberal dilemma of accommodation (pp. 121–136). Dordrecht: Springer.
Horton, J. (2010b). Realism, liberal moralism and a political theory of Modus Vivendi. European Journal of Political Theory, 9, 431–448.
Horton, J. (2012). Political legitimacy, justice and consent. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 15, 129–148.
Horton, J. (2017). What might it mean for political theory to be more realistic? Philosophia, 45(2), 487–501.
Hume, D. (1987). Of the original contract. In D. Hume (Ed.), Essays: Moral, political and legal (pp. 465–487). Indianapolis: Liberty Classics.
Larmore, C. (1990). Political liberalism. Political Theory, 18, 339–360.
McCabe, D. (2010). Modus Vivendi liberalism: Theory and practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mouffe, C. (2005). On the political. London: Routledge.
Neal, P. (1997). Liberalism and its discontents. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Newey, G. (2001). After politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Pettit, P. (2012). On the people’s terms: A republican theory and model of democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rawls, J. (1993). Political liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rawls, J. (1999). The law of peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rossi, E. (2010). Modus Vivendi, consensus and (realist) liberal legitimacy. Public Reason, 2, 21–39.
Rossi, E., & Sleat, M. (2014). Realism in normative political theory. Philosophy Compass, 9, 689–701.
Schaar, J. H. (1969). Legitimacy and the Modern State. In P. Green & S. Levinson (Eds.), Power and community (pp. 276–327). New York: Random House.
Sleat, M. (2014). Legitimacy in realist thought: Between moralism and realpolitik. Political Theory, 42, 314–337.
Wall, S. (2018). Liberal moralism and Modus Vivendi Politics. In J. Horton, M. Westphal, & U. Willems (Eds.), The political theory of Modus Vivendi. Cham: Springer.
Wendt, F. (2016). Compromise, peace and public justification: Political morality beyond justice. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Westphal, M. (2018). Institutions of Modus Vivendi politics. In J. Horton, M. Westphal, & U. Willems (Eds.), The political theory of Modus Vivendi. Cham: Springer.
Williams, B. (2005). In the beginning was the deed. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Winch, P. (1991). Certainty and authority. In A. Phillips Griffiths (Ed.), Wittgenstein centenary essays (pp. 223–237). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Acknowledgements
Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at a MANCEPT seminar in April 2015 at the University of Manchester and at ‘The Political Theory of Modus Vivendi’ conference held at Münster University in July 2015. I am most grateful to the audiences on both occasions for their patience with my tentativeness and their useful and constructive comments and questions. I am also especially indebted to Steph Collins and Fabian Wendt for helpful further discussions and to Thomas Fossen and Manon Westphal for their invaluable written comments, to most of which I should admit that I have as yet been unable to respond at all adequately.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Horton, J. (2019). Modus Vivendi and Political Legitimacy. In: Horton, J., Westphal, M., Willems, U. (eds) The Political Theory of Modus Vivendi. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79078-7_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79078-7_8
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-79077-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-79078-7
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)