Abstract
There have been four main motives to introduce the notion of modus vivendi in the political-philosophical literature. One is to use it as a negative contrast to what one regards as the ideal goal in politics. The second is to use it within a distinctively realist political theory that refrains from advocating utopian ideals. The third is to defend liberal institutions as a modus vivendi. The fourth is to have a concept for the institutional tools for peace. Depending on the motive to introduce the notion of modus vivendi, the notion is conceptualized slightly differently. One aim of the chapter is to provide an overview of the different motives that have led theorists to think about modus vivendi and the different conceptualizations of modus vivendi they have offered. But the chapter also makes a more substantial point: it argues that we should conceptualize the notion of modus vivendi in line with the fourth motive, because this seems the most promising way to get a conception of modus vivendi that is both “deeply motivated” and “open” for all kinds of approaches in political theory.
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Notes
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One may well argue that an overlapping consensus could at best be a consensus to adhere to a conception of justice from within the family of political conceptions of justice (Wendt 2016a, pp. 140–141), since Rawls emphasizes that his favorite conception of justice, “justice as fairness,” is only an example of a political conception ( 1993/1996, pp. xlviii–xlix, 223, 226; 1997, pp. 770, 774–775).
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Rawls suggests that the overlapping consensus also plays a justificatory role: it is required for the “full justification” of a political conception of justice (1993/1996, pp. 386–387). But this leads to problems one can easily avoid by limiting the overlapping consensus to its unity and stability providing function (see Quong 2011, pp. 166–169).
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In the section that follows this definition of modus vivendi, he suggests that there are regimes that are worse than congruently justified regimes but still better than modus vivendi regimes, namely, regimes where only one of the three components that define congruently justified regimes (first-personal reasons, second-personal reasons, internalization) is lacking (Vallier 2015, p. 221). I here stick to the above definition (according to which these regimes would also be classified as modus vivendi regimes).
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Horton argues that a political theory of modus vivendi should not be based on a commitment to value pluralism (2006, pp. 159–161, 167).
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To see peace as the main goal in politics is a Hobbesian idea, of course (see Hobbes 1651/1996, pp. 111, 114).
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See also Wall’s contribution (2018).
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That they are established as the subject of a compromise—or a hypothetical compromise—is arguably not necessary for making them a modus vivendi. Modus vivendi institutions can also be imposed, for example, after a war.
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This is how I conceive it in Wendt (2016a, p. 81).
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In theorizing modus vivendi arrangements, so understood, one can both ask empirical questions about the conditions that make modus vivendi arrangements work and normative questions about people’s duties in establishing and maintaining modus vivendi arrangements.
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On the idea of non-specific instrumental value, see Carter (1999, p. 44).
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It is true that sometimes a country may be able to enrich itself by invading another country, but this usually works just in case that peace is achieved soon thereafter.
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Elsewhere I argue that modus vivendi arrangements can differ in their moral standing, depending on how close they come to the morally best arrangement, on whether they are publicly justifiable, and on their stability (Wendt 2016c).
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In an earlier paper I suggest at one point that theorizing modus vivendi could be motivated as the search for a realist consent theory of legitimacy (Wendt 2013, p. 575). I now think that there is not much of a connection between modus vivendi and legitimacy (2016a, p. 244, 2016b, p. 245) and that realist theories of legitimacy are unconvincing (2016b).
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Even realists can meaningfully compare different modus vivendi arrangements (see Wendt 2016c). They may differ in their standards of comparison, compared to non-realists, but they can (and should) be willing to say that some modus vivendi arrangements are worse than others and that some are so much worse than feasible alternatives that they would be illegitimate if installed.
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On motives to support modus vivendi arrangements, see also Schweitzer’s contribution (2018).
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Acknowledgments
I presented this chapter at the World Congress of Political Science in Poznań in July 2016. I thank all participants for the discussion, I thank John Horton for his helpful commentary in Poznań, and I thank John Horton, Matt Sleat, and Manon Westphal for helpful written comments.
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Wendt, F. (2019). Why Theorize Modus Vivendi?. In: Horton, J., Westphal, M., Willems, U. (eds) The Political Theory of Modus Vivendi. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79078-7_2
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