Abstract
Campbell identifies the problem with claiming that hedonism constitutes the spirit of modern consumerism, which is how could that section of English society who inherited Weber’s Protestant ethic turn into modern consumers motivated by pleasure-seeking? Campbell does not refute the Weber’s thesis, but outlines how teachings evolved after Calvin, first as the Arminian revolt and then under the influence of the Cambridge Platonists. Campbell also identifies a different Calvinist ethic from that described by Weber, showing how the Puritans needed to identify signs of saving grace in order to determine membership of the true church; the doctrine of signs that solved this problem centering on the distinctive pattern of emotional experience that indicated receipt of saving grace. It was this feature of Calvinism, with its emphasis on the importance of experiencing sadness and melancholy, which when linked to the theology of benevolence, led to its evolution into Sentimentalism.
It is hard to distinguish between a Sentimentalist and a Calvinist who believes himself saved.
John W. Draper
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Notes
- 1.
See the discussion on pp. 28–35.
- 2.
Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (London: Unwin University Books, 1930), p. 74.
- 3.
To which one can add the even more intriguing question of how it was possible for these two processes to be occurring at approximately the same time, and in connection with the same critical class of culture carriers.
- 4.
Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 53.
- 5.
Ibid., p. 119.
- 6.
Ibid., p. 166.
- 7.
Ibid., p. 167.
- 8.
Ibid.
- 9.
Ibid., p. 263.
- 10.
Ibid., p. 168.
- 11.
Ibid., p. 275.
- 12.
Samuel Eliot Morison, The Intellectual Life of Colonial New England (Ithaca, NY: Great Seal Books, 1960) p. 10.
- 13.
John Carroll, Puritan, Paranoid, Remissive: A Sociology of Modern Culture (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 6.
- 14.
Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 169.
- 15.
Ibid., p. 274. This marked hostility to all decorative intent in clothing makes it especially difficult to understand the enthusiasm for fashion that gripped the middle classes in the eighteenth century.
- 16.
Ibid., p. 171.
- 17.
Ibid.
- 18.
Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. James Hastings (1908), s.v. ‘Puritanism’, by H. G. Wood (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1908).
- 19.
Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 171–2.
It becomes important, as we shall see, to be able to assess the relative extent to which Puritanism condemned opulence as opposed to voluptuousness, that is to say, comfort-luxury as contrasted with pleasure-luxury; for although, in its initial stages as a reforming movement these were not only both condemned but also closely associated, as Calvinist teachings lost their grip on the population, currents of thought emerge which differentially evaluate these ‘evils’. Many writers have taken it for granted that Puritan thought led to a tendency for pleasure to be regarded as a greater evil than excessive comfort (see Tibor Scitovsky, The Joyless Economy: An Inquiry into Human Satisfaction and Consumer Dissatisfaction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 205–6) but contrary currents of thought existed, outlasting the religious framework of ideas which gave rise to them.
- 20.
For a summary discussion of this controversy, see Gordon Marshall, In Search of the Spirit of Capitalism: An Essay on Max Weber’s Protestant Ethic Thesis (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1982), pp. 82–96.
- 21.
Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 259.
- 22.
Ibid., p. 252.
- 23.
Even, in places, references to teachings such as predestination that persisted. See the mention of A. Kohler’s study on p. 226.
- 24.
The primary source for this argument is Elie Halevy, The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism, new edn (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1955); but see also Basil Willey, The Eighteenth Century Background Studies on the Idea of Nature in the Thought of the Period (London: Chatto and Windus, 1961), pp. 10–11.
- 25.
The term ‘theodicy’ appears to have been coined by Leibniz in the 1690s to refer to the defence of God against charges brought about by a consideration of both moral and natural evil (see Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal ideas, ed. Philip P. Wiener, s.v. ‘Theodicy’, by Leroy E. Leomker, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1968). It rapidly came to be used in a somewhat broader sense to mean the study of the compatibility of the idea of God with the existence of evil, and, more generally still, as a synonym for philosophical theology. Weber keeps fairly close to the original meaning, and it is especially puzzling, therefore, that there is no reference to Leibniz in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, or in any of his monographs on the world religions.
- 26.
There are several dimensions to this problem of theodicy. There is, first of all, the general issue of natural evil and the difficulty of reconciling this with the idea of an omnipotent benevolent god. Secondly, there is the problem of explaining the individual distribution of this evil between persons; why should it be, for example, that some suffer more than others. Thirdly, and lastly, there is the associated question of socially structured inequalities and injustices and what kind of supernatural justification can be assumed to legitimate them. These three dimensions may, for convenience, be dubbed the philosophical, moral and ideological aspects of the single problem of theodicy. The focus of this discussion is on the first two of these, as it tends to be in Weber’s writings. For a consideration of the third dimension, see Bryan Turner, For Weber (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 142–76.
- 27.
Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, trans. Ephriam Fischoff, Introduction by Talcott Parsons (London: Methuen, 1965), p. 139.
- 28.
Ibid.
- 29.
Ibid., p. 143.
- 30.
Ibid., p. 144.
- 31.
Ibid., p. 147.
- 32.
John Hick, Evil and the Love of God (London: Macmillan, 1966).
- 33.
Weber, Sociology of Religion, p. 144.
- 34.
It might be argued that Weber did not discuss the later, more deistical, versions of Protestantism because they did not conform to his conception of a ‘salvation religion’, but, on the contrary, tended to eliminate the need for salvation through their acceptance of this world as ‘good’. Even if this argument were to be accepted, however (and, in fact, the concept of salvation was retranslated rather than eliminated), the problem of theodicy remains.
- 35.
The only one of these writers to be cited more than once by Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is Pascal. Neither Spinoza nor Leibniz is mentioned, whilst there is one intriguing reference to Kant, where it is suggested that ‘many of his formulations concerning ethics are closely related to ideas of ascetic Protestantism’ (p. 270).
- 36.
Gerald R. Cragg, From Puritanism to the Age of Reason: A Study of Changes in Religious Thought within the Church of England 1660–1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), p. 13.
- 37.
As Cragg observes, Calvinism failed to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the English people, alienating them with ‘its reckless lack of moderation and undisciplined exuberance’ (Ibid., p. 31).
- 38.
John Tulloch, Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century, 2 vols (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1874), vol. 1, pp. 8–9.
- 39.
For a discussion of these issues see D. P. Walker, The Decline of Hell: Seventeenth-Century Discussions of Eternal Torment (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964).
- 40.
Gerald R. Cragg, The Church and the Age of Reason 1648–1789 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1962), p. 144.
- 41.
Tulloch, Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy, p. 25.
- 42.
Ibid., p. 31.
- 43.
There has naturally been some difference of opinion over who should rightly be deemed members of this group but Benjamin Whichcote, John Smith, Ralph Cudworth and Henry More appear in nearly everyone’s list.
- 44.
Gerald R. Cragg, The Cambridge Platonists (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. vii.
- 45.
Tulloch, Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy, p. 31.
- 46.
Cragg, The Cambridge Platonists, p. 8.
- 47.
Bredvold rather charmingly describes the Cambridge Platonists as ‘those gentle and modest divines whose gracious charitableness and humanity are a refreshment to the weary scholar who comes upon them’ (see Louis I. Bredvold, The Natural History of Sensibility (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1962), p. 8).
- 48.
Cragg, The Cambridge Platonists, p. 10.
- 49.
Ernst Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in England, trans. James P. Pettegrove (New York: Gordian Press, 1970), p. 81.
- 50.
Tillotson, quoted by Cragg, From Puritanism to the Age of Reason, p. 34.
- 51.
Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance, p. 82.
- 52.
R. S. Crane, ‘Suggestions toward a Genealogy of the “Man of Feeling”’, A Journal of English Literary History, 1 (1934), republished in R. S. Crane, The Idea of the Humanities and other Essays Critical and Historical (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), vol. 1, pp. 188–213, see esp. p. 189.
- 53.
From Ward’s Life of More, quoted in Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance, p. 81.
- 54.
See Cragg, The Cambridge Platonists, p. 10.
- 55.
The popular image of the Puritans as individuals who were hostile to the arts and classical learning is a distortion. As Dowden observes, the Puritan gentleman could well be ‘a scholar, a lover of music, a lover of letters’, and he points out that Cromwell’s chaplain, Peter Sterry, was a lover of the works of Titian and Van Dyke, whilst Milton’s father composed madrigals and encouraged his son to read the poets of Greece and Rome (see Edward Dowden, Puritan and Anglican: Studies in Literature (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1910), p. 21). Morison also notes, of the Puritans in New England, that although they proscribed the theatre, they actually stimulated an interest in ‘the classics, belles-lettres, poetry and scientific research’ (Morison, The Intellectual Life of New England, p. 4). This is not to say, however, that they were prepared to accept classical writers as authoritative sources in theological matters. As Weber notes, Calvin was deeply distrustful of Aristotle and classical philosophy in general, as too was Luther in his early years, whilst the Westminster Confession incorporated the doctrine that everything necessary for salvation was contained in the Scriptures (Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 244).
- 56.
Cragg, The Cambridge Platonists, p. 15.
- 57.
Basil Willey, The English Moralists (London: Chatto and Windus, 1964), p. 172.
- 58.
Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance, p. 38.
- 59.
Ibid., p. 83.
- 60.
Willey, The English Moralists, p. 183.
- 61.
G. Macdonald Ross, Leibniz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 103.
- 62.
It is of interest that, in the course of this discussion, Leibniz attacks Calvinist predestination and enters into the Supralapsarian versus Infralapsarian debate on the Arminian side.
- 63.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Theodicy, trans. E. M. Hughes from C. J. Gerhardt’s edition 1875–90, edited, abridged and with an introduction by Diogenes Allen (Don Mills, Ontario: J. M. Dent, 1966), p. 35.
- 64.
Referred to by Diogenes Allen, ibid., p. 16.
- 65.
Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 52–64. Diogenes Allen feels that there is little support for Lovejoy’s claim, arguing that Leibniz ‘does not need and does not use the idea of a great chain of being’ (Theodicy, p. xix).
- 66.
This possibility only exists if one accepts Lovejoy’s claim concerning the centrality of the idea of the Great Chain of Being, which could, at a pinch, be regarded as a ‘frozen’ version of the doctrine of karma.
- 67.
Weber did note that ‘a religion of predestination obliterates the goodness of god’, but he did not explore the consequences of this fact for the development of Protestantism (Weber, Sociology of Religion, p. 202).
- 68.
Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance, p. 50. See also the references cited on p. 249 above.
- 69.
Willey, The English Moralists, pp. 174–82.
- 70.
Ibid., p. 179.
- 71.
Leviathan, cited by Crane, ‘Suggestions toward a Genealogy’, p. 205.
- 72.
Ibid., p. 206.
- 73.
Ibid., p. 207.
- 74.
Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 232.
- 75.
See Crane, ‘Suggestions toward a Genealogy’, p. 200.
- 76.
See, for a discussion of the role of Enlightenment ideas upon the rise of irreligion and unbelief, Franklin L. Baumer, Religion and the Rise of Scepticism (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1960). For the nineteenth and twentieth centuries see Colin Campbell, Toward a Sociology of Irreligion (London: Macmillan, 1971), chapter 3.
- 77.
Arthur O. Lovejoy, Essays in the History of Ideas (New York: George Braziller, 1955), pp. 82–6.
- 78.
The change in religious thought brought about by the Enlightenment went much deeper than this, constituting a virtual paradigmatic revolution in Thomas Kuhn’s terms – see Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). Lovejoy has outlined how the general world-view that we associate with the Enlightenment can be understood as derived from one of the two fundamental strains in Platonic thought. These he dubs ‘otherworldliness’ and ‘thisworldliness’, meaning by the former an assumption that the world of sense is in some way unreal, and that true reality and goodness exist only in another, ‘ideal’, realm; whilst by the latter he means the acceptance of the world of sense as truly real in its own right (Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, pp. 26–8). It was the former, ‘otherworldly’ strand, which, he claims, dominated Christian and Western thought up to the eighteenth century, but that at this point, the rejection of Christian theology based on revelation coincided with a switch of emphasis to the other, ‘thisworldly’, one. This contrast of Lovejoy’s, and indeed the very terminology he employs, suggests some comparison with Weber’s analysis of the world’s religions (even though there is an obvious contrast in usage). Central to this latter discussion is the fundamentally contrasting conception of the relationship between the world of empirical reality and the divine that mark occidental and oriental religions. Predominant in the West is the concept of a transcendental omnipotent god, implying, ‘the utterly subordinate and creaturely character of the world created by him out of nothing’ (Weber, Sociology of Religion, p. 178). Such a view tends, as Weber emphasizes, to rule out any real possibility of religion taking the path of self-deification or any ‘genuinely mystical subjective possession of god … because this appeared to be a blasphemous deification of a mere created thing’ (ibid.). In the East, however, the world of sense was not regarded as a special creation, but merely as ‘something presented to man’, something which has been in the nature of things from all eternity, and this concept of a real empirical world was not abandoned as in the West but taken as the starting point for ‘insight into the ultimate consequences of the karma chain of causality, to illumination, and hence to a unity of knowledge and action’ (ibid., p. 179). As Weber comments, ‘this way remained forever closed to every religion that faced the absolute paradox of a perfect god’s creation of a permanently imperfect world’ (ibid.). Now this would appear to be the very distinction which the Enlightenment revolution in thought reversed, as Lovejoy suggests, with Leibniz’s theodicy having the unintended effect of making the world seem ‘near-perfect’ and thus making self-deification, pantheism and forms of mysticism, real possibilities in Western culture.
- 79.
The thinkers of the Enlightenment were greatly influenced in this respect by the views of such classical writers as Plato and Aristotle, whom they considered to be less prejudiced than modern men because their judgements were less overlaid by history and custom.
- 80.
Crane, ‘Suggestions toward a Genealogy’, p. 193.
- 81.
Willey, The English Moralists, p. 217.
- 82.
Crane, ‘Suggestions toward a Genealogy’, p. 194.
- 83.
It was also argued that the mere contemplation of God’s goodness would move a man to charitable feelings, and that if it did not, then there was little hope of such a person experiencing any benevolent feelings. As Barrow expressed it, ‘what can we esteem, what can we love, if so admirable goodness does not affect us? How prodigiously cold and hard is that heart, which cannot be warmed and softened into affection by so melting a consideration?’ (See Isaac Barrow, The Works of the Learned Isaac Barrow … being all his English Works; published by his Grace Dr. John Tillotson, late Archbishop of Canterbury, 5th edn, 3 vols (in 2) (London: A. Miller, 1741), vol. 3, pp. 299–300).
- 84.
Ibid., p. 195.
- 85.
Ibid., pp. 206–7.
- 86.
Ibid.
- 87.
Ibid., p. 211.
- 88.
Quoted by Crane, ‘Suggestions toward a Genealogy’, p. 211.
- 89.
Ibid., p. 212.
- 90.
Although this discussion is focused upon currents of thought which were essentially English in character, it is important to recognize the important contribution made to the developments under consideration by thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment. Apart from the very obvious influence of Hume and Adam Smith, men such as Francis Hutcheson, Dugald Steward, Adam Ferguson, Lord Kames and Lord Monboddo all contributed significantly to the intellectual debates of the period. See Louis Schneider, The Scottish Moralists: On Human Nature and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), and Gladys Bryson, The Scottish Inquiry of the Eighteenth Century (New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1968).
- 91.
Quoted by Crane, ‘Suggestions toward a Genealogy’, p. 188.
- 92.
Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 119.
- 93.
Ibid., p. 104.
- 94.
As Weber notes, ‘Calvin viewed all pure feelings and emotions, no matter how exalted they might seem to be, with suspicion.’
- 95.
William Haller, The Rise of Puritanism, or the Way to the New Jerusalem as set forth in Pulpit and Press from Thomas Cartwright to John Lilburne and John Milton, 1570–1643 (New York: Harper Bros., 1957), pp. 84–5.
- 96.
Ibid., p. 27.
- 97.
Ibid.
- 98.
One only needs to read Pilgrim’s Progress, or, perhaps better still, John Bunyan’s largely autobiographical Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners to realize something of the frequent and violent passions that could beset the Puritan.
- 99.
Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 261.
- 100.
Quoted by Amy Louise Reed, The Background of Gray’s Elegy: A Study in the Taste for Melancholy Poetry 1700–1751 (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962), p. 12.
- 101.
Gordon Rattray Taylor, The Angel-Makers: A Study in the Psychological Origins of Historical Change 1750–1850 (London: Heinemann, 1958), p. 117.
- 102.
Charles Wesley illustrates these attitudes in the lines: ‘Ah, lovely Appearance of Death / No Sight upon Earth is so fair’, and ‘Pain, my old companion, Pain / Seldom parted from my Side / Welcome to thy Seat again / Here, if GOD permits, abide’ (quoted by Rattray Taylor, Ibid., p. 119).
- 103.
Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 110.
- 104.
Ibid., p. 111.
- 105.
Ibid., p. 112.
- 106.
Ibid., pp. 113–14.
- 107.
Ibid., pp. 115.
- 108.
Weber links the idea of the religious believer as a ‘vessel of the Holy Spirit’ with a preoccupation with the inward mystical and personal experience of God’s grace, whilst the idea of the religious believer as a tool of the divine will is associated with concentration upon an outward, sober, responsible ethic of works. Lutheranism is then seen as embodying the former model and Calvinism the latter. Even within Calvinism, however, certainty that one possessed saving grace was never, in practice, assessed by the individual on the basis of external criteria alone, but was recognized as involving a distinctive subjective state.
- 109.
John Bunyan, The Pilgrims [sic] Progress, From this World to that which is to come (London: George Virtue, 1848), p. 35.
- 110.
It is important to recognize the different role which emotional sensibility had within Calvinism compared with the more pietistic and mystical forms of Protestantism. Whereas in the latter, intense emotional states were primarily the means of attaining experience of, or union with, God, in the former emotionality is critically merely a sign of one’s elect status.
- 111.
Edmund S. Morgan, Visible Saints: The History of a Puritan Idea (New York: New York University Press, 1963), p. 34.
- 112.
Herbert Wallace Schneider, The Puritan Mind (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1958), p. 20.
- 113.
Weber does refer, in his discussion of Pietism, to the practice of attempting to assess the subjective state of grace of a believer, but he does not seem to consider this to be an important ingredient in any developing doctrine of signs (Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 244).
- 114.
Morgan, Visible Saints, p. 67.
- 115.
Ibid., p. 72.
- 116.
Ibid., p. 89.
- 117.
Ibid., p. 91.
- 118.
Ibid., p. 70.
- 119.
Haller, The Rise of Puritanism, p. 88.
- 120.
Ibid., p. 92.
- 121.
Ibid., pp. 95–6.
- 122.
Ibid., p. 115.
Interestingly, in view of Weber’s remarks on the consequences of the abolition of the confessional for the development of a Protestant ethic (see The Protestant Ethic, pp. 106 and 124), Haller suggests that the Puritan habit of committing the details of all sins to paper served the same psychological function ‘as that of auricular confession’; that is to say, having balanced his spiritual books, the Puritan could go to bed with a good conscience (see Haller, The Rise of Puritanism, p. 100).
- 123.
Haller, The Rise of Puritanism, pp. 90–1.
- 124.
There was a natural tendency for signs of the experience of saving grace to be associated in the popular mind with extraordinary and intense emotional experiences, especially of a hysterical nature, with the consequence that screaming, fainting and manifesting convulsions were commonly considered proof of the gift of grace. The Puritan divines had to issue repeated warnings against these erroneous beliefs (see Schneider, The Puritan Mind, pp. 124–5). The prevalence of these unorthodox ideas indicates something of the widespread need for a clear doctrine of signs, and of the difficulty in distinguishing ‘true’ from ‘false’ symptoms of saving grace. In fact, the former were meant to be ‘gracious affections’ rather than intense forms of emotional expression, something that was important for the development of a sentimental theology.
- 125.
John W. Draper, The Funeral Elegy and the Rise of English Romanticism (London: Frank Cass, 1929, repr. 1967), p. 319.
- 126.
Ibid., p. 67. Draper, in fact, describes the psychological ideal of the Puritans as ‘a tumultuous and exalted depression’ (Ibid., p. 320).
- 127.
Ibid., pp. 236 and 238.
- 128.
Quoted by Hoxie Neale Fairchild, Religious Trends in English Poetry, 3 vols (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939–49), vol. 1, p. 41.
- 129.
Cragg, From Puritanism to the Age of Reason, p. 36.
- 130.
Peter Burke, Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe (London: Temple Smith, 1978), p. 257.
- 131.
Quoted by Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 175.
- 132.
Ibid., p. 174.
- 133.
Draper, The Funeral Elegy, p. 237.
- 134.
Ibid., p. 239.
- 135.
Quoted by Eleanor M. Sickels, The Gloomy Egoist: Moods and Themes of Melancholy from Gray to Keats (New York: Octagon Books, 1969), p. 150.
- 136.
Draper, The Funeral Elegy, p. 246.
- 137.
Ibid., p. 309.
- 138.
Ibid., p. 93.
- 139.
Ibid., p. 236.
- 140.
Sickels, The Gloomy Egoist, p. 157.
- 141.
Draper, The Funeral Elegy, p. 241.
- 142.
Sickels, The Gloomy Egoist, p. 157.
- 143.
Insufficient attention has been paid to this critical psychological consequence of the loss of religious conviction as far as what might be called the ‘negative’ Christian beliefs are concerned – that is, belief in the devil, sin, hell and eternal damnation. For, whilst individuals may experience great relief in being freed from the tremendous burden of fear and anxiety that such beliefs typically create, they may also experience a psychic sense of loss. This is because fear and its associated emotions of dismay, awe and terror, constitute powerful states which are experienced as intensely stimulating; consequently there is a kind of ‘pleasure’ which attends them even if the individual concerned is not fully able to appreciate this at the time. Life without such emotions can therefore come to be regarded as unexciting. The parallel here is with soldiers who have been exposed to fire in battle. Although they may sensibly prefer to remain out of the firing line, it is not uncommon for them to feel a considerable sense of loss when returned to a peacetime existence, and that loss is connected, in part, with the pleasurable intensity of living which even powerful, negative emotions can bring.
- 144.
Sickels, The Gloomy Egoist, p. 345.
- 145.
Bredvold, The Natural History of Sensibility, p. 85.
- 146.
Draper, The Funeral Elegy, p. 22.
- 147.
See p. 122 above.
- 148.
Fairchild, Religious Trends in English Poetry, vol. 1, p. 545.
- 149.
Haller, The Rise of Puritanism, pp. 89–90.
- 150.
Fairchild, Religious Trends in English Poetry, vol. 1, p. 546.
- 151.
Draper, The Funeral Elegy, p. 18.
- 152.
Fairchild, Religious Trends in English Poetry, vol. 1, p. 545. P. M. Masson has indeed claimed that Rousseau’s sentimental belief in his own innate goodness was derived from the Calvinist doctrine of election (see P. M. Masson, La Religion de J.J. Rousseau, 3 vols (Paris: Hachette, 1916), vol. 1, p. 37).
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Campbell, C. (2018). The Other Protestant Ethic. In: The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism. Cultural Sociology. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79066-4_6
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