Abstract
In this chapter the author studies the relation between norms as members of artificial reality and human actions as members of natural reality, through the logic of change developed by G.H. von Wright. The chapter contains a critical evaluation of the ontological and epistemological assumptions in Kelsen’s pure theory of law. It is argued that the ontological difference between normative and non-normative ideas has been exaggerated in the philosophy of law.
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Notes
- 1.
The close similarity between this idea and David Lewis’ conception of the ontology of possible worlds is obvious. Lewis (1987).
- 2.
Moore (1988–89), p. 872.
- 3.
Moore (1988–89), p. 881.
- 4.
Moore (1988–89), p. 882.
- 5.
See von Wright (1963), p. 28 ff.
- 6.
Hage (2015) talks about “interfacing the world of law and the outside world” and argues: “The world of law is not a goal in itself; it is meant to have impact on the ‘outside world’, the world that consists of facts which are not the result of the operation of legal rules” (p. 36). See also what he says about “bridges” from the world of law to the outside world (p. 45).
- 7.
A thoroughly performed study of Kelsen’s pure theory of law is Bindreiter (2003). Here we also find many valuable references.
- 8.
Merkl (1917).
- 9.
Kelsen (1996), p. 15.
- 10.
Kelsen (1996), p. 15.
- 11.
Kelsen (1964–65), p. 1151.
- 12.
Kelsen (1996), p. 58.
- 13.
Kelsen (1935), p. 517 ff.
- 14.
Kelsen (1960), pp. 196 f and 203 f.
References
Bindreiter U (2003) Why Grundnorm? A treatise on the implications of Kelsen’s doctrine. Springer, Berlin
Hage J (2015) The (onto)logical structure of law: a conceptual toolkit for legislators. In: Araszkiewicz M, Pleszka K (eds) Logic in the theory and practice of lawmaking. Springer, Berlin, pp 3–48
Kelsen H (1935) The pure theory of law. Law Q Rev 51:517 ff
Kelsen H (1960) Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd edn. Mohr Siebeck, Heidelberg
Kelsen H (1964–65) Professor Stone and the pure theory of law. Stanford Law Rev 17:1128–1157
Kelsen H (1996) Introduction to the problems of legal theory (trans: Litschewski Paulson B, Paulson SL). Oxford University Press, Oxford
Lewis D (1987) Counterfactuals. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Merkl AJ (1917) Das Recht im Lichte seiner Anwendung. Helwing, Hannover
Moore MS (1988–89) The interpretive turn in modern theory: a turn for the worse?. Stanford Law Rev 41:871–957
von Wright GH (1963) Norm and action. Routledge, Abingdon
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Frändberg, Å. (2018). The Place of the Normative in the Ontological Universe. In: The Legal Order. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 123. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78858-6_6
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