Skip to main content

Further Applying the Theoretical Framework

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
How and Why States Defect from Contemporary Military Coalitions
  • 151 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter first summarizes the Dutch and Canadian cases and the key analytic conclusions from both case studies. It then broadly analyses the Regional Command-South coalition and assesses whether it fits the criteria of a collapsed coalition outlined earlier in these pages. It finally turns to a variety of other cases to determine whether the analytic framework also explains continued coalition participation.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 79.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    “Afghan Policy Reveals Coalition Divisions,” Netherlands Business Forecast Report, January 1, 2010.

  2. 2.

    Ibid.

  3. 3.

    Ibid.

  4. 4.

    David Brunnstrom, “Keep Troops in Kandahar, U.S. Urges; Canada, Netherlands Asked to Reconsider Afghan Withdrawal,” Ottawa Citizen, January 28, 2010; Doug Sanders, “Dutch Government Folds over Afghan Mission; Parliament Dissolved after Coalition Parties Fail to Reach Consensus on Withdrawal of Troops from War-Torn Country,” The Globe and Mail, February 21, 2010.

  5. 5.

    Emma Alberici, “Dutch Pull out of Afghan Mission,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation Transcripts, August 2, 2010.

  6. 6.

    Sanders, 2010.

  7. 7.

    Jan Zalewski, “Dutch Troops End Four-Year Mission in Afghanistan,” Global Insight, August 2, 2010.

  8. 8.

    The contours of the Dutch backfill plan were outlined as early as 2008. “Netherlands to Recall Troops US Likely to Fill Gap,” Townsville Bulletin (Australia), July 18, 2008. The Australian government was insistent that it would not assume leadership in Uruzgan province; the United States therefore flowed more forces into the province to fill the gaps. Tony Jones, “Australia in Afghanistan for at Least Two More Years,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation Transcripts, June 23, 2010.

  9. 9.

    “Netherlands to End Mission in Kunduz,” European Union News, March 15, 2013.

  10. 10.

    Bill Graham, “Afghanistan: Some Lessons Learned, a Personal and Political Perspective,” as found in Jack Cunningham and William Maley, Australia and Canada in Afghanistan: Perspectives on a Mission (Toronto: Dundurn, 2015), p. 72.

  11. 11.

    Brunnstrom, 2010.

  12. 12.

    Olivier Schmitt, “The Reluctant Atlanticist: France’s Security and Defence Policy in a Transatlantic Context,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 4 (2017), p. 463–474. See also: Tom Lansford, “Whither Lafayette? French Military Policy and the American Campaign in Afghanistan,” European Security 11, no. 3 (2002), p. 129.

  13. 13.

    See also Alastair Cameron and Jean-Pierre Maulny, “France’s NATO Reintegration: Fresh Views with the Sarkozy Presidency?,” in Occasional Paper, ed. Alexis Crow (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2009), p. 4.

  14. 14.

    It is not a coincidence that France’s reintegration into NATO’s command structures was announced nearly concurrently with its decision to send a battalion task force to Kapisa province. Interview with former European and NATO Policy (US DOD) Official, Washington, DC, March 13, 2017; Nicolas Fescharek, “France: Vigilant Pragmatism in Afghanistan,” in Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan: The Politics of Alliance, ed. Gale A. Mattox and Stephen M. Grenier (Stanford University Press, 2015), pp. 131, 134; Ronald Hatto, “French Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion, and the War in Afghanistan,” in Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War, ed. Beatrice De Graaf, George Dimitriu, and Jens Ringsmose (Routledge, 2015), p. 168.

  15. 15.

    Olivier Schmitt, “Afghanistan (2001–2014): Evolving Utility,” in Dans La Peau D’un Pilote De Chasse: Le Spleen De L’homme-Machine, ed. Caroline Moricot and Gérard Dubey (Presses Universitaires de France, 2016), p. 221.

  16. 16.

    Joshua Foust, “How France Lost Afghanistan,” Need to Know on PBS, June 15, 2015.

  17. 17.

    Jereme Ghez and F. Stephen Larrabee, “France and NATO,” Survival 51, no. 2 (2009), p. 85; Hatto.

  18. 18.

    Patrick Wintour, “David Cameron Warns François Hollande against Early Afghanistan Exit,” The Guardian, May 17, 2012.

  19. 19.

    Mirwais Harooni, “Hollande Defends Early Afghan Pullout,” Reuters, May 25, 2012.

  20. 20.

    Ibid. “Billet” is a term referring to a specified position within a military organization.

  21. 21.

    Janene Pieters, “Netherlands Cyclists Most Likely in EU to Be Hurt in Traffic,” Netherlands Times, April 12, 2016. This is not to dismiss the sacrifices that each country made during ISAF, but rather to highlight differences in risk perceptions and tolerances.

  22. 22.

    Rebecca Gill Chavez, “El Salvador: Exporting Security in the National Interest,” in Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan: The Politics of Alliance, ed. Gale A. Mattox and Stephen M. Grenier (Stanford University Press, 2015), p. 85.

  23. 23.

    The dataset compiled for and informing this research captures coalition participation through 2012.

  24. 24.

    North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The Kosovo Air Campaign (Archived): Operation Allied Force,” News Release, April 7, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49602.htm. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49602.htm.

  25. 25.

    Karl P. Mueller, “Examining the Air Campaign in Libya,” in Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War, ed. Karl P. Mueller (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), p. 2.

  26. 26.

    McInnis, 2015.

  27. 27.

    Lidwien Kapteijns, “Test-Firing the ‘New World Order’ in Somalia: The US/UN Military Humanitarian Intervention of 1992–1995,” Journal of Genocidal Research 15, no. 4 (2013).

  28. 28.

    Indeed, Italy’s defection from the Axis coalition could also be seen as an attempt to ensure its own national survival once it became increasingly clear that the Axis would lose. That condition—defecting to ensure survival—is an example of Walt’s conception of bandwagoning. Those conditions have not, by and large, been present in the post-Cold War coalitions discussed in this book.

  29. 29.

    Interview with former OSD Policy Eastern European Desk Officer, Washington, DC, March 5, 2017.

  30. 30.

    From a report at the time: “Military expert Vakhtang Maisaia notes that Georgia’s decision to engage in this NATO led operation is a correct one from a political perspective. He argues that by doing so Georgia demonstrates that it continues to aspire to [membership] of European and Euro-Atlantic structures.” “Experts Debate Deployment of Georgian Troops to Afghanistan,” BBC Monitoring Trans Caucases Unit, April 7, 2009.

  31. 31.

    Bridget Kendall, “Public Opinion About the Afghan War Changes 2007–2010,” in The War in Afghanistan (British Broadcasting Company, 2010).

  32. 32.

    Theo Farrell, “Back from the Brink: British Military Adaptation and the Struggle for Helmand, 2006–2011,” in Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, ed. Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga, and James Russell (Stanford University Press, 2013), p. 121.

  33. 33.

    Robert Fry and Desmond Bowen, “UK National Strategy and Helmand,” in The Afghan Papers: Committing Brian to War in Helmand, 2005–06, ed. Michael Clarke (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2011).

  34. 34.

    Ibid.

  35. 35.

    Ibid.

  36. 36.

    Nick Meo and Robert Fox, “Thousands of UK Troops May Be Sent to Afghanistan Next Year,” Independent on Sunday, September 19, 2004.

  37. 37.

    Beadle.

  38. 38.

    Farrell, “Back from the Brink: British Military Adaptation and the Struggle for Helmand, 2006–2011.”

  39. 39.

    Ibid.

  40. 40.

    Ibid., p. 122.

  41. 41.

    Andrew M. Dorman, “The United Kingdom: Innocence Lost in the War in Afghanistan?,” in Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan: The Politics of Alliance, ed. Gale A. Mattox and Stephen M. Grenier (Stanford University Press, 2015), p. 117.

  42. 42.

    James Grubel, “Australia’s Howard a Surprise 9-11 Witness,” Reuters, September 4, 2011.

  43. 43.

    Graeme Dobell, “Great Australian Foreign Policy Speeches: Howard on 9/11 and the US Alliance,” The Interpreter (2014), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/great-australian-foreign-policy-speeches-howard-911-and-us-alliance.

  44. 44.

    William Maley, “Australian Approaches to Afghanistan,” in Australia and Canada in Afghanistan, ed. Jack Cunningham and William Maley (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2015).

  45. 45.

    Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania Senior Official, Vilnius, Lithuania, March 27, 2017.

  46. 46.

    Interview with former senior DOD official, Washington, DC, February 17, 2017.

  47. 47.

    Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Jens Ringsmose, and Hakon Lunde Saxi.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

McInnis, K.J. (2020). Further Applying the Theoretical Framework. In: How and Why States Defect from Contemporary Military Coalitions. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78834-0_5

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics