Childhood, Adulthood and the Law

  • Jonathan Herring
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Law book series (BRIEFSLAW)


This chapter will explore the consequence of accepting that adults are as vulnerable as children. It will argue this requires a rethinking of the nature of legal rights and responsibilities. The law needs to promote values of relationships and mutuality, rather than individualism and autonomy. It will also require a different response to vulnerability. Rather than seeing vulnerability as a state to be avoided or to escape from it will require the law to recognise our vulnerabilities and the responsibilities we owe to each other as a result.


Rights Vulnerability Care Age of consent Responsibilities Public/private 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Law, Exeter CollegeUniversity of OxfordOxfordUK

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