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Negotiated Justice and Enforcement Legitimacy

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Negotiated Justice and Corporate Crime

Part of the book series: Crime Prevention and Security Management ((CPSM))

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Abstract

This chapter situates our discussion within the conceptual frameworks of ‘negotiated justice’ and ‘legitimacy’. This chapter sets out the framework for understanding the legitimacy of enforcement responses to corporate crime, laying the groundwork for discussion of Civil Recovery Orders (CROs) and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) in subsequent chapters. This chapter provides an overview of all cases that have used CROs and DPAs to date.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Donald R. Cressey, ‘Negotiated Justice’, Criminology (1968), 5(4): 5.

  2. 2.

    Donald R. Cressey, ‘Negotiated Justice’, Criminology (1968), 5(4): 9.

  3. 3.

    See Richard L. Lippke, The Ethics of Plea Bargaining (Oxford University Press, 2011). For discussion of its origins, see Mary E. Vogel, ‘The Social Origins of Plea Bargaining: Conflict and the Law in the Process of State Formation, 1830–1860’, Law and Society Review (1999), 33(1): 161. See also Mary E. Vogel, Coercion to Compromise : Plea Bargaining, the Courts, and the Making of Political Authority (Oxford University Press, 2007).

  4. 4.

    Penny Darbyshire, ‘The Mischief of Plea Bargaining and Sentencing Rewards’, Criminal Law Review (2000), 895, 896. See also JUSTICE, Negotiated Justice: A Closer Look at the Implications of Plea Bargains (JUSTICE, 1993); Aogán Mulcahy, ‘The Justification of Justice—Legal Practitioners’ Accounts of Negotiated Case Settlements in Magistrates’ Courts’, British Journal of Criminology (1994), 34: 411.

  5. 5.

    See, for example, Criminal Justice Act 2003, s.144 ‘Reduction in Sentences for Guilty Pleas’; Sentencing Council, Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea : Definitive Guideline (March 2017).

  6. 6.

    David Moxon and Carol Hedderman, ‘Mode of Trial Decisions and Sentencing Differences Between Courts’, Howard Journal of Criminal Justice (1994), 33(2): 97.

  7. 7.

    John Baldwin and Michael McConville, Negotiated Justice: Pressures to Plead Guilty (Martin Robertson and Co Ltd, 1977). For further discussion of legal and extra-legal pressures, see Kevin Kwok-yin Cheng, ‘Pressures to Plead Guilty: Factors Affecting Plea Decisions in Hong Kong’s Magistrates’ Courts’, British Journal of Criminology (2013), 53: 257.

  8. 8.

    Ralph Henham, ‘Further Evidence on the Significance of Plea in the Crown Court’, Howard Journal of Criminal Justice (2002), 41(2): 151.

  9. 9.

    It is notable that the Attorney General did publish Guidelines on Plea Discussions in Cases of Serious or Complex Fraud in 2009. For further discussion, see Daniele Alge, ‘Negotiated Plea Agreements in Cases of Serious and Complex Fraud in England and Wales: A New Conceptualisation of Plea Bargaining?’, European Journal of Current Legal Issues (2013), 19(1).

  10. 10.

    In the white-collar and corporate crime literature, the centrality of negotiation (and associated concerns) in the response to corporate crime is a common theme: e.g. Hazel Croall, ‘Combating Financial Crime: Regulatory Versus Crime Control Approaches’, Journal of Financial Crime (2000), 11(1): 45; Celia Wells, ‘Corporate Crime: Opening the Eyes of the Sentry’, Legal Studies (2010), 30(3): 370.

  11. 11.

    See Nicholas Lord, Regulating Corporate Bribery in International Business: Anti-corruption in the UK and Germany (Ashgate, 2014); Michael Levi and Nicholas Lord, ‘White-Collar and Corporate Crimes’, in Alison Liebling, Shadd Maruna, and Lesley McAra (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (6th ed, Oxford University Press, 2017) for an overview of the regulatory literature relating to white-collar and corporate crimes.

  12. 12.

    Federico Mazzacuva, ‘Justifications and Purposes of Negotiated Justice for Corporate Offenders: Deferred and Non-prosecution Agreements in the UK and US Systems of Criminal Justice’, Journal of Criminal Law (2014), 249, 255.

  13. 13.

    Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (5th ed, Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 164. Bronitt submits that DPAs ought to be regarded as ‘diversionary tools of preventive justice’. Simon Bronitt, ‘Regulatory Bargaining in the Shadows of Preventive Justice: Deferred Prosecution Agreements’, in Tamara Tulich, Rebecca Ananian-Welsh, Simon Bronitt, and Sarah Murray (eds), Regulating Preventive Justice : Principle, Policy and Paradox (Routledge, 2017).

  14. 14.

    Described as ‘the offender’.

  15. 15.

    The Full Code Test in the Code for Crown Prosecutors must be satisfied here. See CPS , The Full Code Test, available at: https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/full-code-test (last accessed January 11, 2018). See also Ministry of Justice, Code of Practice for Adult Conditional Cautions: Part 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (January 2013), para. 2.2.

  16. 16.

    Criminal Justice Act 2003, s.22(3). The conditions may include a financial element: Criminal Justice Act 2003, s.23A. For further consideration of conditional cautions, see Robert A. Braddock, ‘Rhetoric or Restoration? A Study into the Restorative Potential of the Conditional Cautioning Scheme’, International Journal of Police Science and Management (2011), 13(3): 195.

  17. 17.

    Ministry of Justice, Code of Practice for Adult Conditional Cautions: Part 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (January 2013), para. 2.21 et seq.

  18. 18.

    Criminal Justice Act 2003, s.24.

  19. 19.

    Ministry of Justice, Code of Practice for Adult Conditional Cautions: Part 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (January 2013), para. 2.7.

  20. 20.

    CPS , Adult Conditional Cautions (The Director’s Guidance) (7th ed, April 2013), para. 12.1.

  21. 21.

    See W.B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series (1956), 56: 167–198.

  22. 22.

    Justice Tankebe and Alison Liebling, ‘Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: An Introduction’, in Justice Tankebe and Alison Liebling (eds), Legitimacy and Criminal Justice : An International Exploration (Oxford University Press, 2013).

  23. 23.

    See Tom R. Tyler, ‘Self-Regulatory Approaches to White-Collar Crime: The Importance of Legitimacy and Procedural Justice ’, in Sally S. Simpson and David Weisburd (eds), The Criminology of White-Collar Crime (Springer, 2009); Mike Levi, ‘Legitimacy, Crimes and Compliance in “the City”: De Maximis non Curat Lex?’, in Justice Tankebe and Alison Liebling (eds), Legitimacy and Criminal Justice : An International Exploration (Oxford University Press, 2013).

  24. 24.

    Nicholas Lord, ‘Establishing Enforcement Legitimacy in the Pursuit of Rule-Breaking “Global Elites”: The Case of Transnational Corporate Bribery’, Theoretical Criminology (2016), 20(3): 376.

  25. 25.

    OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 1997.

  26. 26.

    United Nations Convention Against Corruption 2003 (UNCAC).

  27. 27.

    See, for example, OECD, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Phase 4 Report: United Kingdom (OECD, 2017).

  28. 28.

    Justice Tankebe and Alison Liebling, ‘Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: An Introduction’, in Justice Tankebe and Alison Liebling (eds), Legitimacy and Criminal Justice : An International Exploration (Oxford University Press, 2013).

  29. 29.

    Mike Hough, Jonathan Jackson, and Ben Bradford, ‘Legitimacy, Trust and Compliance: An Empirical Test of Procedural Justice Theory Using the European Social Survey’, in Justice Tankebe and Alison Liebling (eds), Legitimacy and Criminal Justice : An International Exploration (Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 330.

  30. 30.

    Andrew Jefferson, ‘The Situated Production of Legitimacy: Perspectives from the Global South’, in Justice Tankebe and Alison Liebling (eds), Legitimacy and Criminal Justice : An International Exploration (Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 249.

  31. 31.

    Mike Levi, ‘Legitimacy, Crimes and Compliance in “the City”: De Maximis non Curat Lex?’, in Justice Tankebe and Alison Liebling (eds), Legitimacy and Criminal Justice : An International Exploration (Oxford University Press, 2013).

  32. 32.

    Wilfried Hinsch, ‘Legitimacy and Justice: A Conceptual and Functional Clarification’, in Jorg Kühnelt (ed.), Political Legitimization Without Morality? (Springer, 2008), p. 39.

  33. 33.

    See Tom R. Tyler, ‘Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Authorities?’, Behavioral Sciences and the Law (2001), 19: 215; Tom R. Tyler, ‘Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation’, Annual Review of Psychology (2006), 57: 375.

  34. 34.

    See Wilfried Hinsch, ‘Legitimacy and Justice: A Conceptual and Functional Clarification’, in Jorg Kühnelt (ed.), Political Legitimization Without Morality? (Springer, 2008); David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (2nd ed, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

  35. 35.

    See Anthony Bottoms, and Justice Tankebe, ‘Beyond Procedural Justice : A Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice’, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (2012), 102(1): 119.

  36. 36.

    Wilfried Hinsch, ‘Legitimacy and Justice: A Conceptual and Functional Clarification’, in Jorg Kühnelt (ed.), Political Legitimization Without Morality? (Springer, 2008).

  37. 37.

    Tom R. Tyler, Why People Cooperate: The Role of Social Motivations (Princeton University Press, 2011).

  38. 38.

    Wilfried Hinsch, ‘Legitimacy and Justice: A Conceptual and Functional Clarification’, in Jorg Kühnelt (ed.), Political Legitimization Without Morality? (Springer, 2008).

  39. 39.

    Anthony Bottoms, and Justice Tankebe, ‘Beyond Procedural Justice : A Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice’, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (2012), 102(1): 119.

  40. 40.

    Susanne Karstedt, ‘Trusting Authorities: Legitimacy, Trust, and Collaboration in Non-democratic Regimes’, in Justice Tankebe and Alison Liebling (eds), Legitimacy and Criminal Justice : An International Exploration (Oxford University Press, 2013), emphases in original.

  41. 41.

    Mike Levi, ‘Legitimacy, Crimes and Compliance in “the City”: De Maximis non Curat Lex?’, in Justice Tankebe and Alison Liebling (eds), Legitimacy and Criminal Justice : An International Exploration (Oxford University Press, 2013).

  42. 42.

    Anthony Bottoms, and Justice Tankebe, ‘Beyond Procedural Justice : A Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice’, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (2012), 102(1): 119.

  43. 43.

    Andrew Jefferson, ‘The Situated Production of Legitimacy: Perspectives from the Global South’, in Justice Tankebe and Alison Liebling (eds), Legitimacy and Criminal Justice : An International Exploration (Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 249.

  44. 44.

    Anthony Bottoms, and Justice Tankebe, ‘Beyond Procedural Justice : A Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice’, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (2012), 102(1): 119, 156–159; Neil MacCormick, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, 2007).

  45. 45.

    Nicholas Lord, ‘Establishing Enforcement Legitimacy in the Pursuit of Rule-Breaking “Global Elites”: The Case of Transnational Corporate Bribery’, Theoretical Criminology (2016), 20(3): 376.

  46. 46.

    Ibid.

  47. 47.

    For a useful threefold framework for thinking through legitimate power, see David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (2nd ed, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). We draw on this framework here to inform our analysis.

  48. 48.

    See David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (2nd ed, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

  49. 49.

    A further issue here is how to measure expected performance. Should that be assessed from the perspective of enforcement authorities? What, however, if (parts of) the general public express different views—though it is acknowledged that there are significant difficulties in measuring such public opinion. For some sentiments on this issue, see, for example, Larry Elliott, ‘Gordon Brown: Bankers Should Have Been Jailed for Role in Financial Crisis’, The Guardian (October 31, 2017); J.R., ‘The Economist Explains: Why Have So Few Bankers Gone to Jail?’, The Economist (May 14, 2013); Ian Birrell, ‘Iceland Has Jailed 26 Bankers, Why Won’t We?’, The Independent (November 15, 2015).

  50. 50.

    See Nicola Padfield, ‘Deferred Prosecution Agreements’, Archbold Review (2012), 7: 4.

  51. 51.

    See Mike Levi, ‘Legitimacy, Crimes and Compliance in “the City”: De Maximis Non Curat Lex?’, in Justice Tankebe and Alison Liebling (eds), Legitimacy and Criminal Justice : An International Exploration (Oxford University Press, 2013).

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King, C., Lord, N. (2018). Negotiated Justice and Enforcement Legitimacy. In: Negotiated Justice and Corporate Crime. Crime Prevention and Security Management. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78562-2_2

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