Abstract
Alexander’s comments on Aristotle’s Metaphysics often uncover fruitful doctrinal tensions that help deepen our understanding of some Peripatetic tenets, by disclosing implications that would otherwise lay hidden. Nowhere else does this become clearer than in Alexander’s exposition of the several meanings of δύναμις laid down by Aristotle in his philosophical lexicon (Metaphysics Δ chapter 12). The point discussed therein is of the utmost importance: it concerns the well-known divide between active and passive capacities, whose joint (and mutually dependent) activation brings about change, that most basic feature of the physical world. The cleavage between these two kinds of power seems clear-cut. There are, however, some borderline cases that call into question their subsumption under any of those major (and purportedly all-inclusive) headings. The problem that troubles Alexander concerns the way soul and nature fit into this global picture of capacities and the right way in which to think of them as causal powers. After presenting the general account of Aristotelian δυνάμεις, the paper outlines two mutually related questions Alexander raises about them, both of which call for careful consideration, since they seem to give a wrong picture of φύσις. The paper concludes by dispelling doubts and by highlighting some presuppositions that may explain the difficulties Alexander finds in Aristotle’s account.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Cf. Metaph. IX 5.1048a1–9; Ph. VIII 4.255a34-255b5; GC I 7.324b7–9.
- 2.
Alexander presents the coincidental unity of agent and patient in the same individual as the rationale for the addition of the words ἢ ᾗ ἕτερον to the formula of δύναμις (see 389.6: διὰ τοῦτο προσέθηκε; 389.17–18).
- 3.
Metaph. Δ 16.1015b16–36; 9.1017b26-1018a3; cf. Top. I 7 (passim).
- 4.
Aristotle had already made clear (at 1019a34–35; cf. 1049b8) that the agent bringing something else to a standstill counts as a genuine principle of change, and thus qualifies as a δυνατόν according to the first meaning of δύναμις. Kirwan ’s (1993) translation of this line (‘for what can keep a thing the same is in a way also capable’) seems to slightly obscure this point.
- 5.
Cf. Metaph. IX 5.1048a5–7; Ph.VIII 4.255a34–255b1.
- 6.
- 7.
A similar conclusion can be gathered from Physics VIII 4, a chapter that sheds some light on the meaning of the expression ᾗ συμπέφυκεν in our passage from Metaphysics Θ 1 (1046a28). In Physics Aristotle is directly concerned with naturally continuous magnitudes (συνεχές τι καὶ συμφυές, 255a12) and their inability to move themselves ‘from within’, since they cannot be analyzed into an inner moving principle and an extended moved body. The four simple bodies lack the internal difference of agent and patient that would allow them to be moved by themselves (αὐτὰ ὑφ᾽ αὑτῶν). In spelling out their lack of inner structure, Aristotle made abundant use of the adjective συμφυές. So it makes sense to suppose that, when he claims in the Metaph. that nothing can be affected by itself to the extent that it is one by σύμφυσις (ᾗ συμπέφυκεν), Aristotle hints at the kind of unity that simple bodies display, and that any natural compound must realize to a certain extent. I take it that ‘connatural union’ is put forth in the Metaphysics as a general constraint on any natural being, in so far as it is natural (ᾗ συμπέφυκεν), and not as a peculiar feature of simple bodies alone. Giving this qualification full scope allows one to see why ‘this passage seems to make deep troubles for the idea of natural beings as self-movers ’, as Johansen claimed (2012, p. 87). Perhaps with an eye to this physical background, Johansen prefers to render ᾗ συμπέφυκεν by ‘in so far as a thing shares the same nature’. On the contrary, the Revised Oxford Translation gave pride of place to the biological cases of ‘organic unity’ (sic, 1046a28). On being one by σύμφυσις, see also Metaph. Δ 4.1014b20–26; Bonitz , 719b.20ff.
- 8.
For the notion of ‘externally-directed powers ’, see M. Tuozzo (2011).
- 9.
Ph. III 3.202a21-202b22; de An. III 2.425b26–426 a 27.
- 10.
Ph. III 3.202b14–22.
- 11.
The medical knowledge of a particular physician can be likened to the (piece of) grammatical skill which ‘is in a subject, the soul, but is not said of any subject’ (Cat. 1 a25–28), whereas its universal type (which can be shared by a manifold of competent physicians) is akin to knowledge -of-grammar as such (the general ability to speak and write in a given language). Symmetrical distinctions hold of the passive ability to recover from illness.
- 12.
Or so it seems to follow from Juv. 469b1–3, where Aristotle builds upon Alc. I 129c-130d. N. Denyer (2001, pp. 213–214, ad 129d4–5) points out that the parallelism holding between the tools of the trade and the hands of the cobbler ‘soon leads to the idea that we may talk of bodily parts themselves as tools or ὄργανα’. This way of talking is fully endorsed by Aristotle, who is happy to see animal bodies as ὄργανα of their souls: cf. de An. II 4.415b18–20; PA I 1.642a10–13, 645b16–17; Protr. B 8; B 23 (Düring (1969). On the instrumental nature of the body, especially see Menn (2002). I have discussed these issues at length in Mittelmann (2013).
- 13.
As Fernández and Mittelmann (2017, p. 156, note 38) have claimed, ‘[w]hen it comes to natural dunameis and causal powers embodied in organic bodies, those bodies themselves provide the matter that gets acted upon by the souls they embody’.
- 14.
Cf. Alexander (1887), De anima 23.15–24 (on the nautical skill as a moving principle); 79.17–20 (on the art of dancing as the inner source of the dancer’s motions).
- 15.
Cf. Ph. VIII 4.255a8–9.
- 16.
Alexander concerns himself with this difficult subsumption in 390.11–12: πῶς ὑπάγοιντο ἂν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει.
- 17.
Graham ’s translation understates the point by downplaying the strength of the participle διῃρημένον (‘distinct’), whose full meaning is disclosed in the next paragraph (at 255a14), where Aristotle states the conditions under which a full-fledged duality of agent and patient obtains: ‘For in so far as a thing is one and continuous not by contact, it does not suffer change; but it is in so far as it is divided (ᾗ κεχώρισται) that one part naturally acts, the other is acted upon’ (Ph. VIII 4.255a12–15). The infinitive διῃρῆσθαι reappears in the next line (a16), to describe the relation that holds between the moving principle and the moved body within one and the same self-mover .
- 18.
Reference to 2.1 has been added by Dooley (1993) , following Hayduck’s 1891 apparatus.
- 19.
Cf. Ph. II 1.192b16–23, 193a9–30.
- 20.
The fact that those materials themselves are close to elemental stuff (‘stone, earth or a mixture of the two’, 192b19–20) largely explains that their inner tendency to change is not to produce it, but rather to undergo it: cf. VIII 4.255b29–31.
- 21.
Cf. Metaph. Δ 4.1014b26–31.
- 22.
To my knowledge , only Johansen (2012, pp. 83–89) has seen the full implications of this passage for the account of self-motion. As he rightly points out, ‘this passage seems to make deep troubles for the idea of natural beings as self-movers ’ (p. 87), even though difficulties can be overcome by a careful reading of the restrictive qualification ᾗ συμπέφυκεν, at 1046a28.
- 23.
This conclusion becomes all the more troubling when we remember Alexander ’s outspoken hostility towards this comparison, and his efforts to read it as being about the nautical art, and not about an actual sailor: cf. Alexander (1887), De anima 15.10–15; 23.24–24.3; 79.17–20. On these passages, see also Mittelmannn (2013).
- 24.
EN VI 5.1140b7.
- 25.
- 26.
In stating the aporia, Charles calls attention to a paradoxical consequence: ‘[T]here will be few, if any, virtuous acts if the agent’s desire to produce some future goal excludes the possibility of his performing a moral praxis’ (1986, p. 120).
- 27.
Cf. de An. II 5.417b2–7; 416b16–19.
- 28.
Cf. de An. II 4. 416b18–19.
- 29.
Cf. de An. II 4.416b27–29.
- 30.
Or to a highly unusual one: cf. de An. II 5.417b5–16; cf. 416b2–3.
- 31.
Cf. de An. II 4.416a34-b3.
- 32.
EN X 4.1174a21–23.
- 33.
Notwithstanding the differences between both moving principles, ‘when a doctor cures himself this is just about as near to nature as craft can come’: D. Sedley (2010, p. 13).
Bibliography
Ancient Texts
Alexander of Aphrodisias. (1887). In I. Bruns (Ed.)., (CAG suppl. II 1) Alexandri Aphrodisiensis praeter commentaria scripta minora (De Anima Liber cum Mantissa). Berlin: Reimer.
Alexander of Aphrodisias. (1891). In M. Hayduck (Ed.)., (CAG I) Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria. Berlin: Reimer.
Aristotle. (1949). (repr. 1956). In L. Minio-Paluello (Ed.)., Aristotelis Categoriae et Liber De Interpretatione. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Aristotle. (1950). In W. D. Ross (Ed.), Aristotelis Physica. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Aristotle. (1956). In W. D. Ross (Ed.), Aristotelis De Anima. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Aristotle. (1960). In O. Gigon (Ed.), Aristotelis opera ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri. Berlin: W. de Gruyter.
Aristotle. (2005). In M. Rashed (Ed.), Aristote. De la Géneration et la Corruption. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Aristotle. (1957). In W. Jaeger (Ed.), Aristotelis Metaphysica. Oxford: Clarendon Press
Modern Texts
Ackrill, J. L. (1978). Aristotle on action. Mind, 87, 595–601.
Charles, D. (1986). Aristotle: Ontology and moral reasoning. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 4, 119–144.
Denyer, N. (2001). Plato: Alcibiades (Cambridge Greek and Latin classics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dooley, W. E. (1993). Alexander of Aphrodisias. On Aristotle Metaphysics 5. London: Duckworth.
Düring, I. (1969). Der Protreptikos des Aristoteles. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Fernández, P., & Mittelmann, J. (2017). ἡ κίνησις τῆς τέχνης. Crafts and souls as principles of change. Phronesis, 62, 136–169.
Graham, D. (1999). Aristotle: Physics VIII. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Johansen, T. K. (2012). The powers of Aristotle’s soul. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kirwan, C. (1993). Aristotle. Metaphysics. Books Γ, Δ, and Ε (Second ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kosman, L. A. (2013). The activity of being. An essay on Aristotle’s ontology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard.
Menn, S. (2002). Aristotle’s definition of soul and the Programme of the De Anima. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 22, 83–139.
Mittelmann, J. (2013). Neoplatonic sailors and peripatetic ships: Aristotle, Alexander and Philoponus. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 51, 545–566.
Natali, C. (2002). Actions et Mouvements chez Aristote. Philosophie, 73, 12–35.
Nussbaum, M. (1984). Aristotelian dualism: A reply to Robinson. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2, 197–207.
Nussbaum, M. C., & Putnam, H. (1992). Changing Aristotle’s mind. In M. C. Nussbaum & A. O. Rorty (Eds.), Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima (pp. 27–56). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sedley, D. (2010). Teleology, Aristotelian and platonic. In J. G. Lennox & R. Bolton (Eds.), Being, nature and life in Aristotle (pp. 5–29). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tuozzo, T. (2011). How dynamic is Aristotle’s efficient cause? Epoche, 15, 447–464.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Mittelmann, J. (2018). To Be Handled with Care: Alexander on Nature as a Passive Power. In: Boeri, M.D., Kanayama, Y.Y., Mittelmann, J. (eds) Soul and Mind in Greek Thought. Psychological Issues in Plato and Aristotle. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 20. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78547-9_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78547-9_11
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-78546-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-78547-9
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)