Abstract
In Nicomachean Ethics II 4 Aristotle famously raises a puzzle concerning moral habituation, and he seems to dissolve it by recourse to the analogy between moral virtue and skills. A new interpretation of the chapter is offered on the basis of an important evaluative dissimilarity then noted by Aristotle, one almost universally disregarded by interpreters of the chapter. I elucidate the nature of the dissimilarity in question and argue for its paramount importance for understanding Aristotle’s conception of moral agency. I also show that it is the particularly intricate and puzzling character of the chapter that has prevented scholars from noticing such a dissimilarity and from integrating it to the interpretation of the chapter.
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- 1.
For Annas ’ skill-based account of virtue , see Annas (2011).
- 2.
And perhaps also from simply recognising the dissimilarity itself. A good example is Tom Angier ’s recent book, where he does not even consider Nicomachean Ethics II 4 as containing an argument against the ‘evaluative’ assimilation of moral virtue to skills (see Angier (2010, pp. 41–49)). Some interpreters have even attributed to Aristotle some sort of consequentialist assimilation of virtuous agency to skills concerning the way they contribute to the value of their typical products. The most prominent example is Sauvé Meyer (2011, p. 47 and p. 162). Her view serves as an example of the sort of consequentialist view I have mentioned.
- 3.
I will be using Bywater 1894 edition of the Ethica Nicomachea. All translations are my own, unless otherwise indicated.
- 4.
- 5.
Stewart (1892, p. 182). Italics are mine.
- 6.
Cf. τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ γραμματικήν (1105a25), τά κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα (1105a28–9).
- 7.
- 8.
The phrase with ὑπό is not necessarily Aristotle’s stock phrase to refer to artifacts . Whereas he sometimes uses this phrase (e.g. EN 1175a24), he also uses the phrase with κατά in other places (e.g. Ph. 193a32).
- 9.
- 10.
Broadie and Rowe (2002, translation ad loc.).
- 11.
Or ‘have their goodness in themselves’ (Ross) or ‘ont leur valeur en elles-mêmes’ (Tricot). In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle tends to use τὸ εὖ and τὸ ἀγαθόν interchangeably (e.g. EN 1097b27).
- 12.
In fact, there are reasons to think with Arthur Adkins that the traditional conception of ἀρετή reinforced this natural suggestion. Adkins argues that such a conception, ‘from Homer onwards, always commended the correct reaction, or the production of the correct result, in a given situation, regardless of the manner in which the result was produced or the intentions of the agent’, adding that ‘the explicit linking of εὐδαιμονία and ἀρετή merely emphasised this’ (1963, p. 332). Adkins himself suggests that the first in the history of philosophy to remove this ‘chief impediment’ was in fact Aristotle (p. 334), by insisting that any action performed from ἀρετή must satisfy certain conditions internal to the agent. I think Adkins was right.
- 13.
The clearest interpretation along these lines is Alexander Grant ’s (1885, commentary ad loc.). His view is that T2 helps to solve the aporia about habituation by somehow reinforcing the analogical argument initially offered by Aristotle to dissolve it. For the point of this analogical argument was to show that if we have reason to suppose that mere getting F-things done is not proof of the possession of skill , then we have reason to suppose that it is no proof of the possession of moral virtue either. If Aristotle’s second argument now in T2 consists in arguing that, whereas an artifact can be judged as being good by its intrinsic properties, mere doing of ‘just things’ or ‘moderate things’ cannot be so judged, it follows that it is even more evident that in the case of moral virtues the mere doings of these things do not imply the possession of a just or moderate character by the agent: for how could they have such implication if, strictly speaking, these ‘things’ are not even moderate or just? I find Grant ’s interpretation unconvincing. Aristotle evidently thinks that merely getting just things done is no proof of the possession of justice, not because it cannot be characterised as ‘moderate’, ‘just’, etc., but rather because, although it can be so characterised, there are (as he claims in T3) further conditions internal to the agent performing these actions that need to be fulfilled in order for the agent to count as just or moderate.
- 14.
See for instance Hutchinson (1986, pp. 90–91); Irwin (1999, p. 195); Taylor (2006, p. 83). These scholars ssuppose that in order for something to count as having ‘artistic merit’ you needed the knowledge condition. Hence, on this interpretation, you need the knowledge condition in order for something to count as a just or moderate deed too. It is now supposed that Aristotle’s point in T2 is merely to point out that in order for these deeds to count as done justly or moderately and thus to imply the possession of character you need further inward conditions besides the knowledge condition. This contributes to the initial analogical argument simply because the distinction between the knowledge condition and such further inward conditions (acting from rational choice and full possession of character) is perfectly adequate to account for the distinction between ‘the just, etc. deed’ and ‘the just, etc. deed done justly’. The just deed is done with the relevant knowledge , and is the one involved in habituation; the just deed done justly requires further inward conditions and it is the one arising from virtuous character. It should be clear by now that I reject this reading. The knowledge condition is not needed in order for something to count as a just or moderate deed or outcome. Moreover, this reading flagrantly ignores the significance of the evaluative disanalogy, and also misinterprets the initial distinction between (i) artifacts and (ii) bringing them about in a skillful way that is the basis of the analogy – what can now be the basis of this distinction, if the knowledge condition applies equally to both?
- 15.
See also Rh. 1374a9–17 and EN 1136a1–4.
- 16.
Cf. EN 1113b26–7, 1114a12–16.
Bibliography
Ancient Texts
Annas, J. (1993). The Morality of Happiness. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Echeñique, J. (2018). Another Dissimilarity between Moral Virtue and Skills: An Interpretation of Nicomachean Ethics II 4. In: Boeri, M.D., Kanayama, Y.Y., Mittelmann, J. (eds) Soul and Mind in Greek Thought. Psychological Issues in Plato and Aristotle. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 20. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78547-9_10
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