Abstract
Although philosophy of mind is a hot topic in contemporary philosophy, Ancient theories of the mind are not usually taken into consideration. In this Introduction we briefly focus on some of the reasons why the Ancient conceptions of the mind tend not to be considered seriously any more. We try to account for why it is still reasonable to study some theories that apparently have been overcome by contemporary science of the mind. Although one can grant that Ancient theories of the mind may not be a starting point for a contemporary philosopher of mind, we suggest that the approaches of the Ancient philosophers still provide insights to those who are interested in investigating the mind-body problem. Ancient discussions of the mind, we hold, should not be taken as archeological pieces that can be easily neglected. Even though we recognize that some ingredients of Ancient theories in fact are ‘archeological’ (especially those elements related to physiological aspects), we hold that their philosophical analysis, inasmuch as it can contribute to clarifying problems that have not been resolved yet, can be dealt with seriously. Finally, this Introduction also describes briefly the contents of this book.
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Notes
- 1.
Crane and Patterson (eds.) (2000, p. 3, note 8).
- 2.
Those authored by Langton, Stone , and Patterson (all of them included in Crane and Patterson (eds.) (2000)).
- 3.
Crane and Patterson (eds.) (2000, p. 2).
- 4.
Lowe (2008, p. 149, note 8).
- 5.
Lowe (2013, p. 230).
- 6.
- 7.
Crane and Patterson (eds.) (2000) do not seem to endorse this view, as they appear to take seriously Ancient theories as a reasonable historical antecedent of contemporary theories.
- 8.
For discussion see Annas (1992, p. 54).
- 9.
Pl. Phd. 105c9-d4; Arist. de An. 402a6–7.
- 10.
This is understood as a ‘nutritive and reproductive capacity of the soul’: ἡ αὐτὴ δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς θρεπτικὴ καὶ γεννητική (de An. 416a19).
- 11.
He supplies several arguments for the claim that the soul continues to live after the physical death (Phd. 69e-84b, 102a-107b; Phdr. 245c-e, 246a; R. 608c5-612a7; Lg. 893b-895a). To be sure, Plato acknowledges the existence of the mortal kinds of the soul (the spirited and appetitive kinds) in the Timaeus (see 69c-70a; cf. also 61c, 65a, 70d-71a, 72d), but the important point for us is Plato’s claim that the soul can continue to exist after the individual’s death. This possibility is reserved just to its rational part.
- 12.
This is a more or less usual (and probably wrong) way of rendering the difficult Greek expressions αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό, αὐτὸ ταὐτό (Alc. I 130b1, d4). This interpretation surely assumes that in the analogy with the crafts the αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό is the self, the soul, or the person. However, as observed by Gill (2006, p.347), the English term ‘self’ is ‘a rather peculiar usage, representing the conversion of a reflexive suffix (as in ‘himself’) into a noun’. But the Greek αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό doesn’t mean a fundamentally reflexive relationship, but ‘what is the core or essential feature of the itself’ (349). Pradeau (2000, p. 210) proposes ‘ce soi-meme lui-meme’ as a reasonable rendering of αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό, although he warns us that his translation renders a ‘redondance pronominale assez inhabituelle’. In the nineteenth century, especially due to the authority of Schleiermacher, the authenticity of this dialogue has been questioned. Some contemporary scholars also forcefully challenge the authenticity of Alcibiades I, notably Smith (2004) and, more recently, Renaud and Tarrant (2015), who tend to support the inauthenticity (pp. 38, 46). However, they declare that their purpose is ‘to explore the hypothesis that the dialogue may be interpreted along the same lines as any other dialogue of Plato’ (p. 5). Some other interpreters tend to take Alc. I to be authentic (Annas (1983, pp. 114–115), cited by Gill (2006, p. 344). See also Pradeau (2000, pp. 20–29); Denyer (2001, pp. 14–26). Gerson (2003, p.14, note 1) prefers not to take a strong position on the authenticity — both of the Theages and the Alc. I —, although he tends to accept their authenticity).
- 13.
As observed by Long (2005, p.174), philosophy of mind is a relatively recent discipline ‘indelibly coloured by Descartes and the sharp distinction he introduced between the physical and the mental. Inasmuch as Plato discusses such concepts as belief, desire, pleasure, action, and emotion, he can be brought into contact with what we call philosophy of mind. But the mind/body distinction, in the way it has preoccupied modern philosophy, has only partial bearing on the Platonic dualism of body and psyche’. In spite of the differences between Plato and Descartes, both philosophers share the view that the soul has a nature such that it will continue to live after death (i.e. independently of the body). But, of course, there are important differences between them as well: in its most technical use, soul appears to be distinguished from mind by Descartes, the former being able to animate the body, and the latter being responsible for intuiting, thinking, and imagining. Descartes usually employs the expression l’esprit and mens when making reference to mind as something different from the body. By contrast, l’âme and anima designate the mind in its union with the body. On the difficulties concerning the word ‘mind’ to understand Plato’s psyche cf. Griswold (1996, pp. 2–3). Besides, in Modern philosophy (maybe due to Descartes’ influence) the starting-point of inquiry is the mind’s consciousness of itself. For a full discussion of these distinctions see Broadie (2001).
- 14.
See Bossi (2015, pp. 45–46).
- 15.
Fronterotta (2015, p. 111).
- 16.
- 17.
Fattal (2013, pp. 17ff.).
- 18.
See Beakley and Ludlow (eds.) (2006, p.3): ‘the doctrine that there are two different types of substance, physical substance, which is the object of the natural science, and mental substance, which is the stuff of which our conscious states are comprised’; Watson (1999, p. 244): ‘the view that reality consists of two disparate parts’. In other words, we use the term ‘dualism’ to connote the number of kinds of substances that there are (see Crane (2001, p. 36)).
- 19.
By way of example, see Plt. 309d-e (a ‘courageous soul’ takes part in what is just); Sph. 228a-b (‘perversion of the soul’ is dissension and sickness).
- 20.
The Cartesian dualism is well attested in the Meditations on First Philosophy II (AT VII 20–21); cf. Notae 6–7 (AT VIII 343–344), where Descartes 1904 puts emphasis upon the fact that ‘the human composite’ is, due to its own nature, destructible, whereas mind is indestructible and immortal. See also Letter to Elisabeth, Primitive Notions (May 21 and June 28, 1643; AT III 665; AT III 691–92). Descartes seems to have assumed that the brain is ‘the seat of our mental life’, since there is a pervasive system of correlations between mental events and brain processes (see Meditations on First Philosophy VI: ‘I take note that the mind is immediately affected not by all parts of the body (mentem non ab omnibus corporis partibus immediate affici), but only by the brain’; AT VII 86; transl. Kemp Smith). See also Discourse on Method Part 5, and Kim (1998, p. 46).
- 21.
- 22.
Putnam (1997, pp. xiii–xiv, 279, 302 et passim). Surely, one might provide reasons to show that Putnam’s functionalism is not ‘substantially the same’ as Aristotle’s view that ‘all things are defined or determined (ὡρισμένα) by their function (τῷ ἔργῳ)’ (Aristotle, Mete. 390a10).
- 23.
Shields (1988, p. 1).
- 24.
As argued by James (2000, pp. 112–113), Descartes , as a young student at the Jesuit College of La Flèche, must have received a thorough training in Aquinas ’ philosophy and the debates surrounding it. But later he took the opinions of scholastics to be mistaken and relatively easy to refute (Letter to Mersenne, November 11, 1640 = AT III 231–232, quoted by James (2000, p. 113, note 7).
- 25.
Charles (2008).
- 26.
Lowe (2013, pp. 197–198).
- 27.
Strongly challenged by Kahn more than two decades ago; see Kahn (1996, pp. 243–247).
- 28.
- 29.
We are very grateful to Gabriela Rossi for her critical reading of this introduction.
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Boeri, M.D., Kanayama, Y.Y. (2018). General Introduction. In: Boeri, M.D., Kanayama, Y.Y., Mittelmann, J. (eds) Soul and Mind in Greek Thought. Psychological Issues in Plato and Aristotle. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 20. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78547-9_1
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