Abstract
Cicero’s concept and therapy of fear and distress are mainly conveyed in the Tusculan Disputations, a text with strong Stoic influences. In this work, Cicero’s therapeutic aim is to empower individuals to become their own therapists and to enable them to master their emotions. He argued that words have the potential for curing, or at least soothing, teaching and consoling. Cicero created a Stoic-Platonic therapy consisting in a thorough investigation of the roots of fear, complemented by applying techniques of self-mastery, memorization of philosophical maxims, and meditation. A century later, Seneca provided, in his Letters on Ethics, an in-depth analysis of fear and anxiety-producing situations, and considered fear to be the greatest scourge of the human mind. Seneca’s Letters offer an engaging approach to the problem of fear, beginning a tradition of more personally directed, curative philosophical dialogues between philosopher and patient, the reader his or herself.
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Notes
- 1.
The Tusculans was written in the year 45 BCE, and the name originates from Cicero’s villa at Tusculum. The text is set in the form of dialogues intermixed with long expositions. The Tusculans brings together philosophical material from Epicurean, Cyrenaic and Stoic schools for use as ‘remedies’ against distress and fear (Cicero 1927, p. xi). I have used the recent translation of Books 3 and 4 by Margaret Graver (2002), which provides a modern translation with a focus on the emotional concomitants of the text. As noted in Chapter 1, Graver translates the Latin term passio as “emotion” rather than “passion” given that in her opinion, it would be anachronistic to label experiences such as fear, anxiety, anger and desire as “passions” since the latter currently have the connotation of extreme emotions (Graver, p. 3). For Books 1 and 2, I have used the Loeb translation (Cicero 1927).
- 2.
The Letters is a collection of 142 letters written by Seneca during his retirement. This text provides an eclectic collection of Stoic ethics, although Epicurean ethics are also addressed. Many of the letters focused on the cause and management of fear and anxiety. I have used the recent translation by Margaret Graver and A. A. Long (Seneca 2015).
- 3.
Unfortunately, there is not enough space for discussion of other seminal texts of Stoic ethical philosophy, such as those of the later Stoics Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius.
- 4.
Graver translates the Latin ‘aegritudo’ with the unavoidably anachronistic “distress,” and the same translation is provided in the Loeb Collection.
- 5.
In the Introduction to the Tusculan Disputations, the translator J. E. King notes that “…The study of philosophy was, he found, his only comfort in distress. He had suffered cruelly in his family life. He had quarrelled with and divorced his wife Terentia, his second marriage was a failure, and in Feb. 45 BCE his beloved daughter Tullia had died. The public life in which he still longed to play his part was no longer open to a man of his convictions. The days were evil. There was nothing, he felt, for him to do in the Senate or the courts of law. Since the glories of his consulship in 63 BCE his political life had been one long disappointment” (Cicero 1927, pp. xii–xii).
- 6.
“…for the man who is afraid of the inevitable can by no manner of means live with a soul at peace…” (Tusculans 2.2).
- 7.
The Stoics sub-classified emotions into sub-species. Thus hesitation, panic, terror, superstition and several others derive from fear (Brennan 2005, p. 95).
- 8.
The concept of ataraxia was discussed in the previous chapter, and a brief discussion of the concept of apatheia is in place. The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary (Urmson 1990) defines apatheia as a state of insensibility for people or objects (p. 26). Epicurus used apatheia to denote absence of emotions, and the Stoics used this term to denote freedom from emotion. Similarly, Liddell’s dictionary renders apatheia as impassibility or insensitivity regarding persons, and in the more restricted Stoic sense as “freedom from emotion” (Liddell and Scott 1996, pp. 174–175). Gisela Striker remarks that the Epicurean concept of ataraxia is the pleasure of mental tranquillity, although the individual in this state is still amenable to be disturbed by external events (Striker 1990, p. 100). On the other hand, the Stoic concept of apatheia has the meaning of “complete indifference to everything bodily or external,” with the consequent freedom from emotion (Striker 1990, p. 101). Thus, whereas ataraxia is reached by balancing external problems with pleasant memories and the anticipation of pleasures, apatheia is reached by following a value-system based on making correct judgments (Striker 1990).
- 9.
“…fear and distress are caused by beliefs about what is bad. Fear is a belief that some serious evil is impending, distress a belief that a serious evil is present” (Tusculans 3.24); “…for as distress is due to present evil, so fear is due to coming evil, and consequently some said that fear was a special branch of distress…” (Tusculans 4.64); and “Anyone who is subject to distress is also subject to fear since the things we are distressed at when they are present are the very things we fear when they are impending” (Tusculans 3.14).
- 10.
This association was noted by Cicero in Tusculans 3.22 where he states that distress is used to denote “sorrow, worry, or anxiety in mind”, whereas fear “is clearly related to distress” (Tusculans 3.23).
- 11.
Anxiety ( angor , in Loeb’s edition (Tusculans 4.28) is defined by Cicero as “oppressive distress” whereas “worry” is defined as “distress accompanied by thinking” (Tusculans 4.28).
- 12.
We may observe here how ‘anxiety,’ a species within the class of distress, was also used by Cicero as a symptom of fear.
- 13.
According to Cicero, a “sickness” occurs whenever “the simmering and agitation of mind becomes habitual,” and “cannot be removed” (Tusculans 4.23). Mental sickness has to be differentiated from an “infirmity of the mind”, which Cicero defines as a vigorous opinion, deeply attached and rooted, that some object is worthy of avoidance which is in fact not worthy of avoidance” (Tusculans 4.26). Finally, for Cicero “proclivities” refer to the proneness to contract certain sicknesses, for instance, that “some people are more prone to fear than other people” (Tusculans 4.28).
- 14.
“They are in anxiety either from the evils they undergo or from those they anticipate” (Tusculans 3.33).
- 15.
“all that tends to alleviate distresses, terrors, lusts, [is important] for here is the richest fruit of the whole field of philosophy” (Tusculans 1.119).
- 16.
“We must use our outmost endeavour…to have the power to be ourselves our own physicians” (“tute tibi imperes”) (Tusculans 2.47).
- 17.
Chrysippus, one of the fathers of the Stoic school remarked that “It is not the case that there is a method which we call “medical”, concerned with the disease of the body, but no method for the diseased soul. Nor does the latter method fall short of the former…Therefore, just as it is appropriate for the doctor concerned with the bodies to be inside the sickness which befall them and the proper cure for each, so also it falls to the doctor of the mind to be ‘inside’ both these things in the best way they can” (Chrysippus, On Emotion, book 4, cited in Graver (2002, p. 210)).
- 18.
“Should we be speaking in terms of “the spurning of reason” and “too-vigorous impulse,” or in terms of fear, desire, and so on? And is it to appear that the object of one’s distress is not a proper thing to be upset about, or that distress should be eliminated altogether?” (Tusculans 4.59).
- 19.
For instance, Cicero would argue that losing a job in a given context is not something to be feared, as there are other, and potentially even better, job options available for the person at risk. For Cicero, this may be more practical than arguing in the Stoic fashion that losing a job is a non-preferred indifferent, since the main goal in life is to attain virtue.
- 20.
“Yet how numerous are the roots of distress, and how bitter they are! The trunk itself may have been cast down, and still they must be pulled out, every one, by single disputations if need be” (Tusculans 3.83).
- 21.
“the methods which enable a person to bear present afflictions will also enable him to think little of those in prospect” (Tusculans 4.64).
- 22.
“The entire theory of emotion can be summed up in a single point: that they are all in our power, all experienced through judgment, all voluntary. It is this error, then, that must be removed, this belief that must be taken away” (Tusculans 4.65).
- 23.
“…but we adapt the line we take to the occasion, to the character of the dispute, to the personality of the litigant; we act similarly in the alleviation of distress, for we have to consider what method of treatment is admissible in each particular case” (Tusculans 3.79).
- 24.
The Cyrenaic school of philosophy was founded in the fourth century BCE and evolved from the Socratic tradition. The aim of this school was achieving sensual pleasure, which was considered to be more fulfilling than mental pleasures. This school provided an example of ‘positive hedonism’ in contrast of the ‘negative hedonism’ of the Epicureans (see previous chapter).
- 25.
“One looks far ahead to misfortunes that are to come, and this makes their arrival easier to bear” (Tusculans 3.29), and “Foresight and mental preparation can do a great deal to lessen the pain [by] rehearsing every event in human life” (Tusculans 3.30).
- 26.
“This indeed is wisdom in its noblest and most godlike form: to scrutinize human life and understand it deeply, not to be surprised by anything that happens; and never to think that something cannot happen merely because it has not happened yet” (Tusculans 3.30).
- 27.
As rendered by Cicero in the Tusculans, Epicurus remarked that “It is foolish to rehearse misfortunes which may not yet happened and may not happen at all…they are always in anxiety, either from the evils they undergo or from those they anticipate” (Tusculans 3.32).
- 28.
“For it is not within our power to forget or gloss over circumstances which we believe to be evil, at the very moment when they are piercing us. They tear at us, buffet us, goad us, scorch us, stifle us—and you tell us to forget about them? That is contrary to nature!” (Tusculans 3.35).
- 29.
“For the passage of time is itself a means of cure, a slow one to be sure, yet very effective” (Tusculans 3.35).
- 30.
“And yet it is not the case that consolatory speeches of this kind have no value; indeed, they may well be the most valuable thing of all” (Tusculans 3.55).
- 31.
“In my Consolation, for instance, I combined virtually all these methods into a single speech of consolation. For my mind was swollen, and I was trying out every remedy I could” (Tusculans 3.76).
- 32.
“But it is necessary, in dealing with diseases of the soul, just as much as in dealing with bodily diseases, to choose the proper time…” (Tusculans 3.76).
- 33.
This is the title used in the latest translation by Margaret Graver and A. A. Long (Seneca 2015), which I have used in this chapter. The text is also known as Letters to Lucilius or Moral Epistles.
- 34.
Graver and Long state categorically that the Letters were not composed to suit a real person, but to convey Seneca’s ethical thoughts in a therapeutic way for the posterity. They remark that in Letter 8 (8.2) Seneca admits that “the work I am doing is for posterity: it is they who can benefit from what I write.”
- 35.
“… life is not worth living, and there is no limit to our sorrows, if we indulge our fears to the greatest possible extent” (Letters 13.12).
- 36.
“Even in the midst of safety you will have no confidence if your mind has once been given a shock; once it has acquired the habit of blind panic, it is incapable of providing even for its own safety” (Letters 104.10).
- 37.
It is interesting to contrast Seneca’s ‘pre-emotions’ with William James’ concept of emotions. As I shall discuss in Chapter 6, James defined emotions as the feeling of somatic changes. According to James, when we see a bear we feel fear because we run, and not because we believe or think that the bear is a dangerous animal. On the other hand, Seneca considered the behavioural reactions that precede the cognitive evaluation of the object as a mere pre-emotion, a first movement that does not qualify as a true emotion.
- 38.
“the steadiest speaker, when before the public, often breaks into a perspiration, …some tremble in the knees when they rise to speak; I know of some whose teeth chatter, whose tongues falter, whose lips quiver… nature exerts her own power and through such a weakness makes her presence known even to the strongest” (Letters 11.2).
- 39.
Once an individual is “overwhelmed by the disaster, the rest are overwhelmed by fear, and the possibility that they may suffer makes them as downcast as the actual sufferer” (Letters 54.3).
- 40.
See especially the first 40 letters.
- 41.
I used the term “diluted Stoicism” because, for the Stoic doctrine, fear is always the result of a false belief and cannot be rational by definition.
- 42.
“Some evil is probable for the future; it is not proven right off. How many unexpected things have come to pass! How many of our expectations never happen at all! Even if it is to come, what good does it do to anticipate your grief? You will grieve soon enough, when it comes; in the meantime, allow yourself something better” (Letters 13.4).
- 43.
Seneca’s remedy is fully Epicurean (compare with Chapter 2): “Some things, then, torment us more than they should, some sooner than they should; and some torment us that should not do so at all: either we add to our pain, or we make it up, or we get ahead of it” (Letters 13.5).
- 44.
“Yes, dear Lucilius, we are too quick to give way to opinion. We do not demand evidence of the things that frighten us, or check them out carefully” (Letters 13.8).
- 45.
Fear of death is implicit in the above list of fears.
- 46.
“…let us avoid not only danger but also discomfort, as much as we can, and retreat into safety…” (Letters 14.3).
- 47.
“The beginnings are in our power; the results are judged by fortune; to which I grant no jurisdiction over myself. But fortune will bring some trouble, some adversity” (Letters 14.16).
- 48.
“Whatever is assigned to us by the terms of our birth and the blend in our constitutions, will stick with us, no matter how hard or how long the soul may have tried to master itself” (Letters 11.6).
- 49.
In Letters 14.9 Seneca follows the Epicurean precept of having few desires. Seneca remarks it is a big danger to desire the same objects as the “common crowd” (Letters 14.9) since this competition will only bring unsafety. Seneca cites Epicurus’ remark that “He enjoys riches most who has least need of riches” (Letters 14.17) also adding that “He who feels the need of wealth also fears for his wealth” (Letters 14.18).
- 50.
The main cause of fear is that “we do not adapt ourselves to the present but direct our thoughts toward things far in the future. Thus foresight, which is the greatest good belonging to the human condition, has become an evil” (Letters 5.9).
- 51.
“Beasts avoid the dangers which they see, and when they have escaped them are free from care; but we men torment ourselves over the future which is to come as well as over that which is past. Many of our blessings bring bane to us; for memory recalls the tortures of fear, while foresight anticipates them. The present alone can make no man wretched” (Letters 5.9).
- 52.
“The more you achieve, the more you will have to fear” (Letters 19.8).
- 53.
“It does not shun danger but rather takes flight, even though we are more exposed to dangers when we don’t face them” (Letters 104.10).
- 54.
“Zeno, of our school, offers the following syllogism: Nothing bad is glorious. But death is glorious. Therefore, death is not bad. Now, that was a big help! You have freed me from fear; after that, I won’t hesitate to offer my neck to the sword!” (Letters 82.8).
- 55.
“No one cares how well he lives but only how long—despite the fact that every one of us has the chance to live well, and no one can live long” (Letters 22.17).
- 56.
“These thoughts, and others like them, are what we must ponder if we want to be at peace as we await the final hour. For fear of that one makes all our other hours uneasy” (Letters 4.9).
- 57.
In Letter 8 he states that “I am still plundering Epicurus, in whose work I today found this saying: You should become a slave to philosophy, that you may attain true liberty” (Letters 8.7), a good illustration of therapeutic reading and writing.
- 58.
“…what need is there to take an advance on future troubles, ruining the present with fear of the future? When troubles come is time enough to bear them. Surely it is foolish to be miserable now just because you are going to be miserable later on!” (Letters 24.1).
- 59.
“You see with children how people they love and know, people they play with, frighten them terribly if they see them wearing masks: well, the same thing happens with us, who are just slightly bigger children” (Letters 24.13).
- 60.
Seneca proceeds to cite Epicurus in two remarks that are preserved in this text. Both remarks reject suicide as a product of fear of death: “What could be more absurd than to seek death when it is fear of death that has made your life unquiet?”, and “So great is the foolishness, no, the madness of human beings, that some are driven toward their death by fear of death” (Letters 24.23). Fear of death is specifically addressed below (Section 4.5).
- 61.
Graver uses anxiety to translate the more generic Latin malum, but the Latin anxietas is not used here. As I mentioned earlier, anxietas had a much stronger somatic connotation than in our current use.
- 62.
“There is but one road that leads to safety: you must rise above external things and be content with what is honourable. For he who thinks there is something better than virtue, or that anything besides virtue is good at all, exposes his breast to everything fortune can throw at him and waits anxiously for the blows to land” (Letters 74.6).
- 63.
“All anxiety and worry is dishonourable, all reluctance to act; for honourable conduct is sure and unhampered, undismayed, ever standing at the ready” (Letters 74.30).
- 64.
“an infirmity is a persistent judgment in a corrupted person that certain things are very much worth pursuing that in fact are only slightly worth pursuing” (Letters 75.11).
- 65.
“But of all the suffering crowds of humankind, the greatest is of those who are troubled by the thought of death. That thought meets them at every turn, for death may come from any direction. Like troops passing through enemy territory, they must be looking around all the time, turning their heads at every sound. Unless this fear is driven from the breast, we live with quaking hearts” (Letters 74.3).
- 66.
“No man can have a peaceful life who thinks too much about lengthening it, or believes that living through many consulships is a great blessing” (Letters 4.4).
- 67.
Seneca stated that it is possible to “depart from life contentedly” but that most humans who “ebb and flow in wretchedness between the fear of death and the hardship of life; … are unwilling to live, and yet they do not know how to die” (Letters 5.5).
- 68.
Death may be welcomed, and “even, if circumstances commend that course, to invite it. There is no difference whether death comes to us, or whether we go to death” (Letters 49.6).
- 69.
“…the soul must be hardened by long practice, so that it may learn to endure the sight and the approach of death” (Letters 82.15–16).
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Starkstein, S. (2018). Roman Fears: Cicero’s and Seneca’s Remedies. In: A Conceptual and Therapeutic Analysis of Fear. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78349-9_3
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