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Self-Intimacy and Individuation

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The Foundations of Phenomenological Psychotherapy

Abstract

Ipseity rather than as a produced thing appears as an event or rather as a phenomenon. The constitutive temporariness of human existence, its motility, is seen at each moment as a disclosure of meaning, as an intelligible space that opens up with respect to the meaningful things we encounter. Clearly, ipseity does not create the world, nor does it “constitute” it; rather, in each case, it comes to itself, it finds itself, while at the same time enabling the appearance of the world as something meaningful. This chapter elucidates the structure of ipseity in relation to the world, everyday life, one’s own history, the changes occurring over the course of one’s life, the unprominent sphere of meaning, the trauma, and the creation of a symptom.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The categories are rooted in actualization.

  2. 2.

    The domain of the proper is grasped as a relation that is always underway starting from the ongoing situation.

  3. 3.

    From this perspective, the attempt to reduce the understanding of others to the exterior perception of acts or expressions of the human body—by tracing these back to psychic connections and ultimately completing the constitution of the flesh viewed from the outside by Einfühlung—seems contrived at best.

  4. 4.

    Greisch is particularly fascinated by this patchwork aspect of the “carpet of life” and identifies it in Stefan George’s poems (2000).

  5. 5.

    Personality, in other words, does not correspond to a theoretical category, but is rather a formal indication.

  6. 6.

    In its attempt to explain the generation of meaning according to a motor theory of mind founded upon the neo-Darwinist axiom of the survival of the fittest, evolutionary epistemology (Hayek 1952; Popper and Eccles 1986; Weimer 1977) turned to biology in search of the objectiveness required to ground such a theory—as already Pierce had done. In doing so, however, it turned away from actual life and from the possibility of finding the source of meaning in life itself, as it is actually experienced. On the other hand, this issue may be regarded as a point of contact with the tradition of American pragmatism, in the style of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics.

  7. 7.

    Heidegger notes: “Even the life which distracts itself meets the world as ‘distraction’, as something dispersive, multiple, which satisfies, engages, absorbs, empties and bores. This means that the inclination shows itself as something moving toward itself” (GA 61, pp. 119–150 it).

  8. 8.

    Heidegger writes: “In factical life experiences run through each other in multiple ways, at one moment coming out of this life-world, at the next moment out of that one, entwining and reshaping themselves, growing over themselves—among the availabilities back and forth, over and away to other running motivations” (GA 58, p. 55).

  9. 9.

    Boss (1977) grasps this point by grafting it upon the spatial harmonics which has always been dear to phenomenology: “Once human existence is seen as bearing the spatio-temporal worldwide realm of openness as, itself, a perceptive and actively responsive openness, the problem of location takes on a wholly different aspect. It is then self-evident that the possibilities for relatedness belong fundamentally and immediately to the whole realm of perceptive openness. They are, in fact, what constitute human being-in-the-world. This openness is the primordial spatiality or prespatiality in which the possibility of a phenomenon’s being located at any point in space is grounded” (p. 132).

  10. 10.

    Heidegger grasps this relation with the other as the threat of subjection (Botmassigkeit) to the dictatorship of the anonymous “yes” (GA 2, p. 126). Radically reversing its meaning in ethical terms, Levinas instead grasps the same phenomenon as the command (Gebot) issued to me by the face of the other, an order to be obeyed (see Greisch 1994a).

  11. 11.

    For a review, see Baltes et al. (2006).

  12. 12.

    Freud’s casual use of the term trauma to describe “any excitations from outside which are powerful enough to break through the protective shield (den Reizschutz zu durchbrechen) … with a breach in an otherwise efficacious barrier against stimuli” (Freud 1920, p. 29)—which has become en vogue once again through the ambiguous category of post-traumatic stress disorder—points to a quantitative view of affections which has its roots in Aristotle (Met. Delta 21, 1022 b 15–21). However, alongside a quantitative definition of affections, in Chapter 21 of Book Delta of the Metaphysics, Aristotle puts forward another three definitions, pertaining to quality: according to the movement of alteration, according to the act of changing, and according to one’s disposition.

  13. 13.

    The term Reizschutz, which is usually translated as protective wall or shield, literally means “protection against stimuli.”

  14. 14.

    The research on attachment which one of the authors of the present book conducted with Guidano in the early 1990s (Guidano 1991; Russiello et al. 1995; Arciero 1994, 2002; Arciero and Guidano 2000) was aimed, not so much at interpreting the difference between various forms of reciprocity on the basis of the level of security/insecurity of early relationships, but rather at grasping—within the context of a non-representational epistemology inspired by Merleau-Ponty—the various forms of attachment as a source of emotional organization and the narrative capacity of the individual as a means of emotional articulation and regulation. By making the relational system coincide with that of emotional organization, this approach opened up a new research horizon that placed affectivity at the center of every relationship and hence implied a radical contextualization of all the aspects of human psychological life. This perspective, which was developed together with Guidano, pointed to the need to study individual differences. On the other hand, by generating different forms of misattunement and misregulation in continuity with early experiences, the endurance of the same forms of emotional organization throughout one’s life may be seen to lay the foundations for the understanding of various personality disorders (Arciero and Bondolfi 2009). This perspective also helps understand the findings made by some recent studies on emotional experience among street boys living in extreme adversity in post-conflict Sierra Leone (Ardizzi et al. 2013, 2015).

  15. 15.

    The treatment of a symptom, therefore, also has its starting point in the patient’s experience of the mechanisms that underlie this gap.

  16. 16.

    Historical reality coincides with virtuality: the disclosure of possibilities that call one’s actual condition into question.

  17. 17.

    In this sense, an action, to the extent that it implies the intention of being recognized for what it is, may express a certain illocutionary force—during a conflict in a couple, for instance—that has very little to do with the energetics of vitality affects, as argued by some researchers working on the motor system (Di Cesare et al. 2013).

  18. 18.

    Heidegger grasps this experience as an intuition: an original retro- and pre-conceptual formation.

  19. 19.

    Fragment 119, Ethos antropoi daimon, revolves around the terms ethos and daimon, character and destiny. Most commentators (Zeller and Mondolfo 1961; Kirk et al. 1983; Kahn 1979; Marchovich 1978) adopt Snell’s reading, according to which the destiny of a man is determined by his character.

    If we instead read the fragment as a noun phrase (Arciero 2006), i.e., as a “nominal predicate, with neither verb nor copula, regarded as the standard expression in Indo-European, whereas the verbal form would have been the third person of the present indicative of ‘to be’,” then it “does not express any factual data, but establishes a timeless and permanent relation which acts as an authoritative argument” (Benveniste 1966). In other words, daimon cannot be considered as predicative of ethos, but rather carries an essential value, insofar as it expresses an integral part of the human being. What makes this such a remarkable fragment, then, is the speculative tension springing from the simultaneity of ethos and daimon, which coexist in parallel yet distinctly: the simultaneity of the one and the many. From this perspective, it is even more interesting to note that if in the same sentence we had the verb esti, the third-person singular of the present indicative of “to be,” the sentence would refer to present situations: it would find its content in the situation it refers to.

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Arciero, G., Bondolfi, G., Mazzola, V. (2018). Self-Intimacy and Individuation. In: The Foundations of Phenomenological Psychotherapy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78087-0_5

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