Abstract
In one of the three methodological appendices to his socio-economic research on the Negro problem (titled ‘Facts and Valuations’, and republished—as Chap. 7—in the ‘selection of essays edited of methodology’ by Paul Streeten) (Value in Social Theory) Gunnar Myrdal states:
Scientific facts do not exist per se, waiting to be discovered by scientists. A scientific fact is a construction abstracted from a complex and interwoven reality by means of arbitrary definitions and classifications. The processes of selecting a problem and a basic hypothesis, of limiting the scope of study, and of defining and classifying data relevant to such a setting of the problem, involve a choice on the part of the investigator. The choice is made from an indefinite number of possibilities. The same is true when inferences are drawn from organised data. Everything in the world is connected with everything else; when shall one stop, and in what direction shall one proceed when establishing causal relations? Scientific conventions usually give guidance. But, first, convention itself is a valuation, usually a biased one, and it is the more dangerous as it is usually hidden in tacit preconceptions which are not discussed or even known; second, progress in science is made by those who are most capable of freeing themselves from the convention in their science and of seeking guidance from other sciences and non-scientific endeavours.
Prior to research, therefore, are complicated theories. The architecture of these theories is arbitrary except when they are intentionally founded upon a definition of relevant interest. (Myrdal, ‘Facts and Valuations’ (1944), in Value in Social Theory, Harper 1958, pp. 153–54)
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Notes
- 1.
An American Dilemma, The Negro problem and modern Democracy, New York, 1944 Routledge.
- 2.
Here I feel it necessary to remind readers that the theme of the relation between theory and facts is as old as the history of philosophy itself. Even modern philosophers, sociologists and even economists … and city planners, have had to deal with this at different depths (and/or levels of superficiality), so much so that it would be out of place to refer to it so generally here. This book is focused on the re-evaluation of a path of a school of economic thought upon which Myrdal’s influence is important for a specific reflection on the epistemological foundations of economics. It is in relation to this rather limited viewpoint that I intend to analyse Myrdal’s contribution, giving him neither a specific position of relevance, nor a role in the history of philosophical thinking. Notwithstanding, having myself a moderately decent background in philosophy, I think that his knowledge is not superfluous and is of interest even for those scholars more familiar with philosophical thinking and its more current expressions—an initial reflection on the matter could include considerations about the ‘theoretical contents of facts’, developed by C. West Churchmann in his work Prediction and rational decision (1961, Prentice Hall, pp. 70–72).
- 3.
This very important writing, drawn from another book by Myrdal, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions (1957) (Chap. 12) was republished by Paul Streeten in the cited volume on Value in Social Theory (as Chap. 11), with the same title, ‘The logical crux of all science’. In effect, this book is a collection of different writings already published on various occasions.
- 4.
Which is the subject of this Trilogy.
- 5.
Although I am also informed—through indirect information, on which basis I don’t feel confident to argue—that even in the natural sciences and in the philosophy of science or scientific research, a large body of opinion on ‘scientific relativism’ has arisen, for instance in the vast debate provoked by Kuhn’s thesis (one of the best sources of which is the book edited by Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970) that includes contributions by, among others, Kuhn (1970), Popper (1970), Pearce (1970), Feyerabend (1970) and other well-known philosophers of science); these debates have echoed across disciplines and deserve a paper, if not a book, dedicated to them.
- 6.
Here there is already a slight nuance in the use of the word. The use of the expression by Myrdal, sufficiently common and current, says that theory is preliminary and preventive to the research of facts. The sharper use deriving from the logical and philosophical tradition would say that theory is itself independent from facts and from their verification.
- 7.
Without claiming to become ‘immutable and universal facts’.
- 8.
This is the reason for my attempts in this book to bring the arguments of these two together, even if we have no evidence of a personal or intellectual relationship between the two.
- 9.
At the same time it is worth noting here, at the end of this chapter, also the Contents of the Myrdal book of Essays on Methodology collected by Paul Streeten:
Value in Social Theory. A Selection of Essays on Methodology. Harper and Brothers, Pub, New York. (1958).
INTRODUCTION, by Paul Streeten (Editor of the collection, list of the strange subjects that had orientation and sense to his choices, list that deserves special attention and original reading): (1). Is and ought; (2). Programme and Prognosis; (3). Programme determined by Prognosis; (4). Prognosis determined by Prognosis; (5). Interdependences between programme and prognoses; (6). The task of the social science; (7). Ideologies; (8). Summary
PART ONE
I. International integration (pp. 1–8)
1. The Place of Value premises in Scientific Analysis (pp. 1–2);
2. The classical theory of perfect market; (pp. 2–5)
3. The classical theory of international trade.
II. The relation between Social theory and Social Theory
1. Some historical hints (pp. 9–14)
2. The traditional role (pp. 15–25)
3. New functions (pp. 26–37)
5. Effects on science (pp. 38–47)
7. The Value problem (pp. 48–54)
PART TWO
III. Introduction to the study of the Negro Problem
1. The Negro problem as a moral issue (p. 55)
2. Valuations and beliefs (pp. 58–61)
3. Furthers notes on the scope and direction of this study (pp. 62–64)
IV. American Ideals and American conscience
1. American Creed
2. Value premises in this study.
V. Valuations and beliefs
1. The mechanism of rationalisation
2. Theoretical critique of the concept ‘mores’
3. Valuation dynamics
4. The empirical studies of valuations and beliefs
5. ‘Personal’ and ‘political’ opinions.
VI. Encountering the Negro problem
1. On the minds of the whites
2. On the Negro themselves
3. Explaining the problem away
4. Explorations in escape
5. The etiquette of discussion
6. The convenience of ignorance
7. The North and the South
VII. Fact and Valuations
1. Biases in the research on the American Negro problems
2. Methods mitigating biases
3. The history and logic of hidden valuations
4. The point of view adopted.
VIII. Facets of the Negro Problem
1. American minorities
2. The anti-amalgamation doctrine
3. The ‘rank order of discriminations’
4. Relationship between lower class group
5. Cast and class
6. A parallel to the negro problem
7. A manifoldness and the unity of the Negro problems
8. The theory of the vicious circle
9. A theory of democracy
10. Practical conclusions from alternative value premises.
IX. The Principle of Cumulation
PART THREE
X. Ends and Means in Political Economy.
XI. the Logical Crux of all Science.
1. The Relation between the moral and the intellectual discord
2. The logical necessity of a theory and the need of adjusting it to facts
3. The provenance of truthful theory
4. The crux of all science
Postscript
- 10.
And this, despite the fact that the title of the writing and of the chapter is ‘The logical crux of all science’ (1958 see bibl.ref.).
- 11.
‘Science’ today, in order to make decisions effective, is called ‘strategic planning’ (on this, see my book Introduction to strategic planning (Archibugi 2005)).
- 12.
Compare, for instance, Myrdal’s assertions on the utility of social theory, in this chapter (Vol. I) of this Trilogy, where I have translated the quotations.
- 13.
On the role of the ‘utopic’ analysis, compare the considerations by the authors/testimonials selected in Chap. 2, Vol. II of this Trilogy.
- 14.
Crisis and Cycles in the Development of Economics is an adaptation of a speech given to a luncheon held for the author and his spouse Alva by the American Economic Association at its annual meeting in New Orleans in December 1971. It was published in the American Economic Review (paper and proceedings vol. LXII, May 1972, pp. 456–462). The article was republished in Political Quarterly in January 1973 and later in the volumes of various writings amply cited here, Against the stream, etc. 1973 (which is Myrdal’s last book).
- 15.
I refer overall to the controversy between the Austrian School of economics headed by Carl Menger, with a work of 1883, Untersuchungen über die Methode der Socialwissenschaften und der politischen Oekonomie insbesondere (Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences with Special Reference to Economics), and the Historical School of economics headed by Gustav Schmoeller, with the work of 1888, Zur Litteraturgeschichte der Staats- und Sozialwissenschaften (History of Literature of Political and Social Science). These two books sparked a controversy between the schools that lasted decades, and posed again in terms poorly changed till today (this was highlighted in the original).
- 16.
And certainly in the soul of the author of this book.
- 17.
It is a matter of a chapter (XII) of the book of 1957: Economic Theory and Under-developed Regions, republished by Paul Streeten as the final chapter (XI) of his selection of Myrdal’s writings of 1958, Value in Social Theory, etc. (already quoted).
- 18.
This renaissance has yet to happen in general terms. However, the aim of this book’s analysis is not the success of this revolutionary vision, but rather the analysis of its nature. I consider it crucial to explain as clearly as possible how Myrdal reached the threshold of the programming approach that is revolutionary in the field of the social sciences episteme, yet did not make the final ‘little step’. In order to best demonstrate this, I have chosen to paraphrase (in the most appropriate meaning of the word) Myrdal’s text with a few modifications to better and more fully express the programming approach.
- 19.
I refer to an endless series of works by authentic and enlightened planners (among which I include some of my own writings) that have explicitly criticised the experiences of false planning on all operational levels. See the use of the word ‘pseudo-planning’ in the introduction by Dudley Seers, ‘The Prevalence of Pseudo-Planning’, in the valuable collection of papers on the crisis of planning, edited by Seers himself and Mike Faber (as the proceedings of three meetings in 1969 organised by the Institute of Development Planning (IDP) at the University of Sussex) (Dudley & Faber, 1972, in two volumes: the first as ‘issues’ and the second as ‘experiences’).
- 20.
Robbins Lionel (1932). Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science.
- 21.
Operational knowledge, which we have declared above to be the only possible and feasible knowledge for the social sciences if they wish to converge definitively into a kind of ‘anti-positivist’ constitution or statute.
- 22.
When descriptive, they are seen only as very close support of operational problems and objectives.
- 23.
Of Carnap I have monitored fleetly the work Logical Syntax of Language (1934) (English translation 1937), a work that made him one of the most authoritative representatives of ‘ logical positivism’. For a general introduction to logical positivism—abounding in shadows—see: Michael Friedman (1999).
- 24.
I have read Neurath’s Empiricism and Sociology (orig. op. of 1934, edited in English by Marie Neurath, his wife, and Robert S. Cohen in 1973), one of only a few of his writings to have been translated from German, both before and after his death. Neurath was very important for having taken care, in cooperation with Rudolf Carnap and Charles F.W. Morris, of an ambitious project started in 1939, Foundations of the Unity of Science: An International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. The project, which was not completed, nevertheless gave rise in 1944 to a first publication of two volumes, including 19 special scientific monographs by illustrious authors (among them John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Rudolf Carnap, Charles Morris, Thomas Kuhn, George de Santillana and others), by University of Chicago Press (1944), for every sector of the sciences (published from 1938 until 1970). (See Bibl. Reference under Neurath, Carnap and Morris.)
- 25.
I did not have time to read the English editions of Neurath’s writings, which were intense, mainly after his death. On the initiative of his wife and of his pupils and friends, including Robert S. Cohen, who continued until recent times, half a century after Neurath’s death, to edit the English publication of his writings, whether philosophical and economic (see, Bibl. Refer., Cohen and Neurath 1983 e 2004) who have constituted for some people, a posthumous revelation of Neurath’s work. I take this opportunity to signal the revival of Neurath (probably due to the aforementioned English translation of his writing) with the mere indication of some authors and titles that, I repeat, I did not have the time to read carefully: Danilo Zolo, Reflexive Epistemology and Social Complexity. The Philosophical Legacy of Otto Neurath (1990); John O’Neill, Unified Science as Political Philosophy: Positivism, Pluralism, and Liberalism (2003); Nader Vossoughian, Otto Neurath: The Language of the Global Polis (1990).
- 26.
Karl Mannheim ’s work has strong roots in the German critical-philosophical culture (Kant and Kantism) and, at the same time, in the Marxian critical Materialism (present in the works as The German Ideology, and in part also in the Grundiss which, in spite of having been written in the nineteenth century, only became somewhat well known in the twentieth century).
- 27.
For instance, the wide reconstruction of the problems and reasoning of the Sociology of Knowledge, achieved by the work of Werner Stark (1958), allows us access to the essential literature written in German that otherwise would be reserved to a restricted ambit of specialists. Another useful source is the essay by F. Warren Rempel (1965) and also the recent anthology of essays edited by Volker Meja and Nico Stehr (2001).
- 28.
Ideology and Utopia, An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (pp. 286 and 295). His arguments to sustain these ‘consequences’ and to explain this ‘activist element’ deserve at least to be mentioned in this book. I will do that in Vol. III, as part of the discussion of utopia as the epistemological way to find and to implement the truth, and through some quotations of Mannheim himself (Chap. 2, Vol. II.)
- 29.
Published under the title Positivismus in der deutschen Sociologie (1969) and under the authorship of Theodore Adorno and other participants.
- 30.
The first report, by Karl Popper (as the representative of the (logical) ‘neo-positivists’), and the second report, by Theodore Adorno (as the representative of the ‘dialecticians’), both under the same title: The logic of social sciences (Die logik der Sozialwissenschaften). The reports are accompanied by ‘ten speeches in the discussion’, including those by Ralf Dahrendorf, Jürgen Habermas, Hans Albert and Harald Pilot. The proceedings of this debate were translated and published in English only in 1978).
Let me note here that the importance of the philosophers of the Frankfurt School and other well-known scholars, is also derived from the fact that it is impossible not to meet them in the current literature of many disciplinary fields. However, such meeting occurs ‘second-hand’, that is, through what I would call ‘ruminating passages’ of these works, which in today’s academia—always oriented more toward a generic ‘specialisation’—has been obliged to appear as an update, substituting the direct contact with the author’s texts. This produces also a kind of ‘schematisation’ (and perhaps also approximation) of the original works, which can be misleading.
- 31.
I reviewed Max Horkheimer’s Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft (1967) and Kritische theorie (1968). By Adorno, also a very versatile writer, I read Zur Metacritik der Erkenntnisttheorie [It.tr. Sulla metacritica della gnoseologia (Milano, Sugar, 1964); Negative Dialectik, in Gesammelte Schriften (1973) [it. tr.. Dialettica negativa (Torino, Einaudi 1970)]. By Herbert Marcuse I explored (with disinclination and hopelessness, having already read other writings by him on the populist age) Philosophie und Kritische Theory (1937) it. tr. Filosofia e Teoria critica, from the work Kultur and Gesellschaft. (1965, it. tr. Cultura e Società, Torino, Einaudi 1969); and ‘On Science and Phenomenology’, in A. Giddens, ed. Positivism and Sociology, London: Heinemann, 1974.
- 32.
Habermas, fortunately (for me), has been widely translated into Italian. Nevertheless, even in translation he is still hardly understandable to me, if not entering inside the evolution (a bit esoteric) of the ‘critical theory of society’ (developed within the German sociology represented by the Frankfurt School). Anyway, remaining also in serious doubt, having in mind the effort needed, about its utility, even independently from the exploration which was motivated with the intention of revealing possible anticipations of the epistemological overturning to which this book is dedicated.
- 33.
As Marx roughly accused all ‘philosophers’ of doing (in the ‘XI thesis’ on Feuerbach ), included in his posthumous work Deutsche Ideology.
- 34.
Without ignoring, of course, but rather conditioning those programmes and projects of change, towards their better performance, minimising the costs and maximising the benefits, minimising the resources employed and maximising the results attained.
- 35.
As already mentioned briefly in the Introduction, in my readings I discovered—just before finishing this book—in the work of a follower of Popper, George Soros (well known more as a finance operator than as an economist), an analysis of the cognitive and operational basis of the social sciences that, though starting from very different backgrounds from this book, are very similar to those described here—so much so that I felt the need to examine Soros’s work where its aspects are related to this book. (This occurs in Chap. 6, Vol. II.)
- 36.
At least examples known to me (a significant limitation that must never be forgotten).
- 37.
On the other hand, it is very surprising that in Habermas’s work I never found any mention, or criticism, of the works of Gunnar Myrdal, who was totally ignored by the younger Frankfurt School. They inhabited two very distant worlds.
- 38.
Denouncing at the same time the ambiguous and prior forms and techniques—of the ‘positivistic’ mould oriented to the prediction, which led to the methodological flop and the scarce and irrelevant planning experiences appeared in the political horizon up to now, in the single countries (with very non-homogeneous structures) and also in the world at large, as we will see later the essential tools of the ‘true’ programming approach are the ‘decisional models’ and not the ‘growth models’ based on a positivistic approach: and that are condemned to be disproved by the facts, because they are based on a ‘half-logic’ (as Frisch said) on which is based the ‘pre-programming’ initiatives.
- 39.
In fact, an increasing number of forms are emerging for the management of many problems manifested on a planetary scale (from the elimination of armed conflicts, more or less local, to the management of planetary health and its protection from pollution and from irrational pillaging of resources, to the implementation of material progress for the poorest populations of the world and their integration into a world development process).
- 40.
In this chapter, dedicated to the contribution of Gunnar Myrdal, it is worth remembering that one of the most sagacious of Myrdal’s books on the subject of economics (already mentioned) was entitled by the author, simply, Against the Stream, Critical essays on economics (Myrdal 1972).
Bibliographical References to Chapter 2 (Vol. I)
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Friedman, Michael. (1999). Reconsidering Logical Positivism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Mannheim, K. (1940). Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction. London: Routledge.
Mannheim, K. (1950). Freedom, Power & Democratic Planning. London: Routledge & Kegan.
Marcuse, H. (1937). Philosophie und Kritische Theory [tr.it. Filosofia e Teoria critica, dal vol. Kultur and Gesellschaft. (1965), [tr.it. Cultura e Società, Torino, Einaudi 1969].
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Myrdal, Gunnar. (1958). ‘The Logical Crux’ in Value in Social Theory, A Selection of Essays on Methodology, Edited with Introduction, very important on the contribution of G. Myrdal, by Paul Streten (pp. ix–xivi), Harper, New York.
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Archibugi, F. (2019). Towards New Scientific Paradigms for the Social Sciences (According to Myrdal). In: The Programming Approach and the Demise of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78057-3_2
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