Abstract
The term “end-poverty” is adopted by the World Bank (WB) in working with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and countries within the sphere of influence of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This chapter contextualizes the BRI in a world of struggle, one in which actors, including sovereign nations as well as new and traditional financial institutions involved in the BRI, take actions, based on their own field of expertise and knowledge. “End poverty” is the common-ground between these various actors. The moral endowment and indeterminacy of the term “end-poverty” enable WB and the new financial institutions like AIIB and the New Development Bank (NDB), to engage with the BRI. These actors engage with the BRI primarily for their own interests. The new financial institutions engage with BRI out of their member countries’ interest in the BRI projects, instead of filling in the infrastructure investment gap in the targeted regions and ending poverty. The founding members of the new financial institutions aim to challenge the existing world order in multilateral lending and development financing rather than to “end poverty”. Likewise, China deploys its global strategy and furthers its interest through the BRI. The financing mechanism of the BRI exemplifies a combined contract-based infrastructure financing and political-objective defined development financing. While the term “end poverty” enables the actors’ struggle for interests, these struggles contradict with the term “end poverty”. Lack of analytical rigor on the term “end poverty” risks, with the BRI projects, strengthening the elites and their power in the recipient countries over their populations.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Kim (2015).
- 3.
The Bretton Woods conference established the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which has evolved into five institutions, making up the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund.
- 4.
The multilateral development finance evolved dramatically in the past decades, with a multitude of development banks and funds established: The African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank. See, Wihtol (2014).
- 5.
- 6.
Kennedy (2016), p. 5.
- 7.
David Kennedy explores the struggles at the level of the works of the experts and their perception of order in a governed system, to “explore the role of expertise and professional practice in the routine conflicts through which global political and economic life takes shape.” See Kennedy (2016), p. 2. Such a tackling-angle enriches the understanding of the global political economy and the shape of it by various actors with their own particular interests, and the perception of expertise by revealing the indeterminacy therein.
- 8.
Kennedy (2016), p. 2.
- 9.
Wildau and Ma (2017).
- 10.
The Silk Road Fund is an investment fund established in 2014. The fund’s initial $10bn is from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, China Investment Corporation, China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China. Out of the four entities contributing the initial $10bn, China Investment Corporation is the Chinese sovereign wealth fund, established in 2007 as a state-owned company, with registered capital of $200bn, responsible for managing part of the country’s foreign exchange reserves.
- 11.
Chhibber (2015), p. 2.
- 12.
Kynge (2016).
- 13.
“The bank’s primary focus of lending will be infrastructure projects with authorized lending of up to $34 billion annually.” See Chhibber (2015), p. 2.
- 14.
Wihtol (2014).
- 15.
Dixon (2015), p. 1.
- 16.
Wihtol (2014). The $100bn of currency swaps is consisted of the PRC contributing $41 billion; Brazil, the Russian Federation, and India $18 billion each; and South Africa $5 billion.
- 17.
“The CRA is a framework for the provision of support through liquidity and precautionary instruments in response to actual or potential short-term balance of payments pressures. It will provide financing similar to the IMF but not under an IMF agreement.” See Chhibber (2015), p. 2.
- 18.
The CRA is designed as “an external account support facility to help developing countries manage balance of payments crises”, see Biswas (2015), p. 3.
- 19.
Chhibber (2015), p. 2.
- 20.
Kynge (2017), “Asia must invest $26tn in infrastructure by 2030”; Asia’s infrastructure gap, estimated by the Asian Development Bank, requires $8 trillion through 2020, see World Economic Forum (2014).
- 21.
Arezki et al. (2016), p. 36.
- 22.
Fallon (2015).
- 23.
For a detailed narrative on the infrastructure investment needs in Asia, see Inderst (2016).
- 24.
Arezki et al. (2016), p. 36. As the article argues: “with a higher projected leverage it is likely that the AIIB will not just be issuing AAA rated bonds to long-term investors, but also lower rated bonds with a higher yield, which should make these particularly attractive to long-term investors in the current global low yield environment.”
- 25.
The co-financing of projects in Asia by World Bank and the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is an example of such cooperation. “Since the AIIB began business at the start of 2016, it has co-financed five projects with the World Bank”. See Kynge (2017).
- 26.
“To the extent that the AIIB succeeds, it will secure the buy-in of its clients and member states, and the new bank may even exert pressure on the established multilateral lenders to change.” See Chin (2016).
- 27.
For a detailed narrative of the share of GDP and of voting rights in IMF, and the discontent of BRICS with the Bretton Woods structure of governance, see Biswas (2015).
- 28.
Lioa (2015).
- 29.
The latest argument is made by Jiajun Xu by tracing the play out of power transition in the World Bank over the last five decades, which shows the US’s hegemonic role in the World Bank that drives the rising China to “initiative the AIIB and NDB, putting competitive pressures on the US-centred multilateral institutions to adapt.” See Xu (2017). Jiajun Xu focuses on the role of the emerging financial institutions challenging the traditional financial institutions due to the power play, including voting rights and internal structure, within the financial institutions.
- 30.
Kennedy (2013), p. 37.
- 31.
In practice, when the 2007–2008 global financial crisis hit the world, certain countries resort to financial agencies other than assistance from IMF. Indonesia, for instance, obtained “the necessary funds through currency swaps with the Bank of China and the Bank of Japan”. See Dixon (2015), p. 4.
- 32.
Chhibber (2015), p. 2.
- 33.
“The founding of these new agencies must be seen as an implicit challenge to the established international financial system” See Dixon (2015), p. 2.
- 34.
This is largely due to the constraints on the foreign exchange reserves of most of the large developing countries.
- 35.
Biswas (2015), p. 11.
- 36.
Lioa (2015). As Lioa introduces, “Other sources of voting shares include the amount of paid-in capital. If China pays in 30 percent of the bank’s capital, as it is slated to, it will still only receive 26 percent of the organization’s voting shares.”
- 37.
The five principles are: 1. Help recipient countries build their self-development; 2. Impose no political conditions; 3. Adhere to principles of equality, mutual benefit and common development; 4. Strive for the best whilst remaining realistic; 5. Keep pace with the times, pay attention to reform and innovation.
- 38.
Lioa (2015).
- 39.
Lioa (2015).
- 40.
Lioa (2015).
- 41.
The conditionality clauses have been under criticism. Those criteria of conditionality have lead to unwanted consequences. For instance, during the Asian financial crisis of 1997, “as a condition of IMF bailout, Indonesia and Thailand both had to slash their fiscal budgets, doing away with critical social services in the process, so that the interest on the loans could be repaid,” leading to the criticism over IMF for “forcing the country to open up its financial markets before there was a proper regulatory infrastructure in place.” See Lioa (2015), Gold (1979), Dell (1981), Nowzad (1981), Spraos (1986) and Best (2012).
- 42.
Sustainability is listed as one of the goals of finance for development is incorporated into the AIIB: to be “leaner, cleaner, greener”.
- 43.
Mishra (2016), p. 169.
- 44.
Lioa (2015).
- 45.
- 46.
Articles of Agreement (2015).
- 47.
Wildau and Ma (2017). For other summaries of the financing mechanism of the BRI, see Weinland (2017) and Wells and Weinland (2017). It is estimated that the BR infrastructure projects took place with the amount of $900bn, planned or underway, of investment on ports, roads, rail lines popping up across Asia.
- 48.
“National rejuvenation” 民族复兴 (Min Zu Fu Xing), and “major-country diplomacy” 大国外交(Da Guo Wai Jiao), are included in Chinese President Xi's report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. For an analysis of national rejuvenation and major-country diplomacy, see, for instance Baijie (2017) and Yi (2017a).
- 49.
Dollar (2015).
- 50.
- 51.
Similar narratives include, for instance, “a community of shared future for mankind,” and promoting “benefit-sharing world through partnerships worldwide.” See Xinhuanet (2017).
- 52.
Wildau and Ma (2017).
- 53.
According to the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks, the state-owned commercial banks may have the following business (Art.3 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks): Absorb public deposits; issue short-term, medium-term and long-term loans; arrange settlement of both domestic and overseas accounts; handle the discount of negotiable instruments; issue financial bonds; issue cash and sell government bonds as agents; buy and sell government bonds; do inter-bank lending and borrowing; buy and sell per se or as agents foreign exchanges; provide credit card service and guarantee; handle receipts and payments and insurance businesses as agents; provide safe boxes; undertake other businesses approved by the People’s Bank of China.
- 54.
Non-official translation. 关于银行业支持重点领域重大工程建设的指导意见 [Guanyu Yinhangye Zhichi Zhongdian Lingyu Zhongda Gongcheng Jianshe de Zhidao Yijian], 银监发 [2015]43号, 中国银监会国家发展和改革委员会发布, 2015年8月21日 (CBRC no.43, 2015, released by the National Development and Reform Commission of the CBRC). The CRBC is China’s banking regulator.
- 55.
杨中华: 境外贷款增速加快, 国有大行布局“一带一路”区域, [Yang Zhonghua, Jingwai Daikuan Zengshu Jiakuai, Guoyou Dahang Buju Yidaiyilu Quyu] 界面新闻, 2017年4月10日 Yang (2017b).
- 56.
易会满: 商业银行要做“一带一路”金融服务生力军, [Yi Huiman, Shangye Yinhang Yaozuo Yidaiyilu Jinrong Fuwu Shenglijun] 2017年5月19日, 财新网 Yi (2017b).
- 57.
Yang (2017b).
- 58.
金融事业部出品, 金融机构参与“一带一路”高峰论坛舆情研究报告, [Jinrong Jigou Canyu Yidaiyilu Gaofeng Luntan Yuqing Yanjiu Baogao]凤凰财经, 2017年5月25日 Phenix Financial News (2017).
- 59.
田国立: 构建金融大动脉, 助力“一带一路”建设再上新台阶, [Tian Guoli, Goujian Jirong Dadongmai, Zhuli Yidaiyilu Jianshe Zaishang Xin Taijie] 2017年6月14日, 中国银行网站 Guoli (2017).
- 60.
Wildau and Ma (2017).
- 61.
Kynge (2016).
- 62.
Kynge (2016).
- 63.
Another policy bank in China, the Agriculture Development Bank of China, focuses on agriculture development in China, and is not much involved in the BRI.
- 64.
For instance, China CITIC Bank, the seventh largest lender in terms of total assets in China, is actively involved in the BRI, providing loans to projects along the belt and road. Reportedly, President TIAN Liguo of BOC said that, there are nine Chinese commercial banks setting up 62 branches at provincial level, providing loans exceeding $1000bn. See, 林琦, 中行将尝试通过并购扩大一带一路沿线的网络布局--董事长 [Qi Lin, Zhonghang jiang Changshi Tongguo Binggou Kuoda Yidaiyilu Yanxian de Wangluo Buju] Qi (2017).
- 65.
The China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation is the only state-owned policy insurance corporation dealing with export and credit insurance, providing insurance service, including short-term export credit insurance, mid-term export credit insurance, and overseas investment insurance. The China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation also offers consultation to Chinese companies investing outside of China. Reportedly, by June 2017, China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation has supported 1097 export and investment projects along the Belt and Road, exceeding the amount of $320bn, covering fields including transportation, oil equipment, electrical engineering, and so on. It has the paid the amount of $1.67bn as indemnity to companies and banks along the Belt and Road, covering projects in 60 countries along the Belt and Road. See, XIAO Yang, 政策性信用保险为“一带一路”建设增添新动能 [Zhengcexing Xinyong Baoxian wei “Yidai Yilu” Jianshe Zengtian Xingongneng] Policy Credit Insurance Adds New Engine to the Construction of the Belt and Road (2017a).
- 66.
Jim Yong Kim, the World Bank Group President, announced at the opening plenary session of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, that “in partnership with China, other countries, and multilateral development banks, we’ve initiated the Global Infrastructure Facility and the Global Connectivity Alliance to provide project preparation funds, and transaction structure advice to help accelerate project readiness.” See: World Bank (2017).
- 67.
OECD’s definition of development financing does not lack criticism against such definition, and proposals to broaden the definition have been put forward. See, for instance, “the OECD-DAC definitions of ODA and OOFs are a good starting point, but they need to be reformed to clarify and to take into account all forms of finances aimed to support development”. This part, however, does not aim to categorize the various channels of funding in the financing mechanism of BRI into the terms OECD statistics provide; nor does this article wish to explore the evolvement of such definition of the OECD through the practices of the financing mechanism of BRI.
- 68.
See ii. (a) of the definition of the official development assistance by OECD.
- 69.
The official development assistance (ODA) is defined as those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; ii. Each transaction of which (a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and (b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25% (calculated at a rate of discount of 10%).
- 70.
The other financial flows (OOF) are defined as official sector transactions that do not meet official development assistance criteria.
- 71.
OECD (2017).
- 72.
The Chinese government’s definition of foreign aid enlists financing mechanisms that overlap with the financing mechanism of the BRI. According to the State Council White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid, China provides grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans, with 8 forms of foreign aid: complete (turn-key) projects, goods and materials, technical cooperation, human resource development cooperation, medical teams sent abroad, emergency humanitarian aid, volunteer programs in foreign countries and debt relief’. State Council (2011) White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid. pp.8. Financial resources for Chinese foreign aid, as written in the white papers, are, (a) grant, (b) interest-free loan from the government budget, and (c) concessional loans issued by the Exim Bank of China. The BRI projects, with concessional loans issued by the Eximbank of China, have an element of foreign aid.
- 73.
An example of such funds set up the CDB, though not for the BRI, is the China-Africa Development Fund set up by CDB, conducting equity investment in Chinese companies and projects investing and trading in Africa, to provide financial support to the companies and projects.
- 74.
The two preferential facilities provide loans with low interest rate (2–3%), and long period (15–20 years, with the option of only paying back the interest for a period, and paying back certain amounts every half a year). Such financial mechanism is, thus, preferred by developing countries.
- 75.
朱振鑫, “一带一路”融资机制全梳理, 民生证券研究院, [Zhu Zhenxin, Yidaiyilu Rongzi Jizhi Quan Shuli] 2017年3月22日 Zhu (2017).
- 76.
For a detailed narrative on the financing mechanism and the current situation of the financing of the BRI, see Zhu (2017).
- 77.
There are clear indications of commercial and diplomatic interests attached to the project: it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than the Ministry of Commerce that deals with strategic plan in finance for development. For a detailed narrative on the institutional arrangement within China on development cooperation, see Gu (2015), pp. 2–3.
- 78.
Gu (2015).
- 79.
Arezki et al. (2016), pp. 7–8.
- 80.
“Crédit Agricole retained the number 18 spot on the list, with $854m.” See Weinland (2017).
- 81.
Such investors include, sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, and insurance companies. See Arezki et al. (2016).
- 82.
Weinland (2017).
- 83.
“In 2012, banks from China that made it into the top 20 did $4.47bn in infrastructure finance in Asia, holding 11.2 per cent of the total market. Four years later, Chinese banks did $38.4bn, more than 60 per cent of the market.” See Weinland (2017).
- 84.
EPSC (2015).
- 85.
Globalization has led to optimistic results. As Martin Sandbu writes, in the quarter-century from 1990, “the absolute number of people living in ‘extreme poverty’ has fallen from 2bn to less than half that”; “rich countries made up 80 percent of nominal global economic output in 1990”, and now “that number is barely 60 per cent.” Through this process, “globalisation has created its own defenders. Thanks to economic integration, (much of) the developing world has become richer — which constitutes both a benefit and a source of power to shape world affairs.” See Sandbu (2017).
- 86.
Sandbu (2017).
- 87.
Allen (2017).
- 88.
Anderlini (2017).
- 89.
For detailed analysis, see Kynge et al. (2017).
- 90.
Cottee (2017). The major obstacles for nuclear projects include environmental consciousness and the dwindling market competition in nuclear energy providing industry.
- 91.
“In Libya, for instance, the outbreak of civil war in 2011 put paid to a $2.6bn project to build a line from Tripoli to Sirte, hometown of the late dictator Muammer Gaddafi.” See: Kynge et al. (2017).
- 92.
China Development Bank is the largest of China’s three state-owned non-commercial “policy banks”.
- 93.
Wildau and Ma (2017).
- 94.
Chin (2016).
- 95.
Xiao (2016), p. 437.
- 96.
Reportedly, The United Kingdom was interested in attracting Chinese finance to London rather than Frankfurt. See: Anderlini (2015, 17 March).
- 97.
For details of the response of major European countries, US, Japan, Australia, South Korea, see: Callaghan and Hubbard (2016).
- 98.
EPSC (2015).
- 99.
See, for instance Xinhua News (2017).
- 100.
“Many African officials are concerned that Chinese workers are displacing local workers”. See Monga and Lin (2015), p. 807.
- 101.
See, for instance, Nicholas Morris, Developing A Sustainable Legal System for the Belt and Road Initiative; Guilherme Vilaça, Strenghtening the Cultural and Normative Foundations of the Belt and Road Initiative: The Colombo Plan, Yan Xuetong and Chinese Ancient Thought, both included in this volume. By no means this chapter considers such readings into BRI by referring to the Chinese philosophies unjustified; quite a contrary, those readings offer an alternative approach to reading into Chinese activities on the global arena, and to global governance in general.
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Zhang, K. (2018). A Tale of Ending Poverty: The New Financial Institutions and China’s Global Strategy. In: Shan, W., Nuotio, K., Zhang, K. (eds) Normative Readings of the Belt and Road Initiative. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78018-4_6
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