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Corporate Governance Codes: How to Deal with the Bright and Dark Sides of Family Influence

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The Palgrave Handbook of Heterogeneity among Family Firms

Abstract

This study examined how corporate governance codes specific to private family firms encourage the bright side and restrict the dark side of family influence. Moreover, it investigated whether these codes foster agency or stewardship tendencies of the family’s involvement in the business. The results of this qualitative research study revealed that the eight analyzed codes are not consistent in their recommendations and focus on different aspects of family influence. Nevertheless, some common recommendations could be identified—for instance, the relevance of family governance mechanisms to avoid conflicts.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The quite general approach of the Turkish code might be due to the fact that the organization that developed the code for family firms, the Corporate Governance Organization of Turkey, also set up other corporate governance codes for specific settings—for instance, the Codes for Turkish Football Clubs.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. HSBA Hamburg School of Business Administration, Institute for Mittelstand and Family Firms (IMF), Hamburg, Germany

    Stefan Prigge & Felix K. Thiele

  2. Leuphana University of Lueneburg, Lueneburg, Germany

    Felix K. Thiele

Authors
  1. Stefan Prigge
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  2. Felix K. Thiele
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Correspondence to Stefan Prigge .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Bryan School of Business and Economics, University of North Carolina-Greensboro, Greensboro, NC, USA

    Esra Memili

  2. School of Business Administration, The University of Mississippi, University, MS, USA

    Clay Dibrell

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Prigge, S., Thiele, F.K. (2019). Corporate Governance Codes: How to Deal with the Bright and Dark Sides of Family Influence. In: Memili, E., Dibrell, C. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Heterogeneity among Family Firms. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77676-7_12

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