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The Need for Reforming the Alternative Benchmark Regime in WTO Anti-Subsidy Law

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Book cover The Use of Alternative Benchmarks in Anti-Subsidy Law

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EYIELMONO,volume 4))

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Abstract

Alternative benchmark regimes for NMES in WTO anti-subsidy law have proven a large—and still enlarging—area of law. But whether this development is in accord with the WTO’s legal framework and with its constitutive core, is doubtful.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    On the WTO accession process and respective commitments of China see Sect. 3.2.1.

  2. 2.

    https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm (last visited 1 January 2018).

  3. 3.

    Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam, WT/ACC/VNM/48, 27 October 2006.

  4. 4.

    Protocol on the Accession of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, WT/L/662, 15 November 2006.

  5. 5.

    Gantz, 36 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation (2010), 85, at 94.

  6. 6.

    Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Republic of Tajikistan, WT/ACC/TJK/30, 6 November 2012.

  7. 7.

    According to the statistics provided for by the WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing measures, which are based on respective notifications of WTO members, of a total of 431 anti-subsidy investigations between 1 January 1995 and 30 June 2016 the US initiated 191, Canada 53 and Australia 23. The EU is listed with 77 investigations, see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/CV_InitiationsByRepMem.pdf (last visited 1 January 2018). According to the Global Countervailing Duty Database by Bown, for the period from 1995 to 2015, the US commenced 187 investigations, Canada 52 and Australia 21. The EU is listed with 76 proceedings, see Bown, Chad P. (2016) “Global Countervailing Duties Database,” The World Bank, June, available at http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/gcvd/ (last visited 1 January 2018).

  8. 8.

    Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. 71-361, 46 Stat. 59019, 17 June 1930, 19 USC 4 (§§ 1202-1683g), last amended 15 July 2015. §§ 1671-1677h therein refer to anti-subsidy law.

  9. 9.

    19 USC 4, § 1671.

  10. 10.

    Pub. L. 112-99.

  11. 11.

    See Cornelis, 2 Global Trade and Customs Journal (2007), 421.

  12. 12.

    Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, US Court of Appeals, Judgment of 18 September 1986, 801 F.2d 1308. For a more detailed overview on the history of non-applicability of US countervailing duty law in NMES see Smith, J., U.S. Trade Remedy Laws and Nonmarket Economies, at 5 et seq.

  13. 13.

    Smith, J., U.S. Trade Remedy Laws and Nonmarket Economies, at 10 et seq.

  14. 14.

    China sought judicial action against the decision, but its claim was rejected by the US Court of International Trade, see Smith, J., U.S. Trade Remedy Laws and Nonmarket Economies, at 10 et seq.

  15. 15.

    19 USC § 1677(18)(A).

  16. 16.

    See e.g. Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China, Case C-570-907, Amended Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 17484, 9 April 2007, at 17486 et seq.; Smith, J., U.S. Trade Remedy Laws and Nonmarket Economies, at 16.

  17. 17.

    Special Import Measures Act, RSC 1985, chapter S-15, last amended on 1 November 2014.

  18. 18.

    An Act relating to the Customs (Customs Act 1901), C1901A00006 No. 6, 3 October 1901, last amended on 5 May 2016.

  19. 19.

    Zhou, 49 Journal of World Trade (2015), 975, at 978.

  20. 20.

    Unlike other major economies, Australia does, however, not apply NMES methodologies against China. Rather, Australia has explicitly granted to China market-economy status for trade remedy investigations as part of the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement negotiations in 2005. See Paragraph 2 Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China on the Recognition of China’s Full Market Economy Status and the Commencement of Negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the People’s Republic of China, 18 April 2005, available at https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/chafta/Documents/mou_aust-china_fta.pdf (last visited 1 January 2018).

  21. 21.

    For the data see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A20# (last visited 1 January 2018).

  22. 22.

    Request for Consultations by Canada, US — Softwood Lumber III, WT/DS236/1, 27 August 2001; Request for Consultations by Canada, US — Softwood Lumber IV, WT/DS257/1, 13 May 2002; Request for Consultations by China, United States — Preliminary Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations on Coated Free Sheet Paper from China, WT/DS368/1, 18 September 2007; Request for Consultations by China, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/1, 22 September 2008; Request for Consultations by India, US – Carbon Steel (India), WT/DS436/1, 18 April 2012; Request for Consultations by China, US – Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS437/1, 30 May 2012; Request for Consultations by Pakistan, European Union — Countervailing Measures on Certain Polyethylene Terephthalate from Pakistan, WT/DS486/1, 5 November 2014; Request for Consultations by Canada, United States — Countervailing Measures on Supercalendered Paper from Canada, WT/DS505/1, 5 April 2016; Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States — Countervailing Measures on Cold- and Hot-Rolled Steel Flat Products from Brazil, WT/DS514/1, 17 November 2016; Request for Consultations by Turkey, Countervailing Measures on Certain Pipe and Tube Products (Turkey), WT/DS523/1, 13 March 2017; Request for Consultations by Canada, United States — Countervailing Measures on Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS533/1, 28 November 2017; Request for Consultations by Canada, United States — Certain Systemic Trade Remedies Measures, WT/DS535/1, 20 December 2017.

  23. 23.

    For the data see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A30# (last visited 1 January 2018).

  24. 24.

    Request for Consultations by China, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/1, 22 September 2008; Request for Consultations by China, US – Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS437/1, 30 May 2012.

  25. 25.

    In US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), the US initially also invoked Section 15(b) CAP. In the course of proceedings, however, the US and China agreed on the dispute being entirely solved under the general alternative benchmark regime of the ASCM, see Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.110; Pauwelyn, 12 World Trade Review (2013), 235, at 240.

  26. 26.

    For the data see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A30# (last visited 1 January 2018).

  27. 27.

    http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/legality (last visited 1 January 2018); http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/legitimate (last visited 1 January 2018).

  28. 28.

    Bodansky, UGA Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-013 (2007), 1, at 3.

  29. 29.

    http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/legality (last visited 1 January 2018).

  30. 30.

    http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/legitimacy (last visited 1 January 2018).

  31. 31.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 435.

  32. 32.

    Bodansky, UGA Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-013 (2007), 1, at 2.

  33. 33.

    Bodansky, UGA Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-013 (2007), 1, at 1; Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 435; Bronckers, 2 Journal of International Economic Law (1999), 547, at 555.

  34. 34.

    Bodansky, UGA Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-013 (2007), 1, at 2 et seq.; Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 435.

  35. 35.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 435.

  36. 36.

    http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/legitimacy (last visited 1 January 2018).

  37. 37.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 435.

  38. 38.

    Bodansky, UGA Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-013 (2007), 1, at 7.

  39. 39.

    Bodansky, UGA Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-013 (2007), 1, at 7.

  40. 40.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 435; Bodansky, UGA Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-013 (2007), 1, at 3.

  41. 41.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 435; Bodansky, UGA Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-013 (2007), 1, at 3.

  42. 42.

    Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, at 45; Hilf, 4 Journal of International Economic Law (2001), 111, at 116; Shell, 44 Duke Law Journal (1995), 829, at 831; Nguyen, 22 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal (2008), 243, at 243.

  43. 43.

    Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, 18 December 1996, at para. 1.

  44. 44.

    Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, at 38 et seq; Hilf, 4 Journal of International Economic Law (2001), 111, at 121.

  45. 45.

    Appellate Body Report, China – Rare Earths, at para. 5.57.

  46. 46.

    Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, at para. 5.123; Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, at 474 et seq.

  47. 47.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 435 et seq.

  48. 48.

    For a more detailed description of these developments see Hilf, 4 Journal of International Economic Law (2001), 111, at 111.

  49. 49.

    In dependence on Hilf , the terms “rule-oriented” and “rule-based” shall be distinguished here, the latter referring to being more fully determined by the rule of law, see Hilf, 4 Journal of International Economic Law (2001), 111, at 114.

  50. 50.

    Bronckers, 2 Journal of International Economic Law (1999), 547, at 548.

  51. 51.

    Shell, 44 Duke Law Journal (1995), 829, at 831.

  52. 52.

    Hilf, 4 Journal of International Economic Law (2001), 111, at 116.

  53. 53.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 434; Shell, 44 Duke Law Journal (1995), 829, at 833.

  54. 54.

    Hilf, 4 Journal of International Economic Law (2001), 111, at 129 et seq.

  55. 55.

    Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I, 135, at para. 124; Hilf, 4 Journal of International Economic Law (2001), 111, at 129.

  56. 56.

    Bronckers, 2 Journal of International Economic Law (1999), 547, at 555; Elsig, 41 Journal of World Trade (2007), 75; Howse in Coicaud/Heiskanen (eds.), at 355; Armingeon et al. in Cottier/Delimatsis (eds.), 69, at 74; Qin, Wayne State University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2014-11 (2014), 1, at 12 et seq.

  57. 57.

    Bronckers, 2 Journal of International Economic Law (1999), 547, at 556.

  58. 58.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 435 et seq.

  59. 59.

    Hilf, 4 Journal of International Economic Law (2001), 111, at 117 et seq.

  60. 60.

    Statute of the International Law Commission, UN GA Resolution 174 (II), 21 November 1947.

  61. 61.

    See Sect. 3.2.1.2.

  62. 62.

    On particularities of the WTO accession process see Cattaneo/Primo Braga, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5116 (2009), 1, at 12 et seq.; Michalopoulos in Hoekman et al. (eds.), at 61; https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acces_e.htm (last visited 1 January 2018).

  63. 63.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 441.

  64. 64.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 441.

  65. 65.

    Charnovitz, GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 237 (2013), 1, at 59. For this reason, Qin designated the provision as “loophole in the system”, see Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 389.

  66. 66.

    https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/term (last visited 1 January 2018).

  67. 67.

    https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/thesaurus/condition (last visited 1 January 2018).

  68. 68.

    Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, at para. 5.123.

  69. 69.

    Qin, Wayne State University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2016-05 (2016), 1, at 11.

  70. 70.

    Ministerial Decision, Agreement Establishing the WTO: acceptance of and accession to the agreement, LT/UR/D-6/1, 15 April 1994.

  71. 71.

    Charnovitz, GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 237 (2013), 1, at 55 et seq.; Qin, Wayne State University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2016-05 (2016), 1, at 12.

  72. 72.

    Qin, Wayne State University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2016-05 (2016), 1, at 13.

  73. 73.

    E.g. Articles 27 and 29 ASCM, see Sect. 5.2.2.1.3.1; Qin, Wayne State University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2016-05 (2016), 1, at 12.

  74. 74.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 400 et seq.

  75. 75.

    Qin proposes the introduction of such an annex to the WTO Agreement to remedy present legal insecurity, see 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 431.

  76. 76.

    E.g. the aforementioned Articles II:7 GATT and XX:3 GATS.

  77. 77.

    Tyagi, 15 Journal of International Economic Law (2012), 391, at 414.

  78. 78.

    Ehlermann/Ehring, 8 Journal of International Economic Law (2005), 51, at 57.

  79. 79.

    De Witte in Biondi et al. (eds.), 107, at 125; Fortunato in Blanke/Mangiameli (eds.), 1357, at 1377; Tatham, Enlargement of the European Union, at 260; Conway, EU Law, at 114.

  80. 80.

    Charnovitz, GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 237 (2013), 1, at 59.

  81. 81.

    Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, at 38.

  82. 82.

    Polouektov, 36 Journal of World Trade (2002), 1, at 9 et seq; Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 383 et seq.

  83. 83.

    Hilf, 4 Journal of International Economic Law (2001), 111, at 114; see also Sect. 5.2.1.2.1.

  84. 84.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 383 et seq.

  85. 85.

    Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials, at para. 7.112.

  86. 86.

    Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials, at para. 7.112; Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 439.

  87. 87.

    Especially by Qin , see Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 440.

  88. 88.

    On structure and general hierarchy of the WTO agreements see Sect. 2.3.2.

  89. 89.

    Appellate Body Report, China – Rare Earths, at para. 5.55, 5.57 and 5.61; see Sect. 3.2.3.1.2.

  90. 90.

    On the different types of accession commitments see Sect. 3.2.1.2.

  91. 91.

    Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, at 179 et seq; Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 421.

  92. 92.

    See Sect. 2.3.2.

  93. 93.

    See Sect. 3.2.3.2 for the China-specific alternative benchmark regime for NMES in Section 15(b) CAP and the general regime in Article 14 ASCM.

  94. 94.

    Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, at para. 5.123.

  95. 95.

    See Sects. 5.2.2.1.3.1 and 5.2.2.1.3.2.

  96. 96.

    Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, DSR 1999:III, 1161, at para. 6.47, footnote 49.

  97. 97.

    For a more detailed discussion on the reasons for the expiry of the provisions see Sect. 6.1.4.1.1.1.

  98. 98.

    Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners, at para. 398.

  99. 99.

    See Sect. 3.1.1.1.2.

  100. 100.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 401.

  101. 101.

    For a more detailed discussion on designating accession protocols as reservations see Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 401 et seq.; Tyagi, 15 Journal of International Economic Law (2012), 391, at 418 and 424 et seq.

  102. 102.

    Consenting Tyagi, 15 Journal of International Economic Law (2012), 391, at 418.

  103. 103.

    Regarding the discussion of the Protocol of Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement introducing the permanent waiver of Article 31bis and Annex I to the TRIPS Agreement see Matsushita et al., The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy, at 653 et seq.; Kongolo, Unsettled International Intellectual Property Issues, at 22.

  104. 104.

    On the two initially existing exceptions in anti-subsidy law for developing countries and the transition to a market economy, Articles 27 and 29 ASCM, see Sects. 5.2.2.1.3.1 and 6.1.4.1.1.1.

  105. 105.

    On the differentiation between WTO-plus and WTO-minus commitments see Sect. 3.2.1.2.

  106. 106.

    Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, DSR 2001:VIII, 591, at para. 382.

  107. 107.

    See Sect. 5.2.2.1.1.2.

  108. 108.

    As regards a discussion of the pros and cons of designating accession protocols as amendments see Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 403 et seq.; Tyagi, 15 Journal of International Economic Law (2012), 391, at 418 and 424 et seq.; on the requirements for an amendment of WTO provisions in general see Ehlermann/Ehring, 8 Journal of International Economic Law (2005), 51, at 57.

  109. 109.

    Charnovitz, GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 237 (2013), 1, at 47.

  110. 110.

    In the case of China, for instance, the accession terms were approved unanimously by all of the then 142 WTO members, see https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm (last visited 1 January 2018).

  111. 111.

    Charnovitz, GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 237 (2013), 1, at 59.

  112. 112.

    https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acces_e.htm (last visited 1 January 2018).

  113. 113.

    https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acces_e.htm (last visited 1 January 2018).

  114. 114.

    Ehlermann/Ehring, 8 Journal of International Economic Law (2005), 51, at 58.

  115. 115.

    Luo, Anti-dumping in the WTO, the EU, and China, at 99; Ehlermann/Ehring, 8 Journal of International Economic Law (2005), 803, at 811.

  116. 116.

    Luo, Anti-dumping in the WTO, the EU, and China, at 99.

  117. 117.

    As argued by Ehlermann and Ehring , authoritative interpretations may add to or diminish existing rights of WTO members in contrast to Panel and Appellate Body interpretations, which may not. This also accords with the requirement not to undermine Article X WTO Agreement, see Ehlermann/Ehring, 8 Journal of International Economic Law (2005), 51, at 58 et seq. Qin , on the other hand, distinguishes between mere interpretation of a legal framework as set down in Article 30(3)(a) VCLT and subsequent agreements with modifying effect, e.g. Article 59 VCLT. Taking a narrow view on Article IX:2 WTO Agreement, she contends authoritative interpretations must not change the existing rules of a legal framework, see Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 411 et seq.

  118. 118.

    The major part of scholarly literature follows this understanding, just see von Bogdany/Wagner in Wolfrum et al., at 6 et seq.; Charnovitz, The Path of World Trade Law in the 21st Century, at 318, footnote 144.

  119. 119.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 412.

  120. 120.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 412.

  121. 121.

    See Sect. 3.2.3.2.4.1 for the different models of application; see also Mueller, 50 Journal of World Trade (2016), 867, at 872 et seq.

  122. 122.

    Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, at 315 et seq. For a more detailed discussion of the pros and cons of designating accession protocols as amendments see Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 403 et seq.; Tyagi, 15 Journal of International Economic Law (2012), 391, at 420 et seq.

  123. 123.

    Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, at 44 et seq.; Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 405.

  124. 124.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 406.

  125. 125.

    Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24 April 2012, DSR 2012:XI, 5751, at para 267; Moloo, 31 Berkeley Journal of International Law (2013), 39, at 61; Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, at 47.

  126. 126.

    Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, at 45.

  127. 127.

    Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, at 45.

  128. 128.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 411; Arato, 38 Yale Journal of International Law (2013), 289, at 307; Arato, 9 The Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (2010), 443, at 458 et seq.

  129. 129.

    Murphy in Nolte (ed.), 82, at 83 et seq.; Arato, 38 Yale Journal of International Law (2013), 289, at 307 et seq.

  130. 130.

    Draft Article 38 VCLT, see Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 407; Arato, 38 Yale Journal of International Law (2013), 289, at 310.

  131. 131.

    Qin, Wayne State University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2016-05 (2016), 1, at 14 et seq.; Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 407 et seq.

  132. 132.

    Murphy in Nolte (ed.), 82, at 85.

  133. 133.

    Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R, adopted 27 September 2005, and Corr.1, DSR 2005:XIX, 9157, para. 259; Arato, 38 Yale Journal of International Law (2013), 289, at 315.

  134. 134.

    See ICJ cases Namibia, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, 16 and Wall, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, 136., as well as Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, DSR 1998:I, 9), at para. 45 et seq.; Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 408 et seq.

  135. 135.

    Panel Report – China Raw Materials, at para. 7.112; Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 439 et seq.

  136. 136.

    Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 January 2010, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS363/AB/R, DSR 2010:II, 261, para. VII.281.

  137. 137.

    See Tyagi, 15 Journal of International Economic Law (2012), 391, at 415.

  138. 138.

    Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2005, DSR 2005:XII, 5663 (and Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, 5475), at para. 192.

  139. 139.

    Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 259.

  140. 140.

    https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm (last visited 1 January 2018).

  141. 141.

    Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/2, 2 April 1996.

  142. 142.

    Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/2/Rev.11, 7 June 2001, and Corr.1, 22 June 2001.

  143. 143.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, at para. 192.

  144. 144.

    See Sect. 5.2.2.1.1.2.

  145. 145.

    Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, at 45.

  146. 146.

    See Sect. 5.2.1.2.1.

  147. 147.

    Dissenting Qin, Wayne State University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2016-05 (2016), 1, at 14 et seq., and 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 407 et seq.

  148. 148.

    Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, at 474.

  149. 149.

    Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, at 474 et seq.

  150. 150.

    Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, at 476.

  151. 151.

    See Sect. 5.2.2.1.3.7.

  152. 152.

    See Sect. 3.2.1.3; Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 438 et seq.

  153. 153.

    Qin mentions the example of EU accession where prospective members are required to bring their national law in accordance with EU law and, if necessary, enact additional EU-mandated provisions, see Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 436.

  154. 154.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 438.

  155. 155.

    Regarding China, for instance, Section 15(b) CAP addresses the use of alternative benchmarks in connection with anti-subsidy investigations. Section 15(a) CAP set up a corresponding regime for anti-dumping proceedings.

  156. 156.

    In the example of China, the anti-dumping rules for NMES were set to expire 15 years after China’s accession, while the anti-subsidy rules are permanent.

  157. 157.

    See Sect. 5.2.2.1.2.

  158. 158.

    Qin, 37 Journal of World Trade (2003), 483, at 513.

  159. 159.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 440.

  160. 160.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 440.

  161. 161.

    For the like discussion on the applicability of Article I:1 GATT see Sect. 5.2.2.1.2.1.

  162. 162.

    Bayefsky, 11 Human Rights Quarterly (1990), 1, at 5.

  163. 163.

    Qin, 37 Journal of World Trade (2003), 483, at 514.

  164. 164.

    Qin, 37 Journal of World Trade (2003), 483, at 515.

  165. 165.

    E.g. granting temporary exceptions from the WTO acquis for transitory countries though Articles 27 and 29 ASCM have per se expired.

  166. 166.

    See Sect. 5.2.2.1.3.10.

  167. 167.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 441 et seq.

  168. 168.

    Hoyt, 136 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1988), 1647, at 1666.

  169. 169.

    See Sect. 2.4.2.4.1.

  170. 170.

    See Sect. 2.4.2.4.2.1 regarding the interpretation of the Appellate Body in Canada – Aircraft of Art. 1.1(b) ASCM and Sect. 2.4.2.4.2.2 regarding the interpretation of the Appellate Body in Brazil – Aircraft of item (k) of the Illustrative List of Subsidies.

  171. 171.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 93, 95.

  172. 172.

    For details see Sect. 3.1.1.2.

  173. 173.

    Emphasis by the authoress.

  174. 174.

    Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European Communities, WT/DS212/AB/R, adopted 8 January 2003, DSR 2003:I, 5, at para. 139; Panel Report, United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/R and Corr.2, adopted 7 June 2000, as upheld by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS138/AB/R, DSR 2000:VI, 2631, at para. 6.52.

  175. 175.

    Emphasis by the authoress.

  176. 176.

    See general Interpretative Note to Annex 1 A.

  177. 177.

    Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, at 14.

  178. 178.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, at 17.

  179. 179.

    Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, at 16.

  180. 180.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, at para. 139.

  181. 181.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, at para. 139.

  182. 182.

    Mueller (2016), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2665960, 1, at 6.

  183. 183.

    For the details see Sect. 3.1.2.4.1.

  184. 184.

    Possible Elements to be Considered for Inclusion in an Anti-Dumping Code, TN.64/NTB/W/13, 9 December 1966.

  185. 185.

    Possible Elements to be Considered for Inclusion in an Anti-Dumping Code, TN.64/NTB/W/13, 9 December 1966, at 4.

  186. 186.

    See Sect. 5.2.2.1.1.2.

  187. 187.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 95.

  188. 188.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 95.

  189. 189.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 93, 95.

  190. 190.

    See Sect. 2.4.3.1.

  191. 191.

    Polouektov, 36 Journal of World Trade (2002), 1, at 5.

  192. 192.

    Polouektov, 36 Journal of World Trade (2002), 1, at 5.

  193. 193.

    Detlof/Fridh, 2 Global Trade and Customs Journal (2007), 265, at 268.

  194. 194.

    Due to the Soviet Union, which basically was the only state economy country taking part in the negotiations for the ITO, the draft ITO Charter contained a section on ‘Expansion of Trade by Complete State Monopolies of Import Trade’. After it became apparent that the Soviet Union would not be joining the GATT, the respective provisions were removed from the agenda, see Detlof/Fridh, 2 Global Trade and Customs Journal (2007), 265, at 268; Polouektov, 36 Journal of World Trade (2002), 1, at 6.

  195. 195.

    Polouektov, 36 Journal of World Trade (2002), 1, at 5; Du, 63 International & Comparative Law Quarterly (2014), 409, at 427.

  196. 196.

    See Sect. 5.2.2.1.1.4.

  197. 197.

    Polouektov, 36 Journal of World Trade (2002), 1, at 5.

  198. 198.

    Jain/Khanna, Economic Concepts and Methods, at 26 et seq.

  199. 199.

    See Sect. 2.4.3.1.

  200. 200.

    Qin, 7 Journal of International Economic Law (2004), 863, at 870; Feldman/Burke, 62 American University Law Review (2008), 787, at 805.

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Müller, S. (2018). The Need for Reforming the Alternative Benchmark Regime in WTO Anti-Subsidy Law. In: The Use of Alternative Benchmarks in Anti-Subsidy Law. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(), vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77613-2_5

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