Abstract
This paper argues that there is a difference between the concept of law and the validity of law. Whereas the concept of law provides the criteria of what law is, its validity signifies that law belongs to a certain system of meaning (e.g., a social, moral, or legal order). Accordingly, a norm that can properly be called law may or may not have legal, social, or moral validity (first thesis: separation of concept and validity of law). The first function of validity is to distinguish a particular system of meaning from others (second thesis: separation of different forms of validity). The validity of legal norms may depend on other systems of meaning such as morals (justice, equality, etc.) or social behavior (effectiveness, enforcement, acceptance, etc.) or not (third thesis: moral or social validity is not a necessary condition for the validity of law). Only norms that are law and are legally valid are also legally binding (fourth thesis: validity of law is a necessary condition for its bindingness).
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Notes
- 1.
Grabowski (2013) provides an excellent overview and discussion from an analytical point of view.
- 2.
Cf. Raz (1977), p. 339: “A rule which is not legally valid is not a legal rule at all. A valid law is a law, an invalid law is not.”
- 3.
Jellinek (1959), p. 333: “All Law has as a necessary feature, that of validity. A legal sentence is only part of a legal order if it is valid; law that is no longer valid or not yet valid is not law in the proper sense of the word. A norm is valid if it is capable of working to motivate, to determine the will. This ability stems from the conviction that cannot further be deduced that we are obliged to follow it” (my translation, SK).
- 4.
Again Jellinek (1959), p. 334.
- 5.
Raz (1977), p. 341.
- 6.
Verdroß (1950), p. 98: “The question of validity (efficacy) of a legal order leads us into sociology, the question of the positive legal validity of a single norm is a problem for legal theory, the question of obligation finally is a problem of the philosophy of values” (“Wertphilosophie”), (my translation, SK).
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
Different opinion: Peters (2011), p. 21 ff., who takes soft law to be normative sentences and law (p. 23). She has to admit though that the binding force of European law does not stem from the respective regulations, but from Article 42 TEU, the general duty to cooperate (p. 24): “The legal duty of cooperation is the source of a legal obligation of the member states to take European Union soft law into account in some way or the other - without being directly bound by it.”
- 11.
“Promoting function,” Peters (2011), p. 35.
- 12.
Goodin (2005), p. 240.
- 13.
For this element of legal norms, see below.
- 14.
“Evolution” or “growth” of soft law, Goodin (2005), pp. 239 f.
- 15.
For examples cf. Peters (2011), pp. 27 f.
- 16.
Luhmann (1987), p. 257.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
Dworkin (1986), p. 413.
- 20.
John Austin: “A law is a command which obliges a person or persons. But, as contradistinguished or opposed to an occasional or particular command, a law is a command which obliges a person or persons, and obliges generally to acts or forbearances of a class […] a law is a command which obliges a person or persons to a course of conduct,” Austin (1832), p. 18.
- 21.
Schmitt (1989), p. 22: “Every law as a normative regulation, including the constitutional law, in its ultimate foundation needs a previous political decision that has been reached by a politically existing power or authority” (my translation, SK). Or Coleman (1982), p. 148 assumes “that the authority of law is a matter of its acceptance by officials.”
- 22.
“Law in a juridical sense in general is everything that human beings who live in some kind of community together, mutually acknowledge as a norm or rule for this coexistence,” Bierling (1894), p. 19 (my translation, SK).
- 23.
- 24.
Moore (1903), p. 10.
- 25.
Kelsen (1960), S. 47. Instead of a formal, Kant presupposes a material basic norm: “An External Legislation, containing pure Natural Laws, is therefore conceivable; but in that case a previous Natural Law must be presupposed to establish the authority of the Lawgiver by the Right to subject others to Obligation through his own act of Will,” Kant, Law, p. 33.
- 26.
Kelsen (1960), pp. 65 f., 68 f., 198 f.
- 27.
Dreier (1996), p. 580.
- 28.
For this discussion in Germany in the twentieth century, cf. Kirste (2015a), pp. 91 ff.
- 29.
Liebnitz (2003), pp. 70 f.: “Unde pater, Iegem ex conventione populi valere;” in German: “Hieraus erhellt, daß das Gesetz seine Geltung aus der Übereinkunft des Volkes bezieht.”
- 30.
Locke (1824), p. 418: “Thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others. The rules that they make for other men’s actions, must, as well as their own and other men’s actions, be conformable to the laws of nature, i.e. to the will of God, of which that is a declaration; and the ‘fundamental’ law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good or valid against it.” Locke uses the term very rarely, though.
- 31.
“…any law of the ordinary legislature, which conflicted with a constitutional law directly proceeding from the extraordinary, would be treated by the courts of justice as a legally invalid act” (Austin 1832, p. 244 cf. also p. 265, note). So Austin obviously knows the term, also when he speaks of “solemnities or formalities which are essential to the validity of certain contracts” (1832, p. XXXIX) but finds no systematic use for it, even where one would expect it.
- 32.
Austin (1832), pp. 278 f.: Blackstone “tells us ‘that the laws of God … are superior in obligation to any other laws: that no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to them: that all human laws which are valid, derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from those divine originals… to say that a human law which conflicts with the law of God, is therefore not binding, or not valid, is to talk stark nonsense… Numberless human laws adverse to general utility, have been and are enforced in every age and nation: and yet such human laws conflict with the law of God as known through the very exponent adopted by Blackstone himself…”—making it clear that “validity” was a useful concept for both Blackstone and himself.
- 33.
Austin (1832), p. 269: “If a law which it sets to its subjects conflict with a law of the kind, the former is legally valid, or legally binding.”
- 34.
Bentham (1840), p. 104: “lf a king had taken an oath to render his subjects unhappy, would such an engagement be valid?… It cannot be denied then, that the validity of the contract is at bottom, only a question of utility, a little wrapped up, a little disguised, and in consequence, more susceptible of false interpretations.” For the causes of invalidation of exchanges: p. 172.
- 35.
Bentham (1840), p. 207. He adds though: “But for granting or refusing it reasons are necessary.”
- 36.
Fichte (1845), p. 89: “So viel läßt sich einsehen, dass eine Gemeinschaft freier Wesen, als solcher, nicht bestehen könne, wenn nicht jeder diesem Gesetze unterworfen ist; und dass sonach, wer diese Gemeinschaft wolle, notwendig das Gesetz auch wollen müsse; dass es also hypothetische Gültigkeit habe. Wenn eine Gemeinschaft freier Wesen, als solcher, möglich sein soll, so muss das Rechtsgesetz gelten.” Cf. also p. 91 where validity (“Gültigkeit”) of law for one is made dependent on the acceptance of the other.
- 37.
Kant rarely applies the term “Geltung” (“validity”) or “gelten” (to be valid) and does not elaborate a systematic use of the term. However, he does not omit the term, even in his legal philosophy, cf. in the introduction of the Metaphysics of Morals he writes “Nur sofern sie [die Sittengesetze, SK] als a priori gegründet und notwendig eingesehen werden können, gelten sie als Gesetze”/Moral Laws “in contradistinction to Natural Laws, are only valid as Laws, in so far as they can be rationally established a priori and comprehended as necessary.” In this context Kant applies the term “validity” to signify different preconditions for natural and moral laws as means of explanation or comprehension. In more legal context he states, “Also gilt der Satz: ‘Kauf bricht nicht Miete,’ “The proposition, then, that ‘Purchase breaks Hire’ holds in principle,” Philosophy of Law, pp. 15 and 132.
- 38.
Cf. Hegel Grundlinien: § 217 Z, p. 619: “Mein Wille ist ein vernünftiger, er gilt, und dies Gelten soll von dem anderen anerkannt sein. Hier muß nun meine Subjektivität und die des anderen hinwegfallen, und der Wille muß eine Sicherheit, Festigkeit und Objektivität erlangen, welche er nur durch die Form erhalten kann” [my emphasis, SK].
- 39.
Weber (1974), Col. 224–226: The ancient greek “νόμισμα” for money relates it to νόμῳ (custom) and νόμος (law) as Aristotle said in his Nicomachean Ethics V, 5, 11: “money has become by convention a sort of representative of demand; and this is why it has the name ‘money’ (nomisma) because it exists not by nature but by law (nomos) and it is in our power to change it and make it useless.” Just like conventional laws, money does not exist naturally, but is valid based on our changeable recognition.
- 40.
Lasson (1882), p. 424.
- 41.
Schmitt (1993), p. 25.
- 42.
For concepts of validity as attribution or “membership”, cf. Grabowski (2013), pp. 271 ff., which he rejects, pp. 279, 311.
- 43.
- 44.
Rickert (1921), p. 122: “Something that merely exists, is not valid… Who says that ‘facts’ that are not values, are valid, talks imprecisely, or nonsense” (my translation, SK).
- 45.
Forst (1996), p. 53.
- 46.
Lippold (1988), p. 465: “Validity is defined as: Attribution of a certain norm to a certain order of norms” (my translation, SK).
- 47.
In the perspective of his social concept of validity of law, Jellinek correctly writes, “das Unrecht bricht dasjenige, was unverbrüchlich gelten soll; es zeigt, daß das, was sein soll, nicht sein muß; es beweist, daß die Autorität nicht mächtig genug ist, ihren Geboten unter allen Umständen Geltung zu verschaffen,” Jellinek (1908), p. 62.
- 48.
For this discussion cf. Grabowski (2013), pp. 71 ff. Against him (2013, p. 79), I would take the concept of law as the criterion between law and non-law and would consider illegal laws (“Unrecht”) still law, although somewhat deficient law even up to the “unbearable thesis” in Gustav Radbruch’s Formula. Norms that meet the criteria set by the concept of law are law. If they are immoral they lack moral validity and, if the respective constitution permits moral norms, may even lack legal validity, cf. Kirste (2011), pp. 78 ff. and below here.
- 49.
Hegel, Grundlinien, § 81, p. 272 u. § 82 Z, p. 279.
- 50.
Until this authoritative decision about competing validity claims, validity may only be supposed (“vermutet”), but not be proved, Paulson (1979), pp. 12 ff.
- 51.
Rudolf von Jhering hits the point, writing that it would not be the plaintiff’s goal to merely recover his object, but to make valid his right, von Jhering (1872), p. 19.
- 52.
Cf. Heckmann (1997).
- 53.
Dworkin (1967/68), p. 42.
- 54.
Dworkin (1967/68), p. 45 holds a different position: “If … we tried actually to list all the principles in force we would fail. They are controversial, their weight is all important, they are numberless, and they shift and change so fast that the start of our list would be obsolete before we reached the middle. Even if we succeeded, we would not have a key to law because there would be nothing left for our key to unlock. I conclude that if we treat principles as law we must reject the positivists’ first tenet, that the law of a community is distinguished from other social standards by some test in the form of a master rule… We might want to say that a legal obligation exists whenever the case supporting such an obligation, in terms of binding legal principles of different sorts, is stronger than the case against it.”
- 55.
Larenz (1967, p. 19).
- 56.
Alexy (2009), p. 156 [my translation, SK].
- 57.
Hoerster (2006), p. 63.
- 58.
Kelsen (1960), pp. 219 f.
- 59.
Alexy (1992), p. 148 f.
- 60.
Larenz (1967), p. 22.
- 61.
Kelsen (1960), p. 219.
- 62.
Kelsen (1960), p. 215 f.
- 63.
For an early positivistic view cf. Lasson (1882), p. 423.
- 64.
Kelsen (1960), p. 203: “Because the basis for the validity of a norm can only be another norm, this precondition can again only be a norm: not one, enacted by a legal authority, but a presupposed norm…”.
- 65.
Kelsen (1960), p. 197.
- 66.
- 67.
Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, p. 44.
- 68.
This is often misunderstood, cf. e.g. Green, Leslie, “Legal Positivism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/legal-positivism/, under 3.
- 69.
Geiger (1963), p. 205.
- 70.
Weinberger (1988), p. 119.
- 71.
In his well-known “normative force of the factual”, Jellinek (1959), p. 339 f.: “Because the factual everywhere has the tendency to transform itself into the valid, in the whole range of the legal system it generates the precondition that a given social state rightfully exists, thus everybody, who wants to precipitate a change of this state, has to prove his better right” (my translation, SK). Validity is based on our feeling of being bound by a norm, 1959, p. 223.
- 72.
O.W. Holmes, A. Ross would be among them, cf. Grabowski (2013), pp. 312 ff., 321 ff.
- 73.
Ross (1958), p. 45: “a rule can be valid to a greater or lesser degree varying with the degree of probability with which it can be predicted that the rule will be applied. This degree of probability depends on the material of experience on which the prediction is built,” cf. the article by Eliasz/Zaluski in this volume.
- 74.
Bierling (1877), p. 8.
- 75.
Bierling (1877), p. 7: “Law exists only as long as it is valid, i.e. as long as it is being recognized (respected, felt or looked at as binding or decisive” (my translation, SK).
- 76.
Bierling (1894), p. 47.
- 77.
Ross (1958), p. 35: “Only the legal phenomena in the narrower sense, however the application of the law by the courts are decisive in determining the validity of the legal norms. In contrast to generally accepted ideas it must be emphasized that the law provides the norms for the behavior of the courts, and not of private individuals. The effectiveness which conditions the validity of the norms can therefore be sought solely in the judicial application of the law, and not in the law in action among private individuals.”
- 78.
Stammler (1896), p. 129.
- 79.
Husserl (1925), p. 6.—Gerhart Husserl (1893–1973) was son of Phenomenologist philosopher Edmund Husserl and a legal philosopher and civil law professor at different German universities and, during World War II, in Washington.
- 80.
Nelson (1917), p. 9.
- 81.
Radbruch (1993), p. 314.
- 82.
Luhmann (1993), p. 107: “Following Talcott Parsons we can label validity as a circulating symbol that is being passed on with every use – just as solvency in the economy or the collective binding in politics” and on p. 98, “We chose the concept of ‘symbol’, because the point is to respect and reproduce the unity of the system in the variety of its operations. In the legal system this is achieved by the symbol of the validity of law” (my translation, SK).
- 83.
Kelsen (1965), p. 467: “Daß das Recht ‘gilt’, bedeutet, daß es befolgt bzw. angewendet werden soll; daß es wirksam ist, bedeutet, daß es befolgt bzw. angewendet wird”. “That the law is ‘valid’ means that it ought to be observed or applied; that it is efficacious means that it is observed or applied” (my translation, SK).
- 84.
Lask (1905), p. 5.
- 85.
For an analytical—critical—discussion of these concepts, cf. Grabowski (2013), pp. 344 ff.
- 86.
An early example of a positivistic theory of validity can be found in Thomas Hobbes. He assumes that there would be no valid contracts without a positive constitution, “And therefore where there is no Own, that is, no Propriety, there is no Injustice; and where there is no coercive Power erected, that is, where there is no Common-wealth, there is no Propriety, all men having Right to all things: therefore where there is no Common-wealth, there nothing is Unjust. So that the nature of Justice consisteth in keeping of valid Covenants, but the Validity of Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a Civil Power sufficient to compel men to keep them: and then it is also that Propriety begins,” Hobbes, Leviathan XV, S. 202 f.
- 87.
Ralf Dreier (1994, p. 123 f.): “Law consists of those norms which belong to the constitution of a system of norms organized in a state or on the international level, if this system is on the whole socially effective and, in a minimal sense, ethically justifiable, and of those norms which are laid down according to this constitution, if these, taken by themselves, are socially effective or have at least the chance to become socially effective and which are, in a minimal sense, ethically justifiable.” Speaking of the concept of law here, his definition is relevant for validity as well, because he advocates unity of concept and validity of law.
- 88.
“Validity is a function in part of the internal point of view: a law is valid if it passes all the tests provided by the rule of recognition. The criteria for efficacy are different, however: a law is efficacious if it is obeyed more often than not. That a law is valid is no guarantee that it is efficacious, and that it is not efficacious is no proof that it is invalid”… “It would however be wrong to say that statements of validity ‘mean’ that the system is generally efficacious. For though it is normally pointless or idle to talk of the validity of a rule of a system which has never established itself or has been discarded, none the less it is not meaningless nor is it always pointless…,” Hart (1991), p. 103 f.
- 89.
“No such question can arise as to the validity of the very rule of recognition which provides the criteria; it can neither be valid nor invalid but is simply accepted as appropriate for use in this way,” Hart (1991), S. 109.
- 90.
Raz (1977), p. 341: “These remarks may lead one to conclude that explaining what is legal validity is no more nor less than explaining what is law. This, however, is a mistake. The nature of law is explained primarily by explaining what are legal systems. Validity, on the other hand, pertains to the rules of the system.”
- 91.
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Kirste, S. (2018). Concept and Validity of Law. In: Westerman, P., Hage, J., Kirste, S., Mackor, A. (eds) Legal Validity and Soft Law. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 122. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77522-7_3
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